Defence Reform Bill

Jeffrey M Donaldson Excerpts

Wednesday 20th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I have heard these arguments from my hon. Friend before. I have always been clear that we have no choice but to reduce the size of the Regular Army to operate within our budgets. The difference between an Army of 102,000 and an Army of 82,000 is £1 billion a year. He does not have that funding available, and neither do the Opposition. If we are to operate within our budgets, we have no choice but to draw down the Regular Army as we withdraw from Afghanistan and to build up the reserve strength that will primarily be needed if we again become embroiled in an enduring operation with six-month troop rotations.

[Mr Jeffrey M. Donaldson (Lagan Valley) (DUP)]

Recruitment is critical to the success of this project. In Northern Ireland, almost all our reserve units are at 100% recruitment capacity. Why not extend and raise the ceiling for recruitment in successful areas?

[Mr Hammond]

I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that, although we have not publicised it, we have increased the recruiting cap on units in Northern Ireland to 115% of liability, and the Army will continue to consider increases in liability caps in other parts of the country where recruiting performance is strong. I can go further and tell him that a review is currently under way to look at trade skills available in Northern Ireland. Most of the reserves recruiting is trade skills-specific. If we find that pools of additional trade skills are recruitable, we will consider locating additional units in Northern Ireland to tap into them. We have to be agile and go where the potential recruits are and where the skills we need are.

I want to go briefly through some of the other points that have been raised. I want to nail the point my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay has made several times in debate and in the media. He says that a 40% or an 80% mobilisation rate is not achievable. We are looking at a maximum mobilisation of between 3,000 and 4,000 reservists at any given time, out of an Army Reserve of 30,000. By my maths, that is significantly below 40% or 80%. During Operation Telic in Iraq, 85% of reservists responded to call out—an 85% mobilisation rate—and Operation Herrick had a 79% mobilisation rate, so I do not quite understand his point.