Afghanistan

Jeffrey M Donaldson Excerpts

Wednesday 7th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

The Government believe, in alliance with the United States and the other members of the international coalition, that we have the correct strategy. We believe that the counter-insurgency aim of protecting the population, and of providing them with security so that there is a space for better governance, is the correct strategy.

There is a difference between our national security mission to ensure that Afghanistan can develop in a way that enables the Afghan forces to look after their own security, and the wider mission of reconstruction and development—that is complementary to, but not the same as, the national security mission—which will have to be undertaken for a very long time, given the social state of Afghanistan.

[Mr Jeffrey M. Donaldson (Lagan Valley) (DUP)]

I support the Secretary of State’s response to the hon. Member for Walsall North (Mr Winnick). On the question of dialogue with the Taliban, we need to be clear that it would be entirely unacceptable for us to discuss the future of Afghanistan with them at the same time as they are killing our soldiers in that country. Should not we draw on the lessons from Northern Ireland and other theatres of conflict? We should require a clear and unequivocal ceasefire by the Taliban and some degree of commitment to non-violent principles before there can be any question of dialogue with them.

[Dr Fox]

Although in principle I do not disagree with the right hon. Gentleman, we must be clear what we are dealing with. The Taliban covers a broad range of different groupings—there is no single Taliban commander or a Taliban army with a Taliban uniform—and it is advantageous to find the groups among them who are reconcilable to the process, and to bring them on board to create a critical mass of support. That can only help us in our wider counter-insurgency aims. We should also reflect on the terms we use—not just “the Taliban”, but “the insurgency”—and ask whether there are a number of discrete insurgencies rather than just one, just as there are a number of discrete groups that we tend to call “the Taliban.” If the House accepts that we are dealing with greater complexity than is sometimes described, we might find it easier to understand the complexity of some of the solutions that we and the Afghan Government must find.