Defence

James Gray Excerpts

Thursday 11th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Vernon Coaker]

I agree. I will come on to the point that my hon. Friend has made very well when I talk about affordability.

[James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on this debate and on his speech, with every single word of which the whole House would agree. We also could not possibly disagree with the motion, with one exception. It is exceptionally disappointing that he calls for defence expenditure to be maintained “at current levels”. Actually, defence expenditure should be increased quite substantially, and that is the thrust of his speech, so he has got the wording of the motion slightly wrong.

[Vernon Coaker]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his advice. I am sure that he has read the whole motion, which says that expenditure should be maintained

“at least at current levels”.

This is the problem that I have in trying to be conciliatory. I tried to put together something that everybody would agree with, but perhaps I should have been a bit stronger. I take the admonishment, but I did say “at least”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Lewis]

My right hon. Friend speaks with great experience as a former Armed Forces Minister, and he made a considerable input to our recent report, “Gambling on ‘Efficiency’: Defence Acquisition and Procurement”, by making that very point.

Quite rightly, the hon. Member for Gedling emphasised the current process involving the national security capability review, and he focused on the question of fiscal neutrality, which the National Security Adviser says he has been told to observe. When I challenged the National Security Adviser with that on 18 December, when he appeared before the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, he said, “Well, it’s not as if the defence budget isn’t growing; it is fiscal neutrality within a growing budget.” He then did something else, which is indicative of a worrying trend: he lumped together the £36 billion that we are spending avowedly on defence with all the other money that we spend on everything else related to security, and he started talking about a £56 billion budget. That lumping together of money for security and intelligence services, counter-terrorism and even the relevant aspects of policing with the defence budget, is a form of sleight of hand that causes me concern. That is what I wish to address in the second half of my remarks.

We have a real problem in this country because the tried and tested system for strategic decision making has broken down. In my years as a research student, my area of study was the way that Britain planned towards the end of the second world war, and the early period after it, for what form of strategy we would need to deal with future threats. I was struck by the fact that there was a huge argument between 1944 and 1946 between clever officials in the Foreign Office who wanted to make the Anglo-Soviet alliance of 1942 the cornerstone of our post-war foreign policy, and the Chiefs of Staff who wanted to prepare their assessments of what Britain might have to face militarily on alternative assumptions that that alliance might well continue—in which case all would be well—but that it might break down. There was a tremendous stand-off until 1946, when finally the iron curtain had descended and it became clear that the Chiefs of Staff, who had looked at the Anglo-Soviet alliance in theoretical terms and said, “Well it could work, but it might not”, had been right to be cautious, and the Foreign Office staff, who wanted to put all their eggs in the basket of being able to continue the wartime alliance into peacetime, had been wrong. I was very struck by the systematic way in which the strategic arguments were hammered out, and at the centre of it all was the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee, as we all know, is made up of the heads of each of the three services. The shocking thing that I have to say to the House today is that one can now become chief of staff of any of the three armed services—one can become head of the Royal Navy, or head of the Army, or head of the Royal Air Force—and yet have no direct input into the strategic planning process. This is all part of the lumping together of military strategic planning with national security strategies that are vague and amorphous and, above all, primarily in the hands of civil servants.

If the civil servants themselves were steeped, as they used to be, in the subject matter of their Departments, that would be less of a problem than it is today. But some years ago, it was decided that those in the senior levels of the civil service—which are, of course, peopled by very clever and able individuals; that is not in dispute—should be able to hop from one Department to another. One might be at a senior level in one Department and then go for the top job in another, including, for example, the Ministry of Defence. What we have is a combination where formerly specialist civil servants have become generalists and the professional military advisers—the Chiefs of Staff—have become more like business managers serving as chief executives with an allocated budget to administer to their services. All their thoughts about strategy get fed through just one single individual—the Chief of the Defence Staff—who then has to represent all their views on the National Security Council. It is this melding together, this mishmash, of the military, the security and the civilian roles that is undermining what we need, which is a clear-headed and systematic approach to the strategic challenges facing this country.

[James Gray]

My right hon. Friend is making an extremely important point about the whole structure of decision making within the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Defence. Does he agree that he has not yet mentioned a very important element in that, namely Ministers? He has not yet discussed Ministers’ role in considering the strategy of the nation. Is it not particularly interesting that when Sir Mark Sedwill appeared before the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy the other day, he let us know that the review that is currently being undertaken by his Department was commissioned during the general election campaign, when presumably Ministers had their minds on something else? I would be interested to know exactly who it was who commissioned the strategy at that particular time.

[Dr Lewis]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and he made a very useful contribution to the questioning of Mark Sedwill on 18 December. The reason I have not really mentioned Ministers is that, frankly, Ministers do not seem to be having much of a role in this, either. What I did not say, because I did not want to dwell too long on it, is that the stand-off between the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office in 1944 was finally resolved when it went all the way up to Churchill, who finally gave the Chiefs of Staff permission to continue doing the contingency planning for a possibly hostile Soviet Union that they wanted to do, and that the Foreign Office did not want them to do. The reality here is that there has been a loss of focus. There is no proper machinery, other than this rather woolly concept of a National Security Council, served by a secretariat, run effectively by the Cabinet Office.

In conclusion, what I really want to say is this. Constitutionally, we know what is right. That was confirmed when we spoke to the former Secretary of State for Defence in the Defence Committee and he was attended by a senior MOD official. We asked him, “Is it still the case that the Chiefs of Staff—the heads of the armed forces—retain the right to go directly to No. 10 if they think the danger to the country is such that they have to make direct representations?” The answer was yes, it is. But what is the point of their having that right if they are not actually allowed to do the job of planning the strategies and doing what they used to do as a Committee —serving as the military advisers to the Government? As my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (James Gray) says, ultimately, the Government always have the right to accept or reject such military advice as they get from the service chiefs, but the service chiefs ought to be in a position to give that advice.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

Rarely in debates in this Chamber can the fourth speaker have been faced with such a major challenge as mine in following three such well informed, all-encompassing, brilliant speeches as those of the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker), my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) and now the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), who knows what he is talking about. It is quite a challenge to think of something new to say after those three outstanding speeches. I agree with all of them, and I agree very strongly with the motion. However, you and I have known each other for 25 years, Madam Deputy Speaker, so you will be aware that it would none the less be entirely uncharacteristic of me simply to say “I agree,” and then sit down; that would not be in keeping at all.

I welcome the fact that the hon. Member for Gedling has secured the debate, but I regret the fact that it had to be called under the rules of the Backbench Business Committee. When I—and many of us in this Chamber—first arrived here, we had five such debates a year: one each for the RAF, the Army and the Royal Navy and then two further debates on spending matters. That was changed after the 1998 SDSR into five set-piece, major, full-scale debates in Government time on a variety of subjects: defence policy, defence of the UK, defence of the world, and one on personnel and one on procurement. They were serious debates opened by the Secretary of State, with a packed House and vast numbers of people watching; they were an important part of the body politic’s discussions on defence.

That system has now been replaced, however, and in fact for two or three years there were no debates on defence at all under the Backbench Business Committee. There are now one or two debates a year if we are lucky, secured by a Back Bencher choosing to do so. That is wrong; the Government should return to the way we were when the Backbench Business Committee was invented and say to it that we expect to have at least five substantive defence debates during the course of the year. It must find time in its programme for that. Allocating such debates to compete with such important matters as live animals in circuses is wrong and downplays the importance of the defence of the nation.

That situation might none the less be symptomatic of something that concerns me, and to which one or two Members have alluded: we as a nation are downplaying defence and the threat to us. There is a degree of war-weariness after Iraq and Afghanistan and so forth, and people would like our troops to come home and there to be no more wars anywhere in the world. But that will not happen, of course, because the world is an extraordinarily dangerous place.

We in this House are guilty of a degree of complacency over the threats to the nation, and that is then spread around the nation, and our voters do not realise what a dangerous place we live in. If we conducted a survey and asked voters on their doorsteps whether we should spend money on defence or health or education, defence would, sadly, come fairly low down their list of priorities. We in this place need to change that by having serious debates on the subject and highlighting the huge threats facing us today.

I will not repeat what others have said about the threats from an expansionist Russia, North Korea, events in the South China sea, and terrorism throughout the middle east, but those threats have not gone away and are worse now than they were before. I personally am extremely concerned about Russian ambitions in the high north and the Arctic and north Atlantic, and I am grateful that the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) has taken up the cudgels of the Defence Sub-Committee, looking into what the Russians are planning to do in the high north. At the moment, however, NATO is, to some degree at least, ignoring that, and it is right that we should remind people that the Russians have just spent billions of pounds on building eight new military stations along the Arctic coast, that they have very substantially increased submarine activity in the north Atlantic, and that they are threatening our lines of supply to the United States of America—and all of this is happening under our noses and we are not doing anything about it. It is right that we in this place should remind our colleagues and the nation that these very real threats are happening on our doorstep.

Part of the reason for that failure to address these real threats comes from what might sound like a rather technical, machinery of government matter, and which my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East touched on. The last truly proper defence review was in 1998, and I pay tribute to the then Defence Ministers, one of whom, the right hon. Member for Warley (John Spellar), is sitting on the Opposition back row. It was a first-class defence review: it was foreign policy led; it was the MOD sitting down and saying, “Given that these are the foreign policy threats to our nation, here’s what we in the MOD must now do to protect the country from them.” Since then, as my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East said, the whole process has become ever more muddled, obscured and complicated. Nobody now quite understands who decides what the threats to this nation are, nobody quite knows who decides what we must do about them, and nobody quite knows where we are going to get the money to do that.

For example, the SDSR used to happen at the same time as the national spending review, and that was extremely important. As the hon. Member for Barnsley Central said, what is the point of having a defence review if we know that, no matter what it concludes, there will be no money to change things? Let us imagine that such a review concluded that there was a vast cyber-threat or Russian threat against us and decided that we must significantly increase our Army, Navy or Air Force. The Treasury would turn round and say, “Well, we’re very glad you have had that review and we’re very interested to read it. You have made some important points and we will be reviewing the Ministry of Defence budget two years from now. So, no matter what you have said in your review, we can do nothing about it.” It seems extremely odd to be mixing the strategic defence review with the security review.

Sir Mark Sedwill, a very distinguished fellow who does an awful lot of good stuff, has said that we need to spend more money on cyber, and he is right, but every single penny that we spend on cyber comes out of other budgets. If we were to double our cyber budget, which might well be a very good thing to do, it might have to be paid for by cuts in the amphibious capability that the hon. Member for Barnsley Central mentioned. If it is any comfort to the hon. Gentleman, I can tell him that if any such cuts were to take place—if HMS Bulwark were to go, for example, or if 1,000 people were to be cut from the Royal Marines—he can be certain that I and many others on the side of the House would not support any Government who proposed to do that. I want to make it plain that we would not go along with any such proposals from the Government. I think that many of my friends in the Ministry of Defence would agree with that and are fighting that battle very firmly at the moment.

It would seem perfectly logical and sensible, when carrying out a review, to start with the Foreign Office assessing the risk. The Cabinet Office should follow that by determining how much of that risk is to do with us—with policing or with cyber, for example. Those conclusions should then go to the Ministry of Defence, which would identify the threats to the nation and decide what to do about them. Subsequently, the Treasury should say, “Fine, that is what you want to do about the threat. Here is how we are going to find the money for it.” But to have a national security review mixed in with a strategic defence review, and happening at a time that is not contingent with the national spending review, seems to be absolutely pointless and, indeed, substantially misleading. We are misleading ourselves that somehow we are looking into these things properly. I would like to see the defence part of the review separated out. It ought to be happening in the autumn of this year, at the same time as the Budget, in case we need more money to do what the Foreign Office says we ought to be doing.

That is all I want to add to what others have said. We are facing incredibly dangerous and worrying times, and this nation is under threat. There are very real threats to our people’s security and safety. If we in this place do not address that fact strategically, and if we do not find a way of increasing our defence spending towards the 3% that many of us in the Chamber want, I fear that we will not be doing our duty. We will not be doing what our people send us here to do, and we will not be putting in place the correct way to defend our nation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ruth Smeeth]

I could not agree more with my hon. Friend. At this point, the national security and capability review seems to equate to little more than a campaign of cuts and reductions so severe that it is causing concern not just within our armed forces but even among our closest allies, which regularly raise discussion about it. Perhaps the most egregious example is the Government’s reported plan, already mentioned, to decimate our amphibious capability and cut up to 1,000 Royal Marines.

I have seen at first hand the Royal Marines’ extraordinary courage, ability, focus and fortitude, and I am a fan. Following his photo op this week, I hope that the Secretary of State for Defence has also come away from his time at Lympstone with a fresh appreciation of what our Royal Marines bring to the table; perhaps he will use them more effectively, going forward.

[James Gray]

As chair of the all-party parliamentary group on the armed forces, I want to put on the record how much I appreciate the hon. Lady’s chairmanship of its Royal Navy and Royal Marines section, as well as the chairmanship of the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) of its RAF section. I want to thank them for it.

[Ruth Smeeth]

You’ll make me blush.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

I am very grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention because he is absolutely right. My preferred option would be to bring this back in house. I do not know whether he would go that far, but his central point is right that the MOD needs a plan B. I have been watching with interest the news on Carillion, which made the papers just this morning, and this is a really critical time for it.

I want to talk about capability, and I will do so briefly. We are running slightly ahead of time, but I wish to hear what the Minister has to say. Following the 2015 SDSR, there is a new mini-review, led by Sir Mark Sedwill, as several right hon. and hon. Members have mentioned. The review is looking at both security and defence aspects. My fear, which other Members have adumbrated, is that it is about what the Government can get away with spending, as opposed to what they need to spend given the threats they face.

As the hon. Member for Gedling said in his speech, we learned from a report in the Financial Times at the weekend that the review will now be split. Many of the Members who regularly attend defence debates will recall that the report was supposed to be published, and presumably a ministerial statement would have been made, early in the new year. I would have been charitable and extended that right up to the end of March. We now learn, however, that the defence aspects will be kicked later into the year. I would be grateful to the Minister if he told us in his summing up whether that is the case. The cynic in me does wonder—I am not normally one for being cynical—if this is about getting beyond the local elections in May. I sincerely hope not, because that kind of politics is not on.

[James Gray]

The hon. Gentleman seems to imply that there is some plot or conspiracy involved in splitting up the security and defence parts of the review. If that is the case, I strongly welcome it, because that means there is a much greater chance that the defence budget will not be cut. If the two parts are announced together next week, the extra spend—on cyber, for example—will come straight out of the defence budget. If he wants them to be announced next week, he is actually speaking in favour of defence cuts.

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

The hon. Gentleman is much more optimistic than me. I have seen just this week, on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, how the Government do this kind of thing. They take every opportunity to pull the wool over people’s eyes. He need only ask his colleagues the hon. Members for Moray and for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine, as well as the rest of the Scottish Conservative intake. We need a proper SDSR that takes account of the fact that we will no longer be members of the European Union, and of the fact that we have had currency fluctuations and the devaluation of the pound. I am in favour of taking more time if we get a more considered outcome, but the cynic in me suggests that that is not what is at play.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Ellwood]

I would be happy to do that. We perhaps take for granted how open our economy is, and how we require the freedom of the seas to ensure that we can trade and attract business here. There is now an entwined link between security and our economy, and we forget that at our peril. My right hon. Friend reminds us of this powerful point.

My hon. Friend the Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine (Andrew Bowie) went through a comprehensive list of our equipment. I feel that he must have copied my list! I will simply underline the fact that we have some amazing bits of equipment coming through as a result of our pledge to spend £178 billion. The aircraft carriers have been mentioned, as has the F-35B, of which 14 have now been delivered. We have heard about the Type 26, and we have had a good debate about the Type 31. We have also heard about the River class, and the Dreadnought programme is coming on line as well. In the Army, we have the Ajax armoured fighting vehicles; these were Scimitars and Samsons in old language, if my hon. Friend remembers them. In the RAF, we have the upgrade of the Typhoon, and the F-35 fifth-generation fighter is joining our armed forces as well.

Much of this debate has focused on expenditure. As has been mentioned a number of times, the Defence budget is £36 billion this year. We hold the fifth largest Defence budget in the world. The Government have made a commitment to increase this by 0.5% above inflation every year of this Parliament, so it will be almost £40 billion by 2021. The Secretary of State has expressed the view strongly in public that the capability review is a priority for the Ministry of Defence, and he will shortly outline in more detail the process of how we will move forward. The capability review was brought about because things had changed since the SDSR in 2015. We have had terrorist attacks on the mainland, and cyber-attacks, including on this very building. We have also seen resurgent nations not following international norms. It was rightly decided that this necessitated a review, to renew and reinforce our commitment to the UK’s position as a force for peace, stability and prosperity across the world.

[James Gray]

I am glad to hear that the Minister is taking the capability review so seriously. I want to ask one simple question. If the review comes to the conclusion that more defence spending is required, where will that extra money come from?

[Mr Ellwood]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. As I have said, it is for the Secretary of State to spell that out in more detail, and that will happen shortly, but that is the big question that we must ask ourselves as fiscal, and responsible, Conservatives. The money must come from somewhere, which is why we cannot simply rush in and say that it will be provided. The details need to come through, and I hope that we will hear more details from the Secretary of State in due course.

It is clear from the contributions that we have heard today, and also from the world around us, that the world does not stand still, and nor should we. We must be sure that we possess the right combination of conventional and innovative capabilities to meet the varied and diffuse threats that I have outlined. We must also retain our long-standing position as one of the world’s most innovative nations, and do more to harness the benefits of technological progress and reinforce our military edge. I can assure the House that the Ministry of Defence has no intention of leaving the UK less safe, or the brave men and women of our armed forces more vulnerable, as a result of this review.