Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and Robert Buckland

Wednesday 24th May 2023 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Buckland]

My hon. Friend says he is a protectionist, and I think that might need a bit of amplification. I do not think he means it in the traditional sense of the word, but I am genuinely intrigued.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

Yes, he does!

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and Robert Buckland

Ping Pong: House of Commons
Tuesday 15th November 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

Would my hon. and learned Friend not go further and say that a Bill on national security is precisely the wrong place for restrictions on the press, as it would make it look as if we were really trying to hit them hard?

[The Solicitor General]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. The Bill is all about balance and the importance the Executive attach to the way they seek to interfere or intrude into the private lives of individuals and to setting out clearly the criteria that must be met before they can act. It would be wrong to take any measure that sends a message that the Government wish to ride roughshod over the interests of individuals and freedom of speech. He knows that the consultation launched two weeks ago will deal with the very issues that have caused him concern over a number of years, although it would be wrong for me to pre-empt the outcome of that open process.

Leveson Inquiry

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and Robert Buckland

Monday 3rd December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter), whose remarks about the carrot and the stick in relation to costs were well made. There is no doubt in my mind that in order to incentivise the major titles and the print media to join a new regulator, there have to be proper incentives—with members enjoying an advantage over non-members in terms of civil actions and not having to pay aggravated damages.

Along with some other Members, I sat on the Joint Committee on privacy and super-injunctions, which issued its report some months ago. In common with my hon. Friend the Member for Camborne and Redruth (George Eustice) and the right hon. Member for Exeter (Mr Bradshaw), I often found myself in a minority on that Committee. There were many divisions and, as we have heard, the final recommendations were the subject of much debate. I found myself in a minority, for example, because of my strong advocacy of a statute of privacy, which I still believe this country needs and which it is incumbent on this Parliament to introduce.

At that stage, I was still thinking carefully about the merits of some form of statutory intervention or underpinning for the print media. I am persuaded now, however, that some form of underpinning is necessary. I do not come to this issue as someone who is an instinctive regulator. I do not support knee-jerk reactions when it comes to the passage of legislation in this House, but I do view the situation now as so serious that only some form of underpinning will do.

I am often accused of being optimistic in my politics to the point of being quixotic, but when it comes to the ability of the major titles of the print media to agree, first, to the principles of Leveson and, secondly, to a mechanism that will deliver them, I am afraid that my optimism leaves me.

Much has been said about the context in which the Leveson inquiry commenced. Some would say that it was based on a very narrow set of circumstances, but that is belied by the wide terms of reference set out at the beginning of the inquiry. We can see from the title that it is “An inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the press”, but it is important to remind ourselves in this debate of what the aim of the inquiry was. Part 1 of the terms of reference state that it was to make recommendations

“for a new and more effective policy and regulation regime which supports the integrity and freedom of the press, the plurality of the media and its independence, including from Government, while encouraging the highest ethical and professional standards”.

That part of the terms of reference is extremely important, because the scene was set for a wide-ranging examination of not just telephone hacking or bribery but the entire regulatory regime that has applied so far.

It is agreed in all parts of the House that so-called self-regulation has failed. Indeed, I would go further and say that I agree with Lord Justice Leveson that the Press Complaints Commission was not a regulator as we know it. It was not independent; it did not have powers to summon parties to produce documents or provide sworn evidence; it could not deal with complaints from third parties, or indeed with issues that were not subjects of complaints. Its remit was narrow, and its status was compromised. If we are to embark on a new course, it will be regulation in the proper sense of the word for the very first time.

Those who argue against any form of statutory intervention say that they do not want the work of our free press to be inhibited by statute. Of course I agree with that, but on closer examination, it would be wholly wrong to say that the work of our journalists is in some way uninhibited now. It is already hedged by statute, whether it be rules about reporting when it comes to contempt of court or, for example, provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 relating to journalistic material that restricts police powers of search. We have existing defamation statutes that allow the defence of responsible journalism that is in the public interest. The Human Rights Act 1998 itself enjoins the courts to have specific regard to the relevant code of conduct when dealing with privacy cases.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Is not the difference that the press has specific protections in law rather than laws that apply, with a specific penal effect, to the press alone? That is a very important difference.

[Mr Buckland]

I take my hon. Friend’s point about the boundaries that are being set. My point, however, is that there is a parallel between existing statute and what I believe is being proposed. I do not view statutory underpinning as somehow creating an entirely new set of constraints within which journalists will have to work. This is not, in my opinion, analogous to the difference between prescribed rights and general liberties that may be defined by their boundaries. My hon. Friend and I often agree about the distinction between different types of law and the tension that exists between them, but I do not believe that we will end up in that situation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

There has been a lot of praise of Lord Justice Leveson today, and I am afraid that I am going slightly to divert from that, because to some extent prolixity has been mistaken for virtue. Verbosity is possibly part of the problem of his report, which not only goes on for much too long, but fundamentally has missed the bus. I say that because it was not set up to deal with the internet. Indeed, Lord Leveson says on page 169 that

“most blogs are read by very few people. Indeed, most blogs are rarely read as news or factual, but as opinion and must be considered as such.”

However, we discover from Saturday’s Financial Times, a very good source of information and not one that has been involved with any of these problems, that 82% of the UK population receive news online, compared with 54% who receive it from newspapers. So the report is about regulating yesterday rather than dealing with tomorrow; it should make King Canute feel proud, because at least he was going to deal with the tide that was coming in, rather than a tide that had receded some years before.

I am delighted to say that Lord Justice Leveson has used online content himself; it was reported in The Sunday Times that he was caught by a spoof on Wikipedia and said that The Independent was founded by one Brett Straub, who apparently is a Californian student and had no association with the founding of The Independent. So, on the one hand, not much notice is taken of the internet, but, on the other, it has actually been used in putting together this report of almost 2,000 pages.

I listened with great interest to my right hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Mr Lilley), who said that we should always be very cautious when people say that the status quo is not an option as self-evidently the status quo is always an option. As a Conservative, I would often like the status quo ante, but I shall not dwell on that point. A good deal of the report accepts the status quo. On page 1496, Lord Justice Leveson states that

“I do not recommend that any change is necessary to the substantive criminal law.”

On page 1508, on the civil law, he says that he does not want to go over the ground of the Defamation Bill, because that has already been dealt with, and on privacy he says:

“It does not appear that legislative intervention will do other than generate…litigation”.

On defining the public interest in law, he states that:

“I do not recommend a statutory definition.”

In the criminal law and the civil law, we will maintain that terrible thing, that awful spectre, the status quo. That is rather encouraging because it means that the law of the land is working and has been doing its job.

[Mr Buckland]

rose—

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Of course I will give way to my hon. and learned Friend.

[Mr Buckland]

I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for the elevation he has given me. Does not his point have to be succeeded by a second point? Lord Justice Leveson says that regulation is necessary to cover areas of complaint that do not neatly fit into heads of damage or criminality, such as accuracy, at which the press are not always terribly good.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am very concerned by my hon. Friend’s suggestion. If we are to legislate for accuracy, I hate to think what that might do to this House or to politicians and the speeches they make in election campaigns.

More important than the fact that the report suggests no changes to the criminal and civil law is the underlying risk to freedom of expression it contains. Let me start with page 1512 and the subject of the possibility of aggravated, exemplary and restitutionary damages. They have been used in some other countries in the world as a means of crushing opposition. When people say things that the Government of the day do not like, the Government bring complaints or actions for damages, sometimes against individual politicians, and bankrupt them. They are then no longer able to criticise the Government. Although it sounds very fair when we are talking about the hard, sad or disgraceful cases we have heard about in this debate, none the less we should allow newspapers to refuse to fit neatly into some regulatory system thought up by a Government-appointed bureaucrat or risk those fundamental freedoms we have been fortunate enough to have for many centuries.

That brings me to the appointment of the first appointment panel. Who is to appoint the panel? We hear that it will be made up of distinguished public servants with experience of senior appointments. We are actually going back to a 1950s view of the establishment. Perhaps I should welcome that, because I might have fitted very nicely into a 1950s vision of the establishment, but I am surprised that this House by and large wishes to see that return. The report suggests that appointment should take place in

“an independent, fair and open way”—

like the appointment of the new Governor of the Bank of England, I am tempted to say, although I thought it was an excellent appointment. It was advertised for the first time, lots of good and qualified people applied and then the Chancellor appointed who he wanted to in the first place. It was a very good appointment, but this reference to a “fair and open way” should make us deeply suspicious.

The key matter—the nub of all this, which brings it all back under state control—is the role of the recognition body. Under Lord Justice Leveson’s proposals, the recognition body is, unfortunately, under the control of a Government appointee. It is a Government quango where the chairman is appointed by a Secretary of State. That is difficult because that recognition body will have the right of first recognition in saying whether a particular set of regulators will be suitable—there could be more than one—and on the second anniversary and every subsequent third anniversary, it will be able to say whether the statutory tests have been met.

Now what if one of those regulatory bodies did not meet the requirements for equality and diversity that Lord Justice Leveson is so keen on? What if it dared to appoint someone from UKIP who might live in Rotherham, for example, to one of its panels to be an investigator? Do we then find that the checking body, Ofcom, would disapprove that body and, by effect if not by immediate law, would be able to choose the detail of the way in which the press was regulated?

There is another concern—that people will seek advice. By their very nature they will go to the recognition body and say, “This is what we propose. Is it all right if we do this? Will you allow us to continue when we come to our next review?” So there is an insidious power in that recognition body which will undermine the freedom of the press and will assert political correctness throughout the land.

[Mr Buckland]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

It is a privilege to give way.

[Mr Buckland]

It is an attractive and seductive argument that my hon. Friend sets out, but in many other walks of life—for example, my profession, the medical profession and the judiciary—there are over-arching bodies of statute that do the job of verification that he is so concerned about. They are independent. Why should not the proposed press regulatory body work?

Prisons (Property) Bill

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and Robert Buckland

Friday 14th September 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Buckland]

My hon. Friend is right to raise a potential issue about the distinction between remand prisoners and those who have been dealt with and convicted. It is important that we uphold the rights of remand prisoners. They have not been convicted of an offence, but are awaiting the resolution of the allegation against them, so their rights have to be respected. Nevertheless, withholding the right to bail has its consequences. When people are held on remand in custody, they must surrender their personal effects. The authorities will collect those items in the custody area of the court, bag them up, and record and retain them in the normal way.

The Bill deals with the position of unauthorised articles where there is no reasonable explanation or excuse for them to be held.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am interested in what my hon. Friend is saying about remand prisoners. Would he be concerned if the law allowed for the destruction of something found in the possession of a remand prisoner that was legal but unauthorised, in the event that he was then found not guilty?

[Mr Buckland]

That is the point, and a very important one too, and yes it would concern me. Therefore, the question of the destruction of an item properly taken from a remand prisoner should not be resolved until the status of that remand prisoner has been dealt with by the court.

Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and Robert Buckland

Wednesday 29th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Buckland]

I yield to no one in my respect for my hon. Friend, and he and I have had many conversations on these issues, but we cannot get away from the point that the European Union is an exercise of political will first and foremost. It is the political will of its members that drives the future course of the European Union. I accept that we all work within a legal framework, but let us be clear about where we are. The 25 have agreed to sign a treaty that is not an EU treaty. If there is to be any proposed fold-in in five years, the British veto will apply. We have the right to say no, and that is an important point that we need to underline.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

rose—

[Mr Buckland]

I shall take an intervention from my very good and honourable Friend.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. We may not have the ability to say no, because the issue may qualify for enhanced co-operation in five years’ time.

[Mr Buckland]

As a lawyer, I love a legal debate, and bearing in mind what has been said and the aspirations signed up to by the 25, I think there is a very strong case for saying that when the five-year period comes to an end in 2021 or ’22, we will still be in a good position, bearing in mind the clear political will that the Prime Minister has shown by his refusal to participate, and to allow the United Kingdom to participate. That is a very clear statement of intent, and I would be happy to argue the case on that point in five years’ time, just as I am happy, and happy for the British Government, to argue the case about some of the articles in the fiscal compact. Where there is reference to the European Court of Justice, it is incumbent on the Government to argue the point, and to make it clear that we wish the compact to be entirely outwith the institutions of the EU.

Those are matters of legal debate. I do not accept that they are now set in stone, or in some way unarguable or unimpeachable. Let us bear in mind what happened in the economic crisis of 2008, when member states cast to the four winds rules that we all thought immutable. We need to remind ourselves at all times that the institution is an exercise of political will or it is nothing. That is why clear expressions of political will, such as the one that we heard from the Prime Minister in December, are the right approach. I welcome the debate, and I thank my hon. Friends for taking part.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

May I join in the congratulations to my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) on getting this crucial debate, and say how shocked I am by my hon. Friends the Members for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) and for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) for their view that the legality does not desperately matter and it is all about politics? This is a novel and somewhat eccentric view for parliamentarians to take, when the heart of the matter is the law and the detail of the law. Without the rule of law, what we are doing here ends up being a waste of time.

[Mr Buckland]

rose—

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

My hon. Friend is bursting to intervene, so I happily give way to him.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Buckland]

As I said, as a lawyer I realise that although the law is not irrelevant—of course it is not—political will often takes precedence, as we have seen in the history of the development of the EU. Surely my hon. Friend can accept that.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am afraid to say that I disagree with my hon. and almost learned Friend. Law is the foundation of what politicians do, and politicians use their political will through the law. Indeed, they have the ability through Parliament to change the law, but they cannot just ignore it.

That is why I want to come on to Sir Jon Cunliffe’s important letter. He makes two significant points. First, he notes that

“the EU institutions must only be used outside the EU Treaties with the consent of all Member States, and must respect the EU Treaties.”

In response to a question at a meeting of the European Scrutiny Committee last week from my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison), the Minister for Europe—who, if I may say so, was extremely helpful at the evidence session—said when asked whether permission had been given by the Government for the EU treaties to be used:

“No, we have not been asked so to do.”

It ought to be of grave concern to the House and to the country that the member states of the European Union, excluding us and the Czech Republic, have decided to proceed with a treaty without establishing that they are following the correct legal forms.