Business of the House

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Tuesday 18th April 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

The Prime Minister and the party she leads will take to the people the case for the Union of the four nations of our United Kingdom, and our belief that those four nations are better off working together in that unique enduring partnership of the United Kingdom. I say to the hon. Gentleman that the Prime Minister took her decision—a decision that, as she said this morning, she took with considerable reluctance—because it is in the interests of the people of this country. It is in the interests of the entire nation that we have clarity, stability and constancy of purpose as we move forwards.

[Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

Does the Lord President agree that this is actually one of the rare occasions when it is absolutely right that the statement was first made to the British people—not to this House—because it is they who are being asked to use their sovereign power to determine the composition of a new House?

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend makes a cogent point. It will, of course, be for this House in the first place to decide whether to approve the motion that we will debate tomorrow. If the Government’s motion is carried, we will then put our case to the people.

European Affairs

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Thursday 25th February 2016 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)]

May I first congratulate all right hon. and hon. Members who have taken part in the debate this afternoon?

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. I thought the Minister might begin with an apology for the absence of the Foreign Secretary. It is custom for senior Ministers who have opened debates to return for the end of them. On such an important matter, it is a rather surprising discourtesy to the House that the normal convention has not been observed.

UK’s Relationship with the EU

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Tuesday 2nd February 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

I really do not think that the hon. Gentleman should be so dismissive of issues that the Prime Minister has put on the table and which matter a great deal to the people whom both he and I represent in this House. There are very significant advantages to our national interest in remaining part of a reformed European Union, but opinions in the House have differed on the subject, quite honourably and openly, for many years and it is right that the people have the final say.

[Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I am not convinced by my right hon. Friend’s explanation of the Prime Minister’s delay, which is that we need to study the document, because although it is characteristically long on words, it is short on substance. May I draw his attention to page 15, where it notes that the emergency brake in relation to immigration will operate on a proposal from the Commission, and to the draft legislation relating to the euro outs, which says that, if there is opposition to the Council adopting something by qualified majority, the Council shall discuss the issue? Well, that is an enormous difference from what we currently have. I just wonder whether the next 24 hours will allow Downing Street the opportunity to try to make bricks without straw.

[Mr Lidington]

As I have said, this is an ongoing negotiation and we have not reached agreement on all aspects of what is in the Tusk drafts. I would just point out to my hon. Friend that the document also includes a very clear statement by the European Commission that it believes the conditions already exist in the United Kingdom for the emergency brake on welfare access to be triggered.

Common Foreign and Security Policy

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Monday 1st February 2016 General Committees

[Mr Lidington]

I will try to reply to those points. The purpose of the common foreign and security policy is set out primarily in article 21 of the treaty on the European Union. I will not recite it in full—it is lengthy—but it is basically about developing external action in a way that promotes European values and the fundamental interests of security, independence and integrity, and consolidates and supports democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law in external action. The article goes on to list other criteria too.

NATO is to some extent reactive, in that it is the ultimate guarantor of collective security for allies. I do not want to get drawn too far into this question, but I think it is fair to say that at the Wales summit and again at the Warsaw summit later this year, we are trying to ensure that NATO is less reactive and is, for example, focusing very much on questions of resilience and how to have effective deterrents and response plans in place against hybrid attack, not just conventional military attack.

EU external action has particular value added in two ways. First, of course, not every EU member state is a member of NATO, so countries such as Sweden and Finland are able to contribute to EU missions, including military missions, when they would not be able to do so as part of a NATO mission. For example, the Austrians have deployed forces as part of an EU mission in the western Balkans, whereas they could not participate in a NATO mission. Secondly, EU work can provide civilian expertise in things such as training of military personnel; training of police and security forces; border work, including the training of border forces; and missions to try to improve the governance of neighbouring or more distant countries.

The roles should be complementary. One could argue, for example, that the cyber threat to military communications and military capability should be dealt with at NATO level, but we know there is a cyber threat to key IT systems for energy distribution and even for retail distribution in a modern economy. It is much more difficult to say that those fall naturally into NATO’s remit, but effective co-operation and complementarity between NATO and the EU, if done well, can add up to a very effective security response.

On the question of scrutiny, with every CFSP document we check whether the document in question falls within the terms of the scrutiny reserve resolution. If it does, it goes to the Committee anyway for scrutiny. The challenge from the Committee—it is one I understand—is that some quite significant policy documents on EU foreign policy, including some described as action plans in the past, do not fall within the current terms of reference of the scrutiny reserve resolution. The volume of such documents is so large that I would be reluctant to agree to submit all of them for scrutiny, so it comes down to a matter of my judgment as to which I send to the Committee.

I remain open to trying to agree with the Committee a set of criteria that would enable it to have oversight of the documents that it particularly wishes to see and that are genuinely important. I would, in return, want to have a serious discussion about the fact that some documents—not necessarily CFSP documents—go to the Committee at the moment that frankly need not go through the formal scrutiny process and could be dealt with in a more streamlined fashion.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I have three groups of questions. The first is on the scrutiny issue. I draw the Minister’s attention to page 331 of the documents. The criticism on scrutiny in this case is perhaps as much of the European Union as of the Minister: it took six and a half months to prepare the report on 2014, which made proper scrutiny by this House extremely difficult. It seems improper of the European Union to be so slow in producing documents that they cannot be scrutinised properly by national Parliaments, leading to a scrutiny waiver. What can the Minister do to improve that?

In response to the Minister’s suggestion of some negotiation between the Committee and his office as to what is sent for scrutiny, may I say that if the Government were a little more up to date with the debates that had been requested, including one now outstanding for more than two years, there might be more good will between those who wish to scrutinise and those who are scrutineered?

[Mr Lidington]

On the point about the slowness with which the EU sometimes produces documents, I am sympathetic to my hon. Friend’s comments. As he will know, I have exchanged correspondence with both the present and previous High Representatives about that, reminding them of the importance of our parliamentary scrutiny processes and the need for documents to be produced in good time wherever possible. In this particular case, it is fair to say that there was quite a complex negotiation at the level of ambassadorial representatives in Brussels, so it would be wrong of me to say this was all down to the External Action Service of Mrs Mogherini.

However, my hon. Friend’s general point is well made, although I would add that there are ways in which the House of Commons could improve its own scrutiny arrangements. It was probably unavoidable that for more than three months there was no House of Commons scrutiny arrangement in place, because from the moment of Dissolution, the scrutiny structure here fell away and did not operate again until almost the end of July 2015. That is not the fault of my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset and his fellow Committee members—it is a side effect of our constitutional arrangements, but the EU machine continued to turn out documents during that time. It will not surprise my hon. Friend to learn that my personal view is that scrutiny Committees ought to have some arrangement for monitoring documents and sifting them during recesses, because that would help the process.

My hon. Friend referred to the backlog from the previous Parliament. As he will know, we are making efforts to try to clear that as rapidly as possible. There is always a difficult balance to be struck in the allocation of time, both in Committee and on the Floor of the House, but the usual channels are well aware of the concerns of my hon. Friend and his colleagues and are endeavouring to clear the backlog as soon as possible.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

As a supplementary, I cannot let the Minister get away with the suggestion that the delay in reconstituting the European Scrutiny Committee was the fault of anybody other than Her Majesty’s Government. The Whips Office determines when these things happen, so I am surprised that he uses that as a defence. I remind him that these areas are subject to unanimity and if documents are produced late, the Government are in a strong position to refuse them and to say that they must wait for scrutiny by the House. It is not a matter covered by qualified majority voting. Moving on to page 337 of the Council’s conclusions, my first very simple question requires a yes or no answer. Am I right in thinking that these conclusions are conclusions accepted by Her Majesty’s Government?

[Mr Lidington]

Let me deal with the first point. My hon. Friend is clearly right that to some extent the timing of the setting up of any Committee is in the Government’s hands, although I think that what happened in this case was that once Parliament had met, elected a Speaker and heard the Queen’s Speech, it moved on to make provision for the election of Select Committees. Quite a few Members in all parts of the House wished to stand for membership of departmental Select Committees. Because the European Scrutiny Committee is not elected in the same way, it was felt fair to wait until the outcome of those elections to Select Committees were known before we moved on to selecting members of the ESC.

It is true that because CFSP decisions require unanimity, we can block things. We have to decide, when making a decision to block something, especially if the question is one where we actually support the policy, whether blocking on scrutiny grounds is going to cause a harm to our national diplomatic interest that outweighs the offence of not awaiting the correct scrutiny procedures. However, more than once in my time as Minister, I have simply refused to agree to something, which has meant a delay in implementing a number of quite significant EU measures. In this case, we were talking about the latest annual report in a series of annual reports. This has no policy impact—it simply reports what had happened during 2014. I will be straight with my hon. Friend: in those circumstances, and knowing that the Committee only had its first meeting on 21 July, the day after the Foreign Affairs Council, and that it was not likely to meet again until after the summer recess, I decided that it would not be in the United Kingdom’s interests to block the publication of an annual report, when, as we have shown, it would be perfectly possible to have a debate at a future time. No policy has been authorised as a consequence of that decision, because the report was purely retrospective.

I confess that in response to my hon. Friend’s second question, I am slightly at a loss because the copy of the report that I have does not go up to page 337, but only goes up to page 301. There were no conclusions to the report.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I was moving on to page 337 of the package, which relates to the Council’s conclusions on the common security and defence policy, following the Foreign Affairs Council of 18 May. I just wanted to check that those conclusions were agreed by Her Majesty’s Government.

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[Mr Lidington]

I will check the reference, and, if I may, I will try to respond to that in my winding-up remarks at the end of the debate.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful. Perhaps the Minister may be able to find inspiration while I am asking the next question. If the Government did agree to those conclusions, I would bring to his attention paragraph 1 of the conclusions of the Council. As I understand it, Council conclusions are normally agreed by all members of the Council, so it would be odd, unless there was a specific reservation, if the Government had not agreed paragraph 1. It states:

“This calls for a stronger Europe, with a stronger and more effective Common Security and Defence Policy”.

I thought that it was the policy of Her Majesty’s Government to repatriate powers from the European Union, whereas the Foreign Affairs Council on 18 May 2015, in the opening paragraph of its conclusion, calls for more powers for the European Union. If the Government agreed to that, can the Minister explain why they did so?

[Mr Lidington]

The straight answer is that yes, we did agree to any conclusions that require unanimity and, if I may say so, I think that the slip that my hon. Friend is making is to equate support for

“a stronger and more effective Common Security and Defence Policy”

with support for a stronger role for EU institutions in constraining and directing the activities of member states. What we are talking about here are security and defence policies agreed in common, unanimously, by the free decision of 28 national Governments working together, because we have seen in cases such as the Iran nuclear programme, or action in the western Balkans, that we are able to achieve more if we are working together than if even one or two of the big member states try to act on their own.

I would argue that we should be confident and ambitious about the influence that the United Kingdom can and does have on the shaping and framing of those policies. We are one of a handful of EU member states that have a history of global engagement and a worldwide diplomatic network, which is delivering the 0.7% UN target on international development. In terms of the trust fund of Turkey, for example, that enables us to put our money and our commitment on the table, and lead the actions of others at European level.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful for the further opportunity to discuss this. The Minister thinks that I have misconstrued the conclusions, but paragraph 2 of the Council conclusions goes on to say that the EU and member states

“are assuming increased responsibilities to act as a security provider”.

When it refers to the EU, that must refer to the institutions of the European Union and must refer back to the second sentence of paragraph 1. It is giving more power to the European Union institutions; it says it in the document.

[Mr Lidington]

But in this context, that is the European Union institutions acting on the basis of a unanimously agreed decision by the Governments of the member states meeting in the Council. If there is not unanimity, there is no EU foreign policy position and, therefore, no EU action.

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[Mr Rees-Mogg]

The Minister wishes to use words in a way that does not bear the normal meaning of them. Perhaps he will be able to help me in the usage of some words by the writers of the document, where the words do not have any normal meaning. Could he explain paragraph 4 of the document and tell us what the following means?

“The aim is to increase synergies in the EU response to priority horizontal issues”.

What are priority horizontal issues?

[Mr Lidington]

I have some sympathy with my hon. Friend’s dislike of what I sometimes refer to as diplo-babble. I have to confess that one finds this in national policy documents, I dread to say, as well as in European ones from time to time. I think he is being slightly unfair because he is quoting that phrase out of the context in which it is set. The context is the Council committing itself

“to further strengthen the links between external and internal security.”

The next sentence goes on to define priority horizontal issues

“such as terrorism, organised crime, foreign fighters, smuggling and trafficking in human beings, irregular migration, hybrid threats, border management, energy security and cyber security”.

The meaning behind that convoluted bit of jargon is that EU countries working together need to do more to co-ordinate. To take one example, that means co-ordinating the work that we do to strengthen our domestic arrangements to tackle terrorism with the external work that we do through diplomatic and other means.

I believe it is right, for example, that European countries, working through EU justice and home affairs provisions, should provide a system whereby we all have access to records of passenger names of people travelling within the EU or from EU airports to other flights. There is a natural synergy between that and working with countries, such as Turkey, that are used as transit routes by terrorists and organised criminals; just as there is a synergy with EU work to improve governance, public order and the rule of law in the countries of the western Balkans, which are very much prey to organised crime in all its forms, and which need and value external support from elsewhere in Europe to buttress their attempts to build the rule of law in their countries.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to the Minister for his translation of diplo-babble, but there are more examples, such as

“hybrid strategies and operations by state and non-state actors”.

I wonder who is doing the acting.

Paragraph 8 reports:

“Therefore, defence issues should also be considered in coherence”—

for the benefit of Hansard, I make clear that that is two words, “in” and “coherence”, rather than “incoherence”, although one might think the alternative is better—

“with other relevant EU policies and sectors, and vice versa”.

This is an extraordinarily unclear document, except when it is clear and the Government say that it is not.

In the context of my first question on the document, I will bring the Minister to paragraph 16. Could he explain what is meant by the following?

“The establishment of a EU facility linking closer peace, security and development in the framework of one or more existing EU instruments; and a dedicated instrument to this effect, in view of the mid-term review of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020”.

Does that mean more powers to EU institutions?

[Mr Lidington]

No, it does not, is the straight answer. Because I do not have direct ministerial responsibility for Africa, I offer to write to my hon. Friend with further details once I have talked to the Minister for Africa. However, my reading of this section of paragraph 16 is that it is saying that an EU facility should be established to try to drive forward internal peace, security and development in African countries. It seems that those three objectives fit naturally together. An African country that is more secure is likely to be able to offer greater economic opportunities to its people, more economic growth and more employment, which in turn will reduce the attractiveness of crime, terrorism and so on.

The following line, which refers to the

“mid-term review of the multiannual financial framework”,

is saying that this new facility could be set up within the context of the mid-term review, meaning that funds that are currently spent in one particular way could be reallocated through the creation of the new programme. I can give my hon. Friend and the Committee a firm assurance that the unanimity lock remains on the ceilings that were negotiated by the Prime Minister in 2013. The mid-term review may come up with interesting ideas about how to reorganise expenditure programmes, but unless the Government changed their mind, which they have no intention of doing, those seven-year MFF ceilings remain in place.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that answer. If he does write to me, might he look at the opening part of paragraph 16? In that context, does

“the Joint Communication on ‘Capacity building in support of security and development – Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises’”

refer to the development of EU competence, of which I would always urge him to be cautious?

Paragraph 17j states that the Council

“Welcomes the clarification and understanding achieved regarding the possible use of Article 44 TEU”.

Will he explain what that possible use is? Although the document welcomes the clarification, it does not explain it.

[Mr Lidington]

It is part of the Lisbon treaty and permits the Council to entrust the conduct of a CSDP mission to a willing group of member states smaller than the entire EU membership, allowing those without an interest in the mission to give it their political blessing without actually having to participate. Under article 44, a coalition of the willing could therefore take on a mission under the EU banner with the support of EU infrastructure and spending programmes. Italy and a number of southern member states are particularly keen on that at the moment because they are talking about a further CSDP mission in the Mediterranean.

The article has the potential to be useful because it would provide a way to reflect the reality that it is inevitable in a diverse EU membership that member states have different levels of interest in particular crises. It will be no shock to the Committee if I say that Malta is concerned about what is happening in Libya and that Lithuania is concerned about the situation vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine. Article 44 will add value only if it has some different rules that allow for greater flexibility of action. By definition, the article is likely to be used when not all member states want to be fully engaged in a mission and therefore use of the article should not come with an automatic expectation of common funding from member states that have chosen not to participate. Those who want to take part should pay for it.

We can delegate a mission to a particular group of member states, but we are very reluctant to support the idea of delegating responsibility for that mission’s conduct, even if it is being conducted by only a minority of willing member states. In any use of article 44, we would want to insist that standards of planning, organisation, governance and spending oversight in the conduct of a mission remained just as high if it took place under article 44 as it would for any other EU mission.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lidington]

I am grateful to both the hon. Member for North West Durham and my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset for their contributions. The hon. Lady was right that the document we are debating contains no new policy. It is purely a retrospective report on what happened or what was done during 2014. I say to my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset that I do not claim—and never have claimed—that everything about the EU is perfect, certainly not the way it does external policy. I probably know that better than any other member of the Committee after the last five and three quarter years. However, as I said earlier, I believe that in today’s world the reality is that, in order to protect our own citizens and advance the interests of our country, we need to work with others.

I remember my noble Friend Lord Hague saying to me after one extremely long Foreign Affairs Council when he was Foreign Secretary that, while it was utterly frustrating and infuriating to try to get 28 different countries all to sign up to a common package of sanctions against a third country, the effort was worth while, because, when that could be achieved, it was more effective than Britain acting on its own or even than Britain, France and Germany acting together. It closed down so many actual or potential loopholes for sanctions busting, and there was a greater political and economic effect on the country being targeted than if only a small group of the willing had taken action.

The safeguards that we have with regard to the exercise of the EU’s foreign and security policy responsibilities are, first, that it is laid down in the treaties that, for a foreign policy position to be adopted, all member states have to be in agreement. Every country, including the United Kingdom, has a veto. Not only that, but the European Court cannot second-guess policy positions. It has a limited right to look at the implementation of unanimously agreed decisions, for example on sanctions. An individual who is subject to EU sanctions can go to the European Court and argue that the sanction was imposed improperly or on the basis of false evidence, or for whatever other reason. However, the Court cannot intervene in the making of a foreign policy position.

In addition, the European Union Act 2011 provides explicitly for a referendum to be held in this country were any future British Government to be tempted to agree to move from unanimity towards majority voting for common foreign and security policy or common security and defence policy.

I also say to my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset that yes, we do need to be vigilant about attempts to stretch the envelope over competence. For example, since 2010 I have instructed my officials to be very active in resisting what we believe to be unwarranted attempts by the Commission to supplant the role of member states or the rotating presidency in representing the EU position in international organisations. That is a battle that I am sure will continue.

Also, when considering vetoing a particular measure, or at least delaying agreement to it—what my hon. Friend asks me to do more frequently—I consider what the impact of such a veto or delay would be. Sometimes, when the final unclassified version of a document has regrettably, for whatever reason, been produced late in the process by Brussels, I am faced with the decision of whether to override scrutiny in order to allow agreement, or to do as he asks and block agreement pending scrutiny. Sometimes that might mean deciding whether to put at risk the continuation of an EU peacekeeping or training mission in a country where the operation of that mission is important to the United Kingdom’s interests.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

Of course I accept that there are urgent occasions, particularly in relation to sanctions, when it is right to override scrutiny, because giving us time to scrutinise sanctions would also give the person who is supposed to be caught by them time to change his affairs. This document, however, was a report on what happened in 2014, so it was in no sense urgent that it be agreed in July; it could easily have waited until proper scrutiny had taken place. It seems to me, therefore, that the urgency argument really does not apply in this case.

[Mr Lidington]

In this case, as I described earlier, had we blocked agreement on 20 July, it would have been in the knowledge that we could not return to it until scrutiny processes had been completed, which would have taken us well into the autumn, given that Parliament sat for only two weeks in September, and I think the Committee met only once in those two weeks. A debate could probably not have taken place until the second half of October at the earliest.

We had, as we always have, many political objectives at stake during a Foreign Affairs Council meeting. The Foreign Secretary and I took the view that to hold up agreement on this would simply be an unwelcome use of negotiating capital that we wanted to keep for substantive foreign policy issues where getting others to agree to the British position was challenging but important for our diplomatic interests. My hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset is perfectly entitled to say that we misjudged that and that we should have been more rigorous in defending parliamentary scrutiny, but that was the way in which my right hon. Friend and I approached it.

In conclusion, it remains the case, in my view, that we can achieve important objectives of this country by working co-operatively with our nearest neighbours and partners. Furthermore, the diplomatic weight that the United Kingdom brings to the European table is significant. We can and do have a major influence on shaping what later become common European policies. In that sense, we can use the European arrangements to amplify our own diplomatic reach and punching power. Indeed, people from the United States often tell British officials and Ministers that they want us to get involved in bringing other Europeans to the table. In fact, the Prime Minister was very active in ensuring that the United States and European Union positions on Russia sanctions have been very closely aligned throughout the Ukraine crisis.

Although these institutional arrangements are not perfect—I am not going to claim that we will win every single battle—I believe that we can use our power and influence effectively to shape European policy positions in a way that brings tangible benefits to the security and prosperity of the people of the United Kingdom. On that basis, I commend the Government’s motion to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Subsidiarity and Proportionality

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Monday 7th December 2015 General Committees

[Mr Lidington]

I will try to respond as fully as I can within the constraints of time to the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East.

As the Prime Minister said in his letter, the level of a threshold to trigger a red card that would amount to a block on legislation would be a matter for the negotiation itself. I cannot pre-empt those detailed discussions, but we envisage that at a certain point what is currently a power for national Parliaments to require the Commission to review a particular initiative should become an outright bar to further progress.

As for the yellow card, to my mind a change that would be particularly welcome would be an extension of the timeframe allowed beyond the eight weeks permitted under current law. That would enable national Parliaments to consider proposals more closely and to co-ordinate with one another. I would also like to see such a change to the yellow card take into account the very creative proposal from the Dutch Parliament for what it termed a “late card”, so that in the event of a legislative measure changing significantly during its progress through the various institutions it would be possible for national Parliaments to come back and have another look at it, because at the moment that opportunity is forbidden to them regardless of how far-reaching any amendments might be.

Finally, the Government support the green card, but it is also an initiative that is actively being taken forward by national Parliaments at the moment. Yes, we support it, but if it can be achieved through Parliaments working together in COSAC, persuading the institutions to take that change on board, then we are happy simply to support the work that the Parliaments themselves have initiated.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

May I ask the Minister a bit more about the red card? Is it fair to assume that the number of countries that would be required to send in a red card would be lower than the number required to vote against it in the Council of Ministers to provide a blocking majority under qualified majority voting?

[Mr Lidington]

The difference between the two arrangements, as my hon. Friend knows, is that to assemble a blocking majority in the Council of Ministers one has to assemble that majority on the basis of weighted votes, with the most populous countries having greater weight, in the calculation of a majority or minority, than the smaller member states, whereas in the case of the yellow card system each parliamentary chamber in the EU has a single vote. I suppose that it operates a bit like the way that the US Senate operates, with no regard to the relative populations of the different countries.

The answer to that question would therefore depend very much on what the comparator was in terms of the blocking minority among member states. I certainly envisage that a red card would have to involve a higher threshold than a yellow card would, since it would be a more far-reaching measure.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to the Minister for his answer. However, could the red card serve any useful purpose if it were harder to get than a qualified majority vote against a proposal coming from the Commission, because all Governments are responsible to their Parliaments, and therefore to make it a workable proposition, the assumption would have to be that a matter had a qualified majority in favour but the Parliaments sought to stop it?

[Mr Lidington]

Having served as a Minister both in the last Parliament and this one, I have to say that I do not think that Governments can automatically assume that they have the majority in Parliaments, particularly on European matters. So, while the circumstances that my hon. Friend describes would be unusual, it would nevertheless be worth while to have that democratic back stop. Also, a strongly expressed parliamentary view would perhaps, in the case of a number of member states, put greater backbone into a Government resisting a measure to which their Parliament had declared itself opposed.

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[Mr Rees-Mogg]

The very idea that Governments will have backbone in the face of Europe is a novel one, but I hope that we might see it one day.

Moving on to yellow cards, does my right hon. Friend think that part of the reason for the number of cards going down, apart from the lower number of proposals coming forward, is that once the decision was given about the EPP, Parliaments thought there was little point? The Commission did absolutely nothing regarding that important proposal. What is the purpose of this House or any other Chamber passing resolutions if they are just ignored?

[Mr Lidington]

As I said in my opening remarks, that might be part of the explanation. One would have to go back and talk to parliamentarians from the 27 other member states to have a clear analysis. I suspect that with some countries the lack of yellow cards might be down more to domestic political circumstances—perhaps a general election and a change of Government—than to anything happening at the EU level.

It is also fair, however, to take account of the changeover of the Commission. The Juncker Commission’s track record of launching many fewer new initiatives than the Barroso Commission, even in its first term, inevitably reduces the number of targets for national Parliaments. That too is part of the explanation. Frankly, if the Commission is going to stick to that approach and take account, in advance, of what national Parliaments and national Governments would regard as the right priorities, that is a change we should all welcome.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

On that very point, the Commission has tended to respond even when a majority has not been reached, but it has often been pretty stubborn in pushing forward with its proposal anyway. Indeed, in one of the documents we can even see that it wanted to bring forward a more ambitious proposal rather than sticking with the one it already had. To date, therefore, the yellow card has not been hugely successful, as far as one can tell. Does the Minister accept that? Does he also accept that the time limit he mentioned, which it has been argued ought to be extended, can be extended only through treaty change? Is that part of the Government’s intended renegotiation?

[Mr Lidington]

I agree that although there is innovation in the Lisbon treaty—which was an advance, and better than not having any such process—it has not been particularly successful so far. It has certainly taken time for the culture of the Commission leadership to respond to what is necessary. The fact that someone such as First Vice-President Timmermans, who has been an elected politician in a country that has given a high priority to the opinions of its national Parliament, is now a key authority within the Commission has been an important contributing factor to the change we have seen on the part of the Commission in the past year and a bit.

Whether treaty change is needed is something that we are addressing in the course of the detailed negotiations. The technical talks that took place over the summer between UK officials and the secretariats and legal services of the institutions have, on that issue and on the others on which we seek reforms, fleshed out a menu of legal and procedural options for leaders to select from, depending on what deal leaders eventually succeed in negotiating. It would be wrong of me to go further than that, when those negotiations still lie ahead.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful for that because footnote 16 on page 12 of the document gives the Commission’s view that the deadline is enshrined in the treaty and therefore would require treaty change, but the Commission can err, so I hope the Government are right.

Finally—although I may have two questions on this point, depending on the Minister’s answer—I want to ask about the green card issue. Are the Government supportive of a situation in which the Commission loses its exclusive right to propose legislation?

[Mr Lidington]

That is not part of our set of proposals and it would probably be very hard to negotiate that. My word of warning to my hon. Friend is that if that issue were opened up, we would probably see a lot of institutional pressure from the European Parliament to have a right to initiate legislation, and that there would be quite a lot of national Governments around Europe, particularly those of smaller member states, that would be quite attracted by that idea.

As for my hon. Friend’s earlier point—alas, I have lost my thread, so perhaps he could just remind me.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

Prior to the green card issue, I asked about the treaty change and the Minister answered me.

[Mr Lidington]

That is right, and if I have not satisfied my hon. Friend, at least I have replied to him. I will rest it there, Mrs Main.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I am a bit puzzled by the Minister’s last answer. I thought the whole point of the green card was to give a group of member states the ability to propose changes to, amend, alter or even repeal EU legislation. Now, if it is not giving them the right that is otherwise the exclusive right of the Commission, I do not see what it is doing and whether it serves any purpose.

[Mr Lidington]

The distinction is this: the green card proposal would permit the national Parliaments acting collegiately to propose changes and to seek reviews, but it would leave it then for the Commission, having reviewed the matter, to decide whether to bring forward particular amendments.

That is perhaps analogous—not exactly the same as, but analogous—to the European Parliament’s powers to propose an own-initiative report, which can put forward ideas either for new legislation or the amendment or repeal of existing legislation but which cannot bind the Commission to act in a particular way. What one has found in practice, however, is that the Commission has taken very seriously those reports and frequently acted upon them. I hope that if we got a green card accepted, we would find that the Commission responded in the same way to well-evidenced, well-argued proposals from national Parliaments.

I now recall the point on which I was going to respond to my hon. Friend earlier. He expressed doubt as to whether, in the absence of treaty change, having a red card would mean anything. Of course the Commission, while it has the sole right of initiative, can always choose whether to initiate or to persist with a particular piece of legislation, so it faces a certain political choice when it is in receipt of objections from national Parliaments.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

You are being very generous today, Mrs Main; I promise that this is my last question. Is the Minister therefore saying that the democratic deficit will be addressed by the good will of the Commission when it feels like listening to national Parliaments?

[Mr Lidington]

What I am saying is that the democratic deficit needs to be addressed by a number of different and complementary reforms. Those will include some in the culture of the institutions, which we are starting to see, such as a focus on a rigorous selection of limited priorities where the European Union can genuinely provide value-added to all its members from European-level action, rather than leaving it to member states.

I believe that our proposals on national parliaments are not a panacea, which I have never claimed for them, but will help to reconnect electors with what the European Union is doing on their behalf. Obtaining some kind of mechanism for turning the Laeken commitment into institutional reality in the EU would be a further way in which to bridge the democratic deficit.

At the end of the day, bridging the democratic deficit will be about cultural change as much as about legislative and institutional change. It will be about the EU and its institutions demonstrating through their choice of actions that they are attuned to the policy priorities that matter to the people—the citizens whom they claim to represent.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

That the Committee takes note of European Union Documents No. 10651/15 and Addendum, a Commission Annual Report 2014: Subsidiarity and proportionality, and No. 10663/15 and Addendum, a Commission Annual Report 2014: relations with national parliaments; recognises the importance of the principle of subsidiarity and the value of stronger interaction between national parliaments and the EU institutions; welcomes the Government’s reform agenda and efforts to ensure that the Commission responds to future objections under the yellow card scheme by substantially amending or withdrawing the proposal that has been put forward; calls on the Commission to respond to the request of 29 national parliament chambers to establish a working group to consider reforms to strengthen their role; is encouraged by the Commission’s announcement of its intentions to forge a new partnership with national parliaments; and calls on the Commission to set out its plans to do this.(—Mr Lidington.)

Europe: Renegotiation

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Tuesday 10th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

Obviously, as Parliament is sovereign, not least in the fact that EU law has direct effect in the UK only because of Acts of Parliament—decisions of this House—the irreversibility of any decision any Government take on anything is limited. To answer the hon. Gentleman’s question, we are keen to avoid a repeat of the sort of thing that happened over the European financial stabilisation mechanism earlier this year, when, in the heat of a crisis in the eurozone, a deal that had been solemnly agreed by all 28 member states in December 2010 suddenly appeared to be at risk and came up for discussion in a meeting where only 19 member Governments were gathered together. That is not the way in which we can do business in Europe in the future.

[Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend must know that this is pretty thin gruel—it is much less than people had come to expect from the Government. It takes out a few words from the preamble but does nothing about the substance of the treaties; it deals with competition, for which the European Commission itself has a proposal; and it fails to restore control of our borders. It seems to me that its whole aim is to make Harold Wilson’s renegotiation look respectable. It needs to do more; it needs to have a full list of powers that will be restored to the United Kingdom and to this Parliament, not vacuously to Parliaments plural.

[Mr Lidington]

The problem with the idea of a unilateral national parliamentary veto, which my hon. Friend advocates, is that it would mean that, for example, the most protectionist Parliament in any one member state could veto every deregulatory and every single market measure that the United Kingdom believed was profoundly in the interests of our people and our prosperity. Such a unilateral veto would be incompatible even with the arrangements that Norway and Switzerland have with the European Union. I just say to him that if he had had the privilege and responsibility of sitting at Council of Ministers meetings in Brussels, a responsibility that he may well indeed enjoy at some future stage of his career, he would be less sanguine about what he terms the unambitious nature of what we are proposing. What we are proposing is going to require some very tough negotiating indeed.

European Union Referendum Bill

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Tuesday 16th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend is obviously free to take legal opinion of his own, but if he looks again at the wording of section 125 and applies it to the conduct of EU business, he will find that there would be very serious problems in carrying out day-to-day business in the national interest at EU level if the section is left untouched.

We believe that applying the section would be inappropriate because the referendum is taking place as the result of a clear manifesto commitment to negotiate the terms of the UK’s relationship with the European Union and to put them to people in a referendum. Section 125 could make it impossible to explain to the public what the outcome of the renegotiation was and what the Government’s view of that result was.

The Government must be able, and legitimately should be able, to offer their views, including up to the day of the referendum. However, as I have said, the Government are not a campaign: it is not the Government’s job to supplant the role of the lead campaign organisations during the referendum campaign, and it is certainly not our intention to act in that way. We recognise and understand the strength of feeling that exists on this issue, and I am grateful for the constructive and courteous tone in which the debate has been conducted both this afternoon and in private conversations outside the Chamber.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

My right hon. Friend said that the Government may not be able to give their view on the outcomes of the renegotiation. Surely that cannot be true. It cannot be the case that the renegotiation will only be finished within the purdah period.

[Mr Lidington]

What I am saying is that the Government will need to be able to say why they have come to the conclusion and recommendation that they have reached.

As the Foreign Secretary said and as I repeated on Second Reading last week, the Government will exercise restraint during that period. We have listened to what colleagues in all parts of the House have said and are therefore committing ourselves to table amendments on Report to write into the Bill measures that will provide reassurance on that point. I accept completely the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) that it is vital that the British public and both sides in the referendum debate accept that the referendum is being conducted fairly and therefore feel able to accept the result.