Defamation Bill
Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts(12 years, 5 months ago)
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Michael Ellis
The less said about that, the better. I remain a fan of that periodical, and as far as such proceedings are concerned we have to move with the times, because defamation law has not tended to move with them sufficiently.
Jacob Rees-Mogg
My hon. Friend says that we should move with the times. Surely we are Conservatives and should be turning the clock back.
Michael Ellis
Notwithstanding my hon. Friend’s pertinent observation about our party of support and care, I think it is right—I know my hon. Friend will agree—that the Conservative party has moved with the times. It is the longest-serving political party anywhere in the democratic world because it has tended to move effectively with the times over the generations.
Few colleagues have made the point that the Bill will rightly provide a power for the court, under the existing summary disposal procedure, to order publication of a summary of its judgment, which will be available in defamation proceedings generally. It is my understanding that the courts will be able, in certain circumstances, to order the offending publication to reprint some or all of its judgment. That will be quite useful if a judge feels that there has been an egregious failure by the periodical which is not going to be met other than by his or her intervention to ensure that proper redress is made in terms of the court’s ruling. The hon. Member for North Antrim (Ian Paisley) referred some time ago in this debate to a page 1 splash, which a few months later results in a postage-stamp-sized apology on page 52. A judge will be able to order, if he or she wishes, that a transcript of the judgment be reprinted in full in the newspaper. That will be quite powerful for the courts, and an effective measure.
The secondary publishers to which hon. Members have referred, namely the vendors, bookstores and booksellers, need greater protection from civil suit in any defamation action that may be brought against them. There may be certain circumstances in which it is appropriate to take punitive action against a bookseller or a company that disseminates libellous material, but it ought to be a secondary measure. The primary purpose—the primary avenue—should be to take an action against the author and publisher of the offending work, and the disseminator should be involved only if necessary, appropriate and reasonably practicable. I therefore approve of all those measures, which will be rather effective.
We need to remove the trivial and unfounded cases and raise the bar for bringing a claim. I am conscious that it is sometimes prohibitively expensive to take an action for defamation, and colleagues have referred repeatedly to the chilling effect of the costs involved. That can itself be limiting, and a principal concern of mine is that individuals who are without means or even of “middle” means—if I can put it that way—are not able to take the same action as a wealthy individual or a news company that has a greater ability to fight and to defend actions in what can be very expensive defamation proceedings.
In short, this Bill has my support for all those reasons. It is clearly a necessary measure in order to modernise the law of defamation, and in those circumstances I expect it to have considerable support on both sides of the Chamber.
Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)
I thought I might throw a few pebbles into the pond of consensus that there has been so far. We have had near enough five hours of consensus. It is now time to hear a little from the other side.
First, as a general principle, when all parties agree on something, it is usually a mistake. We have found that historically. The cut and thrust of debate, with one side saying one thing and the other putting forward the alternative view, is enormously powerful in getting to the right answer. I am rather suspicious when we have a lawyerly committee that comes together. I am so pleased to follow my hon. Friend the Member for South Derbyshire (Heather Wheeler), to break into the lawyerly cabal and give the view from the layman. So first, I have a suspicion of consensus in principle.
Secondly, as my doubts were beginning to grow, at the end of his fine speech, the Lord Chancellor said that this was a “sound piece of modernising” legislation. It seems to me that the words “sound” and “modernising” never go together. If something is modernising, one ought to be suspicious of it. We had modernising from 1997 to 2010 and it almost bankrupted the nation. Therefore, “sound” and “modernising” are not compatible.
I think back, of course, to the coalition agreement. It is a great pleasure and a daily joy for all of us to be in coalition with our Lib Dem friends, allies, compatriots.
Jacob Rees-Mogg
I am so pleased to hear that it is mutual. I say that for the benefit of the Hansard Reporters in case they did not catch it, although they have such sharp ears that I am sure they did.
The Bill is something that the Lib Dems asked for in the coalition agreement. It is a major piece of legislation, which we are pushing through at the very earliest stage of the second Session of Parliament. We should remind the Lib Dems that this is their legislation. When they come back and ask for more legislation later in the Session, perhaps to do with constitutional reform, we can remind them that they have had their fair share and that we have been relatively sotto voce about our concerns over this Bill, so they cannot expect to have any more.
Jacob Rees-Mogg
I have been listening for the last five hours to how amazingly important the Bill is and to the view that it is short but perfectly formed. It seems to me, therefore, that the power of the Bill and the effect it will have should not be underestimated when we look at the scales of coalition balance. At the moment, they are weighing down heavily on the Lib Dem side and I think that we might need a little counterweight for the Conservatives later in the Session.
I want to consider the merits of the Bill and the whole idea of what we are trying to achieve. We have heard from other Members about freedom of speech, which is something of the utmost importance—the cliché of the evening, but it is a true cliché. Freedom of speech is under attack from the Leveson inquiry, which wishes to bind down journalists to rules of good behaviour, and sometimes from libel lawyers.
However, we should also consider the question of reputation, defamation and how we should protect people when they feel they have been hard done by. My hon. Friend the Member for Hexham (Guy Opperman) quoted Shakespeare. Two can play at that game, so I though I would too:
“Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls.
Who steals my purse steals trash—”
in my case butterflies and moths, and things like that—
“‘tis something, nothing;
‘Twas mine, ‘tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.”
So it is right that there is some protection in our legal system for people’s good name, even though that impinges on freedom of speech.
There are already many protections in the law for freedom of speech. We are fortunate to enjoy under the Bill of Rights an absolute privilege for anything that we say in this Chamber. It can never be used in any court of law. We can be as rude about people as we like—not that I am going to use that privilege this evening, but it is a privilege of absolute free speech.
It is to be welcomed that the Bill maintains that truth should be a defence in a defamation action. That seems perfectly sensible and wise, although I know Pontius Pilate questioned what truth was, and there is always that issue to consider. Truth is not necessarily as absolute as it can sometimes be thought to be off the cuff, so to speak. There are elements and forms of truth, and of course in the oath that people take in courts there is “the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth”, indicating different levels of truth.
Fair comment, which has been allowed in the past, is now being made clearly part of the law, which is absolutely splendid. If people wish to air their disagreements and phrase themselves strongly, that is all to the good and to be encouraged, and it should be protected as part of free speech. However, what if the defamation is serious? What penalties should there be then? Who should decide, and who should be charged?
I am concerned about the liberties that we are giving to internet service providers and to people who are responsible for websites but deny any responsibility for their content. They become more and more powerful as time goes on. There are two or three firms that dominate the world in that sense, but they are not necessarily on the side of the individual who is defamed.
I had my own little issue with somebody who set up a highly amusing Twitter account in my name. It was not done by me—it was much funnier than I could ever have been—but there was nothing that I could do to stop it. It went on churning out comments that some journalists thought I had made. I always thought I could say my own silly things without anybody saying them on my behalf. There needs to be some recourse for people who are impersonated and defamed through that impersonation. The responsibility ought to lie with the internet companies, which ought not to have a great exemption that allows them to tarnish people’s reputations without any great difficulty.
I have some specific concerns about the Bill and the argument that has been developed today. The first is about jury trials. We heard from the Lord Chancellor and others very good arguments for getting rid of juries—that they are expensive, that they are inconvenient, that they make the process more difficult for m’learned friends. However, that requires that we should have absolute faith in the wisdom of judges, and personally I do not. They are broadly good and wise eggs and do their best under difficult circumstances, but they are not omniscient. I feel that if my reputation were on the line, it would be safer in the hands of 12 good and true men and women of this country—ideally, of course, of Somerset. That would be the best way to protect one’s reputation. I accept that it is expensive, but it is more just.
That is particularly important in any libel case that has a political tint about it, because judges are part of the establishment. They are there, in some ways, to uphold the establishment, and we see from some of what they come up with when commissioned by the Government to write learned reports that they often fall on the side of the establishment. Lord Hutton was the supreme example of that a few years ago when he produced a most extraordinary whitewash of all that had gone on over the Iraq affair. I therefore do not believe it is right or wise to use the argument of convenience, which could be used to abolish juries in every trial in the land for all time.
Michael Ellis
Does my hon. Friend accept that the Bill simply removes the presumption in favour of a jury trial? Does he also acknowledge that part of the difficulty with jury trials in defamation actions is that the fact of a jury trial being so much more expensive can and has been used by those who have substantial means who are seeking to put off putative plaintiffs from taking defamation action in the first place?
Jacob Rees-Mogg
My hon. Friend makes the point that the Bill takes away the presumption in favour of juries, which is fair enough. I would put that presumption back. I would trust juries to make the decision, because they are better at doing so than judges, and because a jury decision is more just. The presumption in favour of a jury is less likely to leave one under the hammer of the establishment if one falls on the wrong side of it. It is true that establishment views are sometimes hard to break through, and judges are establishment creatures, so I would always trust juries against judges.
Mark Reckless (Rochester and Strood) (Con)
My hon. Friend makes a compelling argument for retaining the presumption in favour of a jury trial for libel. Will he go further and support the re-establishment of juries in the criminal proceedings at which the previous Government chipped away, and in the broad range of civil matters in which jury trial is no longer available?
Jacob Rees-Mogg
I am in absolute agreement with my hon. Friend. Those who attack juries often take a grand view of people in public life. They think that people who are in office of some kind, or who have a seal from the Crown, are grand fellows who know everything. I think we should trust the people—a sound Conservative party slogan from the 1930s. When brought together randomly, the people make better decisions—after all, they sent hon. Members here—than the most learned judges in the land.
Any attack on juries is a part of the continual chipping away at one of the great protectors of our ancient liberties. We might believe that this attack does not matter because all our liberties are not under attack nowadays, but our liberties are always under attack. It is in the nature of Governments and judges to get more power for themselves and to suck it out from the people to whom it rightly belongs. Members of the House, representing the Commons of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland—although in this instance, we are discussing only English and Welsh law—should always be on the lookout for any attack on the rights of the people.
The cost of jury trials, which was mentioned, is part of the mishmash of saying such trials are less convenient. If jury trials are expensive, we should ask: “Is justice worth paying for, or should we penny-pinch?” Of all the things the state pays for, law and order, defence of the realm and justice are the three bulwarks on which our rights depend.
I want to criticise a couple of little points in the Bill—they are less important than the jury system, but few things are as important—the first of which is the protection of academics unless they are malicious. When one of my hon. Friends said earlier that academics are not malicious, I laughed inwardly, because academics have a reputation for having some of the most spiteful battles of any profession in history when they disagree. We should be careful in saying that academics are frightfully lovey-dovey—even people in the acting community are probably quite tough with one another behind the scenes. We should not make the assumption that academics should be protected against the requirement to tell the truth just because they are academics. If what a person says is wrong, and if it defames somebody and damages their livelihood, whether they are a regius professor or a tabloid journalist ought not to make any difference.
Another thing I would like to keep—I will be accused of being old fashioned for this—is the Slander of Women Act 1891, which protects the reputation of ladies. I cannot see any reason for getting rid of it. It is rather a shame to make our law so dry and drab that we have no elegant ornaments on it to protect the reputations of those who deserve a higher degree of protection than we gentlemen.
Ultimately, there is a battle between defamation and free speech. Our newspapers, much maligned though they have been in recent months, and possibly over the last couple of years, are the most fabulous protector of our freedoms and liberties because they are so rude—because they do spy on politicians; because they do publish stories that we do not like. They embarrass us; they make us look foolish—sometimes even corrupt. That embarrassment and shame have made British public life the most honest of any country in the world. We should always protect that freedom of speech from the forces of law or the forces of Leveson—it does not really matter which: freedom of speech is very precious. But if newspapers misuse that freedom of speech, let them be punished in the defamation courts. Let them be fined and have a penalty to pay, along with the costs of a jury, because that is what has given us such a good and well balanced system—a system that ensures our liberties, but compensates those who are defamed.
Data Protection in the Areas of Police and Criminal Justice (EU Directive)
Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts(12 years, 7 months ago)
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Mr Blunt
I am grateful to the Chair of the Scrutiny Committee for that point, but I will have to take advice on what was received and when before replying to him. I am trying to explain that, in this area, there is considerable confusion between opt-ins and opt-outs, so if he will forgive me, I shall try to explain this complicated matter and its consequences in as simple terms as I can, as much for my own benefit as for anyone else’s.
To address specifically the subject of debate this evening, we support the transfer of data across borders and between organisations where it improves our ability to prevent crime, increase security and keep our citizens safe. We must therefore protect the arrangements that have allowed EU member states to share information about suspected criminal activity in a regulated and proportionate manner. The challenge of the directive is that, although parts of it are welcome and will help in the fight against crime, some of the provisions are excessively bureaucratic and unwieldy. As it is drafted, we have concerns about the costs it would impose on UK law enforcement agencies. We are particularly concerned about the fact that it has been drafted so as to apply to internal processing of data—that is, information being shared by police forces or other criminal justice authorities within the borders of one country.
The Government's approach to the directive has been to establish the best way of securing the benefits of continued data sharing with EU member states, while minimising any resultant costs. Having gone through this analysis, our judgment is that, despite concerns about the current text, we should not opt out of the directive. There are three main reasons for this. First, the directive is at a very early stage of negotiation. There is substantial room for improvement, and it is clear that the UK has significant allies within the Council of Ministers who share our concerns. We believe that we can secure a more effective deal by working with our partners than by going it alone.
Mr Blunt
No. Secondly, the legal base of the measure gives the UK an effective exemption on the issue about which we are most concerned: internal processing of data. The directive is based on article 16 of the TFEU—the new data protection competence created under the Lisbon treaty. Under article 6a of protocol 21, which gives the UK and Ireland particular provisions and protections in the areas of freedoms, security and justice, the UK has what we believe to be a firm protection that provisions on internal processing will not apply to us.
Mr Blunt
No. My intention was to respond to the intervention made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), but he is no longer in his place, so I shall come back to it later.
Thirdly, and most important, exercising the opt-out would endanger our continued ability to share information across borders without necessarily freeing us from the bureaucratic and unwelcome obligations potentially created by the new directive. That is because in the absence of the directive, the UK would have to negotiate new data-sharing arrangements bilaterally with each of the other member states in the European economic area. Notwithstanding the significant time and cost of those separate negotiations, the fact is that each of the member states with which we would be negotiating would be bound by the terms of the new directive, and of course would press the UK to adopt similar requirements to their own. The effect would be that we would end up taking on similar obligations to those of a directive that we had not participated in negotiating, and whose content we had not had the opportunity to influence.
The Schengen instruments contain their own specific and extensive data protection provisions, which will not be affected by the directive and will continue to operate, so in effect we would be opting out of very little, with little potential benefit for the United Kingdom, but potentially to our detriment. Furthermore, there are broader consequences to an opt-out.
Mr Blunt
If we were outside the directive, our ability to negotiate essential data-sharing agreements, such as we are in the process of doing on the passenger name records directive and the European Union third-country passenger name records agreements, could be significantly undermined. Equally fundamental, exercising our opt-out on this measure could throw our participation in other, broader Schengen measures into question and the Council could take the decision not allow us to continue to participate in valuable data-sharing arrangements under the police co-operation provisions of Schengen. This would be a serious problem for our law enforcement agencies, which benefit from the sharing of criminal data under Schengen.
It is therefore our careful collective judgment, based on the most pessimistic view of costs and benefits, shared with the European Scrutiny Committee, that our national interests are best served by participating in this directive so that we are party to the framework governing data-sharing for policing and criminal justice across the European Union.
Mr Cash
I find it extraordinary that my hon. Friend should seek to defend the Government’s breach of a series of requirements as prescribed in the spirit of the orders before the House, but in addition, it is perfectly clear—to me at any rate—that these proceedings are happening because of the timetable of Prorogation.
Jacob Rees-Mogg
I wonder whether the real reason why this is being done in this appalling way, completely ignoring the proper forms of scrutiny, is that the Government know they have an absolutely rotten argument and thought they would push this through quickly while people were thinking about Prorogation and the Queen’s Speech and what will be in the next programme. It is little more than prestidigitation.
Mr Cash
I concur. Other hon. Members wish to speak, so all I can say is that this matter will not to be allowed to rest. We will look into it further. The Committee will expect the Minister to give an explanation in person to us. I shall leave my remarks at that for the time being.
Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)
I will be conscious of your remarks, Madam Deputy Speaker. It is, as always, a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Vauxhall (Kate Hoey). If this motion is passed tonight, it will result in yet another slice of the sovereignty of this House passing to Brussels and to the European Union. We have no obligation to do it. This country has every right to opt out of the measure, and that is exactly what we should do. The rest of the EU would, of course, continue to be bound by the measure, and if there was a benefit to our citizens, they would benefit too. If the House felt the need to legislate independently of the EU, we could do so, but we should not simply accept the measure as it stands.
We have a choice. The Government propose to inch further down the path to greater European integration—a path that, I submit, runs in the opposite direction to that in which the vast majority of the British public wish to go. Although the two Front-Bench teams might agree, I suspect that millions of people outside this place agree with those who have spoken from the Back Benches who, in this argument, are on the side of the British public. Once we have chosen not to exercise our right to opt out, there will be no option to reverse that decision, and we will have slipped yet further into the EU’s clutches.
The Minister expressed concern that if we did not accept the measure, other European countries might choose not to co-operate with us. My first thought to that was, “Simple. Let’s tell them we’ll stop sending the cheque every month.” That might soon get them into order. Then there is this nonsense that we might be obliged to enter bilateral agreements and that it is all too difficult. What nonsense! We have thousands and thousands of civil servants who must surely negotiate bilateral agreements all the time.
Jacob Rees-Mogg
Not only would it not be too difficult but we have an agreement in place already under which it is a requirement of the EU that every effort be made to maximise its effectiveness in the event of it being replaced. So the Government’s argument does not stand up.
Mr Nuttall
My hon. Friend makes a good point. It would not be at all difficult, as the Minister suggested, for us to reach separate bilateral agreements, not just with the remaining 26 members but with the other European countries that are not members. We need to be doing deals with them as well, if this is such a good idea.
As pointed out, if we adopted this measure, it would have significant resource implications, as paragraph 33 of the Government’s explanatory memorandum, dated 13 February, makes clear. At a time when the whole thrust of Government policy is aimed at reducing the amount of regulation, our public services will have to contend with yet more rules and regulations. Many will rightly question why we are subjecting them to more Brussels red tape. The bundle of papers available from the Vote Office on this motion demonstrates the size of the problem. It contains well over 300 sides of A4 paper. So we have more regulations, the cost of which we know not. In essence, we are being asked to sign a blank cheque. We should not be taking this step, and I urge the House to vote against the motion.
EU Criminal Policy
Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts(12 years, 10 months ago)
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Mr Cash
Certainly not. I am not conjuring up a spectre; I am talking about a tendency. In almost every area, the original proposals—from Maastricht, through to Nice, Amsterdam and Lisbon—have adopted a minimalist approach at the beginning, but then expanded, moving further and deeper into the areas of competence that have been acquired. I am not going to dispute what the right hon. Gentleman says about what he has heard; I am merely referring to what I have observed, which is also understood by many others, including the Government.
Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)
The ambition of the European Commission is set out on page 18 of the documents. Its ambition is not a limited extension of criminal policy; it is to have
“an important tool to better fight crime”—
that is, any crime. It is not limited.
Mr Cash
I entirely agree. Furthermore, article 83.1 sets out the following areas of crime:
“terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised crime.”
It continues:
“On the basis of developments in crime”—
the broader remit under which such an extension is proposed—
“the Council may adopt a decision identifying other areas of crime that meet the criteria specified in this paragraph.”
Although article 83.1 says that the Council
“shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament,”
we are talking about a process of opening up and extending those areas of domestic control over criminal jurisdiction that are likely to be transferred to the European domain.
On a final note—and to reply to the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith), the Chairman of the Liaison Committee—the Committee noted that the third sentence of the communication states:
“An EU Criminal Policy should have an overall goal to foster citizens’ confidence in the fact that they live in a Europe of freedom, security and justice”.
I ask the Minister to say whether he agrees with that statement. For our part, we in the Committee think it an example of dangerously ideological thinking. We are concerned that such thinking may inform future proposals from the Commission. Citizens look to their Governments to provide freedom, security and justice in their own states. To expect freedom, security and justice to flow in 27 European states under the auspices of supranational institutions may sound laudable, but in reality it is both implausible and unwarranted. We think that the Commission would have done itself a service by cutting out such a statement from a policy paper of such importance and limiting its ambitions to more practical objectives.
Charlie Elphicke
My hon. Friend helps me to move to my next point. The policy applies not just to market abuse. It also applies to
“terrorism, trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised crime.”
The list is packaged in the manner of “Do you like hospitals?” or “Do you eat food to live?”. It has been put together with breathtaking cynicism and in a way that would make even a push poller blush. We know what this is really about. It is about starting with something that everyone can accept so that they say, “Oh, yes, that’s a good idea,”. That puts the principle in place before things are moved forward. The document says, “We then want to move forward into other areas,” as my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton just said.
Let us look at the issue of market abuse. Why can we not have the market abuse rules in the criminal law of our own nation? Why do we need to have minimum standards across European law if we do not necessarily want to opt in? We are being told that there is no such thing as—
Charlie Elphicke
In a moment.
We are being told that it is a misdescription to talk about a Euro-crime, but on page 9 the document states, under the heading, “What is the possible content of EU minimum rules on criminal law?”:
“The definition of the offences…Regarding sanctions, EU criminal law can require Member States to take effective, proportionate…criminal sanctions for a specific conduct.”
So if we touch on the issue of definition of the offence, and add on criminal sanctions, there is a risk that what we are actually talking about is, in effect, or could be seen as, a form of Euro-crime. I hasten to add that I do not necessarily regard that as a bad idea.
Jacob Rees-Mogg
If we were to have this co-recognition of crimes and action, would it not make more sense to do it with New York rather than with Brussels, because there is much more international financial trading in New York and London than there is in Europe?
Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)
I am very glad that the European Scrutiny Committee recommended this European Commission document for debate because it shows, once again, the ambition of the European Union. We have heard before—it is in the treaty of Rome—the line about ever-closer union. We often hear from the great and the good in this country that we do not need to worry about what the document says because it is not happening yet; it is not so important; these good and great people are not necessarily talking about it yet. And then it creeps in and it happens.
The ambition of the Commission’s document is exceedingly great, and the policies that it has already adopted are important. We notice, in the package of papers before us, that in 2009 the European Commission announced, under the Swedish presidency, that it would have more broad provisions guiding the Council’s criminal law deliberations. So, for three years already, the Commission, the presidency and the Council of Ministers have been looking at what they should be doing with the criminal law provisions and how they should affect us. We in this country are indeed protected by our opt-ins, but we have to bear in mind that once we have opted in, we are subject to qualified majority vote. So it is a once-and-for-all decision—we say, “Yes, we are going into that,” but then the people of this country, as hon. Friends have said, have no further ability to change that law; it becomes a matter bound in to European Union competence.
Let us look, as some of my hon. Friends already have, at the ambition of the European Commission in this area, at what it thinks more common criminal law will do, and how broad it is in its definition of the criminal law. We hear from the Front-Bench spokesmen that common criminal law will be used in rare cases, for important crimes. That is not actually what the European Commission seems to say. Page 11 of the package of documents says:
“EU criminal law fosters the confidence of citizens in using their right to free movement and to buy goods or services from providers from other Member States through a more effective fight against crime and the adoption of minimum standards for procedural rights in criminal proceedings as well as for victims of crime.”
That sentence—that bullet point—from the European Commission covers an incredibly wide set of crimes. They could be anything to do with the free movement of people, or the provision of services throughout the European Union. It then provides for minimum standards of procedure. That affects all sorts of basic points of the criminal law in this country. Will the procedure allow for trial by jury? It does not establish that. Does the procedure outlaw double jeopardy, which we basically still protect our citizens—our subjects—against? It does not say that. It says that it is aiming for these
“minimum standards for procedural rights”
and the rights “for victims of crime.”
The European Commission goes on to say:
“Common rules strengthen mutual trust among the judiciaries and law enforcement authorities of the Member States. This facilitates the mutual recognition of judicial measures as national authorities feel more comfortable recognising decisions taken in another Member State if the definitions of the underlying criminal offences are compatible.”
That means that we have to align our laws with other member states in the European Union. There may not be an immediate proposal to do that, but it is what the European Commission has in its documentation, it is what it wishes to do, and we know from experience that what the European Commission starts out with often comes to be the case.
Who can forget that wonderful moment when Lady Thatcher stood at the Dispatch Box and there were three proposals from Mr Delors, and Margaret Thatcher said “No! No! No!”? Each one of those three has now become an established part of the European family that we know and love.
What is the time scale? That again is set out by the European Commission in its package of documents. Page 18 says that it has a
“vision for a coherent and consistent EU Criminal Policy”
by 2020. So the European Commission wants us, in eight years, to have established that uniformity.
As we have discussed, the proposal includes things that are open to wide interpretation, such as computer crimes. Even an alarm clock is now computer-controlled, so even if you were to steal an alarm clock—[Interruption.] Of course, you would not steal an alarm clock, Madam Deputy Speaker, but if some brigand were to do so, that might be deemed to be a computer crime. The description is therefore set wide, as it is for
“serious infringements of road transport rules”.
If someone were to park on a red route, at what point would it be a matter for the European Union?
The Commission has set out an extremely ambitious communication, which I am glad that the House is debating. It knows clearly its route of travel and where it wants to end up, which is, ultimately, a single European state. No British Government have ever been in favour of that, yet every British Government since 1972 have ceded more powers to the European Union to create a superstate. It is important to debate the proposal at an early stage of its formation so that the Government can be robust and aware of the problem, and so that they can refuse opt-ins that, step by step, lead to the ever-closer union that has been the EU’s policy since it was founded.
Access to a Lawyer
Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts(13 years, 2 months ago)
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Mr Nuttall
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. That is one reason why opposition to our membership of the EU is growing in this country. As I often say to people, in many ways every directive that passes is another nail in the argument of those who will one day argue in a referendum—I believe we will eventually have one—that we should stay in the EU. People are increasingly fed up with the ever-growing competences of the EU. It is all very well to argue that the European Union Act 2011 will put an end to all these things, but we can see—day by day, week by week, month by month—that slivers of competence are going to Europe, and this would be another of those slivers. If the directive were adopted, it would be a classic example of this country’s handing over a further tiny piece of its competence. It might be only a sliver, but this is still a matter of sovereignty. At present, we can decide what our rules are.
Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)
Is this not also a classic example of the European ratchet? First the European arrest warrant allows British subjects going about their lawful business in their own country to be arrested by foreign Governments; then it is decided that there must be basic standards to protect them from such action, because that is only fair and proper; and that then leads to the conclusion that there must be more harmonisation of the criminal law across Europe. In fact, what Her Majesty’s Government should be doing is not just not opting into this, but getting out of all the other measures to which they have agreed.
Mr Nuttall
My hon. Friend has made an excellent point, which I am sure would find widespread support outside the House. Far too much legislation from Europe is already foisted on our constituents, and we certainly do not need this as well. It is, in my view, an example of a solution looking for a problem. There is certainly no great clamour for it. When our constituents go abroad, they may well choose to go to Europe—there are, after all, another 26 countries in the European Union—but they may equally choose to visit any of the other 170-odd countries in the world, where none of this would apply. What do they do then?
We ought to consider speaking—quietly and diplomatically, of course—to plenty of other countries which have judicial systems that are far less helpful to the accused than any that might be found in the European Union. This is, I submit, a criminals’ charter. If it were to become law, the criminals and their lawyers would not only have to comply with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, but would have recourse to this directive as well as the European Rights Act 1998 and the European convention on human rights. It would be yet another hurdle for our police to surmount in dealing with crime and disorder on our streets, and, in my opinion, a problem that we could well do without.
The other group of people who would profit from the directive are the lawyers, particularly legal aid lawyers. As has already been mentioned this evening, it has been suggested that advice be given face to face. I know from my own experience many years ago that when a suspect is arrested, advice is given quite adequately on the telephone, and I see no reason to change that arrangement. Again, there has been no clamour for it to be changed. I see no reason why this country should have to change its practices and procedures purely on the basis of this directive. It may well benefit other countries—indeed, it may well benefit some of our constituents when they travel abroad—but I feel strongly that there is no need for it to be adopted now or at any time in the future. I hope that even when the negotiations have been completed, this will be the last that we hear of it, and that we shall never see it back on the Floor of the House again.
Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession) Bill
Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts(13 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Mr Knight
If I may respond to that en passant, as it were, I accept that argument. The Procedure Committee has not yet considered this, but an argument can be made that we could consider bringing in a process whereby when a private Member’s Bill has had three hours of debate the question is then put. The Procedure Committee would wish to consider that option, although I would not wish to prejudge how it might decide to form its view on that proposition. That certainly could be done and it would mean that we would have more debates, which, in my view, is a good thing.
The next duty of anyone who comes fairly high in the ballot is to decide on the subject. Hon. Members basically make a choice in one of two areas. Either they choose a subject of great controversy or perhaps startling change and to have their day in the sun on Second Reading, knowing that the Bill will be opposed by the Government and even by the official Opposition and will be talked out, or they look for something less controversial but worthy in the hope that they can get it on to the statute book. I have to be honest and say that my first choice was to introduce a daylight saving Bill, but I was usurped by my hon. Friend the Member for Castle Point (Rebecca Harris), who was higher up the ballot and who, to her great credit, has successfully piloted her Bill to Committee. I wish her well with it. Because of her decision, I decided to look around for another less controversial but worthy proposition, and I decided that I wanted to introduce a Bill that would make our law fairer in some way.
I had cause to look at some of the recent work of the Law Commission and of the Select Committee on Justice—I am delighted to see that the Chairman of that Committee, the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith), is in his place—and I observed some of their reflections on the forfeiture rule and the law of succession. I therefore decided on my present Bill. I accept that it is not likely to be the talking point of the week in the village pub, but it deals with three related areas where, in my view, a small change in our law is both warranted and desirable.
I must tell the House that due to the complexities of the subject, this will not be a speech full of soundbites. I shall give some background. The Bill seeks to amend the law of succession in England and Wales where a person disclaims—that is, rejects—an inheritance or is disqualified from receiving an inheritance by reason of the forfeiture rule. What is the forfeiture rule? It has long been a doctrine of the common law of this country and I think it is a good doctrine to which no reasonable person could take exception. It states that if a man or woman is criminally responsible for the death of another, neither he or she nor his or her elected representatives can be entitled to reap any financial benefit from that act. As Lord Justice Salmon said in the case of Gray v. Barr, which was reported in 1971, 2 All England Reports at page 974:
“it would in general, shock the public conscience if a man could use the courts to enforce a money claim either under a contract or a will by reason of his having committed such act”—
that is, the act of murder.
Experience has shown that there are some cases—they might be few, but they are hard cases—where the public conscience would not want the full forfeiture provisions to apply, such as those involving mercy killings, the survivor of a suicide pact initiated by the non-surviving party and perhaps a battered wife driven almost beyond the borderline of sanity by the cruelty of a violent spouse. In such cases, the criminal courts will normally have been merciful and might have not even awarded any custodial sentence in the criminal proceedings. It was to deal with these situations and cases like them that the Forfeiture Act 1982 was passed. That Act provides for discretion to be applied by the courts in cases of manslaughter—I emphasise the word manslaughter, because there is no discretion in cases of murder. In cases of manslaughter where mitigating circumstances exist, the courts can allow the forfeiture rule to be relaxed, where appropriate.
The current rule is defined in section 1 of the 1982 Act as meaning the rule of public policy, which in certain circumstances precludes a person who has unlawfully killed another or unlawfully aided, abetted, counselled or procured the death of that other from acquiring a benefit in consequence of the killing.
My Bill gives effect, with some modifications, to the recommendations set out in the Law Commission’s 2005 report, “The Forfeiture Rule and the Law of Succession”. The subject of forfeiture and succession was referred to the Law Commission following the very unsatisfactory case Re DWS (deceased) 2001. Briefly, the facts of that case were that a person, whom I will call P, killed both his parents, neither of whom left a will. The court had to decide who was entitled to inherit P’s father’s estate under the intestacy rules, which are specified in sections 46 and 47 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925. P was not allowed to inherit because of the forfeiture rule, which I have just outlined. However, P’s child, the grandchild of P’s victims, could not inherit in place of P, because under the intestacy rules P was still alive and therefore P’s child could not take an interest in the estate. In that particular case, the victim’s estate therefore passed to a sister, which was unsatisfactory because by the time the court reached its conclusion the sister herself had passed away.
The Law Commission considered that the outcome of that case was unfair, and I agree. Equally unfairly, however, a situation might arise in which a killer forfeited an inheritance under a will. I do not believe that allowing a killer’s children to inherit from the victim in those narrow circumstances would encourage anyone who would not otherwise do so to commit a murder or attempted murder. The alternative is to stay with our present law and disinherit innocent children, which is most unfair. In any event, the law offers protection to prevent a killer from benefiting from a forfeited inheritance that passes to a minor, because the court has power on application to appoint two trustees or more where a minority interest arises on intestacy. It also has the power to pass over any person with a prior interest in a grant of letters of administration and appoint someone else to run the estate.
Similar problems can also occur where a person disclaims an inheritance under a will or on intestacy. For example, where in an intestacy—to the non-lawyers among us, that means where there is no will to say what should happen to the estate—the person who disclaims is the only child of the deceased, the inheritance will bypass the child’s descendants, because grandchildren can only inherit from their grandparent if their parent dies before the grandparent, in which case the inheritance passes instead to the deceased’s other, but more distant, blood relatives.
Let me give the House an example of how that might arise. Let us say that A, the deceased, dies and leaves a fortune, money which he lawfully made from his ownership of a nightclub and casino. He does not leave a will, but dies leaving a son, B, and two grandchildren, C and D. B is a strict follower of Victorian values and is a devout Baptist Christian, unlike his father. His views are similar to those of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in the USA, which holds the views that God’s way is that we should earn what we get and that gambling is a sin. Because of those beliefs, B decides that he cannot in all conscience accept the legacy, so he disclaims—that is, he gives up his entitlement to money from his father’s estate. Under our law, in so doing he would prevent his own children, C and D, from inheriting, which applies even if they were to welcome the inheritance with open arms. Indeed, C and D might have embraced gambling as passionately as their own father had disowned it, but that would make no difference. Under our law, the inheritance would go elsewhere, which is neither right nor fair. That is why I am seeking to make a change with my Bill.
Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)
If the strict Baptist did not want the money to go to his children, because he thought that
“the wages of sin is death”,
would he be able to take the inheritance and give it away, which would have the same effect as disclaiming, and therefore not lose his right to make that choice?
Mr Knight
B would be able to do that, although our law clearly states that one cannot refuse part of an inheritance—it is all or nothing. Once the decision is made, one cannot change one’s mind, unless others have not acted on one’s initial decision, in which case one can. The son would be at liberty to accept the inheritance and then give it away—indeed, he could give it to the church of which he was a member.
Stranger things happen where there is a will. If someone decides to give up something that they have been bequeathed in a will, what happens depends on the wording of the will. Such cases would need individual consideration.
Mr Nuttall
I certainly wish the Bill well. I am about to express my concern at how long it has been held up in the legislative process. The report from the Justice Committee referred to that.
Jacob Rees-Mogg
I am loth to disagree with the hon. Member for West Ham (Lyn Brown), who always makes fine points, but on this occasion may I encourage my hon. Friend to give us a full explanation so that we can thoroughly understand why the Bill is necessary? Legislation is a big and weighty matter and should be brought in only for major issues where there is real concern. We need to understand that, and I am grateful for the fullness of my hon. Friend’s explanation, which I hope will be even fuller.
Mr Nuttall
I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention. The Bill would not be before the House had it not been for the original case. It raises the question how many other cases in solicitors’ offices throughout the land have been determined on the back of that Court of Appeal case without ever going to court because the solicitors would say, “We know what the law is because of the Court of Appeal ruling in that case.” Many cases may have been dealt with in that way.
It has now been 18 years since the murder, and 10 years since the judgment, which raises the question of how fast we have progressed with the matter.
Mr Nuttall
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that helpful information. If we extrapolate from that, disregarding the fact that the legal proceedings took six years from their launch to their conclusion, we can calculate that in the past 10 years around 2,000 cases have been affected by the delay in bringing the matter to fruition.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) referred to the evidence that Professor Beale gave to the Justice Committee when it prepared its sixth report, which was part of the pre-legislative scrutiny procedure for the draft Civil Law Reform Bill. Professor Beale had indicated the difficulties in implementing the Law Commission’s recommendations. With regard to limitation periods, one problem was that the delay had been so long that new cases had come along in the meantime and changed the legal position.
The Secretary of State for Justice at the time, the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), had accepted that there had been delays in implementing the Law Commission’s recommendations. He said that the draft Civil Law Reform Bill had “been in process” since he had been at the Ministry of Justice. He said:
“One of the difficulties… is that this is an important measure but there have always been other… demands on the legislative programme in the past which have meant that it has been squeezed out, because it is worthy—I actually think very important in terms of what it is doing—but it has not been seen as such a high priority.”
I am sure that those affected by that in the 2,000 cases would think that it is an extremely high priority. He continued:
“That is the honest trust about it… There has also been an extensive period of consultation.”
Well, he is certainly right there. He continued:
“The original proposals, for example, in respect of damages following fatal accidents, which were in the Law Commission proposals, have themselves been refined since then. But if you are saying: ‘Does that take 11 years?’, the answer to that is no.”
There are clearly problems with the procedures. If the case highlights anything—it is perhaps something that the House should look at—it is how the recommendations of the Law Commission are put into legislation. The Minister might have something to say on that later.
The Justice Committee did much pre-legislative scrutiny on that draft Bill and produced an excellent report on it, so it is interesting that the coalition Government have now announced that they do not intend to proceed with it. Were it not for the good fortune of the decision by my right hon. Friend the Member for East Yorkshire to adopt the Bill after his name was drawn in the ballot, I wonder how long the work of the Law Commission and the subsequent legislative scrutiny of the Justice Committee would have languished in the parliamentary waiting room.
If the Bill passes into law, the position would be clarified by virtue of the inclusion of proposed new section 46A, which provides that where a person is entitled to inherit on an intestacy but has either disclaimed their right or is precluded from inheriting by the forfeiture rule, that person is to be treated as having died immediately before the intestate. Clause 2 makes a similar provision to cover cases in which a person dies having left a will and a beneficiary under that will either disclaims or is precluded from inheriting by virtue of the forfeiture rule. Clause 3 provides that in the tragic case of a single parent under the age of 18 dying intestate and leaving a child or children surviving, the estate of the intestate—
Jacob Rees-Mogg
Would my hon. Friend explain a little more about the circumstances under which a testator could leave provision that would not be affected by the Bill? I have been unable to work out how a person who is murdered could have expected and anticipated that in their will. Would he elaborate on that point?
Mr Nuttall
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. One of the problems is that the affairs of a person who is murdered are left hanging in mid air. If they have not made a will, their affairs might be left to the vagaries of the intestacy laws. If they have made a will and have been murdered by their son, law might provide for the estate to pass to that son anyway.