Finance (No. 2) Bill

Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts

Wednesday 17th April 2013 Commons Chamber

[Nigel Mills]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend and I would like to expand a little on this theme. It has been said before that there are various ways of interpreting what the rule of law means. One version from the 17th century is that the rule of law is the

“supremacy of regular power as opposed to arbitrary power”.

In the case before us, rather than saying “Here is the law that applies to everyone,” we are giving the Revenue the right to rewrite the law only for certain people subject to certain permissions. That sounds like arbitrary power to me.

As a classics graduate, I thought I would dip back into history and finally find some use in having done a classics degree. Plato said:

“Where the law is subject to some other authority and has none of its own, the collapse of the state in my view is not far off; but if the law is the master of the government and the government is its slave, then the situation is full of promise.”

What we are doing here is saying that the law now has no authority, as we are giving somebody else the power to change the law, and that rather than the Government having to follow the law, the Government and its agencies can change the law retrospectively. We need to be clear that we are weighing up whether the real sin of the existing excessive, outrageous and truly abominable level of complex tax avoidance by people who should know better and should not be doing it is enough for us to risk weakening the rule of law.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend on the issue of the rule of law. However, I wonder whether the outrageous examples that have caused such scandal over tax avoidance were actually examples of tax evasion, and whether HMRC has in fact been very weak about enforcing the tax law as it exists now.

[Nigel Mills]

I agree with my hon. Friend that tax evasion is a crime that should be prosecuted to the fullest possible extent, but in this instance we are talking about tax avoidance.

We should be clear about the principle of what we are doing. We are saying to HMRC, “You can enforce something that is not in law.” If we are to pursue that line, we must be certain that safeguards are in place so that we do not see—metaphorically, of course—tax inspectors turning up with baseball bats, banging down the door of the taxpayer and saying “Give us money or else.” The “or else” would mean, of course, HMRC making the assessment and taking the money in any event, and the other party having to go through expensive court proceedings to try to get it back. I have worked with many tax inspectors, and clearly I do not think that any of them would literally pick up a baseball bat, but there is a risk that in any difficult situation in which there is some doubt about the application of the law, tax inspectors will start writing letters saying, “Unless you agree with my analysis, I reserve the right to apply the general anti-abuse rule, in which case”—effectively—“you will be in deep trouble.”

I think it would be very generous of Members to assume that, in all circumstances and for ever, HMRC would apply this power only to the largest, most abusive and most complicated taxpayers. I suspect that, in the experience of most Members, the Revenue has at times been a little weaker when tackling the very large taxpayers with very big pockets, and a little stronger when tackling those who are a bit smaller and a bit less sophisticated, and who may not be able to fight back as effectively. There is a real risk here. If we give the Revenue a power amounting to complete discretion in regard to whether it applies this rule to individual taxpayers, what is to prevent a large organisation from buying its tax inspector a nice lunch, and an application to apply the rule perhaps never actually being made?

I am not suggesting that that would ever happen. I have certainly never known such things to happen; tax inspectors are usually very law-abiding, and very committed to their role. However, there have been instances in which we as a Parliament have been concerned that the Revenue has not treated the largest and the smallest taxpayers equally. In this instance, we are giving the Revenue a discretionary power, and allowing it to choose when to try to use it. Are we sure that the Revenue will use that power against the people against whom we think it should be used, and not against our constituents who have not done anything particularly wrong?

It has been suggested that we are introducing too many safeguards, and questions have just been asked as to why we are imposing the burden of proof on the Revenue rather than on the taxpayer, as in every other situation. This is plainly not a normal piece of tax law. We are saying, “You may have complied with the law but we still think that you are in the wrong, so we will retrospectively pretend that the law said something different from what it actually said.” In such circumstances it must be right for the Revenue to have a duty to demonstrate that that is appropriate, rather than saying to the taxpayer, “You must prove somehow that you acted within a law that had not actually been published.” That would be nonsensical. It would be equally nonsensical to make the penalties for contravening the GAAR higher than the penalties for contravening the published law. If I flout the law and am defeated in my claim on the basis of the published law, I will rightly be subject to penalties, but for me to be subject to higher penalties when I have not actually broken the published law, which I can read, would certainly be nonsense.

I accept that the Government have undertaken long and detailed consultation and have tried to find a way of introducing a power to tackle the most aggressive, egregious and outrageous tax avoidance without creating some of the pitfalls that would worry me and, I think, my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field). We do not want to create a tax system that is based not on law, but on random interpretations of various transactions by HMRC at some point in the future. I also accept that the Government have made the safeguards as reasonable as is commensurate with ensuring that the law retains some teeth.

I shall ask some questions about the drafting of the Bill later, but let me first explain why I tabled my amendments. I wanted to try to ensure that the power focused on the large, complex, aggressive, expensive schemes peddled by naughty solicitors and accountants, rather than being used as a general threat against ordinary taxpayers who had tried to structure their affairs sensibly and had chosen to conduct a transaction in a way that we could accept.

There are many innocent ways of trying to reduce a tax bill. It is possible to make a pension contribution rather than taking income as taxed earnings. I do not think any of us would object to that. The law clearly identifies it as a choice that we can all make. The owner of a company can choose whether to take a dividend, a salary or a bonus, or whether to leave the cash in the company and to be taxed on a capital gain when he leaves. I do not think many of us would say that someone who chose not to take a bonus in the year in which he sold his company but instead to allow the cash to be deemed a capital gain in order to secure a lower tax rate would be perpetrating an outrageously aggressive tax abuse arrangement of the kind that we should prevent by rewriting the law. We must be careful not to allow the Revenue to apply this power to every piece of innocent, sensible tax planning, when the only fallback will be the definition of a reasonable use of the rules.

Some people might consider it reasonable for Parliament to intend what it says it intends. When we pass a law, it is reasonable to assume that we mean what we put in that law. If we meant something different, we probably ought to have said that something different, and if it turns out that we have got it slightly wrong, we should amend the law. I accept that we have been doing that in various situations for the last God knows how many years, and have ended up with a hugely complex tax code. Every time we build in more complexity, we create more loopholes, and then we have to create even more complex rules to try to close those loopholes—and then we create more and more. Perhaps the answer is to have much shorter, simpler tax codes. I hope that, once the Government have put the GAAR on to the statute book—as I fully expect them to do—we can attempt a wholesale simplification of our tax regimes.