European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts

Tuesday 12th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Davis]

Not for the moment, no.

Secondly, we have removed Parliament’s power to give binding negotiating directions to the Government. As I have said, this would represent a profound constitutional shift in terms of which branch of the state holds the right to act in the international sphere. I turn again to Vernon Bogdanor, who said:

“Parliament’s role is to scrutinise legislation and policy; 650 MPs, still less 800 peers, cannot themselves negotiate.”

[Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Davis]

I will give way in a moment.

Instead, we have provided that, in the event that Parliament rejects the deal put to it, the Government will be legally obliged to make a statement on their proposed next steps in relation to article 50 negotiations within 28 days of that rejection. This House would of course then have plenty of tools at its disposal to respond, but I am as confident as ever that we will secure an agreement that this House will want to support.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

I was amused to discover that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State was a little taken aback by the amendment I tabled late last night. I tabled it with his best interests at heart. Having spent last week understanding that he might imminently be joining me on the Back Benches and realising that Lords amendment 19, if endorsed by the Commons, might precipitate the same thing again, I thought I ought to do what I could to help him. That is why I tabled my amendment, in addition to the one he has tabled, in lieu of the Lords amendment.

I must tell the House that I really am worried: the irrationality of the debate on the detail of Brexit is truly chilling. A person opens their newspaper and discovers they are about to prevent Brexit, when what the House is doing is legitimately looking at the detail of one of the most complex legal and political exercises in which we have ever engaged in peacetime, and, as a result, our ability to have a rational debate entirely evaporates. If we continue in this way, we will make mistakes and not achieve the best possible outcome.

The House of Lords was not acting irrationally when it agreed amendment 19. It had picked up on something that ought to be of great concern to everybody in this House—namely, that although we can make provision for achieving a deal, if we do not achieve a deal at all, we will be facing an immense crisis. It might be that some of my colleagues on the Government Benches are excited at this prospect and think it a wonderful moment, but I am not; I think it will be catastrophic. The question, therefore, is: how do we take sensible steps, in anticipation of this, to try to ensure a coherent process for dealing with it? That is what this is about. It is not about obstructing Brexit.

If we want to obstruct Brexit, there are plenty of other ways to do it. We could replace the Government with one that would like to stop it, although, having already triggered article 50, we would still have to get the consent of our EU partners. There is, then, a complete constitutional incoherence in imagining that the Bill and the way it is presented somehow leads to that dastardly outcome.

[Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg]

My concern about my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendment is that it would change the constitutional balance and separation of powers. There is a perfectly reasonable way of ensuring that the Government do the proper thing, and that is a vote of no confidence. As long as the Government maintain the confidence of this House, they ought to be able to negotiate international treaties, but if they fail in their negotiations, the House has a remedy that has been a remedy for very many years.

[Mr Grieve]

I take my hon. Friend’s point, but I would like him to consider for one moment the last part of my amendment, new section 5C, which deals with what happens if, on 15 February 2019, we have no deal. His invitation would be for the House to express no confidence in the Government and to get rid of them. Can one imagine a more chaotic process than the triggering of a general election five weeks before we fall off the edge of the cliff?