Ukraine

Jack Straw Excerpts

Tuesday 10th February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I am afraid that my right hon. and learned Friend and I will probably have to agree to disagree on that. The position is this: if Russia was intending to make a full-scale military push into Ukraine, it has the forces available to do it. Approximately 10,000 Russian forces are along the border with eastern Ukraine, and it has sophisticated weaponry in large quantities and air forces that could be mobilised. The Russians are already able to do that.

We judge that the intervention the Kremlin is making is carefully calculated to improve the position of the separatists on the ground and to apply pressure to the Ukrainian regime, but there has not so far been a wholesale land grab—it has been the consolidating of separatists’ positions. We judge that the Ukrainian army at the moment is able to hold the line and that, broadly speaking, it is doing so.

I have said that we will reserve the right to keep under review the question of supplying lethal aid. As my right hon. and learned Friend very well knows, many in the United States are debating openly whether a large package of military equipment assistance should be provided to Ukraine. That would clearly change the parameters of the debate. We are watching that debate very closely.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

The right hon. Gentleman said in his statement that it was a national decision for each country in the NATO alliance whether to supply lethal aid to Ukraine. He is absolutely right—that is a matter of fact—but does he accept that this cannot be left to unilateral decisions by individual countries? The Russians, for certain, would regard any provision of lethal aid—I certainly do not rule that out in certain circumstances—as a consequence of collective decision making within NATO and seek to respond in a similar way.

While accepting the reality the Foreign Secretary describes—it is a national decision—what efforts is he making to ensure that there is some co-ordination, not least so that we do not end up with a situation in which, within the NATO alliance, two policies are being pursued, which the Russians would skilfully exploit?

[Mr Hammond]

I am afraid that the reality is that, if the United States decides to supply lethal aid, there will be two policies within the NATO alliance, because the German Chancellor could not have been clearer about her position, which she set out on Saturday, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) said. This is a matter for individual national Government decision, and individual countries will make their own decisions. As far as I am aware, no countries within the NATO alliance apart from the United States are actively contemplating the supply of lethal assistance to the Ukrainians.

Iran (Nuclear Talks)

Jack Straw Excerpts

Tuesday 25th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I can reassure my right hon. Friend that transparency and an inspection and verification regime are at the heart of these negotiations. The Iranians understand that the regrettable but none the less undeniable lack of mutual trust between the two sides means that there will have to be robust inspection and verification procedures in place throughout the duration of any agreement. Indeed, there will have to be proper transparency and inspection arrangements in place beyond the duration of any agreement under the usual terms of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in respect of a non-nuclear power.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

I draw the attention of the House to the fact that I am co-chairman of the all-party group on Iran. The Secretary of State’s characterisation of negotiations with the Iranians as tough, complex and painstaking sounds all too familiar. I have every sympathy with him and commend him on his work. All of us want to see a satisfactory deal, but does he accept that there is a danger, if this drifts on, of a hardening of sanctions by the United States Congress and, at the same time, a degradation of sanctions by some of the other parties in the E3 plus 3? Has he any comment to make on the report in Fars News, an Iranian news agency, yesterday that President Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with President Rouhani of Iran in which he proposed

“to lift the anti-Iran sanctions in a unilateral and gradual process.”

[Mr Hammond]

I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that Foreign Minister Zarif refers often to the negotiations that took place in the middle of the last decade. I suppose he does that to emphasise that he was involved in the discussion long before any of us at the table were. It is, as the right hon. Gentleman suggests, absolutely essential that the sanctions regime remains robust. Last November, we said that the easing of certain specific sanctions under this deal did not imply, and would not be allowed to imply, a general weakening of the sanctions regime. We have seen nothing to suggest that the sanctions regime has weakened. We monitor it carefully and it remains effective and robust and it must continue to do so. I too saw, while I was still in Vienna yesterday, those remarks attributed to President Putin. I was with Foreign Minister Lavrov, who gave me no reason to believe that they were likely to be true, and I note that they were reported by an Iranian source. We are seeking clarification from the Russians, but I do not expect to see them break ranks. The Russians have been entirely constructive and very much engaged in this process, as have the Chinese.

Iran (UK Foreign Policy)

Jack Straw Excerpts

Thursday 6th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

The hon. Member for South Norfolk (Mr Bacon) and I are grateful to the Backbench Business Committee for agreeing to the debate. The hon. Gentleman and I are joint chairmen of the all-party parliamentary group on Iran. Flagged on today’s Order Paper is the report on Iran from the Foreign Affairs Committee, published in July. I know that the whole House will be grateful for that.

The debate comes at an important moment. In less than three weeks, on 24 November, the deadline for the current phase of the E3 plus 3 nuclear negotiations with Iran will be reached. Before I say more about those negotiations, let me put the debate in context. Here in the United Kingdom, too little is either known or understood about Iran. With a population of 77 million, it is second in size only to Egypt in the wider middle east, but it is much more prosperous than Egypt. It is “middle income” on the United Nations’ GDP measure, ahead of Bulgaria, which is a member of the European Union. Iran has a distinguished three-millennium civilisation, with as many connections, cultural and political, to Europe as to its southern and eastern neighbours. Its language is Indo-European. The words “Iran” and “Aryan” share the same root. Although it is Muslim, it is Muslim in its own singular way, through its practice of Shi’ism. It is a great mistake ever to suggest to an Iranian that Iranians are Arabs. It may sound counter-intuitive today, but traditionally lran’s strongest links in the region had been with the Jewish communities of the middle east.

Iran’s relationship with the United Kingdom has over many decades been close but difficult. “Behind every curtain you’ll find an Englishman,” goes one familiar saying in Farsi. From an Iranian perspective, one can appreciate why. From the late 19th century onwards we saw relations with Iran in mercantilist, neo-colonialist terms only. Iran was divided into spheres of influence by Russia under the Tsar and the United Kingdom. In the early part of the last century, highly preferential terms for the D’Arcy petroleum company, the forerunner of BP, were extorted from the then Government. Subsequently, we were instrumental in removing the Qajar dynasty, putting Reza Shah on the throne. We jointly occupied Iran with the Soviet Union for five years from 1941 to 1946. We and the United States then successfully conspired to remove the democratically elected Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953.

We then continued this rather dismal record by propping up the Shah even when there was every indication, if only we had recognised it, that he was heading a decadent and decaying regime which was highly likely to collapse. A year after the Islamic revolution came the Iran-Iraq war, in which by common consent Iraq was the aggressor and Iran the victim, but the west, including the UK, sided with the aggressor.

At the end of this week we have our Remembrance Sunday, when we remember the fallen who gave their lives for us in two world wars. Those wars are part of the definition of contemporary Britain. Similarly, we understand nothing about Iran if we do not understand the deep and still contemporary trauma that the Iran-Iraq war inflicted on Iranian society—the near-million killed and the sense of isolation which that war reinforced as one western nation after another, the UK included, unworthily supported Iraq. With that isolation came the sense that Iran could rely only upon itself.

Despite its complex and difficult relationship with the United Kingdom, the US and other western nations, Iran principally looks west, not east or south, for its future. Of course, there are those in the system who define themselves against the “Satans” of the west and who have a vested interest in the status quo, including in sanctions, but there are many, many more who want a normal relationship with the west. It was that demand that lay behind President Rouhani’s surprising victory in the presidential elections in June 2013, and there are, indeed, more American PhDs in President Rouhani’s Cabinet than in President Obama’s.

In the 1980s—and under the cover of mutually rebarbative, but carefully controlled, rhetoric—the one country from whom Iran gained some understanding, and very significant arms supplies, was Israel. David Menashri, of Tel Aviv university, one of Israel’s foremost experts on Iran, subsequently commented:

“Throughout the 1980s, no one in Israel said anything about an Iranian threat”

to Israel. He continued:

“The word wasn’t even uttered.”

That, however, was all in the days of the cold war.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I am listening intently and with great interest and I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on securing this debate. However, he will perhaps agree that it was not just a question of the election of President Rouhani; there have been attempts in the past by Iran to reach out. While accepting that mistakes have been made by both sides in this difficult relationship, one only has to think of immediately after 9/11 when the Iranians reached out, and the early days of Afghanistan when they tried to help and did, indeed, help, but were rebuffed by the “axis of evil” speech by President Bush, for example.

[Mr Straw]

I absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman. I was heavily involved after President Khatami reached out to the United States in the moment of need. Iran provided significant practical help, without which it would have been far more difficult to remove the Taliban and to retake Kabul. Iran got no thanks for that, however. It was unnecessarily rebuffed by the United States at the time, as it was during the 2003-05 nuclear negotiations. It was also rebuffed when it sought a comprehensive bargain with the west. I am afraid that that prospect was greeted in parts of the United States with suspicion. In my view, there was a worry that if a deal was struck that resulted in the normalisation of relations with Iran, the part of the American system—and, indeed, the part of the Israeli system—that always likes to define itself against some kind of enemy would have had that enemy removed.

Twenty-five years after the collapse of the Berlin wall, the metrics of the middle east have all changed. The view of the Netanyahu Government in Israel, which is echoed by many in the United States Congress, is that Iran now poses an existential threat to the state of Israel because of the doubts as to whether Iran’s nuclear programmes have a military purpose. Those programmes are the subject of the intensive negotiations that will, we hope, have reached a satisfactory conclusion by 24 November.

As it was I, along with my French and German counterparts, who began the original E3 negotiations with Iran in 2003, I offer the following observations. Iran is not an easy country to negotiate with. That is partly due to cultural and linguistic problems and partly for historical reasons, but fundamentally it is a product of Iran’s complex and opaque governmental system, in which the elected President has constantly to broker decisions with unelected elements, including those in the revolutionary guards and those in the Supreme Leader’s office.

Unlike North Korea, which pulled out of the non-proliferation treaty, or India, Pakistan and Israel—all nuclear weapons states which have never accepted the treaty’s obligations—Iran has stayed within it. The treaty protects

“the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”.

However, the treaty is silent on the question—critical to the outcome of the negotiations—of the enrichment of uranium. The Iranians claim a right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, and I hope the whole House will support them in that. The interim agreement signed last November explicitly recognised that.

The last set of negotiations, which took place between 2003 and 2005 and in which I was directly involved, ran into the ground. The Bush Administration had undermined the Khatami Administration through the “axis of evil” speech, and they did so again by refusing to offer Iran any confidence-building measures until it was too late. By that time, conservative forces in Iran had re-gathered their strength, with President Ahmadinejad the result.

When parliamentary colleagues and I met Foreign Minister Zarif in Tehran in January this year, he pointed out that when I had been negotiating with him in 2005, Iran had fewer than 200 centrifuges. After eight years of sanctions, it now has 18,800. We should be careful what we wish for. The good news about the current round of negotiations is that both sides have kept them confidential. However, it is no secret that the Iranian Government cannot do a deal unless it includes a continuation of enrichment for peaceful purposes, and unless the scale of the programme allowed does not involve the Government having to make significant numbers of its scientists redundant.

The negotiations are predicated on the basis that, because of Iran’s past failures to make full disclosures to the International Atomic Energy Agency, there remain unanswered questions about the true intent of Iran’s nuclear programmes. None of us outside the inner workings of the Iranian Government can know for certain what this is. My own instinct is that after the trauma of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran probably did begin work on a nuclear weapons system. More recently, however, a 2007 US national intelligence estimate—which has been reconfirmed by the White House in the past two years—concluded that Tehran had halted nuclear weaponisation work in 2003. If that is the case, there is no reason why, with some flexibility on both sides, a deal should not be concluded. If that happens, the gradual lifting of sanctions—which Iran so desperately needs—will help to bring Iran back fully as a partner in the international community.

[Mr Philip Hollobone (Kettering) (Con)]

I am listening carefully to the right hon. Gentleman’s well-informed speech, and I am impressed by it. In 2004, Hassan Rouhani, who was then the chief nuclear negotiator, stated:

“While we were talking with the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in parts of the facility in Isfahan…by creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work”.

Is not that an ominous warning for the current negotiations?

[Mr Straw]

I have seen that quotation before. One of the truths about the Iranians is that they have a history of sticking to the letter of what is agreed while trying to make that agreement as accommodating to themselves as possible. They are not the only country to do that. However, it was Hassan Rouhani—now President Rouhani—sitting across the table and leading the negotiations, and I believed that he was a man with whom we could do a deal. I am glad that the present British Government self-evidently still think that; otherwise, they would not be sitting across the table from his representatives now. There is no evidence one way or the other that what was being installed at Isfahan was related to the weaponisation of the nuclear programme. I have seen no such evidence whatever, and Iran has a right to a nuclear power programme in the same way as any non-nuclear weapons state does.

My plea to the British Government is that they do not make the best the enemy of the good in these negotiations. Just as the world changed 25 years ago with the collapse of the Berlin wall, so it is changing again before our eyes, especially in the middle east. With chaos in Iraq and in Syria, many now see the potential of Iran to be part of the solution, not part of the problem. A deal that is good for both sides would have other benefits, not least for human rights. There cannot be anyone in the House who does not share the profound concern about aspects of Iran’s human rights record, including the recent incarcerations and executions.

One of the truths about Iran’s complex and opaque system of government is that the elected Government do not control the judiciary. There are other unacceptable elements of the regime. The more we are able to do a deal—of course on acceptable terms—the more it will empower the elected Government and the better able we will be to secure a resolution of the other concerns, including those on human rights. The reverse is also true.

[Mr Mike Hancock (Portsmouth South) (Ind)]

Has there been any evidence from the right hon. Gentleman’s past negotiations with Iran, or prior to that point, that any “give” on the part of the west has done anything to improve the lot of the people in that country? In my view, there is little or no evidence of any movement in relation to Iran’s human rights record.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Straw]

I think there is. For example, we can look at the human rights record under President Rafsanjani, and it got better under President Khatami. As long as President Khatami had power and authority in the extraordinary and very competitive power game that takes place in Tehran, he was able to do things. Moreover, the level of media freedom these days is infinitely greater than it was under Ahmadinejad. The licence to break the controls on the internet, including from President Rouhani himself, also illustrates that changes have taken place. There is a long way to go, however. I am certain that improvements in human rights will come about only through the empowerment of the forces for good in Iran and a diminution of those who are opposed to change. If there is no deal, the consequences are likely to be adverse not only for Iran but for the international community.

[Sir Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex) (Con)]

The right hon. Gentleman knows my views on this. I support exactly what he is trying to do, and I take the view that the Government must, if they can, move all this forward. Does he agree, however, that one of the most difficult things in dealing with Iran is that, rather like China and Russia, it has absolutely no regard for the rules, other than the rules it chooses to set itself. The complications for America are shown in the question raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr Hollobone) just now, in that it is impossible to know whether or not the Iranians are going to abide by the rules, and that makes it much more difficult to reach a conclusion.

[Mr Straw]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman and I recognise the support he gives on this issue. I do not generalise between Russia and China; they have similarities, to the extent that they refuse to accept obligations, but they differ. These days we can see in China a real determination by many elements of its Government better to impose a rule of law. Going back to what I have said, those who have dealings, both diplomatic and business, with Iran say that the Iranians are very hard negotiators—and they are—but when, in the end, they have done a deal, they stick to it. It has to be said that there is no evidence that Iran has resiled from what it agreed on 24 November 2013; the IAEA reports that it has implemented what it has agreed.

If there is no deal and negotiations break down because of unacceptable red lines from some, but not all, of the six countries involved, over time the international consensus will break down. First China and then Russia will peel away, and then we are likely to see a reappraisal of policy within the European Union. That reappraisal will be fuelled in part by a belief that US sanctions against Iran have a greater effect extra-territorially, on European banks and trading entities, than they have within the domestic jurisdiction of the US itself. That belief is well founded, because the US authorities do provide greater certainty, and therefore greater protection from penalty, to US banks and entities trading with Iran than they do to similar banks and entities outside the US; I am talking about legal trade allowed under the sanctions regimes.

That may explain the curious irony about exports in recent years to Iran. Across the EU, such exports have slumped in the past 10 years, whereas in the US they are on a rising trend. Ten years ago, US exports to Iran were one ninth of ours, but now they are double. One reason for the fall in our exports, proportionately greater than any other western country’s, is that the UK is alone in maintaining a policy of not supporting any trade with Iran. I have heard no credible explanation for that, and I ask the Minister to have it revised.

I have to be brief, given the time, but the last matters I wish to raise are important and they relate to the reopening of the embassy. The Foreign Affairs Committee reported in July that the reopening was imminent, and indeed it was. As I understand it, that has fallen away not only for some practical reasons, but because of the Home Office’s refusal to accept the re-establishment of a visa regime without categorical undertakings from the Iranians about returns. Iran is difficult on the issue of returns of overstayers and illegals, but so are China, India, Nigeria and a long list of other countries. Iranians do not feature in the top 10 of foreign national prisoners here, or of returns. So I very much hope this is not an area where British foreign policy, and the importance of reopening the embassy fully, is being led not by King Charles street, but by 2 Marsham street, the headquarters of the Home Office. That would be an eccentricity which this House should not tolerate.

I have spoken for too long, Mr Deputy Speaker. I am very grateful to the Backbench Business Committee for the opportunity to have this important debate on Iran.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Ellwood]

My hon. Friend is right to raise these matters. The mob that came through was essentially let through by the security guards who were supposed to protect the embassy. We must pursue both the security and the repayment issues before reopening the embassy.

The second issue is about visa services. We and the Iranian Government agree on the importance of visa services resuming in capitals as soon as possible after embassies reopen. Visas are an important issue for the large number of Iranian citizens who wish to visit the UK but who currently must travel to Abu Dhabi or Istanbul to obtain them. Restoring a visa service in Tehran is important both as a key component of normal embassy business and for the broader UK-Iran bilateral relationship. A future UK visa service in Tehran must be able to operate effectively and within the framework of Iranian law, while also meeting broader UK immigration objectives. In particular, we need to address the problem of individuals with no legal right to remain in the UK.

Both these issues are essential to the British embassy’s ability to function effectively in Tehran, and we hope we can reach agreement with the Iranian authorities soon, so that our plans for the embassy can progress.

[Mr Straw]

As the Minister knows, I am absolutely with him and the Foreign Secretary on the issue of our being able to re-equip the embassy. On the visa service issue, however, does he understand the high suspicion that exists that our foreign policy is, to a degree, being blocked by the Home Office, and that what the Home Office is demanding is evidence of a greater willingness to allow returns than was the practice when we did have an embassy, and than is the practice in respect of other countries that are more difficult than Iran over the question of returns, including of foreign national prisoners?

[Mr Ellwood]

I appreciate what the right hon. Gentleman says. The fact that there are other challenges with other countries in respect of these issues should not prevent us from trying to strike the appropriate deal when opening these embassies, but I take on board his point.

Both the issues I referred to earlier are essential to the British embassy’s ability to function effectively in Tehran, and we hope we can reach agreement with the Iranian authorities as soon as possible.

[Mr Ellwood]

If the visa situation were to be resolved, the embassy would still not open straight away. There are certain Vienna convention conditions that still need to be met. I cannot say more than that, but until that happens we will not be able to reopen our embassy.

On trade and sanctions, it is important to remember that economic pressure has been the key to bringing Iran back to the negotiating table, enabling us to pursue a peaceful solution to one of the most thorny national security challenges of our time. That pressure has been achieved through sanctions as well as through broader reductions in trade, driven by assessments made by companies and banks that trading with Iran carries risks. Weakening that economic pressure risks undermining prospects for a nuclear agreement, and that is why we do not currently encourage trade with Iran.

That is also why we support US sanctions, which are closely aligned with EU sanctions and form a core part of the international sanctions regime. US secondary sanctions, which influence companies’ commercial decisions over whether to trade with Iran, have had some of the highest impacts of all economic sanctions, particularly in reducing Iranian oil exports. I do not agree that such sanctions are designed to bolster US trade with Iran at the expense of UK and EU trade. In response to the right hon. Member for Blackburn’s point, EU trade with Iran at the moment is higher than that of the US—

[Mr Straw]

rose—

[Mr Ellwood]

I knew the right hon. Gentleman would want to come back on that. In certain areas, such as agriculture, there has been an increase, but the amount of EU trade with Iran is 40 times higher than that between the US and Iran.

[Mr Straw]

The truth is that EU trade with Iran has more than halved overall, and ours has absolutely plummeted. Meanwhile, from a base of close to zero 10 years ago, the United States has been pushing up its trade in a straightforward, ruthless and mercantilist way. It has not allowed diplomatic niceties to get in the way when its trade is legal, but it has discouraged legal trade by UK entities.

[Mr Ellwood]

The right hon. Gentleman’s point is well made. I note that a Europe-Iran trade forum took place here in London in October. Representatives of the Foreign Office attended it, but we did not endorse it as such. However, that shows that trade is taking place. As I mentioned in response to an intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk, we are trying to affect behaviour. If we continue to encourage trade before we have reached a nuclear deal, we will undermine our influence in that regard.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Straw]

I wish to reinforce the thanks of all of us to the Backbench Business Committee for agreeing to this debate, and I thank all 15 Members who have spoken in this thoughtful and valuable debate.

There is common ground on the importance of Iran and on Israel’s entirely legitimate concerns, as a small and potentially vulnerable country in the region, to protect its own security—the difference lies in the approach we should adopt towards Iran. When I said we need to be careful what we wish for, I was drawing the attention of those who may take a different view from many of us in this House to the consequences of an antagonistic approach towards Iran. I simply ask those who do adopt that view not to look into the crystal ball but to examine the record of the past 50 years and, indeed, the past 10 years.

The hon. Members for South Norfolk (Mr Bacon) and for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) referred to the offer of a grand bargain with the United States and the co-operation that was actively delivered to us—it was not just offered—by the Khatami Government in the wake of the 9/11 atrocities. It was actions and inactions by the west, particularly the United States, fanned by the right wing in Israel, that led to those offers by the reformists in Iran being rebuffed. The consequence was not that Iran disappeared or that the possibility of Iran building up a nuclear weapons capability disappeared, but that Iran became more difficult to deal with, more belligerent and disruptive in the region, and its 200 centrifuges increased to 18,800. So please let nobody here believe that if there is no deal because of pressure from parts of US and parts of the Israeli governmental elite, that would lead to a status quo or, madly, to attacks on Iran. What it will lead to, in the judgment of many of us here, is an increase in enrichment capabilities and an empowering of precisely those elements inside the governmental system of Iran whom we do not wish to see empowered. There will also be more difficulties on human rights.

I understand, of course, that there are risks on both sides, but I hope that the Minister, whom I thank for his thoughtful contribution, will take away from this debate the point that many of us who took part in it—both Government and Opposition Members—believe that there are risks worth taking in these negotiations, because the benefits of a respectful deal on this nuclear dossier will extend far beyond nuclear and will far outweigh the risks.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered UK foreign policy towards Iran.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I apologise for interrupting the business of the House, but a story that amounts to a national scandal broke this morning in a public hearing of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. It has long been taken as a standard in this country that the relationship between a lawyer and a client is protected by privilege, and that communications between them are protected from intervention by the state. What has become clear this morning is not only that that is not case at the moment, but that each of the three agencies has policies for handling legally protected material, and in one case for deliberately withholding that material, even from secret courts and security-cleared special advocates. My question to you, Madam Deputy Speaker, is how do we deal with that? Have the Government approached you requesting to come to this House to explain precisely how this came about?

Palestine and Israel

Jack Straw Excerpts

Monday 13th October 2014 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

I listened with great care to the sensitive speech that we have just heard from the hon. Member for Easington (Grahame M. Morris), and I compliment him on his balanced remarks. I find this a very difficult issue to address, and I do not think the answer to the question that the House is having to consider is absolutely on one side or the other.

It fell to me when I was Foreign Secretary to commit the United Kingdom Government for the first time to a two-state solution with a Palestinian state. I have never wavered in that view and I believe that the earlier that state comes about the better, both for the Palestinians and for the middle east as a whole. I also share the frustration of the hon. Gentleman and that of many other hon. Members about the impasse, which has causes on both sides of the dispute. I believe that the Israelis are totally unjustified in their settlement policy. But I must also say that the way in which the Israelis, having withdrawn from Gaza, have been subject to an ongoing attack by Hamas from within Gaza has clearly had a massive influence on Israeli public opinion. That has made it more difficult to make the progress we would like.

For me, the most important question is what practical benefit agreeing this motion would have. It might make us feel good and it might make us act in a similar way to a number of other countries around the world, but recognising a state should happen only when the territory in question has the basic requirements for a state. Through no fault of the Palestinians, that is not true at the moment.

It seems to me that the motion is premature. I say so for the following reason. We do not have a Palestinian Government; there are actually two Governments. Palestine is split, not because of the Israelis but because of the conflict between Hamas and Fatah. Not only are the boundaries of the Palestinian state not known but there is no Palestinian Government with any control over foreign policy or defence policy or who have an army with which to protect the territory of that state. That is not a criticism; it is simply a factual description of what would normally be a precondition. The United Kingdom did not recognise the state of Israel until 1950. It was only after what the Israelis call their war of independence that the Israelis demonstrated that they had created a state not simply through a declaration but through having the fundamental requirements.

We know that there have been occasions elsewhere in the world when states have been declared without the means to carry out the function of a state. We have seen it in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, where the Russians recognise an independence that is bogus in reality. We saw it in South Africa, where Transkei and Bophuthatswana were declared independent states when, of course, they were never any such thing.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

On the issue of the boundaries of a state of Palestine, surely their basis —although not their detail—is very clear and is internationally agreed to be the 1967 boundaries?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

I will not take issue with the right hon. Gentleman on that, but I think that the boundaries are perhaps the least of the problems that we are addressing. I am saying something that has applied to British policy for generations, as it has to the policies of other countries. We recognise a state when the territory in question has a Government, an army, military capability—[Interruption.] That might not be something of which hon. Gentlemen would approve—

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[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment (b), at the end of the Question to add,

‘, as a contribution to securing a negotiated two state solution.’

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Grahame M. Morris) on bringing this debate to the House. I also pay tribute to the extraordinary and very moving speech by the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Sir Richard Ottaway), which, as I think we all appreciated, was a very difficult speech to make.

As the House will note, the amendment has wide, cross-party support. Its purpose is very simple. It is based on the belief that the recognition of the state of Palestine alongside the state of Israel will add to the pressure for a negotiated two-state solution, and may help to bring that prospect a little closer to fruition.

The “Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” was promulgated at the end of April 2003 under the auspices of the Quartet—the UN, EU, US and Russia. Though, palpably, much of the progress presaged by the road map has been confounded by events, crucially, by the road map the Government of Israel were signed up to there being a separate and independent state of Palestine. One part of the road map anticipated that Quartet members, which include the UK, could

“promote international recognition of a Palestinian state, including possible UN membership”

as a transitional measure, well before any final status agreement. The Government of Israel disagree. They claim that recognition of Palestine as a state should be at the conclusion of any successful peace negotiations. But such an approach would give the Government of Israel a veto, even over whether such a state should exist.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

I understand what the right hon. Gentleman is trying to achieve by his amendment, but how does he think the passing of the motion would encourage either Hamas or the Israelis to change their approach to negotiation, which has been so unfruitful so far?

[Mr Straw]

It is the Palestinian Authority that is part of the negotiations, not Hamas. I believe that the fact of the Israelis’ intemperate reaction to the very prospect of the House passing this resolution is proof that it will make a difference. The only thing that the Israeli Government understand, under the present demeanour of Binyamin Netanyahu, is pressure. What the House will be doing this evening will be to add to the pressure on the Government of Israel. That is why they are so worried about this resolution passing. Were it just a gesture, as the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) implied, they would not be bothered at all. They are very worried indeed because they know that it will have an effect.

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his contribution, but does he not accept that this is a Back-Bench motion? This has no effect on Government policy, and it is just futile.

[Mr Straw]

We represent the electorate of the United Kingdom. I can tell the hon. Gentleman, having spent 13 years sitting on the Treasury Bench, that resolutions passed in the House, whether they emanate from Back Benches or Front Benches, make a difference, and this resolution will, if it is passed, make a difference.

[Andrew Bridgen (North West Leicestershire) (Con)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

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[Mr Straw]

I have had my ration, if the hon. Gentleman will excuse me.

A moment’s thought will allow us to appreciate just how ill-founded the Government of Israel’s assertion is. Israel has been occupying Palestinian land for nearly 50 years. It fails to meet its clear international legal obligations as an occupying power. In the last 20 years, as we have heard, it has compounded that failure by a deliberate decision to annex Palestinian land and to build Israeli settlements on that land. There are now 600,000 such Israeli settlers in East Jerusalem and the west bank. The Israelis are seeking to strangle East Jerusalem by expropriating land all around it, and two months ago, they announced the illegal annexation of a further nearly 1,000 acres of land near Bethlehem. The Israeli Government will go on doing this as long as they pay no price for their obduracy. Their illegal occupation of land is condemned by this Government in strong terms, but no action follows. The Israelis sell produce from these illegal settlements in Palestine as if they were made or grown in Israel, but no action follows.

Israel itself was established and recognised by unilateral act. The Palestinians had no say whatever over the recognition of the state of Israel, still less a veto. I support the state of Israel. I would have supported it at the end of the 1940s. But it cannot lie in the mouth of the Israeli Government, of all Governments, to say that they should have a veto over a state of Palestine, when for absolutely certain the Palestinians had no say whatever over the establishment of the state of Israel.

Today’s debate will, I hope, send a strong signal that the British Parliament stands full square behind the two-state solution set out in the road map. The current impasse can be broken, in my view, only by actions, not simply by words, and the recognition of Palestine by the international community would further, not hinder, these aims.

Three years ago on 9 November 2011, the right hon. Member for Richmond (Yorks) (Mr Hague), then Foreign Secretary, told the House:

“The United Kingdom judges that the Palestinian Authority largely fulfils criteria for UN membership, including statehood”.

He added that we, the United Kingdom,

“reserve the right to recognise a Palestinian state bilaterally at a moment of our choosing and when it can best help to bring about peace.”—[Official Report, 9 November 2011; Vol. 535, c. 290.]

That moment is now. I urge hon. Members on both sides to support the amendment.

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[Dr Offord]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.

That is also an agreement to which our Government of the United Kingdom, as part of the European Union and the Quartet, are a signatory. Therefore, this motion asks the UK Government to break their commitment to the peace process. That is not a proposal that I can accept.

A negotiated two-state agreement would also resolve others issues, including borders, security arrangements and recognition by all of Israel’s right to exist, but this motion would allow recognition of a Palestinian state that would not even recognise or even accept Israel’s 1967 borders. The former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), has called for the 1967 borders. If we had acceded to such requests in the past, the Golan heights would be in the hands of Syria or, in fact, ISIL nowadays, meaning that Israel would not be able to continue to exist, which I cannot accept.

Similarly, the concept that the 1948 armistice lines should become a border with a terror state is another irresponsible policy and something in which the Parliament of any liberal democracy should not be involved in any way. The battle that Britain and our allies are a part of is to stop the spread of fundamentalist Islamist control over the Levant—of which Israel is a part—and not to speed it along.

[Mr Straw]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. Is he aware that when I intervened on the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) I was careful with my language and spoke about any borders being based on 1967, not resolutions? That is no different from that which is contained in the final page of the road map, which was endorsed by the Government of Israel, among others.

[Dr Offord]

I am grateful for that clarification.

Recognition of Palestine appears attractive as it is considered to be the first step towards the internalisation and perceived legitimisation that could allow diplomatic and legal challenges to Israel through organisations that are perceived to be sympathetic to Palestinian grievances. The recognition of Palestine would produce significant setbacks for the existing peace process and is bound to elicit a retrenchment in the position of Israel when it has previously agreed statements that have produced land swaps for peace.

Most infamously, that occurred in 2005 when Israel undertook the unilateral move to withdraw from Gaza. Members all know what has happened since: more than 11,000 rockets have been fired from the Gaza strip into Israel by terrorists. Some 5 million Israelis are currently living under threat of rocket attacks, and more than 500,000 Israelis have less than 60 seconds to find shelter after a rocket is launched. That means that people in the biggest cities of Israel, including Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa, are all at risk.

On the other hand, negotiated peace deals, such as the Egypt and Israel peace treaty in 1979 and the Israel and Jordan peace treaty in 1994, are examples of land being relinquished in return for stable peace negotiations. The same did not occur at the Camp David negotiations in 2000. The proposal to establish an independent Palestinian state in virtually all of the west bank and Gaza, along with a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, was rejected because of the alternative condition that the Palestinian Authority declare an end to the conflict as part of the final agreement.

Consequently, the proposal for the recognition of Palestinian statehood without the fundamental aspects of final-status negotiations, coupled with a reciprocal agreement that relinquishes further claims over lands, property, settlements, the right to return and access to Jerusalem, is premature.

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[Mr Ellwood]

I ask the hon. Lady to be patient so that I can complete my speech and get to that point. We have made our position clear: Britain defends the right to choose our moment, which is appropriate for the peace process, when we make that bilateral decision.

Returning to Israeli settlement building, last week I visited the E1 area of the west bank and met members of the Bedouin community living there who face relocation by the Israeli authorities. They told me that they had no wish to leave, and expressed their fears of being forcibly transferred to make way for the construction of Israeli settlements. Such a move would seriously threaten the possibility of a contiguous Palestinian state, and according to the UN would be contrary to international humanitarian law. Israel’s recent decision to advance settlement plan units in Givat Hamatos will also have serious implications for the possibility of Jerusalem being part of a Palestinian state. As the Foreign Secretary said on 3 October, Israel needs to change course on that now. The Palestinian Authority must also show leadership, recommitting themselves to dialogue with Israel, and making progress on governance and security for Palestinians in Gaza as well as the west bank.

[Mr Straw]

The words that the Minister and his ministerial colleagues, including the Prime Minister, have used against further Israeli settlement building have been very robust. What action do the British Government intend to take if those words are ignored?

[Mr Ellwood]

We are in a critical position, and at the discussions in Cairo it was clear that there is a huge effort to recognise where we are in trying to sort out a two-state solution. That has been recognised, and there is now a huge international effort to bring all parties to the table, which is where such issues need to be discussed. Having said that, we have made clear our concern about the developments, which must be considered when the parties come together to consider a two-state solution.

Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa and Security

Jack Straw Excerpts

Wednesday 10th September 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

Our decision at the moment is that we will continue to supply non-lethal aid to the Syrian moderate opposition. Of course, we keep that decision under continuous review. As I said earlier, the situation in Syria is very different from the situation in Iraq. While ISIL is seeking to make it a single theatre, we have to respond to the realities on the ground in both countries.

These are vital steps, but the Prime Minister has made it clear that the political and humanitarian response in Iraq must be backed up by a security response that will defeat ISIL on the ground. The Government’s clear position is that there will be no UK combat boots on the ground in Iraq, but we have given our full support to the targeted air strikes conducted by the United States at the request of the legitimate Government of Iraq. With other NATO allies, and with the consent of the Iraqi Government, we have been delivering arms and equipment directly to Kurdish forces, as I have set out.

I know that many right hon. and hon. Members will, crucially, want to know whether we intend to go further in our security response. As the House will know, Secretary Kerry is currently in the middle east seeking to build a regional coalition of the willing to support Iraqi forces in the battle against ISIL—an organisation which, by definition, represents an existential challenge to all of them. President Obama will speak to the American people later today to set out his wider strategy for dealing with the threat from ISIL, including a possible expansion of US air strikes.

As the global resolve to tackle ISIL strengthens, we will consider carefully what role the UK should play in the international coalition. I should emphasise that no decisions have been made. However, as the Prime Minister set out on Monday, if we reached the conclusion that joining in American-led air strikes would be the appropriate way to shoulder our share of the burden, then, in accordance with the established practice, we would ensure that the House of Commons had an opportunity to debate and vote on that proposition.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

May I take the right hon. Gentleman back to his answer to the hon. Member for Reigate (Crispin Blunt) about the position of the Assad regime? The whole House shares his view that this is an odious regime, but surely what has changed is that two years ago it was rational to assess that the Assad regime could be removed. Is that still his view?

[Mr Hammond]

Our clear intention is to create the conditions where within the Alawite community and the community around the regime, the pressure builds to change the leadership—to remove Assad and those closely associated with him and replace them so that it is possible for the moderate opposition forces and the international community to envisage a political solution in Syria.

We are facing in our near abroad the most capable terrorist group currently operating anywhere in the world. We cannot underestimate the threat that it poses to regional stability and to our security here at home, and we must be prepared to intensify our contribution to action against ISIL if the situation demands.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

I draw to the House’s attention the fact that I am co-chairman of the all-party group on Iran and also co-chairman of the British-Turkish Forum.

I begin by echoing the sentiments expressed by my right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary to the Foreign Secretary—a great post that I hope he enjoys. I always felt it was living history, but I had echoing in my head the words of Henry Ford: history was “one damned thing after another”. So it was for me, and so I think it will be for the Foreign Secretary.

John Maynard Keynes famously said:

“When my information changes, I alter my conclusions. What do you do, sir?”

The information on Syria has changed. The Assad regime is not going to go and, with respect to the Foreign Secretary, I did not really feel that he was any more convinced than we were by the answer he gave. The situation has simply changed. I would not put any money on that regime now going, and if we want to deal with the greater evil, in my view there has to be communication—not a re-establishment of relations—with it. I firmly believe that those in the Government should follow up the entirely sensible suggestion from their hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Crispin Blunt) and many others in this House that we need to see a restoration of the Geneva arrangements and, critically, we need to see Iran brought into that process as well, because there will not be a solution to the problems of Syria—and therefore to the problems of Iraq—without that regional agreement, which yes involves Turkey, but also has to involve Iran. With respect to the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Sir Richard Ottaway), we will not get a solution in Iraq unless we solve Syria as well, because that border is so porous.

Iran has played a constructive part in trying to defeat ISIL and in securing the necessary change in Iraq. The US Administration, as is well known, have been in direct communication with the Iranians and, according to well sourced reports, are now doing all they can to reach agreement with Iran in the P5 plus 1 talks on the nuclear issue. I greatly welcomed the acts of the Foreign Secretary’s predecessor in agreeing in principle to reopen the embassies in Tehran, but those were promised for May. They were pushed back to August and they have now been pushed back to some other date, yet to be defined. I ask the Foreign Secretary: why is this? I know the Iranians are not the easiest partners—a feeling which, I should say, is reciprocated by them—but the Administration in Tehran are under domestic pressure. They have a population desperate for links with the west, and if we build a partnership with them, we can do a great deal more than we have.

I hope, too, that the British Government will abandon their view that we should try to punish Iran through trade. We are the only Government doing this. As US-led sanctions against Iran were being tightened, guess what? Hard-nosed as ever, the United States was increasing its exports to Iran, to the benefit of its farming and its pharmaceutical companies. In Britain, we have been punishing our own companies—nobody else—by ensuring that trade with the Iranians plummets.

[Daniel Kawczynski]

I completely concur with the right hon. Gentleman on that point. A Coventry-based company has worked with the Iranians in the past to produce their national state car. That company would like to do much more work with the Iranians, but because of these policies it is impossible to do so.

[Mr Straw]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. The United States has gone out of its way to assist its own companies to ensure that they exploit, as widely as possible, the provisions in the sanctions regime—including those that were extended in the agreement with Iran of 24 November last year—and take up these opportunities, and western European countries are doing the same. Why is Britain failing to take these opportunities?

[Alistair Burt (North East Bedfordshire) (Con)]

I will be very brief. Just before history gets completely rewritten, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he thinks that pressure on the economy in Iran played any part whatever in bringing Iran back to the negotiating table to talk about its nuclear file?

[Mr Straw]

I am absolutely certain that it did, but the sanctions, led by the United States, allowed for the export from the west to Iran of agricultural products, food products and pharmaceuticals. Those concessions were exploited by the United States and western European countries. It is only the United Kingdom that has added to those sanctions, through additional, gratuitous efforts that simply hurt United Kingdom companies, not Iran.

Let me now turn to Israel and Palestine. Like everybody else in this House, I have no brief whatever for Hamas. It was I who introduced the Terrorism Act 2000 and then, as soon as it was on the statute book, ensured that Hamas, along with 20 other terrorist organisations, was proscribed as a terrorist organisation. I was right to do that then and it is right for it to stay as a terrorist outfit. Hamas breached every rule in the book by launching rockets against the civilian population in Israel, but, as the Foreign Secretary said, that cannot conceivably justify the wholly disproportionate response of the Israelis in allowing 2,000 mainly innocent men, women and children to be killed in the way that they did. Whatever they say, they did not have a care for the civilian population.

Now, as we have heard, the Israelis have decided to annex over 1,000 acres of Palestinian land near Bethlehem. I congratulate the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary on their strong words—this was “utterly deplorable”, according to the Prime Minister, and illegal under international law—but what I ask is, what are we going to do about it? I say, with respect, that the Israelis do not care what is said by any western European Government. I used to think something different, but it is not the case; provided that this more right-wing and more extreme Israeli Government have the United States Congress in their pocket, which they do, they do not care about sentiment here. They would care if we were to do what we should be doing, which is to ensure that goods produced in the occupied territories with the label of Israel are treated like any other counterfeit goods and subject to strict rules and additional tariffs.

I am not in favour for a moment of generalised boycotts or sanctions against Israel, but I am in favour of an EU démarche on Israel to get it to pull back—and if it does not do that, we should withdraw our ambassadors and temporarily downgrade our diplomatic arrangements with the country. I am also strongly in favour of recognising Palestine as a state with a formal status in the United Nations. All the things that Israel said would happen if we were to do this have happened anyway—and with a vengeance.

Let me turn to the issue of Russia and Ukraine. I support the approach that the Government are broadly taking in respect of Russia. The brutal truth is that, at the moment, Vladimir Putin believes that he is winning by his own calculus, because he has more to gain than to lose in the region than the west does. The annexation of the Crimea is now a fait accompli, but I believe that over time these sanctions will hurt Russia. It is significantly economically weaker than we are. Its economy is half our size for a population twice our size, and it is over-dependent on energy. As well as maintaining sanctions, we must work out what we can legitimately offer Russia in the final negotiation and, above all, we must start to reduce Europe’s over-dependence on Russian hydrocarbons. That is what lies behind Russia’s belief that it can win. It must not be allowed to do so.

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[Mr Straw]

Does the right hon. Gentleman also accept that the welcome decision by both parties to have a larger aid programme cannot be a substitute for money spent on the more difficult areas of intelligence and diplomacy? As our aid programme increases so too must our diplomatic programme.

[Dr Fox]

I would go further and say that our national security and the need for hard power in a hard world should, in a time of financial constraints, take precedence over our aid programme.

I was involved in an interesting discussion at a meeting in Paris. I asked why it was that during the cold war we were willing to use the term “better” when it came to our values. For example, we would say that democracy was better than totalitarian rule, free markets were better than command economies and freedom was better than oppression. But when it comes to debates about Islamic fundamentalism, we are not willing to use the word “better”. I believe that religious tolerance is better than enforced orthodoxy, and that equal rights for women are better than women being second-class citizens. When I raised that point, I was told, “Well, nowadays, we can’t really say ‘better’. Things are just different.” If we believe that our values are different and not better, why should we believe, let alone convince anyone else, that they should follow what we have? We in the west are what we are not by accident but because of the value path that we have chosen to take. All the battles that we will face are to do with ideology, belief and values. It is not the capability of the west—of this country or the United States—that has been called into question; it is our will to enforce what we believe by peaceful means or others. If we are not willing to stand up for our values as a country, we will not only fail to shape the era of globalisation but diminish ourselves in the longer term.

Gaza

Jack Straw Excerpts

Monday 14th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

My right hon. Friend is right to say that aid is delivered into Gaza. Our message to Israel is that it is important to go further in easing the restrictions on Gaza, including on the movement of commercial goods and persons to and from the Gaza strip. We have not had any assurances about future aid. She raises a very important point. We encourage Israel to do more, rather than less, to ensure that aid is received and that other normal legitimate movements can take place.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

The whole House condemns the killing of the three Israelis and the burning of the Palestinian, and none of us has any truck with Hamas. However, for all the vacuous words of the Israeli Government and the Israel defence forces spokesman, is it not clear that they have no regard for international humanitarian law; that they place a completely different and much lower value on Palestinian life than Israeli life; and that the cycle will go on as long as the international community, in an effort to be even-handed, fails to say to the Israelis that the actions that they are taking are completely outwith the United Nations charter and any idea of how a civilised nation ought to behave?

[Mr Hague]

That is why it is important for us to stress the need to observe international humanitarian law, be proportionate and avoid civilian casualties, and work hard on bringing about an agreed ceasefire. I add to what the right hon. Gentleman has said, however. Those who launch waves of rockets from within one of the most densely populated civilian populations in the middle east also bear a heavy responsibility, because they know that any retaliation will severely affect the civilian population. We must bear that in mind as well.

Iraq and Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict

Jack Straw Excerpts

Monday 16th June 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

Yes, I do agree with my right hon. and learned Friend. Only yesterday, I made it very clear to the Foreign Minister of Iraq that the support that will be received from the rest of the world will be closely related to progress made on that issue of bringing Shi’a, Sunni and Kurds together. This is essential. As I mentioned in my statement, President Obama has made it clear that support of various kinds from the United States may well be conditional on political action by the Iraqi Government, so that message is very clear.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

I commend what the Foreign Secretary said, and also what my right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary said in his careful remarks about the history here, but may I press the Foreign Secretary a little on the issue of Iran? I welcome the imminent statement he is due to make tomorrow, which I assume means there will be a strengthening of relations, but does he recall that after 9/11, and until, frankly, the Khatami Government were undermined gratuitously by President Bush in his axis of evil speech, the Iranian Government gave the British and American Governments very good, positive and trusting co-operation in respect of the removal of the Taliban? Does he also accept that, with the current Rouhani Government, there is an opportunity to build more positive relations, because the Iranians have a similar interest to us in ensuring their neighbour is a stable democracy and not reduced to the chaos it is in now?

[Mr Hague]

Yes, of course we do have, going back over many decades and including now, important common interests with Iran, and that includes stability in Iraq and, indeed, in Afghanistan. There are also many other issues, such as dealing with the narcotics trade, on which Iran and the UK have common interests, and that is a very good argument for trying to advance our bilateral relations. Of course we also have to deal with the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme, which was something else I discussed with the Foreign Minister at the weekend, and there will be further negotiations this week. We also need Iran to make its contribution to stability in the region by ceasing its support for sectarian groups in other parts of the region. We look to Iran to do those things, but do we have some common interests? Yes, we do.

Ukraine

Jack Straw Excerpts

Tuesday 13th May 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

My right hon. Friend is quite right that huge principles are at stake here. That is why the reaction in the United Nations has been so clear and overwhelming: in the votes held in New York, Russia was entirely on its own in the Security Council, with China abstaining. Russia was outvoted in the General Assembly by 100 votes to 11 precisely because the issues at stake are exactly as great as my right hon. Friend describes them. That is why I underline the long-term cost to Russia—in the reduction of energy market power, the reduction of influence in eastern Europe because of populations turning against it and NATO reinforcing its responsibilities for the defence of its eastern members. All of that flows from what Russia has done in recent weeks.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

May I first welcome the Foreign Secretary’s statement and commend the approach he has adopted? May I ask him about the position of the German business lobby, part of which has been arguing, with the assistance of the former German Chancellor, against any kind of wider economic sanctions? The position of Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier has been commendable, but what assessment does the right hon. Gentleman make of Germany’s understanding that it is in its interest to ensure that if necessary, sanctions, including business sanctions, are strengthened if there is no other way of securing some observation by Russia?

[Mr Hague]

I think that is understood in Germany—certainly by their ministerial and political leaders. I had a long discussion with Mr Steinmeier before yesterday’s Foreign Affairs Council, and he fully joined in bringing about the decisions we made at that Council, while Chancellor Merkel expressed Germany’s strong view at her press conference on Saturday. Of course it is understood across Europe that wider sanctions against Russia will have some damaging consequences in Europe. I have said before that if we come to that point, those sanctions will be designed to have the maximum effect on Russia and the minimum effect on European economies—but they would have an effect on Britain, France and Germany. The plans developed for such sanctions include measures to be taken by Germany, and the triggers for them are the ones that I described earlier. We regard Germany as working closely with us on this issue.

Ukraine

Jack Straw Excerpts

Monday 28th April 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

Treaties of the 18th century are important, and we do indeed rest our case in some international disputes on those treaties, including the treaty of Utrecht. My right hon. Friend should nevertheless bear in mind the fact that Mr Khrushchev transferred the sovereignty of the Crimea to Ukraine—[Interruption.] I think I am receiving some support from the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw). Russia took that decision—also a validly taken international decision—so my right hon. Friend should reflect on the fact that we now try not to settle international disputes in the same manner as in the 18th century. The fact that Russia annexed the Crimea by force in the 1770s does not allow the Russians to do so in the 21st century.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

Will the Foreign Secretary say a word about Germany’s view on economic sanctions? One of the kidnapped military monitors is Colonel Axel Schneider—a high-ranking German officer—so does the right hon. Gentleman agree that that might concentrate the mind of the German people on the need to be firm against Russia?

[Mr Hague]

Four German observers are involved, which is a matter of great concern to Germany and to us. Chancellor Merkel spoke very clearly about these matters on Friday, saying that we needed to adopt additional sanctions and that G7 and EU measures come with the full support of Germany. She has called for the extension of the EU list of names, for further additions to it and for intensified preparation for the wider economic measures that may prove necessary. The support of Germany is certainly there.

Oral Answers to Questions

Jack Straw Excerpts

Tuesday 8th April 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

Yes, absolutely. On the first point, Parliament must always be able to deliberate urgently, although I have always taken the view that before Parliament has gone into recess is too early to call for it to be recalled. However, I take my right hon. and learned Friend’s point about that. I absolutely agree with his second point. At the meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in Athens over the weekend, I emphasised that the strength and unity of the European Union on this issue will be a vital determinant of the ultimate outcome.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

Although I fully support the Foreign Secretary’s strategy, does he accept that the more the Ukrainian Government can reach out to the Russian speakers in eastern Ukraine, the less of an excuse President Putin will have for taking provocative action there?