Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Jack Dromey and David Burrowes

Tuesday 4th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[Jack Dromey]

First, the number of people who receive compensation every year is a handful—it is less than the number of fingers on a hand. There is no automatic entitlement to compensation, and each case is considered on its merits. Secondly, I have rightly focused on cases where people are absolutely entitled to receive compensation for the trauma they suffered as a result of being wrongly convicted and spending many years in prison, and I hope the hon. Gentleman would agree on that.

[Mr David Burrowes (Enfield, Southgate) (Con)]

I share the hon. Gentleman’s concern about the cases he has cited and the appalling years that these people spent, without obtaining justice in the form of compensation. We need to recognise where we agree: there is a consensus in the House on achieving justice for these people. He mentioned the innocence test. Amendment (a) would do away with the language of “innocent” and replace it with a test of “did not commit”. What is the substantive difference between that and the Pannick amendment, which I understand he supports and which also requires that the burden is to prove

“conclusively that the evidence against the person at trial is so undermined that no conviction could possibly be based on it”?

There is still a burden to provide conclusive proof, so what is the substantive difference between it and the “did not commit” test that the Government are now proposing?

[Jack Dromey]

In English law, someone is innocent until they are proved guilty. Let me contrast the three different formulations. The Lords amendment would mean that the new or newly discovered fact showed

“conclusively that the evidence against the person at trial is so undermined that no conviction could possibly be based on it”.

The Government’s original clause would have required that the fact showed

“beyond reasonable doubt that the person was innocent of the offence”.

Amendment (a) in lieu of the Lords amendment repeats those tell-tale words of “beyond reasonable doubt” and proposes a test that the person “did not commit” the offence. We strongly believe that the formulation from the other place provides a much more appropriate test, and that the amendment in lieu is about making it more difficult for victims of miscarriages of justice like those to whom I have referred to receive compensation. Indeed, two of the Birmingham Six have expressed the view, following legal advice, that they might not have been entitled to compensation under the Government’s proposed changes.

[Mr Burrowes]

We are talking about where the burden lies so we are dealing with the difference between a test of “beyond reasonable doubt” and one of proving “conclusively”. This is not about distinguishing “innocence”; the debate was had in the Lords and there has been a recognition that we need to have reference to a “did not commit” test. I am trying to work out where we differ on this. Are we differing about whether something should be proved “beyond reasonable doubt” or just be proved “conclusively”? If so, what is the substantive difference between proving “conclusively” and proving “beyond reasonable doubt”?

[Jack Dromey]

As a lawyer, the hon. Gentleman will know the difference between providing conclusive proof and proving something beyond reasonable doubt. I stress again that the essence of our argument, and that supported by all parties and Cross Benchers in the other place, is that an individual is innocent until proved guilty. We see no good reason why a victim of a miscarriage of justice should suffer a “beyond reasonable doubt” test.

[Jack Dromey]

There is a widespread view, reflected in the debate in the other place—someone talked about “incredulity”—as to why the Government are introducing such a test. A statutory definition providing greater clarity, particularly in the light of some of the cases that have gone before the courts, is one thing, but making it more difficult for people to receive compensation for serious miscarriages of justice is something altogether different. As the Barry George case shows, very few people are receiving compensation. The fear expressed in the other place is that the Government’s proposals will make it yet more difficult to obtain compensation for a miscarriage of justice.

[Mr Burrowes]

We all want clarity, so let me try to understand the difference between “conclusively” and “beyond reasonable doubt”. Are we talking about a balance of probabilities—whether something is more likely than not? Or are we talking about proving something beyond reasonable doubt, so that people are satisfied and sure? Is “conclusively” a balance of probabilities test, a beyond reasonable doubt test or something else? If it is something else, that wording does not provide the clarity we all seek.

[Jack Dromey]

As an eminent lawyer, the hon. Gentleman will know that “beyond reasonable doubt” has a very clear standing and purpose in our criminal justice system.

[Mr Burrowes]

Which is it?

[Jack Dromey]

We believe it is inappropriate for the test to be pitched so high; a “beyond reasonable doubt” test will make it more difficult for victims of miscarriages of justice to obtain compensation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Burrowes]

rose—

[Jack Dromey]

I have given way three times and have been more than happy to do so, but let me continue now.

For all the reasons I have described, Labour tabled an amendment on Report in this Chamber and then wholeheartedly backed the amendment in the name of Lord Pannick in the other place, which would ensure that compensation should be paid only if the new or newly discovered fact showed conclusively that the evidence against the defendant at trial was so undermined that

“ no conviction could possibly be based on it.”

That clearly provides a statutory definition and greater certainty in this area of the law, while adhering to the age-old principle for which I have argued so strongly. When the Court of Appeal has quashed a conviction, it is simply wrong then to require the defendant also to establish beyond reasonable doubt that he or she is, to all intents and purposes, innocent. Such a provision is incompatible with the presumption of innocence.

The framework for which I am arguing already applies in the Supreme Court, where it was brought in by the then President, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, who strongly supported the Pannick amendment in the other place, and indeed in the European Court of Human Rights. Indeed, the Joint Committee on Human Rights has said:

“in our view requiring proof of innocence beyond reasonable doubt as a condition of obtaining compensation for wrongful conviction is incompatible with the presumption of innocence which is protected by both the common law and Article 6(2) ECHR.”

It is worth stressing again that the amendment from the other place is not about giving people more compensation automatically or making it easier for people to get off on technicalities and then to claim compensation in all circumstances; it is about serious and rare cases in which it is entirely appropriate that the victims should receive compensation. As our amendment makes clear, asking people to prove their innocence beyond reasonable doubt is an affront to our system of law, and denying compensation to those who have been wrongly convicted is an affront to a decent society. Many Members of this House, including my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) and the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan), have campaigned for many years on miscarriages of justice.

The simple fact is that our legal system is not perfect, and cases do go wrong. It is a tribute to our legal system that miscarriages of justice are rare, but when they do happen, it is simply wrong to expect those who have suffered to prove to all intents and purposes that they are innocent beyond reasonable doubt—it is adding to the injustice that they have already suffered.

As I argued at the start of my contribution, miscarriages of justice lead to ruined lives. Families are destroyed. People leave while their partners sit wrongly behind bars. Jobs and homes are lost and people’s reputations are left in tatters. The mental despair and anguish are never fully resolved, which is why victims of miscarriages of justice need real help on their release. People’s lives can never go back to how they were. That is where we, as a decent society, have to make amends, and that is what our amendment does.

In conclusion, I urge all Members of this House to support a rigorous and fair justice system that sticks up for its founding principle of people being innocent until proved guilty; that rejects the notion of “beyond reasonable doubt” to obtain compensation; that ensures that where a serious miscarriage of justice has happened, innocent people receive fair compensation for all they have suffered; and that reflects rulings already set out in the Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights. In short, we want a justice system that is serious about putting right serious injustice.