Assisted Suicide

Ian Swales Excerpts

Tuesday 27th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Ian Swales (Redcar) (LD)]

Can the Solicitor-General think of another example where we expect people to commit a crime knowingly, and only find out later whether they will be prosecuted or not?

[The Solicitor-General]

I do not think that I will answer that question, because, to be honest, I am not entirely sure I understand it. I apologise if my failure to understand is entirely my own fault.

The DPP’s guidance relates to the framework within which prosecutors apply the law as it currently stands, and I suggest that that is a framework that should remain in place as it currently stands. As Law Officers, it is for the Attorney-General and for me to superintend the Crown Prosecution Service and to account to this House for its activities and performance, but prosecutors have always had discretion to consider what the public interest might be when they bring criminal proceedings, and it is for prosecutors to decide how to exercise that discretion.

That is set out in the code for Crown prosecutors, the document issued by the DPP that provides guidance on the principles that prosecutors should apply when making decisions on whether to prosecute in any particular case. The test requires—I paraphrase—the prosecutor to be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to convict and that it would be in the public interest to prosecute. Sometimes a statute requires that either the DPP or the Attorney-General—for these purposes that means the Solicitor-General as well—must consent to the prosecution, and in the case of a prosecution under the Suicide Act 1961, as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, it is the DPP who has to consent to the bringing of criminal proceedings.

However, it has been clear for many years that it is not in every case where the evidential test is passed that a prosecution must be advanced. In 1951 in the House, the then Attorney-General, Sir Hartley Shawcross, said:

“It has never been the rule in this country—I hope it never will be—that suspected criminal offences must automatically be the subject of prosecution.”—[Official Report, 29 January 1951; Vol. 483, c. 681.]

Those words underscore the essential independence of our prosecutors from Government, from Parliament, from newspapers and their readers, from religious leaders, from the expert and ignorant, and from all who would seek to interfere in their discretion and independence. As Law Officers, the Attorney-General and I support and protect the independence of prosecutors in their decision making. With that in mind, I will turn to the DPP’s policy document.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ian Swales (Redcar) (LD)]

I would welcome a debate about a change in the law on assisted dying for terminally ill, mentally competent adults. However, today’s motion is about the application of the existing law on assisted suicide, and I was pleased to add my name to it.

I fully support the ongoing development of outstanding palliative care provision, and I welcome amendment (b) in that regard. I praise the great work of Zoe’s Place children’s hospice and Teesside hospice in my constituency. I am glad that the Government are taking more of a lead in providing top-quality palliative care and not having to rely so heavily on bands of local enthusiasts to raise the enormous sums of money that they do. I recognise that, no matter how much we wish it to, such care cannot remove all suffering at the end of life, and some people may request assistance from loved ones to help them to end their lives.

The danger and controversy of such a debate is that its purpose can be misinterpreted. It goes without saying that those who cruelly or recklessly encourage suicide should be prosecuted. Of course, that also includes all those who cause the death of another by their own hand. This does, however, leave sad cases such as that of Tony Nicklinson with no satisfactory resolution; he is not physically capable of committing suicide. I do not believe that it is in the public interest to prosecute a usually law-abiding citizen who helps a loved one to die on compassionate grounds. As other speakers have said, there will also be many health care professionals who have an occasional sleepless night after a wholly illegal act of deep compassion.

I hope that the motion will be supported, as it will give parliamentary endorsement to a flexible and compassionate approach to prosecution. While the policy is welcome, it is not perfect. Only 38% of GPs feel that there is enough guidance for doctors on what to do if a patient asks for help to die. The uncertainty about how the policy applies to doctors could affect their willingness to engage in discussions about the desire of patients to end their life. Since 2002, 182 British citizens have ended their lives at the Dignitas clinic in Switzerland. We cannot bury our heads and pretend that this is not happening. We should have a law applied in this country that encourages open, transparent, frank and safe conversations about a decision that should never be taken lightly but never taken in the dark. Let us also remember that only the wealthier can afford to go to Switzerland and pay the fees and other costs, and if they wish to die surrounded by loved ones it is even more expensive.

The law as currently drafted works as well as it can, but it does not provide a safeguarded means of assisted dying. We must ask whether people are truly protected by a law that investigates the motivation for someone’s request, and that of their assistant, after the person is dead, and whether it is right that people have to travel to an anonymous suburb of Zurich to receive medical assistance in dying. We should be examining what would happen legally if a Dignitas-style clinic were set up in this country. Let us remember that the need to be well enough to travel all that way might, in itself, influence people to make the decision earlier. The policy has not prompted a rise in the number of British people who are being assisted to die overseas. It has led to greater openness, with more people who have assisted a suicide now choosing to self-report to the police. It should be welcomed for setting out the common-sense taken by the DPP and prosecutors in distinguishing between wholly compassionate assistance, which is unlikely to be prosecuted, and malicious assistance, which will rightly be prosecuted.

I also support amendment (a), as it cannot be right that otherwise innocent people must, prima facie, break the law and then wait to see whether they will be prosecuted. Nor can it be right that we are relying on the DPP to interpret a law to this extent instead of having the interpretation fixed here, in the legislature of this country. I believe that only by Parliament giving clarity will health care professionals, the courts and the public know for sure how to deal with each case. It should not be only the rich who can buy dignity in death; everyone should have that basic right. In the words of the 1972 play on this subject, “Whose Life is it Anyway?”