(2 years ago)
Commons ChamberThe Secretary of State will be aware that in March 2020 Russian reconnaissance bombers entered the Rathlin sector of UK airspace. Six Typhoons had to be scrambled in order to escort those reconnaissance bombers out of our airspace. Given the likelihood of an anti-NATO Government being elected in the Republic of Ireland, and given that the UK Government had to seek Republic of Ireland support to enter its airspace in order to escort those bombers out, what actions will the Secretary of State take to ensure that a proper assessment is made of these national security interests?
We have an excellent relationship with the Irish Government on security matters. It is clearly not for me, at the Dispatch Box of the UK Parliament, to talk about Irish policy over the use of its airspace. The hon. Gentleman will know, however, that RAF jets have deployed into Irish airspace on occasion. It is for the Irish Government to set out their policy on why, when and how.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
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These issues are only sensitive among a very narrow band of people who did not give a toss about the life of any soldier in Northern Ireland.
That may be the case. I will talk about something slightly different in the short time I have available, drawing on my own experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, rather than getting into the intricacies of Northern Irish politics.
I served in Afghanistan twice, as a platoon commander and then, latterly, as the adjutant of 2 Rifles in 2009, with a tour to Iraq in between. As a platoon commander, I was only too aware that I was training my soldiers to go out on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, to remove the safety catch and open fire, acting entirely on instinct in the heat of the moment, drawing on everything they had learned in their pre-deployment training and everything they had seen on the tour hitherto. We have to give soldiers the confidence that, on the rare occasions on which they take those decisions—on operations in hugely dangerous situations—and get them wrong, the system will back them up and will agree that they followed the rules of engagement, and that, once all the investigations in theatre are complete, that is them done.
When I was the adjutant of 2 Rifles in Sangin in 2009, arguably on the most kinetic of the Operation Herrick tours, there were lots. Every day I would start shooting incident reports and other sorts of incident report that would go on up to the Herrick taskforce at brigade and would be immediately looked over by lawyers and the Royal Military Police. That process was robust, and when there was any doubt in investigators’ minds, the investigation continued beyond the brigade, up to division, and was looked at thoroughly.
Soldiers have to know that that process is complete, and that when it is done the nation will stand behind them. Otherwise, in that split second when the safety catch has to be removed and lethal force has to be applied, they will hesitate. That could cost them their life.