(3 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe visions on television sets the other day very much were redolent of 1975. No matter what Secretary of State Blinken said, the parallels with the Americans’ departure from Saigon were shocking, but also very true. My point is that the way we withdraw matters almost as much as the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan—I will return to that in a moment. The chaotic, ghastly departure, the way that people were falling off aircraft in their determination to get away, and the helicopters shipping people out, say terrible things about the values that we hold and those we wish to protect. This is a shame on all of us, not just America, but also the whole of NATO and here for us in this House.
We know that US support for the military in Afghanistan had evaporated and there was pressure to leave, but there was a better way. The US non-partisan Afghanistan study group came forward and said that over the past 18 months the US had suffered no casualties at all. It had withdrawn directly from the frontline, and the same for the UK. We were giving support, help and aid to those on the frontline, including the 70,000 members of the Afghan forces who died and of whom we should be incredibly proud today.
The Prime Minister reminded the House that the Afghans lost 70,000 men whom we helped to train and whom we fought alongside, even though some of them were not paid for many months because of endemic corruption in Kabul. Does my right hon. Friend agree that to imply, as some have, that they basically ran away, when for 10 years and more they had done precisely the opposite, is shameful?
There is no question but that is an infamous statement to make. Those men and women lost their lives trying to uphold what we had brought to Afghanistan, and we should be proud of them. I say to the American President—the Government and even the Opposition leadership are perhaps reluctant to say this—that he has no right to use excuses and base them on people who have lost their lives, and done so bravely. The withdrawal of air support was critical at that moment. The moment that went, the Taliban got a green light and knew they were going to go in and that the Afghan forces could not be supported. That was a critical decision. It was done in a hurry, and it was wrong.
As I said earlier, the Afghanistan study group said that there was no need for this precipitative departure by America. It could have kept a number of forces there at a much lower cost, supporting those on the frontline, and we could have supported it in doing that. I ask my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, did we at any stage demand that the US Government review their decision? Did we say to them that this was wrong, or that we must find a way to support what we have started in Afghanistan? I am proud of what our troops achieved and I know they will feel deserted at this point. I did not serve in Afghanistan, but I served in Northern Ireland and I know what the feeling is. However, I say that today those who died rise in glory because they gave something to the Afghans—hope. We must find a way of ensuring that it is not dashed.
(3 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberIf I may, I shall begin by commending my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) for so ably introducing this very important debate and by agreeing with him that we should thank the Backbench Business Committee for finding valuable time for it, especially as our Prime Minister is now due to meet senior members of the Irish Government on these matters only next week.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex has pointed out, the Northern Ireland protocol contains a safeguarding clause in article 16 in the event that the protocol is not working as intended. Either party can activate article 16, in which case they then have to proceed under the provisions of annex 7. It should be remembered that the European Commission, not the UK Government, invoked article 16 on the evening of 29 January 2021. If the rumours were to be believed, Dublin was not even consulted about this action. Dublin found out from London, not from Brussels. The supreme irony is that, in doing so, the European Commission, which took the decision, effectively sought to create a hard border on the island of Ireland for medicines and, crucially, vaccines, despite having sworn blind for three years, during what I describe as the battle for Brexit in this House, that that was absolutely the last thing that they ever wanted to do. I am sure that the Chairman of the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare), who has helpfully reassured us this afternoon that he is not an apologist for the European Union, will be the first to acknowledge that.
Invoking article 16 in that way was, I think it is fair to say, widely derided as a mistake, and the European Commission withdrew it by the cold light of morning. The Commission was really doing it for internal reasons, because of, among other things, the slow roll-out of vaccines, unfortunately, on the continent; nevertheless, the fact that it did it, when it clearly should not have done, means that our Prime Minister is absolutely entitled, as he has said many times, to keep article 16 on the table if the European Commission refuses to be reasonable in renegotiating the Northern Ireland protocol, or even replacing it.
One thing, though, that all protagonists in this debate seem to agree about is their willingness and, in fact, strong desire to uphold the 1998 Good Friday agreement, which has indeed been crucial in bringing peace and stability to Northern Ireland for over two decades. It is fundamentally based on the principle of consent, as the leader of the Democratic Unionist party, the right hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Sir Jeffrey M. Donaldson), and his colleagues have reminded us, but it is now as plain as a pikestaff that the Northern Ireland protocol no longer enjoys the consent of the Unionist community in Northern Ireland.
If the House will not take that from me, it could take it from the new leader of the DUP, whom I wish all the best with his onerous responsibilities at this time. If the House will not take it from him, it could take it from the Nobel prize winner Lord Trimble, who has pointed out, importantly in this context also to audiences in the United States, who follow these matters closely, that the Northern Ireland protocol no longer enjoys the consent of the Unionist community in Northern Ireland. Very wisely, in my view, he has recommended a system of mutual enforcement as a far better alternative.
Does my right hon. Friend recognise that Lord Trimble is not just a Nobel peace prize winner, but one of the two architects of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, the other of whom is now dead, and therefore the greatest authority on what is going on? I absolutely agree with my right hon. Friend. Is it not the reality, therefore, that those who had nothing to do with it now say they are experts, when the real expert says that it is exactly what it is—damaging?
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. Lord Trimble helped to create the Good Friday agreement, at great risk not just to his political career but arguably to his own life, and not least because of that he is respected around the world. If people will not listen to me or even, though I find it difficult to believe, to my right hon. Friend, they should listen to David Trimble.
In February 2021, the European Research Group, which I have the privilege to chair, produced a detailed report on the Northern Ireland protocol, entitled “Re-uniting the Kingdom: How and why to replace the Northern Ireland Protocol”. A copy has been lodged in the Library of the House of Commons. The executive summary of that document says:
“The European Commission’s bungled invocation of Article 16, regarding vaccines, in late January 2021 has, rightfully, been widely criticised. Nevertheless, it has created a unique political opportunity for the United Kingdom Government to seek to negotiate a replacement of the Protocol with alternative arrangements, based on the concept of ‘Mutual Enforcement.’…If the EU remains unwilling to contemplate this, the U.K. Government should retain the option of invoking Article 16 itself and/or consider instigating domestic legislation, to replace the Protocol, via utilising Section 38 (The Sovereignty Clause) of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act, 2020.”
We want to renegotiate this, and we hope that the European Commission and member states will be reasonable. After all, it swore blind that it would never remove the backstop, but after three months of negotiation it did, so there is a clear precedent for it. We would rather do this in a spirit of mutual negotiation, but I am reminded of the words of the late Baroness Thatcher, who famously said: “Northern Ireland is as British as Finchley”. Baroness Thatcher may no longer be with us, but her spirit lives on. We must retain Northern Ireland as a fundamental part of the United Kingdom. If, when push comes to shove, that means that the Northern Ireland protocol has to go, so that the vital principle of consent within the Good Friday agreement can be maintained for the peace and wellbeing of the people of Northern Ireland, then so be it.
(4 years, 8 months ago)
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Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
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That is the point. Each time, we are told that they will reduce, but, in fact, we get more and more addicted to them and are unable to change.
When the Government announced the figure of 35%, they made the point that the plan to exclude Huawei products from the core of the 5G infrastructure meant that we would solve the problem by restricting them only to the edge, as it was described. This position critically rests on the assumption that the core cannot be compromised from the edge. Most cyber experts whom I have spoken to know that this is an unsafe assumption, because they know that the whole 5G network can be attacked starting from the compromised edge, given the nature of change to the technological capability of the edge.
The edge components can be compromised. Indeed, there is some evidence that such attacks have already taken place on a limited scale elsewhere. For example, a hostile adversary might disable our 5G network by simply shutting down our antennas and/or routers at the edge by remotely activating the malware already buried inside many of those processors. Those embedded in the edge will have kill switches, which are currently nigh on impossible to detect and, therefore, to mitigate.
My right hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. One facet of living in a free country is that we are free to make our own mistakes. This is the first big mistake that we have made. As a former Armed Forces Minister, I want to reinforce everything he has said. Given what I learned when I was in office, the idea that we can keep them securely on the edge is complete and utter nonsense.
I agree with my right hon. Friend and he will see that in the course of my remarks I will point out that we—alone, it appears—are taking an enormous gamble.
The second reason the Government prayed in aid of their decision on 5G was the fact that it offered three main benefits: faster data transmission rates, shorter delays and increased network capacity. While faster data transmission rates can improve user experience—there is no doubt about that—for most people, 5G will not significantly impact their experience. Tasks such as viewing a movie will not be perceptibly different from 4G. In any case, the data speeds offered by 5G—100 megabits per second to 1000 megabits per second—are in the range offered by more conventional superfast fibre broadband. In many cases, the desired performance can and should be achieved by other means. Completing the roll-out of superfast fibre broadband, which my Government have constantly promised to complete to the level it should be at, is the No. 1 priority. Further, that will affect the ability of 5G to operate.
The point I am making is that the systems and everything else that is being used are making things very vulnerable. The right hon. Gentleman makes my point exactly.
I am worried about the Government mobile system, which I understand the Government are working on. As usual for the civil service, it has some ghastly acronym. It is called gomo for short, which rather describes the process that we have been going through so far with Huawei. The Government have decreed that it will be one supplier only. It stands to reason that unless the Government block untrusted providers from the system, we will likely be handing over control of yet another vital and sensitive system to the organisation under discussion. That is a big question for the Government. Will they ensure that when that contract is let, the supplier will not have any input from untrusted providers such as Huawei? The Minister needs to answer that question.
I do not think John Lewis is in the market, but we can check that. I have not been there for any telecommunications.
I say to my colleagues and to you, Mr Paisley, that the situation is an utter mess at the moment.