Russia’s Grand Strategy

Debate between Iain Duncan Smith and Bernard Jenkin

Thursday 19th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I certainly think that is the case, and I think the constant fear of our escalating the conflict has been misplaced because Putin has escalated the conflict anyway. There is nothing we can do to prevent him from escalating. In fact, the signal we have sent by being too timid and too slow in sending support into Ukraine has encouraged him to escalate. There is no deterrence in timidity, which is what too many western Governments have shown.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

To drag together that point with something my hon. Friend said earlier, surely such timidity also follows failure to have the capability to be more assertive. In other words, now that their defence budgets have been stripped out, western Governments are worried that any attempt to try to show that they are more belligerent, shall we say, exposes the very fact that most of them are simply incapable of delivering any of that belligerence at all.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I entirely agree with that, but in more direct response to my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), the timidity of the Germans not just to release their own tanks, but to allow the tanks of other nations, such as Poland, to be sent into the conflict to support the Ukrainians sends more than a signal of timidity—it is appeasement. I am sorry to use that word, which I know has a loaded connotation, but it is appeasement. However, we must congratulate Germany on having come a very long way from the days of Gazprom being chaired by a former Chancellor of Germany and Angela Merkel making Germany dependent on Russian gas as a matter of policy. We have come a long way, and we should welcome the fact that Germany has committed to spend €100 billion more on defence, but we are still yet to see what that really means, and it means nothing if Germany is not prepared to help send heavy armour into this conflict.

If I may say so, we have committed to send 12 tanks, but why not 120 tanks? What are our tanks for? Are they there to sit around on Salisbury plain and in Germany to decorate the British Army’s capability, or should we tool them up and get them into this conflict so that the taxpayer can actually get value for money out of this investment? If necessary, we can launch an urgent operational requirement to acquire some more tanks to replace those that we will probably not ever see again in our own country.

Northern Ireland Protocol

Debate between Iain Duncan Smith and Bernard Jenkin

Thursday 15th July 2021 Commons Chamber

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I could not be more grateful for that intervention, and I will amplify the points that the right hon. Gentleman makes, because he is absolutely right. Have no doubt that there has been and continues to be diversion of trade due to the protocol. Article 16 exists in order that either party can take unilateral action to prevent that.

The Central Statistics Office Ireland reports that Republic of Ireland exports to Northern Ireland in the first four months of this year increased by 25% and by 40% relative to the first four months of 2019 and 2020. Northern Ireland exports to the Republic increased by 59% and 61% on the same comparison. Some are heralding that as the birth of an all-Ireland economy, but that is wholly contrary to the letter and spirit of the protocol.

The motion in my name continues by noting that

“significant provisions of the Protocol remain subject to grace periods and have not yet been applied to trade from Great Britain to Northern Ireland and that there is no evidence that this has presented any significant risk to the EU internal market”.

Those grace periods, applying to chilled meats, medicines and the requirement of export health certificates, are intended to lapse in the coming months. The UK Government may choose to extend them, as we already have, with or without the EU’s permission, and they would be justified in doing so because the grace periods are not doing any harm, but that is not a long-term solution.

The Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Simon Coveney, says that the grace periods exist

“to give supermarkets in particular, the opportunity to readjust their supply chains to adapt to”

what he refers to as “these new realities”. I am afraid that confirms in the minds of many that the protocol is being used to create diversion of trade.

Diversion of trade as a goal can form no basis for the rebuilding of trust and public confidence in both communities in Northern Ireland. Article 6 of the protocol requires the EU and the UK to

“use their best endeavours to facilitate the trade between Northern Ireland and other parts of the United Kingdom”.

I regret to say that, thus far, there is little evidence to suggest that the Republic of Ireland or the EU are attaching any importance to that vital commitment, and that is what is destroying trust.

The motion then states that this House

“regards flexibility in the application of the Protocol as being in the mutual interests of the EU and UK, given the unique constitutional and political circumstances of Northern Ireland; regrets EU threats of legal action; notes the EU and UK have made a mutual commitment to adopt measures with a view to avoiding controls at the ports and airports of Northern Ireland to the extent possible; is conscious of the need to avoid separating the Unionist community from the rest of the UK, consistent with the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement; and also recognises that Article 13(8) of the Protocol provides for potentially superior arrangements to those currently in place.”

That is the real point of the motion: that the protocol is only one solution to the challenge of avoiding a hard border in Ireland while also respecting the integrity of the EU and UK internal markets.

There always was more than one way to skin a cat, and the EU agreed to that in article 13(8). Unfortunately, the EU seems implacably opposed to any discussion about how a subsequent agreement under article 13(8) of the protocol could supersede the protocol in whole or in part. Paragraph 25 of the political declaration accompanying the withdrawal agreement also envisaged:

“Such facilitative arrangements and technologies will also be considered in alternative arrangements for ensuring the absence of a hard border on the island of Ireland.”

Sadly, the protocol was not superseded by the trade and co-operation agreement, but now is the time for the EU to accept that its application of the protocol is not achieving its legitimate aims. Either the protocol must be changed by agreement or the UK must exercise its sovereign right to jettison the whole thing as a fundamental threat to peace and stability in Northern Ireland and to the integrity of the United Kingdom.

The EU could start by agreeing to an expanded category of goods that are not at risk of onward travel to the Republic of Ireland. We already have an authorised trader scheme for supermarkets; that could also be expanded, creating far less paperwork than there is now and a permanent exemption from unnecessary sanitary and phytosanitary checks. The EU could also agree to allow non-EU-compliant UK products to be imported into Northern Ireland if they are not at risk of moving into the rest of the EU internal market. The question is whether the EU is capable of being flexible and pragmatic, or whether it will continue to insist on imposing its rules, whatever the cost to peace and stability in Northern Ireland.

The noble Lord, Lord Trimble, was one of the two leaders who won the Nobel peace prize for negotiating the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. He has proposed a new solution: replacing the protocol with a system of mutual enforcement. This would mean that the UK and the EU would each ensure and guarantee that goods travelling across the shared border would be compliant with each other’s standards. Light checks would occur, but away from the border, and both sides would share relevant data on exports.

That proposal would remove the need for direct EU jurisdiction over Northern Ireland; Northern Ireland would be under UK law and fully restored as part of the UK internal market. It would ensure the absence of any new infrastructure on the border itself, it would guarantee the integrity of the EU internal market and, most importantly, it would accord equal respect to the concerns of both communities in Northern Ireland in a way that the present protocol utterly fails to do.

The proposal has not yet been tabled by the UK Government, but my understanding is that they broadly support the sentiments of the motion. Ideally, the EU would accept its obligations under paragraph 25 of the 2019 political declaration and agree in principle that the protocol will be superseded by these pragmatic and practical proposals.

We must hope that the EU lives up to its own ideals. Article 8 of the treaty on European Union obliges the EU to

“develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness…based on cooperation.”

If the EU refuses in principle even to open these discussions, the UK will have no option but to resort to article 16 of the protocol and take unilateral action. The world is watching how the EU is dealing with the United Kingdom.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

Sometimes, over the course of this, the view is taken in the EU, or even in Ireland, that somehow the rest of the UK, or Great Britain, has no regard at all for the status of Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom. May I just read back to my hon. Friend two facts from a recent poll, which shows that to be completely wrong? When asked whether it is unfair to Northern Ireland that it is treated differently from the rest of the UK, over 50% of the residents from the whole of the United Kingdom said, yes, it was unfair. The second question, which is really important, was: how important or unimportant is it that Northern Ireland remains a part of the United Kingdom. Again, well over half—53%—said “important”. Interestingly, that is a margin of 41% over those in the United Kingdom who said it was unimportant. We want Northern Ireland to remain a part of the United Kingdom.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

My right hon. Friend puts down an important marker. We can dismiss any idea that the United Kingdom as a whole is not interested in the interests of Northern Ireland or in Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom. That is an established fact and he has dealt with that very capably.

In conclusion, the world is watching how the EU is dealing with the United Kingdom. The UK will offer agreement on what the problems are and how they must be resolved. Together, the EU and the UK can look for common ground about how to do so; otherwise the rest of the world will see that the grounds for invoking article 16 have indeed already been met, and action will have to be taken.