UK-EU Summit

Debate between Iain Duncan Smith and Bernard Jenkin

Tuesday 13th May 2025 Commons Chamber

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I am delighted to follow the hon. Member for Chelsea and Fulham (Ben Coleman) and his flowery optimism for the future of this country, with it somehow being a terribly good thing that we are realigning ourselves with the European Union without actually rejoining it. It makes me wonder about all the debates I have attended over 33 years in the House about our relationship with what used to be called the common market, then the European Communities and now the European Union.

This debate has a ring of familiarity about it, because there are two sides in the House that tend to completely misunderstand each other—only, I think that Conservative Members now understand the truth, because that came out in the referendum. The referendum demonstrated that the House of Commons was completely out of alignment with the population on the question of our membership of the European Union. The whole Brexit story was about a battle within the House as to whether the pro-EU majority would assert itself and somehow negate the referendum, or whether the referendum would be respected. That is why my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and her shadow Cabinet colleagues are right to put at the front of the motion the importance of honouring the referendum result.

The fact is that a referendum result represents a superior mandate to a single term of election for an elected Government, because that referendum takes place on a single issue. I do not think anyone would pretend that the European Union was the main issue at the last general election, so anyone in the Government or indeed in the Liberal Democrats trying to use the general election result as a mandate to circumvent the result of the 2016 referendum is playing a dangerous political game.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

Of course, that argument was used in reverse on those of us who had had concerns about Europe for 40 years as we were told—exactly to my hon. Friend’s point—that a referendum was superior to continuous elections. We made a decision after the last referendum; that was a generational move. We have hardly had a generation in the few years since the referendum.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I agree with my right hon. Friend. The important point is that we do not have a written constitution, but we do have in our minds a hierarchy of legitimacy on which, in the end, the democratic credibility of the House depends. The fact is, a referendum represents a superior mandate on a single issue and, with a great struggle, the pro-EU majority eventually aligned itself with the decision that the British people had taken on our membership of the European Union.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I am happy to point out that after the referendum and since we left the European Union, we are spending way more than £350 million a week more on the NHS than we were, and our contributions to the European Union have fallen dramatically—in fact, much faster than was expected under the withdrawal agreement. So the benefit that was on the side of the bus has turned out to be correct, although I believe it was a statistical sleight of hand to use that particular number; I disowned it at the time. But have no doubt that if we are to get drawn back into the European Union, we will have to start raiding the NHS to make payments to the European Union again. I do not think that is what the British people voted for.

That brings me back to this great defence fund, which I think will be borrowed. Will we have to borrow some of that fund as well? No, it was going to be borrowed through some European Central Bank mechanism. Will it instead be taxed? In any case, it is all Government borrowing, so will we add to Government borrowing by participating in the borrowing or funding of that fund, or would it not be better if we just remained aloof from it to concentrate on spending money on our own defence? That is the point that has already been made: the money that we have committed to defence over the years, in the period since the second world war and, indeed, since the end of the cold war, is far greater than that of the vast majority of EU countries. We also mandate our nuclear deterrent to the protection of the whole of Europe. We play our part in the defence of Europe. As for the idea that we can deploy troops more quickly through free movement of people, what planet are the Liberal Democrats on? It is utterly ludicrous.

I come back to the point about the defence fund. There have been such funds in Europe before, but I can assure Members that the game that every country plays is the one where what they put in, they get out. The French are past masters at that. They will participate in a multilateral programme, but if they do not get the lion’s share, they pull out. They pulled out of the Eurofighter programme when that was meant to be part of their deal because they were not getting enough work out of it. Therefore, the idea that it is a freebie for British defence companies to participate in the fund and get extra money into the British defence industries will simply not happen.

In any case, this fund is not about creating warfighting capability this year or next year, which is what we need; it is about the very long-term, big programmes that the defence industries want. That will not rescue us from America’s absence from NATO, if that were to occur for more than a few months or a few years under Donald Trump. Let us also remember that Donald Trump will not be there forever; he has 45 more months to go. Let us not do more damage to NATO by making it look to the other side of the Atlantic that we will take care of our own defence in Europe from now on. That is very dangerous.

I remember Madeleine Albright, a Democrat Secretary of State, railing against what was then called the European security and defence policy. She warned that it represented the “Three Ds”: the duplication of NATO assets, which was wasteful and unnecessary; the discrimination against non-EU members of NATO such as Norway, Turkey, Canada and the United States; and the decoupling of American and European defence policy. Is that what we want? Is that what this House wants? Is that what the Labour party wants? No. The Labour party says that NATO is the cornerstone of our defence and rightly so, but what signal is it sending to President Trump?

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I ask that he wait just a minute.

What signal is it sending to Donald Trump by suggesting that we will have an EU defence policy that excludes the United States? It is exactly the wrong signal for this moment.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I am pleased that my hon. Friend raises that point, which I want to elaborate further. The real point is that J. D. Vance, the vice president, came over to Munich and ripped a hole through the Europeans, including ourselves, for not having spent enough, although we were one of the top spenders. Since then, the Americans have gone on and on about that, but each time we get the sense that they are keener to decouple. Does what we are about to do not give strength to the argument that we do not need them any longer and therefore they need to look somewhere else? That is the danger, because NATO was not just about defence of the west; it was about making sure that the US never goes into isolationism again.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

Yes. That promise of creating an EU defence capability has been on the table since the St Malo declaration of 1999, in the aftermath of the Maastricht treaty that first introduced the word “defence” into the EU. That was when France and the United Kingdom, under a Labour Government, declared that the EU would have autonomous military capability, with separable but not separate military forces from NATO.

We still have the absurdity in which the armed forces of the EU countries are allocated to NATO tasks but, at the same time, are ready for EU tasks. There had to be a complicated de-confliction arrangement to try to ensure that an EU defence mission does not conflict with a NATO defence mission. We finished up with something called the Berlin-plus arrangements, which Turkey has never accepted because it is not a member of the EU but is a member of NATO.

There has always been an impasse between NATO and the EU on those two questions, and it is all completely unnecessary because NATO has a military headquarters, it has a political committee and it is an international organisation. Indeed, it is the most successful military alliance in the world. Why is the EU trying to duplicate it just for itself? The EU is more interested in statecraft and state-building than defending our own continent. The anger with which Ursula von der Leyen and Friedrich Merz have attacked Trump reflects a latent anti-Americanism that has always been there and which we could do without at this moment.

Russia’s Grand Strategy

Debate between Iain Duncan Smith and Bernard Jenkin

Thursday 19th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I certainly think that is the case, and I think the constant fear of our escalating the conflict has been misplaced because Putin has escalated the conflict anyway. There is nothing we can do to prevent him from escalating. In fact, the signal we have sent by being too timid and too slow in sending support into Ukraine has encouraged him to escalate. There is no deterrence in timidity, which is what too many western Governments have shown.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

To drag together that point with something my hon. Friend said earlier, surely such timidity also follows failure to have the capability to be more assertive. In other words, now that their defence budgets have been stripped out, western Governments are worried that any attempt to try to show that they are more belligerent, shall we say, exposes the very fact that most of them are simply incapable of delivering any of that belligerence at all.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I entirely agree with that, but in more direct response to my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), the timidity of the Germans not just to release their own tanks, but to allow the tanks of other nations, such as Poland, to be sent into the conflict to support the Ukrainians sends more than a signal of timidity—it is appeasement. I am sorry to use that word, which I know has a loaded connotation, but it is appeasement. However, we must congratulate Germany on having come a very long way from the days of Gazprom being chaired by a former Chancellor of Germany and Angela Merkel making Germany dependent on Russian gas as a matter of policy. We have come a long way, and we should welcome the fact that Germany has committed to spend €100 billion more on defence, but we are still yet to see what that really means, and it means nothing if Germany is not prepared to help send heavy armour into this conflict.

If I may say so, we have committed to send 12 tanks, but why not 120 tanks? What are our tanks for? Are they there to sit around on Salisbury plain and in Germany to decorate the British Army’s capability, or should we tool them up and get them into this conflict so that the taxpayer can actually get value for money out of this investment? If necessary, we can launch an urgent operational requirement to acquire some more tanks to replace those that we will probably not ever see again in our own country.

Northern Ireland Protocol

Debate between Iain Duncan Smith and Bernard Jenkin

Thursday 15th July 2021 Commons Chamber

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I could not be more grateful for that intervention, and I will amplify the points that the right hon. Gentleman makes, because he is absolutely right. Have no doubt that there has been and continues to be diversion of trade due to the protocol. Article 16 exists in order that either party can take unilateral action to prevent that.

The Central Statistics Office Ireland reports that Republic of Ireland exports to Northern Ireland in the first four months of this year increased by 25% and by 40% relative to the first four months of 2019 and 2020. Northern Ireland exports to the Republic increased by 59% and 61% on the same comparison. Some are heralding that as the birth of an all-Ireland economy, but that is wholly contrary to the letter and spirit of the protocol.

The motion in my name continues by noting that

“significant provisions of the Protocol remain subject to grace periods and have not yet been applied to trade from Great Britain to Northern Ireland and that there is no evidence that this has presented any significant risk to the EU internal market”.

Those grace periods, applying to chilled meats, medicines and the requirement of export health certificates, are intended to lapse in the coming months. The UK Government may choose to extend them, as we already have, with or without the EU’s permission, and they would be justified in doing so because the grace periods are not doing any harm, but that is not a long-term solution.

The Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Simon Coveney, says that the grace periods exist

“to give supermarkets in particular, the opportunity to readjust their supply chains to adapt to”

what he refers to as “these new realities”. I am afraid that confirms in the minds of many that the protocol is being used to create diversion of trade.

Diversion of trade as a goal can form no basis for the rebuilding of trust and public confidence in both communities in Northern Ireland. Article 6 of the protocol requires the EU and the UK to

“use their best endeavours to facilitate the trade between Northern Ireland and other parts of the United Kingdom”.

I regret to say that, thus far, there is little evidence to suggest that the Republic of Ireland or the EU are attaching any importance to that vital commitment, and that is what is destroying trust.

The motion then states that this House

“regards flexibility in the application of the Protocol as being in the mutual interests of the EU and UK, given the unique constitutional and political circumstances of Northern Ireland; regrets EU threats of legal action; notes the EU and UK have made a mutual commitment to adopt measures with a view to avoiding controls at the ports and airports of Northern Ireland to the extent possible; is conscious of the need to avoid separating the Unionist community from the rest of the UK, consistent with the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement; and also recognises that Article 13(8) of the Protocol provides for potentially superior arrangements to those currently in place.”

That is the real point of the motion: that the protocol is only one solution to the challenge of avoiding a hard border in Ireland while also respecting the integrity of the EU and UK internal markets.

There always was more than one way to skin a cat, and the EU agreed to that in article 13(8). Unfortunately, the EU seems implacably opposed to any discussion about how a subsequent agreement under article 13(8) of the protocol could supersede the protocol in whole or in part. Paragraph 25 of the political declaration accompanying the withdrawal agreement also envisaged:

“Such facilitative arrangements and technologies will also be considered in alternative arrangements for ensuring the absence of a hard border on the island of Ireland.”

Sadly, the protocol was not superseded by the trade and co-operation agreement, but now is the time for the EU to accept that its application of the protocol is not achieving its legitimate aims. Either the protocol must be changed by agreement or the UK must exercise its sovereign right to jettison the whole thing as a fundamental threat to peace and stability in Northern Ireland and to the integrity of the United Kingdom.

The EU could start by agreeing to an expanded category of goods that are not at risk of onward travel to the Republic of Ireland. We already have an authorised trader scheme for supermarkets; that could also be expanded, creating far less paperwork than there is now and a permanent exemption from unnecessary sanitary and phytosanitary checks. The EU could also agree to allow non-EU-compliant UK products to be imported into Northern Ireland if they are not at risk of moving into the rest of the EU internal market. The question is whether the EU is capable of being flexible and pragmatic, or whether it will continue to insist on imposing its rules, whatever the cost to peace and stability in Northern Ireland.

The noble Lord, Lord Trimble, was one of the two leaders who won the Nobel peace prize for negotiating the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. He has proposed a new solution: replacing the protocol with a system of mutual enforcement. This would mean that the UK and the EU would each ensure and guarantee that goods travelling across the shared border would be compliant with each other’s standards. Light checks would occur, but away from the border, and both sides would share relevant data on exports.

That proposal would remove the need for direct EU jurisdiction over Northern Ireland; Northern Ireland would be under UK law and fully restored as part of the UK internal market. It would ensure the absence of any new infrastructure on the border itself, it would guarantee the integrity of the EU internal market and, most importantly, it would accord equal respect to the concerns of both communities in Northern Ireland in a way that the present protocol utterly fails to do.

The proposal has not yet been tabled by the UK Government, but my understanding is that they broadly support the sentiments of the motion. Ideally, the EU would accept its obligations under paragraph 25 of the 2019 political declaration and agree in principle that the protocol will be superseded by these pragmatic and practical proposals.

We must hope that the EU lives up to its own ideals. Article 8 of the treaty on European Union obliges the EU to

“develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness…based on cooperation.”

If the EU refuses in principle even to open these discussions, the UK will have no option but to resort to article 16 of the protocol and take unilateral action. The world is watching how the EU is dealing with the United Kingdom.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

Sometimes, over the course of this, the view is taken in the EU, or even in Ireland, that somehow the rest of the UK, or Great Britain, has no regard at all for the status of Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom. May I just read back to my hon. Friend two facts from a recent poll, which shows that to be completely wrong? When asked whether it is unfair to Northern Ireland that it is treated differently from the rest of the UK, over 50% of the residents from the whole of the United Kingdom said, yes, it was unfair. The second question, which is really important, was: how important or unimportant is it that Northern Ireland remains a part of the United Kingdom. Again, well over half—53%—said “important”. Interestingly, that is a margin of 41% over those in the United Kingdom who said it was unimportant. We want Northern Ireland to remain a part of the United Kingdom.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

My right hon. Friend puts down an important marker. We can dismiss any idea that the United Kingdom as a whole is not interested in the interests of Northern Ireland or in Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom. That is an established fact and he has dealt with that very capably.

In conclusion, the world is watching how the EU is dealing with the United Kingdom. The UK will offer agreement on what the problems are and how they must be resolved. Together, the EU and the UK can look for common ground about how to do so; otherwise the rest of the world will see that the grounds for invoking article 16 have indeed already been met, and action will have to be taken.

Universal Credit

Debate between Iain Duncan Smith and Bernard Jenkin

Thursday 5th September 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Duncan Smith]

I will not give that estimate now, because I intend to make a clear statement in the autumn about how and when we will roll this out. All I can tell the hon. Lady is that there will be significant volumes, and that I intend to close down jobseeker’s allowance and tax credit well before the election.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Public Administration Committee will produce an important report tomorrow about civil service reform? It comes as no surprise that the Comptroller and Auditor General has said that his programme lacked “an appropriate management approach”, adding:

“Instead, the programme suffered from weak management, ineffective control and poor governance.”

These are problems that afflict all Departments, and have done so for many years under the last Government as well as this one. Will my right hon. Friend support the civil service reform so determinedly championed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Horsham (Mr Maude), to ensure that we secure the change in Whitehall that we need?

[Mr Duncan Smith]

First, let me say that I am a complete supporter of my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General on the civil service reform plan, and I have been from day one. The truth is that if the Opposition were in thinking mode they would have agreed with that as well. The reality is that today’s NAO report shows there were problems in the running of this programme. I intervened when I discovered that and changed it, but I never expected to have to do that. When I arrived, I expected the professionalism to be able to do this properly. So my view is that I have intervened in the right way. All the other programmes of IT change are working and are well run—and they are well run by the Department. This one was not. We have made the changes necessary.