Contest: UK Strategy for Countering Terrorism 2023

Debate between Holly Lynch and Suella Braverman

Wednesday 19th July 2023 Commons Chamber

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if she will make a statement on Contest, the United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism 2023.

[The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Suella Braverman)]

Yesterday, the Government published an update to our counter-terrorism strategy, Contest. A written ministerial statement was laid alongside the Command Paper in Parliament.

Contest has a clear mission: to reduce the risk from terrorism to the United Kingdom, our citizens and our interests overseas, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. The terrorism threat level, set independently by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, has not changed, but the threat from terrorism is enduring and evolving. Despite a prevalence of lower-sophistication attacks in the UK, the threat we see today and in the coming years is more diverse, dynamic and complex: a domestic terrorist threat that is less predictable, harder to detect and harder to investigate; a persistent and evolving threat from Islamist terrorist groups overseas; and an operating environment in which accelerating advances in technology provide both opportunity for, and risk to, our counter-terrorism efforts.

It is within that context that we judge that the risk from terrorism is once again rising. By far the biggest terrorist threat comes from Islamist terrorism. It accounts for 67% of attacks since 2018, and about three quarters of MI5’s caseload. The remainder of the UK terrorist threat is largely driven by extreme right-wing terrorism, which accounts for approximately 22% of attacks since 2018 and about a quarter of the MI5 caseload. Our counter-terrorism response will be even more agile in the face of an evolving threat—more integrated, so that we can bring the right interventions to bear at the right time to reduce risk, and more aligned with our international allies, to ensure that we continue to deliver together against that common threat.

Through this updated strategy, we will place greater focus on using all the levers of the state to identify and intervene against terrorists. We will build critical partnerships with the private sector and international allies to keep the public safe, and we will harness the opportunities presented by new technology. There is no greater duty for this Government than to keep the British people safe, and I will not rest in delivering that mission.

[Holly Lynch]

The Contest update has very much been a sobering reminder of the threats we face. Our agencies, to which we are so grateful, have prevented 39 late-stage terror attacks in the past six years. The majority of them, as we have heard, were Islamist-motivated, with extreme right-wing terrorism making up the remainder. However, we are concerned by certain omissions from the update, and the disparity between the threats outlined and the responses proposed.

On artificial intelligence, the update recognises the challenge, saying that

“terrorists are likely to exploit the technology”.

We have called for new offences criminalising the training of chatbots to radicalise individuals, but concrete measures are woefully lacking in the update, so how are the Government going to tackle that? The update says that the threat from Daesh and al-Qaeda is on an “upward trajectory”, so can the Home Secretary tell us how we are working urgently with international partners to mitigate that risk?

The desperate situation in prisons is laid bare. With four of the nine terrorist attacks in the UK since 2018 perpetrated by serving or recently released prisoners, we are told individuals may develop

“a terrorist mindset…during their time in prison.”

Not only are we failing to de-radicalise people in prison, but people are being radicalised in prison, and failures to manage those prisoners on release are putting the public at risk. Can the Home Secretary tell the House how many terrorist prisoners are due to be released in the next 12 months, and whether every one of them has been engaged in intensive de-radicalisation programmes and assessed for terrorism prevention and investigation measures?

Finally, perhaps the most glaring omission is on state threats, despite the fact that the director general of MI5 made it clear in his annual threat update in November that Iran is

“the state actor which most frequently crosses into terrorism.”

In February, our agencies said that they had to disrupt 15 attempted kidnap and assassination attempts here in the UK. Remarkably, the report makes no reference to the resources, the approach or the powers necessary to respond to that form of terrorism. The Home Secretary knows that we have advocated for proscription powers on multiple occasions, so why do the Government continue to reject those proposals and why have they not finally proscribed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps?

[Suella Braverman]

I thank the hon. Lady for her comments. I know that she recognises the gravity and the sensitivity of this subject, and she will share my view that we must face the threat of terrorism united as one unified country.

Since March 2017, our agencies and law enforcement have disrupted 39 late-stage terrorist plots in the UK, as the hon. Lady said. These have included the targeting of public figures such as Members of Parliament, specific communities and events such as Pride, and public locations such as iconic sites in London. I want to put on record my profound thanks and admiration of all the professionals who work day in, day out under pressure for all they do to keep the British people safe every day. Many of us will never know the lengths to which they go in applying their expertise, dedication and public service attitude to put our safety above their own.

I am very proud of this Government’s track record when it comes to keeping the country safe. As Martyn’s law makes its way through Parliament, I expect the Opposition to be responsible and to support us in our efforts to provide this extra layer of protection for venues. We have seen significant reforms in our National Security Bill, now enacted. The hon. Lady mentioned terrorism in prisons. We take a very tough approach to managing terrorist prisoners, limiting their interactions with each other and restricting their communications. We have developed a new counter-terrorism assessment and rehabilitation centre for expert psychologists and specialist staff to research and implement specialist programmes to draw offenders away from terrorism. Indeed, the independent review of Prevent made extensive recommendations related to those in custody.

The hon. Lady referred to the use of artificial intelligence and technology. Foundation-model AIs undoubtedly hold vast potential, and they are crucial to the UK’s mission to become a science and tech superpower, but there are still many unknowns with this class of technology and many other forms of emerging technology that pose significant, but not yet fully understood, public safety and national security risks. I am particularly concerned about the rapid development and public deployment of generative large-language models like ChatGPT, and we are alert to the exponential pace of their development, the emergent capabilities which make the exact risks difficult to anticipate or control, and the relative ease with which safeguards can be overwritten. Those at the forefront of these technologies are explicit about the seriousness of the risks if proper safeguards are not developed quickly.

We look forward to promoting and enabling an open and constructive dialogue and deepened collaboration with tech company leaders, industry experts and like-minded nations as we seek to ensure that the gifts of this technology are delivered and that society is protected. Indeed, at the recent Five Eyes security meeting in New Zealand, where I represented the UK, we discussed the emerging hostile use of technology and collaborative ways in which we may work at the international level to mitigate those risks.

To conclude, I am very clear that we need to face the threats united as one country. I hope that the Opposition understand the heavy weight of that responsibility and that we will work together constructively to keep the British people safe.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Holly Lynch and Suella Braverman

Monday 22nd May 2023 Commons Chamber

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

Microsoft’s digital defence report outlines how nations including Russia, China and Iran are deploying social media-powered propaganda operations to shape opinion, discredit adversaries and incite fear, with harrowing examples of Russia’s use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine. During the passage of the National Security Bill, the Labour party called for an annual report on the extent of disinformation originating from foreign powers, which this Government rejected. Does the Home Secretary accept that the Government have been far too slow in responding to the scale of this threat, and that such an annual report represents the bare minimum that the Government should be doing to protect the UK from foreign hostile and sustained cyber-interference?

[Suella Braverman]

I disagree with the hon. Lady’s characterisation that the Government have been too slow to act on Russian state threats. Following the invasion of Ukraine last year, the UK introduced trade sanctions in relation to internet and online media services, preventing designated entities from using platforms to connect with UK audiences online. The Government designated TV-Novosti and Rossiya Segodnya on 4 May 2023, choking off the Russian Federation’s ability to disseminate misinformation across the internet through its state-sponsored RT and Sputnik brands. There has been a lot of effort and a lot of work to counter Russian state disinformation.

Prisons and Courts Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Holly Lynch and Suella Braverman

Committee Debate: 1st Sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 28th March 2017 Public Bill Committees

[Suella Fernandes]

Q My second point I would like to raise with all members of the panel relates to health and mental health provision in the Bill and also in the White Paper. In those, there is considerable detail on how governors can work together with the local clinical commissioning group or other health providers to assess the health needs of prisoners, co-commission services and assess quality of performance, instilling a bit more responsibility and flexibility in the system to safeguard health and mental health concerns. I would like the panel’s views on the mental health and health provisions.

Joe Simpson: When you are bound to outside agencies, especially in prisons, they are not there 24/7. The only people who are there 24/7 are prison officers and prison staff. One thing that we are going on from mental health is also social care in prisons. We have a lot of older prisoners who need more social care. Between the hours of 7 o’clock at night until 7 o’clock the next morning, they do not have access to that, and we do not have access to that as prison staff. We have no training whatever in order to assist prisoners who have those needs.

Mental health and health wellbeing should start on reception at the prison, when the prison officer brings the prisoner into prison, goes through the reception process and then passes them on to our colleagues for the mental health check. From that should come a plan of care, but that is not there, for the simple reason of time—“Let’s get them through because staff need to get off,” or, “We need to do this; we need to do that.” It is constant pressure on the regime and having the staffing available to do that.

If you are dependent on an outside agency that has its own staffing problems, it is not going to be done. That is the frustrating part from our members’ side. They identify a problem and nothing seems to be done for two or three days because we cannot get that expertise in. Why not utilise the person who is already there—the prison officer—and train them to do those duties, so that we can give better mental health care and increase wellbeing?

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

Q May I return to the issue of prison officer safety? I have tabled some new clauses that I hope will be helpful in that regard. On Second Reading, we touched on the issue of a prison officer being assaulted in prison by a prisoner. Is that referred to the police, followed up by the Crown Prosecution Service and taken to court, or is it dealt with internally within the prison? What is your experience of the decision making around that process, and what would be the preference of the Prison Officers Association for dealing with those types of incidents?

Joe Simpson: Our view is that somebody who assaults our members should be punished. As for the question of who does that, we are not really bothered. Our experience, and my members’ experience, of the police and CPS is actually getting a policeman in to do the investigation. More often than not, what comes back from the CPS is that it is not in the public interest, because that person is serving a sentence and in prison anyway. That demoralises our members. They feel as if they go to work and they are just punchbags. There was a big campaign by the trade union to try to change people’s thinking on that, because we work behind a wall—people do not look in and we do not look out. We would like our members to be protected by the law and to be taken seriously when they are assaulted at work.

Some incidents are serious physical assaults, but you also have to look at the mental aspects, especially in relation to spitting and biting. Let us say that a prison officer is bitten. We do not know the prisoner’s history. We do not know whether they have any blood-borne disease or anything like that. The officer then has to spend six months on antiviral treatment and everything like that, and along with that goes the mental anguish, not just for the member of staff, but for their family, because they cannot interact properly with their family for six months. That leads to its own problems: high rates of divorce, cases of alcoholism and people just not wanting to come to work. That develops into mental health problems. While they are in the service, they are looked after, but once they are dismissed by the service, all that assistance stops, because the employer turns round and says, “Well, we’re no longer responsible for that care.” Sometimes we are putting really poorly and ill prison officers back into society with no assistance whatever, because of something that has happened in the course of their work.

One of the most disgusting things ever is potting. It is especially the female members of staff who are targeted. A prisoner or prisoners will fill a bucket or whatever with excrement and urine, wait for the officer and then tip it over them. We are seeing an increase in that, because prisoners seem to think that it is more acceptable than hitting a member of staff or hitting a female member of staff. They still see that as a bit of a taboo subject, but that is starting to break down. They are not just targeting male staff; they are now targeting female staff as well, especially with potting, which is absolutely disgusting.