Budget Resolutions

Debate between Helen Goodman and George Kerevan

Wednesday 8th March 2017 Commons Chamber

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

I am pleased to follow the hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), with whom I am happy to serve on the Treasury Committee. I agreed entirely with what he said about science and about “Making tax digital”. He ended with some remarks about the forecast, which is where I shall begin.

I think everybody agrees that the most interesting thing about the Chancellor’s speech was what he did not say. The biggest economic change in the past year has been the 12% fall in the exchange rate since the Brexit vote. For the past six months, the uncertainty about our future trading relationship with the EU has damaged business investment, but it has not damaged consumption, which is why growth has continued faster than expected. Nevertheless, as the independent OBR’s forecast shows, that will not continue. As inflation rises, it will put a squeeze on real incomes. The boost we are currently seeing in export earnings is likely to be followed by a squeeze on margins for many businesses over the next few months. I notice that the Chancellor has put aside £26 billion, which is half what Michel Barnier says he will ask for in the negotiations. Meanwhile, public services are showing serious signs of strain, and we need to tackle the UK’s poor productivity record.

The best thing the Chancellor could do is to start to win battles on Brexit in the Cabinet. He needs to start to win the arguments on the customs union and on the need for harmonised regulation for industry on everything from medicines and chemicals to aviation and railway safety. It is uncertainty about those things that is causing the economic uncertainty and the fall in the exchange rate. New barriers will make real dents in our economic efficiency that we cannot afford, and they will be felt in lost jobs and lost opportunities.

The Chancellor’s money for productivity is welcome; this is a time not for short-term fixes but for long-term reform to address economic weaknesses and social discontent. His extra money for adult skills is welcome as far as it goes, but he is not yet offering maintenance loans for people in further education. Parity of esteem with higher education means parity of treatment.

On the money for schools, the Chancellor began by saying that education is the key to inclusive growth, but then went on to spend a lot of money on selective grammar schools—surely shome mistake. My constituents will be appalled by that move. In St Helen Auckland, where 48% of children are on free school meals, each child will get £609 less over the course of this Parliament. In Woodhouse Close, where 83% of children are on free school meals, there will be a cut of £571 per child. In Butterknowle, the cut is £1,881 per child. It is totally unfair to pour all the money into a tiny number of schools. The measures on school transport are unfair as well, as they do not take account of the long bus journeys that people have to make in rural areas.

The Resolution Foundation has published some interesting work recently, showing that the incomes of pensioners have overtaken those of working-age people. That problem will get worse over the next few months. We know that, for people in the bottom 10%, £1 in £6 is spent on food; for people in the top 10%, it is £1 in £12. At this moment, when we have higher inflation, the Government have decided to go ahead with a freeze on tax credits and child benefits, which are the income supports for the low-wage working poor. The Chancellor could have unfrozen those benefits to help millions of people had he not been committed to going ahead with inheritance tax cuts.

[George Kerevan]

Does hon. Lady agree that one of the other things that the Chancellor failed to mention was inflation and the fact that it is going through the roof?

[Helen Goodman]

Absolutely. The Chancellor said very little about Brexit, the exchange rate or inflation. Those are the major changes in the economy over the past six months.

The Chancellor could have unfrozen those benefits that go to the low-paid working poor had he not been committed to going ahead with cuts to inheritance tax, capital gains tax and corporation tax. To cut corporation tax to 19% may be good for competitiveness, but to cut it to 17% is surely unnecessary at this moment.

I want to throw a lifeline of support to the Treasury team who seem somewhat embattled on the issue of national insurance. I do not know whether they want a lifeline from me, but I will offer it to them anyway. It is reasonable, on equity grounds, to even up the tax that is paid by people in employment and by those in self-employment. We need to look at that whole matter more closely.

I am pleased also that the Chancellor has eschewed the gimmicks of his predecessor. The commitment not to raise income tax and national insurance whatever the circumstance was exactly one such gimmick. However, if we are to look at national insurance, let us look at the fact that it kicks in at £8,000, below the personal allowance.

The one thing on which we all agree across the House is the importance of tackling tax avoidance. What the Chancellor did not say was that the largest amount of money that he is taking in—this is in the final section of the chapter—is an extra £500 million from tax credits, which amounts to another cut in tax credits. The Red Book says that it is a pre-announced cut, but it cannot be pre-announced because the extra savings of £500 million are new.

One of the problems with the Government’s productivity plan is that it is not sufficiently inclusive in respect of workers and people at the top, and of the regions. The Government should really start thinking about making this country more equal, both as an economic efficiency measure and as a social justice measure. The fact is that people with predictable and secure incomes can take on more commitments, and that in turn will boost the economy in the medium term.

Quantitative Easing

Debate between Helen Goodman and George Kerevan

Thursday 15th September 2016 Commons Chamber

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

We are a small but enthusiastic band this afternoon, but it strikes me that there is something serious here. For the last eight years, the entire western world has been undertaking the most extraordinary monetary experiment in 100 years. If it goes wrong, as pointed out by the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker), the consequences will be devastating for the world economy. We may find that all we did in 2008 was delay the explosion of the world’s economy. It is that serious. I hope that the Bank of England and the regulatory authorities are watching via the camera lenses around the Chamber. This debate should not be seen as an attack on the Bank of England, however. There was an emergency in 2008 and the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England stepped in, and quantitative easing was an interesting device—an emergency brake on the banking crisis. As hon. Members have said, eight years on we should be looking at what else needs to be done.

To use a homely analogy that I hope the technical experts in the Chamber will not blanch at, in 2008 there was a fire in the financial system and we used a high-pressure hose called quantitative easing. Once the fire dampens down, if we keep on using the hose and hose everything in case the fire comes back up, we destroy everything in the house. If we look at the unintended consequences of QE, it is contributing to global deflation. There is inflation in parts, bubbling up through the system, but we have had deflation, which attacks the incentive to invest. We are destroying the propensity to save by bringing interest rates down to near zero. We are destroying bank profits. Has anyone looked at bank share prices over the past couple of years? We saved the banks in 2008 only to destroy their business model through the unintended consequences of QE. Who is going to do something about that?

If we do not do something about it, we will be into another banking crisis of a different kind. In the last two rounds of QE, in the EU and Japan, over the past 12 months, we have started a process of competitive devaluations. We are back to the 1930s; everyone’s response is, “Let’s devalue the currency. That will help our exports.” Once everyone does it, we are in the 1930s situation of beggar-my-neighbour, which inevitably leads to all sorts of political tensions. The Chinese Government are at the moment saying that they are not devaluing, but they are privately devaluing, as we can see if we look at what is happening in the international markets. Exchange rate competition is a dangerous, toxic thing, and it is a direct flow from what QE is now being used for.

As the hon. Member for Wycombe pointed out, the whole process has grossly distorted asset prices, so that when we unwind, it will be a case of, “Who knows what we have been investing in, and whether it has been the right thing or the wrong thing?” There has been discussion about house prices, but it is clear that a series of industrial investments and other kinds of investment could be seen to be the wrong ones once prices rebalance, which of course is making people nervous.

It is rare for me to do this, but I will disagree gently with the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman), because I do not think it is a question of using QE for something else in a better way. If we look at the Bank of England’s recent announcement of the £10 billion it is trying to put into company paper, we see that it has chosen 300 companies’ bonds in which it is considering investing this money over the next 18 months. What bonds was it choosing? The Bank of England said it was those of companies that had made

“a material contribution to the UK economy”.

Let me read out the names of some of the companies whose corporate paper the Bank of England is planning to put that £10 billion into. They include: Apple; AT&T; McDonald’s; Pepsi—not Coke, but Pepsi; Proctor & Gamble; UPS; Verizon; and Walmart. We are funding Wall Street. What about the EU? We are supposed to be pulling out of the EU, with Brexit. The Bank’s list includes BMW, Daimler, Deutsche Bahn, Deutsche Telekom, E.ON and Siemens. There are also some fabulous entrants: Moët Hennessy is on the Governor’s list, so the champagne is all right. Even EDF—

[Helen Goodman]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman that the Bank’s definition of “material contribution to the British economy” is inadequate. Like him, I do not think it is very helpful to be investing in fizzy drinks, but we do need to acknowledge that Siemens has a fantastic development in east Yorkshire and that that is good; that is a proper contribution. I do not think he is really arguing against me—

Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [Lords]

Debate between Helen Goodman and George Kerevan

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 19th April 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tyrie]

Of course my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg), as a great and learned constitutional expert, will explain this apparent contradiction to the House in, I hope, a lengthy disquisition in a few minutes’ time.

I really am trying to conclude, but I have just one more point. It is essential in a 21st-century democracy that appointees to an increasing number of quango positions—this was the general point I said I would refer to earlier—should be forced to explain their actions before Parliament and also should feel accountable to Parliament. To achieve that, the means of their appointment and their protection from dismissal are relevant, and that is why a change such as this can offer us something.

Over decades, successive Governments have offloaded their responsibilities to quangos, leaving the public with the sense that nobody is ultimately democratically accountable for anything. I believe that accountability for decisions that were formerly taken directly by Ministers, but now sit with unelected appointees in quangos, needs thorough scrutiny and cross-examination, and that is what we have been trying to do in the Treasury Committee over the past few years.

The agreement with the Chancellor is a sizeable step in the right direction. Of course, in an ideal world, I would like access to the statute book to write exactly what, on behalf of the Treasury Committee, I feel should be on it. However, we live in the real world, and I am very happy with this exchange of letters and grateful to Ministers for their agreement. I shall not press new clause 1 to a Division today.

[George Kerevan]

I agree with the right hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) that there is a lot to be commended in the Bill, although some of the good things, as with new clause 12, were pushed on the Government. I also think that there are still some negative aspects to the Bill, which brings me to a conclusion—[Interruption.] As usual, it will be quite a long conclusion!

The Bill began as a tidying-up operation, which is why it was launched in the House of Lords. It was seen to be about just tidying up a few things, making a few additions and changes to the Financial Services Act 2012. As the Bill proceeded through its various stages, however, the more it became apparent that it exposed a whole series of issues in the financial regulatory system that were not fit for purpose.

We have convinced ourselves—or at least the Government have convinced themselves—that bar a little tidying up, all has been done to resolve the crisis of 2007, but that is not true. What we discovered time and again as the Bill proceeded were issues with the operation of the Bank of England and issues with the functioning of the regulatory bodies and how fit for purpose they are. Furthermore, new issues have emerged only in the last few weeks regarding tax havens. All those problems have appeared. I do not see this Bill putting the problems away and putting the issues to bed. Rather, we are seeing the start of a whole series of pieces of legislation coming into force until we get it right. Far from it being a tidying-up operation, we have started something new.

I am speaking to new clauses 2 and 3, which stand in my name and those of my SNP colleagues. I believe they get to the nub of the issues we are facing as a result of what has been uncovered. In the last 20 years, and more particularly in the last 10, the Bank of England has acquired an extraordinary range of new powers. I do not mean just forecasting or supervising powers over banks, because fundamental policy levers for running the whole economy have been transferred from this House and the Executive to the Bank of England itself. This began with the transfer of powers over interest rates to the Bank of England in 1997, along with the power to set the exchange rates, which no one seemed to notice at the time. This gave the Bank de facto control over our external sector. More recently, of course, with quantitative easing, the Bank has forced interest rates down to the zero band. If monetary policy cannot be manipulated, what else can be done? Gradually, the Bank has been given powers over large swathes of fiscal policy.

Nowadays, the Bank of England even operates our housing policy, as housing determines the whole direction of economic growth. In recent weeks, the Bank has been deciding between buy for let or buy for homeowners. Micro-decisions have been transferred, and my worry is that we have crossed a line of accountability with respect to the Bank of England. This is not a criticism of individuals working for it or indeed of the Governor of the Bank of England, for whom I have high regard. Gradually, however, we have allowed it to take over from this House far too much of the operational policy that directs the economy.

That is why I am happy to support new clause 12 as a step forward in beginning to redress the balance of accountability. New clause 12 and the Government’s acceptance of the general line of march from the Treasury Select Committee means that we are beginning to move to the point where key members of the regulatory regime can be confirmed in their appointments by this House.

We now have two precedents in that direction, with the Treasury Committee as a servant of the House confirming the appointment of the director of the Office for Budget Responsibility and now the head of the Financial Conduct Authority. That is the line of march, but I want to put on record, however, that SNP Members view this as a down payment. We are moving in a direction where the Governor of the Bank of England and all the key members of the regulatory agencies have to be confirmed by this House. I know that will take a long time and that there is always a struggle—sometimes gentle, sometimes not—between the Executive and the House over who has the real say. What we are seeing is a move towards more democratic accountability being held by the House, which I welcome.

Let me move on briefly to new clause 2, which takes this process a little further. Given the policy direction and powers that now lie with the Bank of England, we have to make sure that its committees and, above all, its ruling court of directors are democratically accountable. That is why we tabled this simple new clause, stating:

“In making nominations to the Court of Directors of the Bank of England, the Chancellor of the Exchequer must have regard to the importance of ensuring a balanced representation from the nations and regions of the United Kingdom.”

That new clause was carefully written. There is no suggestion that the court should be a federal body. Our suggestion is that in the balance of its make-up, there should be representation for the whole nation. Rightly or wrongly—much more rightly than wrongly in my opinion—there is a perception that the City of London and its major banks and financial institutions have historically had too big a sway over the court and the Bank.

[Helen Goodman]

The hon. Gentleman is making a powerful point. Does he agree that it must be significant that the economic performance of the peripheral areas of these nations is also peripheral?

[George Kerevan]

I could not agree more. In fact, if we look at the long history of the regions and nations of the United Kingdom—Scotland, Wales, the north of England and Northern Ireland—we see that they have suffered a deflationary cycle since the second world war, because from 1945 onwards, by and large, interest rates were set to control inflation that was triggered by the City of London and over-lending by the City of London. As a result, the north-south divide became a deflationary line, with the nations of the north, and the regions of the north of England, suffering high interest rates. Although those rates were not germane to their economic problems, for most of the post-war period UK interest rates have, on average, been set at a higher level than those in the rest of Europe, simply in order to control and curb over-lending by the City of London, which has resulted in deflation in the industrial regions.

I consider that that might have been mitigated to some extent if there had been broader representation of the nations and their industries on the leading bodies of the Bank of England, and, although I know that the Executive will challenge my proposal, I think we need to move in that direction. I remind Members that the court of directors is not the institution of the Bank that actually makes monetary or fiscal policy. It has oversight over the whole of the Bank’s operations, in the sense of giving value for money, and, above all, ensuring that there is no group-think between the different committees that make operational policy. I therefore think that, at that level, we need to begin the process. At that level, we need wider representation on the court.

Surprisingly—and I raised this in Committee—such representation already exists to a small degree. Since world war 2, traditionally, there has always been a trade union representative on the court of the Bank of England, and there still is, to this day. Even the Government—indeed, successive Governments—have recognised that there can be wider representation on the court, including wider social representation. However, when I asked Ministers whether, if they were rejecting the notion of a court with a wider representation of the economy and the community, they were going to remove trade union representation, there was a deafening silence, and that is why I am putting the question again today. Those who accept the principle that there should be trade union representation—and there should—ought to widen that principle, and that is what I am asking for now.

We tabled the new clause carefully in order not to suggest that the court should be federal or too detailed, with someone representing this and someone else representing that, but simply to suggest that a balance was needed. As anyone who has sat on the board of a company will know, the first thing that one must do when creating a board is ensure that there is some representation of different skills and different interests, so that the board’s members can act as a collective. My point is that the court, and to some extent, I think, the new policy committees of the Bank of England, do not act as collectives. They are in danger of adopting silo thinking, and, ultimately—because of the power that we have given to the Bank of England—they are also in danger of beginning to act with the kind of hubris that central banks begin to wield when they are given too much power. They begin to think that they know everything when they do not. We need democratic accountability in the Bank of England, and we need it not in the sense in which the Bank understands it, but in the sense in which the nation, and the nations of the UK, understand it. That is why I will press the new clause to a vote later on.

We have made some progress with the Bill. I fear that that progress has consisted mostly of discovering more about what we need to do to improve the regulatory structures of the economy, but at least more is out in the open, and the debate is more open. Where do we go next? Where we go next is towards more accountability. The Bill makes a down payment on that accountability, but it does not finally deliver it. That is where we go next.

[Helen Goodman]

Obviously, in the new landscape of the City, the head of the Financial Conduct Authority holds an extremely important post, and the question of who fills that post is therefore vital. I am extremely pleased about the change that was agreed this afternoon and announced by the Minister at the Dispatch Box. It opens up the process, it gives the Treasury Committee a proper role, and it will, we hope, reinforce the independence of the person concerned.

Another person with considerable independence is, of course, the Comptroller and Auditor General. I am pleased, too, that we have moved away from the idea that the court should decide which part of the Bank’s homework the Comptroller and Auditor General should be allowed to mark. There is clearly a parallel with the CAG’s role in respect of the BBC. On Second Reading, we asked Treasury Ministers to publish the memorandum of understanding. They have now published it, and it is an extremely useful document, which sets out, in advance, an agreed framework for the CAG’s remit. That will prevent ad hockery, and will also prevent both the reality and the possible perception of political interference, or inappropriate avoidance of scrutiny of certain areas of the Bank’s work.

New clause 13, which stands in my name, would make the Bank of England subject to the Freedom of Information Act 2000. It seems to me that, as the Bank is a public authority which is fulfilling public policy purposes, the case for covering it does not really need to be made; it is the case against its being covered that needs to be made. The Minister made some important points about why she was not minded to accept the new clause, and I want to respond to what she said. She singled out three areas in particular: monetary policy, financial operations, and private banking.

I am not entirely sure of all the details of the 2000 Act, but we all know that local authorities are FOI-able. Equally, we all know that when we submit freedom of information requests to local authorities, we are not able to see the personal reports on individual members of staff in those authorities. The Act does not give access to that kind of personal information, and I should have thought that the same approach would exempt the private banking work of the Bank of England.

As for monetary policy and financial operations, I do not believe that my new clause would run into those parts of the Bank’s work, because they would still be protected by section 29(1) of the Act. That section states:

“Information is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice…the economic interests of the United Kingdom or any part of the United Kingdom, or…the financial interests of any administration in the United Kingdom, as defined”,

blah blah blah. I should have thought that as long as we were not amending section 29, we would be able to protect the areas about which the Minister was particularly concerned.

I was alerted to this matter by a letter from the Governor, which the Minister herself waved at us in the Chamber last June, about the sale of shares in the Royal Bank of Scotland. I am sure that the Minister remembers the occasion well. In his letter, the Governor said that

“it is in the public interest for the government to begin now to return RBS to private ownership”.

Writing that letter was not part of the Governor’s role on monetary policy, financial policy or prudential policy; it was an intervention in Government policy at the Chancellor’s request on the issue of a share sale.

When the Governor appeared before the Treasury Committee, I asked him whether he would share the analysis that underlay the letter that he had written. He refused point blank to do so. I am not going to read out the full exchange that I had with the Governor on that occasion, because I went into the matter in detail on Second Reading and it has now been placed on the record twice. However, I really feel that in refusing to provide that underlying analysis, the Governor is evading public scrutiny of what is a perfectly proper matter for the public to understand.

The Governor also said in his letter that

“a phased return of RBS to private ownership would promote financial stability, a more competitive banking sector, and the interests of the wider economy.”

In fact, none of that is true. It will not promote a more competitive banking sector. We are hoping that the Comptroller and Auditor General will, in his separate audit of the RBS share sale, secure that analysis. However, there should be a more straightforward way of dealing with this. The share sale is a particular issue and the Comptroller and Auditor General always looks into share sales, so we might get at the truth on this one occasion, but I am sure that there will be other similar loopholes.

The topicality of seeing this analysis was further underlined last week by the interview in the Financial Times given by Sir Nicholas Macpherson on the occasion of his retirement from the Treasury, in which he described the sale of more RBS shares as “tricky”. He went on to say that there was a judgment to be made over whether to sell further shares below the 2008 purchase price. These are not straightforward matters; they do not fall within the normal remit of the Bank of England and they are of public policy significance. They are but one example of why it is appropriate for the Bank of England to be subject to the Freedom of Information Act.

Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [Lords]

Debate between Helen Goodman and George Kerevan

Monday 1st February 2016 Commons Chamber

[George Kerevan]

I am trying to avoid pointing the finger and drawing inferences. What I will do, in agreeing with the hon. Gentleman, is to quote the right hon. Member for Chichester. I hope he will forgive me for doing so. When the LIBOR scandal emerged in 2014, after the Banking Commission, he said:

“As time passes, the pressure for reform will weaken”—

it is, is it not?—

“The old system failed disastrously…Maintaining or resuscitating parts of the failed system, whether at the behest of bank lobbying or for the convenience of regulators, must not be permitted to happen.”

I think we are getting both: we are getting bank lobbying, but we are also getting the regulators wanting a quiet time.

The hon. Member for Wyre Forest made a reasonable point. He said that by extending the senior managers and certification regime, the Bill will place in law a very detailed duty of responsibility on senior bankers to take all reasonable steps to prevent wrongdoing. However, at the same time, it will place the onus on the regulators to prove that that responsibility was discharged. Suddenly, it gives the regulators a job—

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

And no resource.

[George Kerevan]

Absolutely.

As the right hon. Member for Chichester pointed out, time after time when there have been regulatory failures, the regulators have been implicated. I therefore do not want to return to a situation in which it is up to the regulators to prove that something has gone wrong in the new regulatory regime, when they are partly responsible for it. I want the onus to fall on the bankers themselves.

It is worth looking more forensically at the reasons against the presumption of the reverse burden of proof. Andrew Bailey has argued that there is a worry that when the next crisis comes along, senior bankers will rush off to the European Court and claim that their rights under the European convention on human rights are being taken away because of the reverse burden of proof. That is rubbish.

The Parliamentary Commission was perhaps a little unwise to use the phrase “the reverse burden of proof”, even though we all use it and I use it. We are not talking about criminal law and making people guilty until proven innocent. We are talking about infractions in banking if, say, a banking crisis takes place. The legislation that the Government are trying to change would make it an infraction to be responsible for an activity in which wrongdoing took place, rather than for committing the wrongdoing itself. To give a flippant example, if it is a criminal offence to be in charge of a bawdy house, the prosecution needs to prove only that somebody was in charge of that house of ill repute, not that they were selling their own body. It would be no defence that they thought the bawdy house was a nunnery.

The reverse burden of proof regime makes managers responsible for the activity in their banks. When a disaster takes place, it is up to them to prove that they failed to stop it happening, rather than, as has always been the case, it being up to the regulators to find the solution and explain what happened, which means that everyone hides behind collective responsibility.