Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Thursday 16th January 2025 Commons Chamber

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Middleton South) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Tatton (Esther McVey). I agree with every word she said. It is late in the day for a Thursday, so I will try not to repeat many of the pieces of evidence and arguments that she proposed, but they are all valuable contributions to this debate.

I will start by talking about the attitude of Members of Parliament and politicians to regulation in general. A long time ago, I had responsibility in the Cabinet Office for dealing with better regulations. I travelled around the country to look at businesses that complained about regulations and see how those regulations could be made better—that was 18 months of my life that I will never get back. I came to a number of conclusions after that. Politicians have a knee-jerk reaction when it comes to regulation. If a child dies, if there is a fire, or if there is another disaster of some sort, there is a cry from both sides of the House for more regulation— not necessarily better regulation and enforcement, but more regulation—when, in many cases, regulations are already there but inspections and enforcement have not taken place.

The other knee-jerk response, which my Government are giving at the moment, is to say, “Regulations are burdensome so we will try to get rid of some of them.” I do not think that either of those responses deals with the issue. We set up regulators—this afternoon we are talking about the MHRA—but, by and large, once they are set up, MPs and Ministers abdicate responsibility and do not consider them until there is a crisis.

When I had that responsibility, I went to see the European Medicines Agency—this was some time before we left the EU. One of the surprising things I found—or maybe it was not so surprising—was that I was the only Minister who had been anywhere near the place. It was the major European agency that this country got after the Maastricht treaty. It had wide-ranging and important powers, to deal both with the market and with regulation, but nobody bothered with it. If there had been a crisis, however, Ministers and shadow Ministers would have been queuing up to go there.

If there is a lesson, particularly in relation to the MHRA, it is that we should look at regulators—be they water, medicine or other regulators—all the time. We cannot as a Government and MPs abdicate our responsibility, because we then come to a crisis, and the electorate say, “Well, what are you doing?” and the answer is, “Not a lot; we have passed that on.” Those water regulators or medical regulators might be, as the right hon. Lady showed, pretty useless. We should be looking at them all the time.

I was a member of the Science and Technology Committee in 2012. Partly because of that experience, and partly because there was a lot of press discussion and debate about metal hips that were squeaking and not working very well when they had been implanted and about breast implants that were falling apart, potentially damaging and poisoning the recipients, we had an inquiry that reported in October of that year. I will read out some of the comments from the witnesses we heard from about the MHRA, because they are being repeated now. They are very similar to what the right hon. Member for Tatton said about the MHRA’s responses—secretive and slow. For instance, there was evidence that there were problems with metal hips for four years before the MHRA took any action whatsoever. Nearly 14 years later, it still has the same problems.

I asked Dr Heneghan from the Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine at the University of Oxford who had authorised those metal hips. His answer was extraordinary: “Nobody knows. I don’t know—nobody knows.” It was a different regulatory regime then, because we were part of the European Union. Anybody who had the competence—or at least the authority—in any country in the EU could give authorisation, but nobody knew which body had done it, and whether that body was composed of competent people and what evidence they had used to do so.

However, when the MHRA found out, it did nothing for four years. That is disgraceful, and there were all sorts of comments that I can give the House. One was from Dr Stephen O’Connor at the Institute of Physics and Engineering, who said that the MHRA was overly bureaucratic relative to other competent bodies, inefficient, and difficult to deal with. As the right hon. Member for Tatton showed, the MHRA does not answer FOI requests, and it does not tell us what is going on.

The Lancet said about the breast implants, which I will talk about next, that the MHRA was in paralysis and in need of reform. Again, that was a long time ago. It was a different issue with the breast implants, because the MHRA was dealing with a fraudulent product—the products that had been authorised were not the products that were being sold to surgeons to be implanted in women. However, the Committee asked for there to be random and regular testing of the bodies that were responsible for manufacturing those implants. I do not expect the Minister to know at this time, but will she check whether the authorities have done any of those randomised tests on those bodies?

That is the history. The right hon. Member for Tatton has basically analysed what is going on now, but I will just talk about what we learned during the covid period. We learned that many of the NHS’s constituent parts—although not the clinicians—were secretive. Earlier today in the Chamber, we talked about the Government’s response to the first part of the covid inquiry. At the present time, that inquiry is not getting to part of what went wrong during covid, which was the fact that the NHS did not tell us what was going on, and there was also a restriction on political debate. If we are to get the best policies in any crisis, and in the regular turn of events outside crises, we need transparency so that we know how things can be improved and what we can criticise.

The right hon. Lady made the excellent point that keeping things secret encourages people who do not trust vaccines and have odd theories about how societies is controlled not to take the protection from vaccines. We know that no medicine is 100% safe, and there is no point in pretending they are safe, but vaccines have saved many lives over decades—more than decades; over a century—and it is good for society and for individuals that people understand that, and they will be less trusting if we do not tell them what is going on.

As recently as a few minutes ago, I got an email telling me that the UK Health Security Agency is still refusing to release the cost of the bird flu vaccines it has purchased. What possible reason can there be for not saying how much public money has been spent on a good cause? Having vaccines ready for any flu epidemic is a good thing because it saves people’s lives, as we have been discussing. Why should it be kept secret? Could the Minister to respond to that?

Is there any Member in the House who thinks that turning the MHRA, in the right hon. Lady’s phrase, from a watchdog to an enabler is a good idea, or even knows what it means and what is being enabled? I certainly do not know what is being enabled, but one of the things we should remember is that the MHRA and the whole of the health industry are swimming in a sea of pharmaceutical sharks. Pharmaceutical companies produce some extraordinarily wonderful products that keep us safe, but they also produce huge profits, and sometimes they get their products on to the markets by telling lies, or certainly by sins of omission. Everybody knows about the thalidomide case, and how long it took to prove it and to get compensation for the victims.

Almost at random, I have picked two other cases. With Paroxetine—I think that is how to pronounce it—GSK held back information because it did not release the tests that did not show a positive benefit. It also kept back tests that showed that Paroxetine increased the chances of children committing suicide, and it took a lot of investigation to get that—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

Order. Mr Stringer, I assume you are coming to a conclusion soon.

[Graham Stringer]

I am. I have one sentence. I am sorry; I did not realise I had speaking for so long.

Lastly, Reboxetine is another example of where the information given out to doctors was inadequate because it did not show the negative tests. I use those two examples basically to show that the MHRA should not be enabling these things. It should be much more vigilant, and it should be asking for powers to demand the right to know all the information that drugs companies have before it says those drugs are as safe as they can be.

[Several hon. Members rose—]