Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill [Lords]

Graham Allen Excerpts

Monday 7th December 2015 Commons Chamber

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mr Graham Allen (Nottingham North) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Speaker]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 2—Local Government Constitutional Convention: terms of reference—

“The convention must consider the following terms of reference—

(a) the devolution of legislative and fiscal competence to local authorities within the United Kingdom;

(b) the reform of the electoral system for local government;

(c) constitutional matters relating to local government to be considered in further conventions; and

(d) procedures to govern the consideration and implementation of any future constitutional reforms in relation to local government.”

This new clause creates the means by which every UK citizen can engage in a national public discussion of devolution, local government, governance and electoral systems and make recommendations and receive a response from government and parliament to that national debate.

New clause 3—Local Government Constitutional Convention: recommendations—

“(1) The Local Government Constitutional Convention must publish recommendations within the period of one year beginning with the day appointed under section (Local Government Constitutional Convention).

(2) The Secretary of State must lay responses to each of the recommendations before each House of Parliament within six months beginning with the day on which the recommendations are published.”

This new clause creates the means by which every UK citizen can engage in a national public discussion of devolution, local government, governance and electoral systems and make recommendations and receive a response from government and parliament to that national debate.

New clause 4—Local Government Constitutional Convention: composition—

“(1) The Local Government Constitutional Convention must be composed of representatives of the following—

(a) registered political parties within the United Kingdom,

(b) local authorities, and

(c) the nations and regions of the United Kingdom.

(2) At least 50% of the members of the convention must not be employed in a role which can reasonably be considered to be political.”

This new clause creates the means by which every UK citizen can engage in a national public discussion of devolution, local government, governance and electoral systems and make recommendations and receive a response from government and parliament to that national debate.

New clause 5—Commission on devolution of fiscal powers and taxation—

“(1) The Secretary of State shall appoint a commission on devolution of fiscal powers and taxation to local authorities.

(2) The Commission shall consider the following issues—

(a) the desirability, impact and process necessary to implement an Income Tax rate of 10p in the pound on English tax payers;

(b) the desirability, impact and process necessary to give English Councils the same fiscal and taxation powers as those devolved to the Scottish Parliament in the 2012 Scotland Act, and

(c) any other issues that the Commission considers relevant.

(3) The Commission shall produce a report covering the issues listed in subsection (2) no later than 31 December 2017, and shall make such recommendations to the Secretary of State as it deems necessary.”

This new Clause would establish a Commission to consider the possibility of England local authorities being granted the same fiscal and taxation powers already devolved to Scotland in the Scotland Act 2012.

New clause 8—Combined authority functions: cool off period—

“(1) The Secretary of State shall amend any order made under a provision of this Act which transfers a power to exercise of a function from a constituent part of a combined authority to a combined authority, to devolve responsibility for that function back to a constituent part of that authority, if the following conditions are met—

(a) A constituent part of a combined authority requests that the Secretary of State amend an order to return responsibility for the exercise of a function to the constituent part of the combined authority from the combined authority, and

(b) Such a request is made within one year of the first local government election held in the constituent part of the combined authority since the original order was made.”

The intention of this amendment is to create a cooling off period for the transfer of any power to the level of a combined authority. If a constituent part of a combined authority requests that a power is returned to it within one year of next elections held in the constituent part, then the Secretary of State must amend the relevant order to return power to the constituent part.

New clause 10—Governance arrangements for local government: entitlement to vote—

“In section 2 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 (local government electors), in subsection (1)(d) for “18” substitute “16””

This Clause would re-instate the provision in the Bill, as brought from the Lords, allowing votes for 16- and 17-year olds in local government elections.

New clause 11—Review of fire and rescue services in combined authorities—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 15 months of this Act being passed, publish a review of the fire and rescue services affected by the provisions of this Act.

(2) The review must make an assessment of the extent to which the provisions of this Act affecting fire and rescue services have worked safely and efficiently for the protection of the public over the first 12 months from this Act being passed.”

This Clause would require a review, after 12 months of the Bill being passed, of the fire and rescue services to make sure the new system is working safely and efficiently for the protection of the public.

New clause 13—Fiscal and financial powers—

“Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish plans for further devolution of fiscal powers to local authorities in England, including—

(a) an equalisation model related to the retention of business rates, to ensure local authorities with lower business rate income are not negatively impacted;

(b) greater local authority control over local tax rates and discounts;

(c) provision for combined authorities to set multi-year finance settlements.”

This new clause allows the Secretary of State to ensure devolution continues beyond current devolution deals by setting out plans for further fiscal devolution and greater local freedom and stability in relation to budgets and tax rates. The clause also ensures a model is put in place to ensure authorities with lower business rate income do not lose out from the phasing out of central government grants.

New clause 14—Cooperation with peripheral authorities—

“No later than three months after the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State shall publish guidance to be considered by combined authorities while exercising a devolved function, in order to—

(a) have regard for any significant direct impact of decisions taken by the combined authority on neighbouring authority populations;

(b) encourage cooperation between combined authorities and their neighbouring authorities so as to encourage local growth;

(c) enable greater economic cooperation between combined authorities and their neighbours within a travel-to-work area.”

This new clause asks the Secretary of State to publish guidance to ensure neighbouring authorities are considered when devolved functions are exercised, and encourage economic cooperation between authorities within a regional economy or travel-to-work area.

Government amendments 4 to 6.

Amendment 58, in clause 2, page 2, line 10, at end insert—

“( ) The transfer of local or public authority functions to combined authorities shall not be dependent on an order being made under subsection (1).”

This amendment makes clear that devolution deals must not be dependent on a combined authority having a mayor.

Amendment 2, page 2, line 13, at end insert—

“(2A) An order under subsection (1) may not be made unless the proposition that the combined authority have a mayor is approved by a referendum of the electorate of that combined authority.

(2B) The Secretary of State shall, by regulations, establish the procedures to be followed in conducting a referendum under subsection 2A.

(2C) Before making a regulation under subsection 2B, the Secretary of State must consult the Electoral Commission.”

The intention of this amendment is that elected mayors will be introduced only if that proposal has been approved by a referendum of the residents of the combined authority. The rule for the conduct for such a referendum shall be made by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Electoral Commission.

Amendment 57, page 2, leave out lines 21 to 26 and insert—

“(7) An order under this section providing for there to be a mayor for the area of a combined authority may be revoked or amended by making a further order under this section; this does not prevent the making of an order under section 107 abolishing the authority (together with the office of mayor) or providing for a constituent part of the combined authority to leave the combined authority and to resume its existence as a separate local authority.

(7A) An order under this section providing for a constituent part of the combined authority to leave the combined authority and to resume its existence as a separate local authority must make fair provision for a reasonable and proportionate division of resources between the former combined authority and the seceding local authority.

(7B) Where a combined authority has entered into a contractual arrangement with a third party and an order under this section is made to enable a constituent part of a combined authority to resume its existence as a separate local authority, that separate local authority shall be deemed to be a contracting party to that agreement unless an alternative agreement is reached with the third party.”

The intention of this amendment is allow for a constituent part of a combined authority to leave a combined authority without the combined authority being dissolved, with provision for “fair terms” for the leaving party (i.e. their resource is calculated on a per capita basis, or similar.) and the impact this may have on contractual arrangement with third parties.

Government amendments 7 to 25.

Amendment 59, in clause 10, page 12, line 32, at end insert—

“(1) Within 6 months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish a report on the performance of the Localism Act 2011 and a review of the general power of competence provision in relation to its use by combined authorities.”

This amendment introduces a review of the use of the general power of competence by combined authorities.

Government amendments 26 to 29.

Amendment 1, in clause 15, page 17, line 7, at end insert—

“( ) all local authorities in a mayoral combined authority commencing a community governance review of their whole local authority area within two years of this Act coming into force.”

This amendment introduces further measures to support the creation of new local councils with mayoral and combined authorities required to conduct a community governance review within two years of the Act coming into force.

Amendment 56, page 17, line 23, at end insert—

“(4A) Regulations under this section, so far as including structural or boundary provision in relation to a non-unitary district council area, may be made if at least one relevant local authority consents.

(4B) Local authority in this case is defined as—

(a) a non-unitary district council whose area is, or forms part of, the non-unitary district council area;

(b) a county council whose area includes the whole or part of the non-unitary district council area.

(4C) Relating to 4a and 4b

(a) “non-unitary district council area” means the area or areas of one or more non-unitary district councils;

(b) “non-unitary district council” means a district council for an area for which there is also a county council;

(c) “structural or boundary provision” means provision about the structural or boundary arrangements of local authorities in regulations made by virtue of subsection (1)(c).”

The intention of this amendment is to allow the government to make changes to boundaries of local authorities if it has the consent of at least one relevant local authority.

Government manuscript amendment (a) to amendment 56, after subsection (4C), insert—

“(4D) Subsections (4A) to (4C) expire at the end of 31 March 2019 (but without affecting any regulations already made under this section by virtue of subsection (4A)).”

This amendment provides for the provisions in subsections (4A) to (4C) of clause 15, allowing structural and boundary provision in relation to a non-unitary district council area if at least one relevant local authority consents, to expire at the end of 31 March 2019.

Government amendments 30 to 33 and 36.

Amendment 3, in schedule 1, page 37, line 3, leave out paragraphs 4 and 5 and insert—

“4 (1) The mayor is to be returned under the simple majority system.”

This amendment would require the mayors of combined authorities to be elected using the simple majority system, also known as “first past the post”.

Government amendments 37 to 45, 50 and 52 to 55.

[Mr Allen]

One of the difficulties involved in the debates we have had on this so-called constitutional Bill is that they have taken place on the Floor of the House. If we were upstairs in Committee and having detailed debates about particular places and particular boundary issues, the Minister could say, “The hon. Gentleman has made a very good point. I will take it away, talk to one or two authority leaders and issue a few words of reassurance.” On the Floor of the House, however, given the rather clunky weapons at our disposal—such as a Division of the House—they become much bigger issues. I congratulate the Secretary of State and his team on bringing the devolution process to the House, but rather than it being seen as the first step of many, it is lapsing into the good old confrontational stuff that we seem to enjoy so much on the Floor of the House.

Even under that structure, however, we can do a number of things in the Chamber this evening. We need to seek a more consensual way forward and understand that devolution is an organic process and that it will evolve. Once the deals in England have been concluded, they will make progress and other demands will be made. People will see that they can do things that they could not do before. They will look at neighbours who have concluded deals and say, “I’d like to try a little bit of that. I think I’ll talk to the Secretary of State.” The Secretary of State may well suggest to some places, “Things have been done by another place that you could also do.” To other areas, the Secretary of State and/or councils may say, “Perhaps we bit off a little more than we could chew. Let’s take half a pace back, let this settle and then come forward with other proposals in the future.” That process is not very amenable to debate on the Floor of the House of Commons. Almost by definition, it is better done, first, in Committee, and secondly, by the key players—council leaders and Ministers—talking openly and transparently to take forward the process.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman is making a very thoughtful speech. Does he not agree that the fact that devolution is being driven at pace by the Scottish agenda means that there is no time to have such a convention on the big devolution to Scotland, and is it not time for England to have matching devolution if Scotland is going to get so much?

[Mr Allen]

The right hon. Gentleman talks about moving at pace and then immediately suggests that England should have what Scotland has. I would go with the latter of his contradictory points: in such devolution Bills, England should have everything that has been obtained by the Scottish people. To round out the package, England should in particular have not just the powers but the financial capability to make the powers real.

I will talk later about new clause 5, which says that we can have income tax assignment to England, in just the way it pertains to Scotland, without civilisation as we know it falling apart. I would add that that would renew and strengthen the Union, which will need to happen in future decades, as a federal entity in which the nations of the Union work together very closely as a family, but all retain a degree of income tax in their areas to make their own country work effectively.

[Norman Lamb (North Norfolk) (LD)]

I share the hon. Gentleman’s view about financial powers going alongside the responsibility for providing services, but does he not agree that there is a case for devolving responsibility for income tax to below the England level? Most local services in Sweden, for example, are run through tax raised locally, rather than at national level.

[Mr Allen]

I am delighted to hear the Liberal Democrats proposing something in opposition that, sadly, they did not propose when they were a key member of the coalition Government during the past five years. Before Labour colleagues smile too much, however, the previous, Labour Government also did very little on this matter. [Interruption.] My hon. Friend the Member for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer) says that they did. Obviously, I would never be so disloyal as to underline such remarks by repeating them on the Floor of the House, but—

[Mr Speaker]

Order. At any rate, the hon. Gentleman would certainly not have done so in those almost forgotten days when he was a Whip.

[Mr Allen]

Indeed, Mr Speaker. We all have scars and sins that are best left unrevealed; otherwise that can turn into rather a destructive process. If we look at the constructive process initiated by the Secretary of State, there is a way forward. To finish my answer to the right hon. Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb), double devolution has repeatedly been raised by colleagues from all parts of the House in different ways. Let me restate that it would be ludicrous for England to go the way of Scotland, where there is devolution down to Holyrood, but we can hear the sucking sound—Ross Perot used to hear a “sucking sound” in the United States from Mexico—of powers being sucked up from the localities in Scotland into Holyrood. We do not wish that to be repeated in England, which means, as the right hon. Gentleman said, that there must be a proper localisation of power if the devolution bandwagon and evolution are to continue.

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[James Wharton]

I intend to speak at greater length on this issue, but as the hon. Gentleman has given me the opportunity to do so I would like to make it clear that the amendment gives any council, including districts, the permission to request to be removed from or added to a combined authority. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will review the case put forward by a council and make a decision on whether the request can proceed, but I can reassure the House that any such decision would, where possible, be made only following consultation and negotiation with relevant parties. In all cases, we would endeavour to seek and secure the consensus that I think has characterised many of the discussions we have had in a range of places so far, and which is so important in underpinning the Government’s approach to devolution more generally.

[Mr Allen]

I am sure that those words will have been heard throughout the Chamber and, more importantly perhaps, by all those who care about, or are in positions of authority in, local government. I very much hope that they take the message that the Government and the House are keen for there to be progress on devolution, and that it should occur on the basis of consensus, interaction and negotiation facilitated by the Secretary of State and the Government.

The people who have interacted with the Secretary of State and the Minister will make their own judgment on whether the Secretary of State can be trusted on these matters. As far as I am concerned, however, the Secretary of State has got us to this position on devolution, which, as I mentioned earlier, was not possible under the previous coalition Government or the previous Labour Government. Is it perfection? No. Is it genuine progress? I hope the answer to that is most definitely yes.

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

All this consensus can sometimes feel a little bit disconcerting, but I think it is a good thing. The fact that the Minister has underlined and put it on the record, in respect of Government amendment 27, that consensus would have to be achieved—this is not about particular councils having vetoes or unilateral capability, but a negotiated process—is a very important step.

[Mr Allen]

I can barely believe that my hon. Friend would be anything other than consensual. In recent weeks he has perhaps been known as being on the provisional wing of the Labour party, but his innate character is that of seeking consensus. I agree very strongly, as I always do, with my constituency neighbour. I hope colleagues throughout the UK adopt a similar view and take us forward on this issue.

[Jenny Chapman (Darlington) (Lab)]

Is my hon. Friend concerned that there are absent voices from the consensus thus far, in the shape of the public, who are not always involved or even aware that these kinds of deals are going ahead? I realise it is difficult, but do their voices not need to be captured somehow, too?

[Mr Allen]

To an extent, their voices have to be captured by those who seek elected office, whether in this House or in the locality. Devolution is just one part of a broader democratic settlement. It is essential that it is not just the great and the good who are involved. As I outline in new clauses 1 to 4, there has to be the most tremendous unprecedented outreach. A citizens convention must go way beyond even what we saw in Scotland, either in the referendum campaign or in its own citizens convention, and use all the modern techniques of social media, technology and electronic polling, so that people can feel ownership. My hon. Friend is absolutely right that unless we build that in, and unless people feel that a proper debate has been had, the process could be stressed and fractured when people feel that the right thing has not been done. I would argue, therefore, as with new clauses 1 to 4, that we will need a broad-based exercise involving an unprecedented level of public participation in order to settle our democracy not just for the next four years but so that it holds for 100 years after that. That cannot be done on the back of us alone making these decisions.

Madam Deputy Speaker, I seek your advice on a matter of order, although I do not know if I am entitled to do so in the middle of a speech. There are amendments on health. Should we talk about those matters now or wait for a natural break?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)]

The hon. Gentleman asks a perfectly reasonable question, and, just for once, it is a question that the Chair can answer. The answer is no. The matters relating to health are in the next group, of which the lead amendment is new clause 9. We should discuss health at that point.

[Mr Allen]

That is very helpful, Madam Deputy Speaker. In that case, I will limit my final remarks to a brief consideration of manuscript amendment (a) to amendment 56, which bears my name. Amendment 56, which I wish well, seeks to provide some welcome flexibility to allow for the organic growth and development of our devolution proposals. The Secretary of State, who needs to be reassured that the process will not drag on forever, has proposed a manuscript amendment that puts an end date on discussion. Colleagues and local authorities will have an opportunity, a gateway, a window—whatever metaphor we wish to use—in which to make representations. That process will not drag on forever, but there will be a lot of time to make those representations, which seems very appropriate. On that basis, I am pleased to have added my name to amendment 56.

This large group of amendments covers many other areas, including issues on which I could speak at some length, such as votes for 16 and 17-year-olds and a governance review. The latter will be very important. I believe that there are now 34 or so devolution deals. As we develop those, there will be much best practice, which, by definition, we cannot learn from mid-process, around what has been devolved and how, and around how local authorities can use their powers. It will all be at different levels and different speeds—because, again, devolution means people doing their own thing, not taking a one-size-fits-all approach—but there will be a place for a gathering and sharing of best practice by local government so that the next set of deals, building on the pre-existing deals, can be done in the best way.

We do not currently have an institution that can do that. Despite the excellence of the officials in the Department, we do not have what local government might regard as an independent institution to take that forward. It makes a lot of sense, therefore, to have a review at an appropriate time. It might not look that way to the Secretary of State, who is battling through a set of deals with lots of interested individuals—and that can only be his main priority—but, when the dust settles, it will make sense to have an adjunct to the Local Government Association, or whatever local and central Government come up with, to make sure that all the learning from the first set of proposals is carried over to the next set.

With that, I shall draw my remarks to a close. We now have a set of devolution deals, and the boulder is rolling forward. We need to keep the momentum going, so I hope that everyone will wish the Bill well.

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[Alison Thewliss]

I wish briefly to go through some of the new clauses and amendments. The hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen) makes points in new clauses that have been made before in previous debates. His new clauses 1, 2, 4 and 6 include Scotland, as part of the United Kingdom. As local government is entirely devolved to the Scottish Parliament, and the UK Parliament has no scope in that matter, he has perhaps made an oversight in his proposals. In new clause 6, he wishes to make local councils in England equivalent to the Scottish Parliament, which also is not quite appropriate—after all, they are not the same things. The Scottish Parliament is a Parliament, rather than a local authority, and they are very different items.

[Mr Graham Allen]

The hon. Lady is misunderstanding me and I need to clarify my remarks. I am not at all equating a local authority with the Scottish Parliament. I welcome the Scottish Parliament, which is one of the Labour party’s greatest achievements. Donald Dewar and all those people who were in the citizens convention have created, often without the co-operation of the Scottish National party, a magnificent institution. I just have a degree of jealousy that the powers that have rightly gone to Scotland are not coming fast enough to England and to those of us in the rest of the Union. If we are Unionists, we think that the good things that can happen in one country can happen in all countries of the Union.

[Alison Thewliss]

I am not sure that the hon. Gentleman includes me in the statement that we are Unionists, because I am not necessarily—

[Mr Allen]

I say that only because the hon. Lady is elected now to the Union Parliament. This is not the Scottish Parliament and therefore we speak here, all of us, as part of the Union Parliament in Westminster.

[Alison Thewliss]

The hon. Gentleman’s new clause 5 refers to

“the desirability, impact and process necessary to give English Councils the same fiscal and taxation powers as those devolved to the Scottish Parliament in the 2012 Scotland Act”.

That seems to me as though he is drawing a comparison between the two, and I am not convinced that is entirely appropriate.

The right hon. Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb) eloquently put the case for new clause 10, and I, too, absolutely support votes for 16 and 17-year-olds. It is a shame that the Government are not taking the opportunity at least to trial it in local government, as it would be a worthwhile trial. If they are not prepared to bring forward comprehensive legislation to change the franchise for all elections, it would be nice if they were willing on this occasion at least to try it in this way, because it is very much worthy of examination. It has worked well in Scotland; the 16 and 17-year-olds who were given the vote on the referendum were very engaged and have remained engaged. Those who were younger were not able to participate but they still had greater interest in the democratic process as a result—they paid attention. A lot of them felt very aggrieved that they were not able to participate, but, as was said earlier, the bar has to be set somewhere and 16 is a reasonable place to put it. That has worked well in Scotland and I very much encourage it here.

On new clause 12, it seems reasonable to review how the NHS is treated in the devolution deals. It seems reasonable to see how that is working, and perhaps more powers need to go across if things could work better.

On amendment 2, tabled by the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (William Wragg), and amendment 58, I have lot of sympathy for his comments about the imposition of mayors on local authorities. Some of the evidence that we heard in Committee on this issue suggested that it is perhaps not being fair to local government to say, “You must take a mayor in exchange for these powers.” I have a lot of sympathy for the points he makes. As I said earlier in this process, the Glasgow and Clyde Valley city region deal did not require a mayor in Scotland, so it is not a blanket policy of the Government to apply this provision in every circumstance. I believe that the Duchy of Cornwall has not had a mayor imposed upon it at this stage. Evidence was given in that respect in Committee.

On amendment 3 and the supplementary vote system, I am not sure that that system is necessarily the best one for electing anybody. I have been elected under the single transferable vote in Scotland and under first past the post here, and I believe that the first- past-the-post system is far from ideal in terms of democracy. I cannot understand why anyone would want to put first past the post back into an electoral system—perhaps there will be more explanation of that later—when the majority of research suggests it is the least fair way of electing people to any system of government.

I thank you for your time, Madam Deputy Speaker. That is all I have to say today.

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[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I do not think the Prime Minister had any intention of making me the Secretary of State for Health, but now that he has heard from the hon. Gentleman, I am sure that he will not.

We will return to the legitimacy of these changes if there are no referendums. Although the Government might well push the provisions through and order these mayors to be appointed, if there is not that validation through referendums the component parts of the super-areas will chafe. They will say, “We are paying taxes to pay for the centre of a city to which we have no real link. We would rather be run from Whitehall than by these funny people in a town hall with whom we have no real link.” The referendum lock follows the grain of the developing referendum theory of government in this country and will ensure that the process is more successful in the long run. In opposing the amendment, the Government are probably being short-termist.

I promised the hon. Member for Glasgow Central that I would come on to the amendment about first past the post and why I have put my name to it. I am very grateful that my hon. Friend the Member for Hazel Grove proposed it, and had he not done so I would have tabled my own amendment. I believe in first past the post as the fairest electoral system. I think that people get what they vote for rather than what they do not vote for. They get what they most like, not what they least dislike. The fundamental problem with proportional systems is that nobody gets what they want. Everybody gets something else, because the votes go off in all sorts of different directions.

[Mr Graham Allen]

Does the hon. Gentleman feel that the 50% of people in Scotland who voted for non-separatist parties got what they thought they were getting when they received only three Members of Parliament to represent them whereas the other 50% got 56?

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

The hon. Gentleman makes my point for me. They got exactly what they wanted. They got a referendum that decided that they would remain part of the United Kingdom and then they voted for champions to come to this place and represent them constituency by constituency. That is how first past the post works. I wish that they had all voted Conservative; it is a great shame that they did not. The system worked effectively to represent what most people in Scotland wanted. Sadly, most people in Scotland did not want the Conservatives to have 56 MPs. How that aberration could have come about, I do not know, and I am sure that in time it will change.

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[James Wharton]

I will give way when I touch on some of the points discussed earlier if the hon. Gentleman wants to comment at that stage.

As I have already spoken about new clause 1, I want to talk about new clause 5. It proposes that a commission be set up to consider devolving tax and fiscal powers to local level. I well know that the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen) is an advocate of devolving power from central Government, so he will be familiar with the successive inquiries that have covered similar ground to what he proposes. I therefore do not think that a further inquiry into tax power devolution to local government would serve a particularly useful purpose at this time, although I recognise, as always, his consistency and eloquence in bringing such matters before the House. I hope that he will not press his new clause 5 when we reach the end of this group of amendments.

[Mr Graham Allen]

Given that there is now no need for an inquiry, since there is a precedent in Scotland—I congratulate Scotland on being able to retain an element of income tax—there is nothing in the water in England to stop us having income tax assignment as well. On the basis that there is now something stronger than an inquiry in the form of a precedent, approved by the Treasury and by this House in the Scotland Act 2012, I gladly agree not to press new clause 5.

[James Wharton]

I thank the hon. Gentleman. I recognise what he says. There are complexities in devolving such matters to local government, but I am sure he will continue to argue, as such matters are discussed, that he wants those complexities dealt with in reality, rather than just in theory.

New clause 8, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Altrincham and Sale West (Mr Brady), would provide a cooling-off or probationary period for the conferral of functions from a local authority to a combined authority. I know that my hon. Friend has raised that matter in discussions during previous stages of the Bill, and that it is of great interest to him.

I can see the attraction that the flexibility to reverse a conferral of powers might have for an individual local authority, but there are considerable downsides. The very fact that the combined authority might be responsible for those powers for only a year or so might be conducive to little action being taken under what would perhaps be perceived as a temporary conferred function. The combined authority would almost certainly be reluctant to base any investment or other major activity on a function that it could lose in a few years’ time. Moreover, partners, whether businesses or other public bodies, would almost certainly be reluctant to enter into arrangements that could so quickly be reversed. We consider, therefore, that it would be very doubtful that activity within that probationary or cooling-off period of any such conferral of powers would give a realistic picture of how a combined authority might operate in the future or of the full range of improvements that might be achieved.

We consider that a better alternative, if local authorities are not sure whether they wish to confer a specific power, would be for them to trial such joint working across the area of a combined authority through informal arrangements, such as a shadow combined authority or joint committee. Those models are available to local authorities and combined authorities without the need for secondary legislation to be made. I therefore ask my hon. Friend the Member for Altrincham and Sale West not to press new clause 8 to a Division of the House.

New clause 10 seeks to reinsert the clause that was inserted in the other place to amend section 2 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 to lower the minimum voting age from 18 to 16 for the local government franchise in England and Wales. We debated that provision at length when we last met in Committee, after which we agreed to remove the clause by a significant majority of 95. The message was clear then and it remains clear now.

We have discussed quite widely the age of majority and the things that 16 and 17-year-olds are able to do or are prevented from doing by law. It has been suggested that because young people are politically engaged, and quite rightly so, they should be given the vote. That is a conclusion with which I do not agree. The debate has exposed the wider truth that there is a range of views, many of which are enshrined in legislation, that can best be described as encompassing the transition from childhood to adulthood. There is probably no clear point at which a person becomes an adult, but it is at 18, not 16, that society normally draws the line.

Any change to the entitlement to vote must be considered properly. We should not make piecemeal changes to the franchise. We cannot make changes and simply assume that there will be no implications for other areas where our laws and our society treat 16 and 17-year-olds differently. The voting age for UK parliamentary and local elections is set at 18. The age that is used in most democracies is 18. The Government have no plans to change it. Indeed, my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) reminded the House last time we debated this matter that we have no manifesto mandate to do so. Recognising that the shadow Minister says that he intends to test the will of the House on this issue, I encourage all hon. Members to support the Government and oppose the reinsertion of this clause.

New clause 11 requires that the Secretary of State must, within 15 months of the Bill being passed, publish a review of the fire and rescue services affected by the provisions of the Bill. The new clause is not necessary. Devolution is about enabling local areas to determine how best their services are delivered. It is therefore only right that fire and rescue authorities, in agreement with local partners, should decide how and when to review and assess how the provisions of the Bill may affect fire and rescue services. I remind hon. Members that the requirements of the fire and rescue national framework will continue to apply. With those explanations, I hope the Opposition will not press the new clause.

Turning to new clause 13, we are already taking major steps to devolve local taxes and have only just set out plans for a radical devolution of fiscal powers. By the end of the Parliament, the local government sector will retain 100% of local taxes to spend on local government services. For the first time in decades, local areas will see the full direct benefit of business rate growth in their local area. We will also grant new powers to directly elected mayors and to authorities. We will give all local authorities the power to reduce business tax rates to support businesses in their areas. As was confirmed in the spending review, we will set out detailed proposals in due course. In the light of that, I hope the House will agree that this new clause, which would require the Secretary of State to set out a framework for further devolution of fiscal powers, is unnecessary. I hope, therefore, that the shadow Minister will agree not to press it.

New clause 14, which was tabled by the Opposition, would require the Secretary of State to issue guidance to combined authorities on co-operation with peripheral authorities. I do not believe that it is necessary or appropriate. Before making orders establishing a combined authority and orders devolving new functions to such an authority, the Secretary of State must consider that to do so is likely to improve the exercise of statutory functions in the area or areas to which they relate. Additionally, Parliament must approve such orders.

The new clause seeks to provide a further requirement about how, once established, a combined authority should go about the exercise of functions devolved to it. As with local authorities, combined authorities must have regard to all relevant considerations in taking their decisions. Just as local authorities cannot be blind to the impact of their decisions beyond their boundaries, nor can combined authorities. Neither local authorities nor combined authorities can be ignorant of what happens beyond their borders. We do not have these provisions for local authorities and it is the position of the Government that we should not impose them on combined authorities. Therefore, the new clause is neither necessary nor appropriate. I hope that the House will agree.

Amendments 4, 5 and 6 were tabled in response to an amendment tabled in Committee by my hon. Friend the Member for Altrincham and Sale West. The first of those amendments will ensure that the Secretary of State’s annual report on devolution to Parliament includes information on the extent to which powers that have been devolved to a mayor remain exercisable by a Minister of the Crown. Amendment 5 is a consequential amendment to amendment 4, while amendment 6 defines the phrases “combined authority” and “Minister of the Crown”. Although it is the Government’s intention that functions should be devolved as widely as possible, there may be circumstances in which they should be exercised either jointly or concurrently. With those explanations, I hope that hon. Members will accept amendments 4, 5 and 6.

If amendment 58 were accepted, it would mean that any transfer of functions to a combined authority must not be dependent on the combined authority having a mayor. In its intent, it is similar to the provisions of the old clause 3, which the Committee voted to remove from the Bill by a majority of 81. That provision imposed a specific requirement that a mayor could not be a precondition for transferring functions to a combined authority. As I told the Committee, that provision was at odds with our manifesto commitment, and amendment 58 is too.

In our manifesto, we committed to

“devolve far-reaching powers over economic development, transport and social care to large cities which choose to have elected mayors.”

We are not forcing this on anyone or on any place. Whether an area has a mayor is a matter of local choice. However, if an area wants to have a devolution deal of the scale and ambition of Greater Manchester’s, we do expect a mayor to be part of the deal. The effect of amendment 58 would be to stop our pursuing that manifesto policy. It would potentially put the whole future of devolution at risk of challenge. It is an amendment to which we are wholly opposed and that we hope will not be successful should the House choose to divide on it.

Amendment 2 provides that a combined authority mayor can be established only after a referendum. I listened with great interest to the comments of my hon. Friends the Members for Hazel Grove (William Wragg) and for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg). My hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset was, as ever, persuasive and eloquent, but on this occasion, I am afraid to say, he was not quite persuasive enough. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to make regulations governing the conduct of such referendums and to consult the Electoral Commission before doing so. We had an interesting debate on the first day of Committee about this very matter. I recognise that I was repeatedly challenged by Members from both sides of the House about the degree of choice for local areas.

While I do not seek to reopen that debate, I must make it clear again that the Bill does not give the Government the power to impose devolution or a model of devolution in any area. The decision to approach the Government with a proposal for the devolution of powers and the decision on the degree of devolution required are entirely local ones. By the same token, we have always been clear that where areas make that approach to negotiate the significant transfer of powers, like the powers agreed with Greater Manchester, we would expect a mayor to form part of the mix, as that provides the levels of leadership and accountability that are necessary to ensure the effective delivery of such a deal.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Wharton]

The intention is to deliver what local areas want, and therefore the Bill gives us the flexibility to ensure that the county would not need to be reshaped, but equally, where that was wanted, it would give us the flexibility to deliver it. That is the point of the Bill, as an enabling Bill. We want to proceed by consensus, because that is how devolution will last.

Amendment 1 would enable the Secretary of State to make provision in secondary legislation to require all local authorities in the area of a mayoral combined authority to undertake a community governance review within two years of the Act coming into force. Whatever the merits of “parishing” an area, I do not believe the amendment is necessary or appropriate. I recognise the desire for further devolution and for the devolution debate to continue, including on the role of more local decision making and parishes, but this is not the time or place to go down the route set out in the amendment. I hope, therefore, that hon. Members will agree not to press it.

[Mr Allen]

I will be delighted not to press amendment 1, if the Minister can tell the House what shape or structure will be in place to pull together the best practice from all 34 devolution deals for drawdown by those who wish to do further deals.

[James Wharton]

We will be talking about that with the LGA and other interested parties, but we are still in the process of delivering those deals and it would be against the spirit of devolution were we to announce the format for such a forum. I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s comments, however, and the value that such a forum could bring. I am happy to put that on the record. It is our intention to have those discussions and to develop something that has broad agreement.

My hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (John Stevenson), who cannot be with us today because of the terrible flooding that has afflicted his constituency, has tabled amendment 56, which would enable the Secretary of State to use a fast-track process for unitarisation or boundary changes in a particular area. I suspect I am going to take a few interventions on this amendment, but I wish to highlight this point: it enables a fast-track process and streamlines the use of existing powers; it does not bring in powers that do not already exist. He tabled a similar amendment on the first day of the Committee of the whole House, with a view to ensuring that no one council could effectively veto such a change, however sensible and supported such a proposal might be.

My hon. Friend wished to see a way of preventing one council from denying change that might be in the best interests of the wider area. We have heard further arguments today about the proposition, particularly from my hon. Friends the Members for Cleethorpes (Martin Vickers) and for Amber Valley (Nigel Mills). When we debated this last time, I made clear our approach: if such a governance change were to be made, there needed to be a level of consensus across the area and that we are not in the business of imposing change on any one. That remains our starting point and our intention.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Wharton]

I remind my hon. Friend of my earlier comments: those powers already exist. The Government’s intention is to find consensus, to build on the local desire for devolution and to deliver lasting devolution to areas that will benefit from it. Those powers are already there. This is about ensuring we can deliver, in a timely way, the devolution that local areas want, but I can absolutely reconfirm the Government’s commitment to seeking and building on consensus. That is how devolution will stand the test of time.

Amendments 16, 30 and 55 ensure that criminal liabilities of a public authority can be transferred to either a local government or combined authority on the same basis as other liabilities when public authority functions are conferred. Amendments 17 and 31 amend clauses 7 and 16 respectively and allow references in a transfer order or regulations to be made to a formal document, such as guidance, which can be amended from time to time.

Amendment 36 is a technical amendment substituting the original word “jointly” with the new word “concurrently”. The change is necessary to ensure that certain transport functions being carried out by strategic transport bodies and local authorities can be undertaken concurrently rather than jointly. Amendment 3 would change how mayors for combined authorities should be elected. We have debated this matter at length. We believe that, where we are electing an individual to exercise significant executive power, the voting system for which we have made provision is the right one, and that therefore the amendment should be rejected. Finally, amendments 10, 37 to 43, 45 and 44 are necessary to bring the Bill into line with the arrangement in London. They provide clarity and consistency in respect of mayoral deputies with police and crime commissioner functions.

I hope that hon. Members will accept the Government amendments and reject Opposition amendments and that the House will continue broadly to support the delivery of devolution, on which there is so much consensus and support.

[Mr Allen]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 9

Consultation on changes to healthcare provision

‘(1) Part 4 of the Local Authority (Public Health, Health and Wellbeing Boards and Health Scrutiny) Regulations 2013 is amended as follows—

“(1) In section 20 (Interpretation) insert after “for which there is a country council (a);”—

“(c) combined authorities and each constituent part of a combined authority””—(Mr Graham Brady.)

This amendment requires that constituent parts of combined authority are consulted on any major healthcare reorganisation in their area in addition to the combined authority being consulted. It also allows constituent parts of a combined authority to refer any such reorganisation to the Secretary of State for Health without such a referral having to be made by the combined authority to which they are part.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mr Graham Brady]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Brady]

It might help if I indicate now that at the appropriate time I shall seek the leave of the House not to press new clause 8 and amendment 57. Ministers should not take that as indicating that I am entirely satisfied with the responses I have received, but I may be able to find other ways of expressing that dissatisfaction.

The immediate reason for tabling new clause 9 and why I am so concerned about this aspect of the Bill is that we already have a live example in Greater Manchester. I shall not go into huge detail, but because of the difficulties relating to the Healthier Together proposals for the reorganisation of hospital services, the matter will be decided by judicial review this week.

The new clause was tabled in the hope that we can frame the legislation in such a way that proper protection can be given to local authorities and local communities to ensure that this sort of development is not necessary in future. Should, furthermore, the judicial review overturn the existing proposals, it is important to ensure that they cannot simply be imposed in a different way.

The crucial problem is that the existing combined authority arrangements have combined the overview and scrutiny functions of individual local authorities. With the potential downgrading of the University hospital of South Manchester, for example, the usual route of going through Trafford’s or Manchester’s overview and scrutiny committee and referring the matter to the Secretary of State, asking for it to be put to an independent reconfiguration panel, was not available because the overview and scrutiny function was exercised not at the individual local authority level but at the combined authority level.

The Minister for Community and Social Care looks confused, but I assure him that when I had discussions with the Secretary of State he advised me that this was the route to be taken. I then took it to Trafford council, which said that it did not have the overview and scrutiny function and that it was exercised at the combined level. That is the nub of the problem. Significant parts of a conurbation such as Greater Manchester, which may in due course become a mayoral authority, might have no recourse, should a significant reorganisation of health services be proposed that was evidently not in the interest of the local community.

It is a simple proposition that I make in new clause 9. The Minister and I have had some extremely constructive conversations prior to this point, and I hope that he will reassure me that some measure will be introduced—if not today, via a Government amendment in the House of Lords—given that changes to these aspects of the Bill might be made through Government amendment 34. There is, I understand, a peg on which to hang that provision. All I am looking for is the simple reassurance that the Government will ensure that there will always be a route for an individual local authority to make the kind of reference that would have saved enormous cost, uncertainty and trouble in Greater Manchester had it been in place as of today. I very much look forward to hearing the Minister’s response and any reassurance that he might give.

[Mr Graham Allen]

I would like to comment on this group, which includes my own amendment 60. It is relevant to what the hon. Member for Altrincham and Sale West (Mr Brady) has talked about in moving his new clause 9. My anxiety is that the welcome devolution that is taking place—the precedent of devolving health powers to localities is particularly welcome—suggests something of “the Empire striking back”, with the Whitehall Leviathan seeking to place a caveat on the devolution of health powers. What is being set up is the ability of the Secretary of State to revoke health functions from the relevant local authority.

I fear that somebody in the Department of Health might not approve of a devolution proposal within a given area. Let us say that the cities of Nottingham or Manchester—or indeed anywhere represented by hon. Members in their places for this evening’s debate—wished to do something innovative and interesting on public health because it matched the demography in the area. What it might not match, however, is the view of people in the Department of Health. Such people might have a one-size-fits-all masterplan that they would like to impose on everybody.

My difficulty is that if we allow the Secretary of State to pull back to the centre any of these powers, there will be no safeguard in law to prevent that from happening. The Secretary of State could attempt to launch an effort at devolution, but we see again and again what can happen when the dead hand of Whitehall lies upon local government and the charitable and voluntary sectors. A year could be granted to get on with it, with a local authority either allowed to raise its own money or be given some money. If, however, the Department does not like it, it could be pulled up by the roots.

[The Minister for Community and Social Care (Alistair Burt)]

I should not be, but I am tempted to respond. If that is the hon. Gentleman’s concern, why should the Secretary of State sign the order agreeing the devolution in the first place if it does not fit in with his masterplan? If he is going to take back the powers in due course, why would he give them away in the first place?

[Mr Allen]

The Secretary of State does have the power to pull back those experiments and those efforts at devolution. That is why I am bringing forward my proposal. If the Secretary of State is not concerned, he would have no worry about the ability of an independent panel to say, “Hang on—give these guys the amount of time they need to experiment” rather than have to deliver to a Whitehall timetable. That amounts to a contradiction in terms: devolution on the one hand, with the Secretary of State pulling things back into the centre on the other hand. My proposal—which I am sure the Minister can understand—is for the establishment of an independent panel, which would not consist of the Secretary of State and his advisers, but would include representatives of local government where the devolution was taking place and representatives of the national health service. That would enable the medical side to be looked at effectively, and separately from the Secretary of State. It would end the constant process that has driven devolution: the interference of Whitehall, often in the very short term, because someone somewhere in the Department of Health—some unknown person—does not like what is being done in the locality.

[Mr Graham Brady]

Is not the fundamental point that the Bill that we are about to pass may remain on the statute book for many years? The current Secretary of State may be fully committed to devolving these powers, but a future Secretary of State might wish to suck all of them back to Whitehall.

[Mr Allen]

That is always a problem, but in that eventuality, if the amendment were passed, an independent panel would keep an eye on it to ensure that, if the Minister were not the one who is in the Chamber now but someone more malign than he, it would be possible for the independent panel to blow the whistle and say, “You have not given people in this particular area”—whether it was Enfield, Stoke or anywhere else in the country—“a chance to prove that this part of the devolution of the health service is working effectively. You have a particular view”—perhaps in connection with the need to react to a scandal or a financial problem—“and you are not acting on the basis of the good of the people in the area, but retrieving from them their ability to devolve effectively and use health powers effectively.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Alistair Burt]

I rest my case with my hon. Friend: I believe that legislation currently provides the reassurance that he seeks. However, I undertake that, before the matter is concluded in the House of Lords, we will ensure that that assurance is there so that he is covered. He is absolutely right to make sure that his local authority has the opportunity to make representations when it needs to. I am sure that the legislation does that, but we will make doubly certain that it does.

[Mr Graham Allen]

It may well be that the current legislation covers this eventuality, but the Government’s amendment 34 makes it very clear that local government will not be consulted. If the hon. Member for Altrincham and Sale West (Mr Brady) would like quickly to peruse that amendment, he will see that local authorities will have no say whatever if devolved powers are taken back to the Department.

[Alistair Burt]

I will happily cover amendment 34 in a moment. Indeed, perhaps I should speak to that amendment before I turn to amendment 60, which has been tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen), just to make it clear what amendment 34 is about.

Amendment 34 mirrors part of amendment 19 and amends clause 17 to provide that the requirements for combined authority and local authority consent do not apply to regulations revoking previous transfers of health service functions under clause 16. Proposed new subsections 1E and 1F, which amendment 19 would add to section 105A to be inserted by clause 7 into the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, also have the same effect in relation to health functions transfers under section 105A which are revoked.

This means that in the event that it becomes appropriate to restore NHS functions in a local area to NHS bodies, this can be achieved without the need for consent of the combined authority and local authorities concerned. This reflects the fundamental principles for health devolution, as reflected in clause 18, which builds on an amendment moved by Lord Warner in the other place, that the key responsibilities for the Secretary of State for Health and the NHS remain unchanged in any devolution arrangements. We envisage using the powers to revoke only in those circumstances where it was clear that duties and standards such as those referenced in clause 18 were not being met and that revoking the transfer was the best option to achieve the necessary improvement in performance.

The Secretary of State’s ability to use this power supports the key principle, which this House has already agreed and which the House of Lords was also insistent on, that nothing about devolution settlements will impinge on his duties in respect of the national health service, including the duty to promote a comprehensive health service, to exercise his functions with a view to securing continuous improvement in the quality of services and to have regard to the NHS constitution. The other procedural requirements and preliminary conditions will continue to apply, such as the requirement that the Minister making the regulations must consider that the instrument is likely to lead to an improvement in the exercise of the functions concerned, and that Parliament must approve the secondary legislation.

Let me explain in straightforward terms what this is about. The House has already agreed that it wants to retain the national health service, even if NHS functions are devolved to local authorities. That means that the duties of the Secretary of State in relation to the NHS remain absolute. As I said earlier, if the Secretary of State is to sign off these powers to commission services to a local authority, he has to be sure that doing so is in the best interests of healthcare and that the quality of healthcare will be improved. Otherwise, he just will not do it. There will not be any consent involved, or anything else; he just will not do it. However, if he signs it off, it means that he is satisfied that there will be an improvement in the quality of healthcare. Should that fail—should the NHS functions transferred to a new authority fail—it is the Secretary of State’s duty to take those powers back, because he is responsible for the delivery of NHS standards. If he cannot be satisfied, he is going to have to take these powers back. In the circumstances, it is possible that local authorities might disagree and want to challenge that, but his duties are absolute. That is why the requirement for consent is coming out. We are talking about a circumstance that nobody expects to happen. The Secretary of State is not going to devolve unless he is certain, but if he needs to take powers back to maintain his duties, he must have the power to do so. Even if he has to do so, the matter goes before the House, which makes up its mind on it. That is the basis of Government amendment 34 and the answer to amendment 60.

[Mr Allen]

That is exactly the difference between decentralisation and devolution. This proposal is the Secretary of State pushing some power to the locality, purely on the basis that he can suck it back; it is not giving power and, as of right, allowing the local authority to exercise that. There is no way in which the local authority can intervene in this process. It is a bystander, as an agent of central Government.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

The interventions must be shorter, as I still have to get the Front Bencher in.

[Alistair Burt]

The hon. Gentleman is coming at this from the wrong point of view. He is coming at it from the point of view that the Secretary of State is deliberately pushing something towards an authority, but he is not—the authorities are asking him for something. He would not be doing that unless authorities came to him and said, “We want to do this.” The Secretary of State would not agree unless he thought it was in the best interests of healthcare, because it is not his personal judgment but his duty. If those functions are not performed properly, his ultimate duty, which the House has already agreed, must be to take the powers back. The hon. Gentleman is approaching it from the point of view that there is something malevolent about the Secretary of State which means he wants to challenge the authority. The duties he has, which are contained in statute and which the House says he must retain when NHS powers are devolved, are what impels the amendment, nothing else.

[Mr Allen]

rose—

[Alistair Burt]

I will give way one last time, but then I must finish dealing with the rest of the clauses.

[Mr Allen]

The Secretary of State may be doing the right thing—I am sure he would be, just as I am sure the local authority would think it was doing the right thing—but my amendment 60 and our new clause would allow there to be a local government representative and a medical NHS representative judging who is right in the decision about central power and local power. They, too, would make the right decision.

[Alistair Burt]

Let me turn to the independent panel idea in amendment 60, which the hon. Gentleman has tabled. The Bill provides an effective framework to support a more devolved, place-based approach to health and social care, while ensuring that there are appropriate safeguards in respect of the NHS and a clear line of accountability back to the Health Secretary. Our objectives for health devolution must be to improve the health and care outcomes for people residing in a particular local area. Clause 18 requires that where health functions are conferred by an order or regulations on a combined authority, provision must be made about standards and duties to be placed on that authority, including standards in the NHS constitution.

The Secretary of State needs to be satisfied that revoking the transfer would lead to an improvement of statutory functions in that local area. He is under the same duties if he revokes as he is when he grants the powers in the first place. The revocation would need to be debated and approved by both Houses of Parliament, and the Secretary of State would be required to make available to Parliament a report concerning his decision, including what representations had been made to him in the process. That demonstrates that the decision to revoke transfer regulations would be taken only as a consequence of in-depth consideration, as well as engagement with local organisations, and with the support of Parliament. For that reason, I resist the requirement to convene a panel to review the decision, which would not only be unnecessary, but could be burdensome and costly, and could lead to delays just at the time when swift action was required to address fundamental performance issues.

The amendment is not necessary. The Secretary of State, in the exercise of his powers, already has to do what the hon. Gentleman is asking, but the need to move sometimes at speed means he needs to retain the powers; this is therefore covered, there is accountability to Parliament and the Secretary of State has to say exactly why he is doing it. It is straightforward: either he has the power to deliver his duties, or he does not, and he can do it without convening an independent panel to second-guess him. It is his responsibility, and if he exercises those powers unreasonably, there is judicial review, which means that a local authority is doubly protected.

[Mr Allen]

If a local authority, which understands its own demography—it knows its people and its inner-city and rural areas—makes a decision on a public health matter, such as fluoridation or free dental checks for three-year-olds, and the centre does not like it, the Minister can pull back that power, which has been given in what is meant to be a devolution Bill.

[Alistair Burt]

It is not about the centre not liking the decision. The Secretary of State has statutory duties that Parliament has given him. He has to exercise his power both to grant and revoke power based on those duties, not because he likes or does not like a decision. It is that statutory duty for which he is responsible that is so important. The House of Lords pressed that matter, but the House of Commons has accepted it. It is the maintenance of those duties that is so important. Liking or disliking a decision does not come into it.

Let me make further progress on the other amendments that the Government wish to push through. Amendment 35 is a further amendment to clause 18, which applies valuable safeguards to local devolution of health functions, including where certain functions and duties should continue to be held nationally. The clause was inserted in the Bill by an amendment tabled by Lord Warner in the other place and was amended in Committee in the Commons to give further definition and clarity to support its valuable principles. Clause 18 provides that regulatory functions of national bodies held in respect of health services will not be available for transfer to a combined or local authority.

Amendment 35 makes it clear that, in addition to NHS England’s responsibilities for assurance and review of clinical commissioning groups, all its supervisory and oversight functions set out in chapter A2 of part 2 of the National Health Service Act 2006 are out of scope of a transfer order. These include functions relating to CCGs’ institutional and constitutional arrangements, including their establishment.

Briefly, amendments 46, 47, 48 and 49 amend schedule 4, which makes amendments to the 2006 Act to provide a wider menu of flexible, voluntary options for local bodies, including combined authorities, to work with each other and with NHS England in respect of health functions.

One of the amendments introduced by schedule 4 includes provision under proposed new section 13ZA of the 2006 Act for new “devolved arrangements”, whereby NHS England is able to delegate its functions to a group of local commissioners exercising them together, or to make arrangements to exercise its functions jointly with that group. The group of local partners must consist of at least one clinical commissioning group and at least one combined authority or local authority, and the delegates or partners must exercise the function jointly.

Amendments 46, 47 and 48 are minor and technical amendments, which make it clear that “devolved arrangements” may relate to one or more of NHS England’s functions.

New clause 12, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Hemsworth, says:

“The Secretary of State must, within 15 months of this Act being passed, publish a review of health services devolved under the provisions of this Act.”

The review must include an assessment of how standards have been maintained, particularly of the quality and outcomes delivered by the devolved health service.

Maintaining the integrity of the NHS standards and ensuring that there is clear accountability for quality of outcomes is a key objective, as reflected by a number of vital safeguards provided for by the Bill. An order to confer health functions on a combined authority can only be made if a proposal to do so satisfies the Secretary of State that such a transfer will lead to the improvement of statutory functions.

As the House has debated a number of times, the requirements to monitor and regulate the functions that have been devolved remain exactly the same as if they had been with the NHS. It is the Secretary of State’s responsibility to ensure that the quality of services devolved is of NHS quality. For that reason, a full formal review is not necessary. There will be constant review of the quality of work done locally, and putting a formal review in the legislation is therefore not necessary. It is inconceivable that the authority delivering the functions on behalf of the NHS would not keep up a full review and the quality of regulatory work and monitoring work ensures that a full review is carried out in any case.

I hope that the new clauses will not be pressed to a vote and that I have been able to satisfy the House about the functions that need to be retained by the Secretary of State. I hope that the technical amendments will also be agreed to.