(7 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberOrder. The shadow Secretary of State will be heard, and if that means people being removed from Chamber, that will happen.
Our manifesto was absolutely clear about retaining the benefits of the single market and the customs union. As for membership, although almost everybody who wants a progressive new relationship with the EU wants to retain the benefits of the single market and the customs union, almost everybody accepts that that cannot be done in an unreformed way, because of the rules of the single market as they now are. The question of whether we start from reform of the single market or from a bare agreement and then work up is secondary to the outcome we want to achieve. The outcome we want to achieve is: no tariffs for goods going across from us to the EU, and vice-versa; no new red tape at customs, including rules of origin; and a deal that works for services as well as for goods.
We have to recognise the concerns of the EU, and two in particular. First, the main concern is that if we are released from all obligations of a regulatory nature in relation to moving goods and services across Europe, we will be able to undercut EU countries economically. Secondly, if we strike free trade agreements that are released from any of the standards and regulations that they apply, there is the prospect of flooding the UK with goods and products from other countries which do not meet those standards and/or go into Europe. Those are the issues we need to negotiate.
Order. I am not quite sure what all the hilarity is for. This is a very serious matter and it should be debated in a serious manner.
I am just considering how I respond to a cry of “chaos” from a Government who two months ago had a majority but now have a minority and are going into a grubby deal with the DUP. The Secretary of State will have heard exactly how I put it: we focus on retaining the benefits of the single market and the customs union—the exact same benefits, to use his phrase. [Interruption.] I am answering the question. The Secretary of State talked about the “exact same benefits” of the customs union. How is that to be achieved? [Interruption.] You did. You know you did, because we have put it to you several times since. My answer was not a fixed position saying, “We must have this model when we start the negotiations.” My answer is: focus on the outcomes and leave options on the agreement until we have some assessment of the risk and costs of the different options. One thing we do not have from the Government is any assessment of the risks and costs.
I am going to press on to dealing with transitional agreements—[Interruption.]
Order. I am not sure what part of the words “I am going to press on” right hon. and hon. Members do not understand. The Opposition spokesman has made it clear that he intends, for the present, to press on, and that should be respected until such time as he changes his mind.
Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. If we are to obtain the exact same benefits of the single market and the customs union, it would be a good start if the Government now accepted that the negotiations will not be complete by March 2019, that transitional arrangements will be needed if we are to avoid a cliff edge and that transitional arrangements must safeguard our economy and jobs, and provide certainty for business. This also means that by the time of the final agreement at the end of transitional arrangements, a model or framework will have to have been agreed which truly does deliver the exact same benefits as the single market and the customs union. We also need a recognition—if we are being honest—that in the end, if we are going to have a meaningful and ongoing relationship with the EU, a court-like body will be needed to settle disputes. I refer not just to state to state disputes, but business to business disputes and individual to individual disputes.
We need to address a further issue on reset: the involvement of Parliament. For the first six months after the referendum decision, the Government fought in the courts to prevent this House having a say even on the triggering of article 50. They then called a general election to crush the opposition to their Brexit strategy, and that approach has to change. There needs to be a much stronger role for Parliament; we need to strengthen scrutiny and accountability, not push it away. Let us start in the following way—I hope and believe this will be agreed: this House needs a formal statement from the Secretary of State after each round of the negotiations, so that we can hear how he reports on progress and we can ask questions. I ask him to set that precedent now and agree that he will come to this House to report in a formal statement.
(8 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful for that intervention, because what amendment 14 makes clear—the point is sometimes missed—is that these, or indeed any, investigatory powers affect an individual’s privacy. We have to be absolutely clear: the right to privacy is fundamental, but it is not absolute. The Bill gives the state a power to interfere with privacy—that is what it is about. The question then becomes: is there a case for the interference in the first place, and if there is, is that interference necessary and proportionate? Obviously it is for the Minister to respond to our amendment, but in a sense it is all of our duties to remind ourselves that this is all about an interference with privacy, and that is why the safeguards are so important.
The third reason the overarching privacy clause is important is that it is now linked to the test for judicial review of the Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary’s decision, so it has real application every day when one of the warrants is applied for.
Finally, let me say a few words about the appointment of judicial commissioners, an issue that has cropped up a number of times. Under clause 194, it is for the Prime Minister to appoint the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and
“such number of other Judicial Commissioners as the Prime Minister considers necessary for the carrying out of the functions of the Judicial Commissioners.”
Before doing that, he must consult the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, the Lord President of the Court of Session, the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, the Scottish Ministers and the First Minister and Deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland. Our amendment 298 would ensure that the Prime Minister acted on the recommendation of
“the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, in relation to Judicial Commissioners appointed from England and Wales,”
and likewise the recommendation of the Lord President of the Court of Session and the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland in relation to Scotland and Northern Ireland.
The reason is that it is envisaged that judicial commissioners will be appointed from among those who are already very experienced judges—High Court and above—either serving or retired. They will obviously have gained the qualifications to be judges and will be appropriately skilled and qualified to take these decisions, so in truth the exercise of appointing a judicial commissioner will be an exercise in deploying, from the pool of available judges, those who will sit as judicial commissioners.
That is an important consideration. Our amendment is tabled on the basis that it is not appropriate for the Prime Minister to decide that sort of deployment—he does not have the skills and experience to do it—nor, in a sense, should it be a political deployment. This is something routinely done by the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales. Our amendment would ensure that the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, the Lord President in Scotland and the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland make a recommendation that binds the Prime Minister. The appointment is, of course, the Prime Minister’s, but that is the right way to carry out the appointment to this important judicial role, rather than the version in the Bill.
I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend for giving way again. If the recommendation should be a judicial one and if, as I think I understood him to say, the Prime Minister would not have the ability to overturn it, I fail to understand what the point would be of involving the Prime Minister at all.
The answer to that is twofold, although I should say that if the decision was on the recommendation of the Lord Chief Justice and so on, it would not be open to the Prime Minister not to follow that recommendation. We need a slight reality check. At the moment under clause 194, if the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales—or, I am sure, the equivalent in Scotland—was consulted and made his or her views clear, it would be highly unlikely that any Prime Minister would act in a way that was contrary to the advice they were receiving from the senior judge in those jurisdictions, but our amendment would bind the Prime Minister. The question is: what is the point of involving the Prime Minister? The answer to that—to some extent this is to the Minister—is that there is the question of accountability for making the appointment.
There is also the point, as the Lord Chief Justice has pointed out, that he—or she, as the case may be—is not in the business of making judicial appointments as such, and will therefore be reluctant to have that power. The Minister might want to confirm that, because he has been having those discussions, not me. I think the Lord Chief Justice and others are reasonably happy to help with the deployment exercise, but not with the business of appointing judges.