Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Debate between Geoffrey Cox and Robert Buckland

Report stage
Wednesday 25th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Buckland]

I think that there are two things: time and capacity. I do not criticise officials. I have never believed in doing so: it is a bad Minister who blames their officials, just as a bad workman blames his tools. Officials have a lot of work to do under immense pressure, and obviously they want to get it right. I want to get it right, too—we all do—but the Bill might be our last chance to do so in this Parliament. My goodness me, if we cannot get it right here, the Government are really going to have to get it right in the other place.

Let me deal further with the identification doctrine. Opposition new clause 40, which is very well worded, alludes to the US concept of respondeat superior. In effect, it is a wrap-all approach to vicarious liability that captures the acts or omissions of even very junior members of a corporate, which can lead to that corporate being liable. In some ways that has proved advantageous to prosecutors in the US: they have been able to identify more junior officials in corporates and, in effect, get them to co-operate with the authorities, which has opened up evidence that might not otherwise have been available.

The Law Commission looked at that approach. It also looked at what I might call the corporate culture approach in Australian Commonwealth law, and at Canadian legislation on the acts and mental states of senior managers. The Law Commission said—rightly, I think—that neither the US approach nor the Australian approach would be right for our jurisdiction.

The wording of my new clause 5 reflects the Law Commission’s recommendations in two ways. First, as the Law Commission’s report sets out, it would allow conduct to be

“attributed to a corporation if a member of its senior management engaged in, consented to or connived in the offence.”

Senior management is defined as

“any person who plays a significant role in the making of decisions about how the whole or a substantial part of the organisation’s activities are to be managed or organised, or the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those activities.”

We have taken the Canadian approach.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

I draw the House’s attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

I am intrigued by and have a great deal of sympathy with my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendments. As he knows, we discussed the issue when we served as Law Officers together. In the light of the Law Commission recommendation from which he has just quoted, I wonder why his new clause 5 includes the

“neglect of a senior manager.”

It seems conceptually a rather odd proposition that a fraud could be committed by neglect. The Law Commission did not go that far. Why has my right hon. and learned Friend included that provision?

[Sir Robert Buckland]

That is a fair question. What I seek is to tease out from the Government the juxtaposition with the money laundering regulations. My right hon. and learned Friend will remember my making mention of regulation 92 of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017, which uses the word “neglect”. To be frank, I think that there is a problem with that, but it is important for us to tease out from Ministers a way to find a wording that is comprehensive.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

I have enormous sympathy with my right hon. and learned Friend, who is doing the House a service by bringing these amendments to its and the Government’s attention. However, is it not reasonable—Opposition new clause 40 has this purpose in mind as well—that there should be quite a detailed consultation within the financial services industry and among any other commercial organisations that might be affected? New clause 5’s use of the word “neglect” creates an extraordinarily broad possibility for the application of the criminal offence.

I know what my right hon. and learned Friend is doing, and I applaud it. However, it seems to me that it is reasonable to require of the Government that they get it right, but, as the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Liam Byrne) said, that must not become an excuse simply to say “mañana” and kick this into the long grass.

[Sir Robert Buckland]

I am always grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend; I greatly enjoyed our time working together as Law Officers, and I yield to no one in my respect for him. He is right to make that point. I think I couched my remarks in a way that was faithful to the Law Commission’s options, which say that the Government do not necessarily have to do it all—there is a choice here, potentially. On a wider basis, I think that the identification doctrine needs to be looked at. There could be an opportunity for further refinement, perhaps in the other place, and for provision to be made that refers specifically to the offences that I list in new clause 5.

Let me take my right hon. and learned Friend’s point in the spirit in which he made it, and build on it. New clause 5 includes the specification in Law Commission’s option 2B that an

“organisation’s chief executive officer and chief financial officer would always be considered to be members of its senior management.”

We have sought to be faithful to option 2B.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Geoffrey Cox and Robert Buckland

Committee: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st November 2017 Commons Chamber

[The Solicitor General]

As the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab) has mentioned, the Government will, on 5 December, publish their full analysis of the sources of the rights that we have been talking about. I remind my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) that the underlying principles of EU law from which the charter has been developed will be part of the body of law that we bring down to the UK, and will be able to be relied upon.

[Mr Cox]

Is not the answer to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) that the rights might not be replicated in our existing law but the protections will be? The fact that a general statement of a right is not replicated verbatim in our law does not mean that those rights are not otherwise protected adequately and fully by our laws.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend, but I feel as though I am about to become a proxy in a debate between him and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe, so I will now develop my point.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Geoffrey Cox and Robert Buckland

Wednesday 1st December 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

I rise to make a brief contribution. I have listened with great interest to the debate and I await with even greater interest the Minister’s response to the very well advocated position on amendment 6, with which I have great sympathy.

It seems blindingly simple to me. Clause 2(3) stops at the words, “for all purposes.” The comparison with section 3 of the Parliament Act 1911 has been made, so why not include the extra words,

“and shall not be questioned in any court of law”?

The amendment proposes the use of the word “whatsoever”, which was no doubt an attempt by my hon. Friend the. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) to deal with the European question—that is perfectly legitimate and I understand entirely the reason for his wording—but the point is the same: if such a provision was good in 1911, why is it not good now? If anything, the balance between Parliament and the courts has deteriorated, as the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Tristram Hunt) eloquently outlined. The balance is now extremely fine, and it is in danger of being overturned in favour of judicial activism.

It may well be that reliance will be placed upon the residual powers of article 9 of the Bill of Rights, but as an Act of Parliament, that too is subject to judicial interpretation. Over the years, it has been interpreted in a variety of ways by the courts. Notably, it has been impliedly waived or restricted by this House. Section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996 is a good example of Parliament deciding, in effect, to allow its privilege to be qualified. I have strong views on the wisdom of that legislation—it was foolish and has led to unintended consequences, which are at the heart of this debate.

No Member of Parliament wants a diminution of its authority or power. This is an elected Chamber and we represent the people of this country. Sovereignty means just that. It is right that all hon. Members worry—even if it is sounds like lawyers’ caution—about any further unintended diminution of our authority. That is why I support amendment 6. Why not change clause 2(3) to put things as far beyond doubt as possible, mirroring what legislators did in 1911, to ensure that the spectre of the judiciary questioning and second-guessing the proceedings of the House does not become a reality?

[Mr Cox]

I had not intended to speak, and I shall be extremely brief. Most of my remarks will be addressed to the Minister in the hope that he can provide the clarification in substance to the questions asked by my hon. Friends and Opposition Members, which I should like to reinforce.

My first question is precisely that which my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) just asked. Why not add the proposed words? If clause 2(3) is intended to be an instruction to the courts that a certificate shall not be challenged, on the face of it there could be no real reason, unless the Minister has thought of something that others have not thought of or been advised otherwise, why the injunction of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), which is more expressive, explicit and detailed, should not be added. Will the Minister elucidate the purpose of stopping short at the word “purposes” and not going on to be as explicit as possible?

I ask that because historically, ouster clauses in administrative law have not been conspicuously successful. The courts have not paid very much attention to interpreting their duty to examine such issues, and often even where the ouster clause has been passed. [Interruption.] I see from the sedentary reaction of my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr Heath)—the Deputy Leader of the House—that the reason may be that such provisions are so pointless that there is no point in going any further. If that is the reason, it would be helpful if the Government made that clear, so that Members could consider that. I have to tell him that I do not consider the provision to be pointless—I would not imagine that the Government would do anything that was pointless in drafting the legislation.