Courts and Tribunals Bill

Debate between Geoffrey Cox and Jess Phillips

Report stage & 3rd reading
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Commons Chamber

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

I draw your attention, Madam Deputy Speaker, and the attention of the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

It has been a peculiar pleasure to listen to the two speeches made so far by Labour Back Benchers. Both the speech of the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) and that of the Chairman of the Select Committee, the hon. Member for Derby North (Catherine Atkinson), have been treats to listen to, and I feel I can do no better than to say, “Listen to both of them.” However, it would be wrong of me to say that I oppose the Bill in its entirety. The truth is that some of its provisions contain very useful and reasonable directions of travel. Personally, I do not have the profoundest objection to grounds needing to be given for an appeal to the Crown court. I think that would be a reasonable thing to require, provided that the Chairman of the Select Committee’s warnings are heeded and those who have to fill out that appeal are given the opportunity of advice. As has been said, I think by Opposition Members, the problem is that there is a lack of legal advisers in the magistrates court—what we used to call magistrates court clerks.

That brings me to another way in which I should commend the Minister and the Government. The initiative to enhance the resources of the magistrates court can only be a good thing, although I must warn the Minister that the recruitment of more magistrates is something that we looked at years ago, when I sat in the position that she now sits in. It is social and economic factors that are effecting the diminution in the number of those willing and able to put themselves forward for this onerous type of public service, so that diminution is not going to be remediable just by brave words and advertisements. It is going to have to be a sustained campaign, and it will not happen even in the term that she will serve as Minister—long may that continue. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] That was not a wish—it was an observation—but nevertheless, it was heartfelt.

With those cautious commendations given, though, I have to return to the very focus and centre of this Bill. It is a bit like asking us to be grateful to the crocodile who leaves us with our head after it has taken our legs. The reality is that the right of election of trial by jury is at the very heart of the right itself. Since the 17th century, Governments of all colours that have come and gone have continued to respect that as a right, not as a concession or a privilege afforded by the state to a defendant. It is perfectly true that in Scotland it is the court that decides whether or not the defendant should enjoy the right of trial by jury, but in England, it has always been a right—a right given, broadly speaking, to anybody accused of an offence serious enough to warrant more than 12 months’ imprisonment.

For the first time in English legal and political history, a Government have decided to breach that right, and to make the decision reside with the representatives of the state. That places the decision out of the hands of a powerless defendant—some of the most powerless in our society. Some of them may very well be guilty. Many of them may very well be guilty, but the system we have adopted over the centuries does not legislate so much for the guilty, but for the innocent caught up in the system. So many examples in history have shown how the innocent can be caught up in this system, and it is for the innocent that the criminal justice system is ultimately designed. It is designed for their vindication, requiring against them the level, burden and standard of proof that the criminal justice system enforces, with the presumption of innocence.

[Jess Phillips]

rose—

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

Because time is short, I will give way to the hon. Lady, but only she.

[Jess Phillips]

What the right hon. and learned Member is saying about the system being designed for the innocent is compelling, but the system is absolutely not designed for the person who is absolutely innocent in the system, and that is the victim. No part of the system asks them to elect where the trial might go. No part of the system asks them if they think it should be appealed. The real innocent—the definitely innocent—gets no say.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

That invites a long answer, which I do not have time now to give, but any defendant who appears before a court enjoys the presumption of innocence, and it is upon that basis that any system has to proceed. In England, the right has been accorded to those who enjoy this presumption of innocence to decide where they should be tried. Any abrogation of that right, such as for an offence that carries a sentence of more than 12 months’ imprisonment, removes the power from the individual and hands it to the state. In England—peculiarly in England—it has always been regarded as the right of a defendant. Make no mistake, this is an historic Bill for that reason.

To remove and abrogate the right of a litigant to trial by a jury of their peers has exactly the effect that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East has said. A person of good character, a professional person or an employee in the workplace accused of theft from his employer—all of these would have had the right to say, “No, I wish to have the careful and meticulous process that the Crown court provides, not the swift and summary justice that the magistrates court provides.” That person may suffer for the remaining years of their life the most profound impact upon their history. A Member of this House accused could be tried before the magistrates court, despite the impact and consequences that that might produce. In the magistrates court, the only criteria will be whether it might receive more than two years’ imprisonment. Many such offences would not. That is broadly the criteria that is applied by the magistrates.

If this egregious act is to be taken by this House, I strongly support that the Chairman of the Select Committee’s recommendation be taken on board by the Minister, because unless the magistrates have the express ability to consider whether someone is of good character, whether they have a profession, whether it would mean that they would be disqualified forever from whatever profession they are in, or expelled from their employment—with massive implications for the rest of their life—how can it be fair or proper to impose upon that person a system of summary justice that cannot, at its heart, achieve the levels of fairness of a Crown court trial? That is not only because legal aid is available in the Crown court, but because of the forensic scrutiny that the allegation is placed under. The automatic right of appeal has always been provided in the magistrates court, even where the sentence would be less than 12 months, because it has always been acknowledged that the kind of justice distributed in the magistrates court is necessarily swift and necessarily summary.

There are not provisions for the disclosure of unused material in the magistrates court. What is to be done about those, if offences are now going to be tried that might carry a two-year imprisonment? None of these things have yet been thought through within this Bill. There has simply been a transference from the Crown court to the magistrates court, in breach of a provision and a right that has been respected in this country for 300 years.

I therefore say that Members should listen to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East and to the Chairman of the Select Committee, the hon. Member for Derby North. They spoke the milk of human wisdom, and I suspect the fact that it came from them is not wholly unrelated to the fact that each of them have years of experience in professional practice in the courts. Heed them.

I urge the Minister—even if she is to take the step that I profoundly oppose and regard as an historic mistake: the abrogation and dilution of the right to trial by jury, making it, in fact, no longer a right but a concession made by the state to the individual—to listen, please, to the comments, the recommendations and the warnings given by those on her own side. For someone of good character to come before a court for the first time, facing a two-year sentence of imprisonment, and for the magistrate to be unable to consider such a factor would, in many cases, constitute the profoundest injustice. The risk is that over the coming years there will be all the appalling, wearisome, grievous experiences of realising that injustice has actually been done, although the whole system that we have devised over the centuries was designed to avoid that at all costs.