Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill

Gareth Thomas Excerpts

Monday 9th September 2013 Commons Chamber

Amendment made: 76, page 1, line 6, leave out from ‘person’ to end of line 7.—(Miss Chloe Smith.)

[Mr Gareth Thomas (Harrow West) (Lab/Co-op)]

I beg to move amendment 3, page 1, line 6, leave out ‘or’ and insert ‘and’.

[The Temporary Chair (Sir Roger Gale)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 4, page 1, line 8, after ‘lobbyists’, insert—

‘and

(c) the person has signed up to the Register’s Code of Conduct.’.

Amendment 136, in clause 3, page 2, line 36, at end add—

‘(3) The Minister is under a duty to ensure the independence of the Registrar.

(4) The Minister is under a duty to ensure the Registrar is adequately financed and resourced so that the Registrar can exercise its functions under this Part.’.

Amendment 31,  in schedule 2, page 53, line 1, after ‘Minister’, insert—

‘after consultation with the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the House of Commons.’.

Amendment 138, page 53, line 2, at end insert—

‘(1A) The power of the Minister under sub-paragraph (1) is exercisable only following the approval of a proposed appointment by resolution of both Houses of Parliament.’.

Amendment 34, in clause 4, page 3, line 21, at end insert—

‘(c) the approximate value of the registered person’s spending on their lobbying activities for each quarter.’.

Amendment 36, in clause 5, page 3, line 37, after ‘information’, insert ‘and spending on lobbying’.

Amendment 137, page 3, line 38, at end insert—

‘(aa) details of any communications or meetings with a Minister of the Crown or Permanent Secretary that do not fall within section 2(3), and.’.

Amendment 56, page 3, line 47, at end add—

‘(c) if the registered person engaged in lobbying in the quarter in return for payment (whether or not the payment has been received), the purpose and subject matter of the lobbying services provided by the registered person; and

(d) if the registered person received payment in the quarter to engage in lobbying (whether or not the lobbying has been done) the purpose and subject matter of the lobbying services provided by the registered person.’.

Amendment 152, page 3, line 47, at end add—

‘(c) if the registered person received payment in the quarter to engage in lobbying (whether or not the lobbying has been done) the amount of payment received.’.

Amendment 37, page 3, line 47, at end insert—

‘(4) Spending on lobbying for each quarter is the approximate value of the amount a registered person spends on their lobbying activity for each quarter.’.

Amendment 40, in clause 10, page 5, line 28, leave out from ‘offence’ to end of line 30.

Amendment 42, in clause 14, page 7, line 39, at end insert—

‘or breaches the code of conduct’.

Amendment 43, in clause 22, page 10, line 31, leave out ‘seek to’.

New clause 1—Duty to apply a code of conduct—

‘(1) The Registrar shall, after wide consultation with relevant stakeholders including the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the House of Commons, prepare a code of conduct with which all registered persons will be required to comply, and may produce revised codes from time to time;

(2) The Secretary of State must lay any professional lobbying code of conduct before Parliament.

(3) Any code shall provide that any inappropriate financial relations between registered persons and parliamentarians are strictly forbidden.

(4) An organisation or person included on the register which contravenes the provisions of the code of conduct shall be liable to civil penalties as set out in Section 14.’.

New clause 2—Disclosure of names of professional lobbyists—

‘The Government must disclose the names of all persons who are professional lobbyists that work for them, including senior persons—

(a) who are employed directly with the UK Government;

(b) who are formally employed by the political party or parties that form the Government;

(c) who are employed on a temporary basis as consultants; and

(d) contractors.’.

New clause 7—Professional lobbyists taking up employment in government—

‘(1) Any professional lobbyist registered under section 1 taking up a senior position in Government will—

(a) have their appointment scrutinised by a Committee, and

(b) have restrictions placed on their activities as set out in subsection (3).

(2) “Senior position in Government” means a position as senior civil servant or their equivalent.

(3) The Minister, after consultation with relevant stakeholders, may make regulations about the activities set out in subsection (1)(b).’.

Clause stand part.

[Mr Thomas]

I rise to speak to the amendments tabled in the names of my right hon. and hon. Friends. Given the lack of time for debate that Ministers are allowing for this part of the Bill, let me rattle through the case for the amendments.

Amendment 3—the lead amendment in the group—is a probing amendment to explore why Ministers do not want the employer of a lobbyist to be revealed. We were led to believe that the motivation behind the Bill was to make the lobbying industry more transparent. Making it harder to understand who the employer of a person engaged in consultant lobbying is will hardly achieve that objective.

Let us take the example of the lobbying firm that has provided so much of the backdrop to debates on the Bill. If Crosby Textor suddenly decided that, after all, it is a firm of consultant lobbyists, the individuals working as consultant lobbyists for Crosby Textor would not, under the Bill, need to record by whom they are employed. Given the widespread concerns about what and who Crosby Textor lobbies for, it seems reasonable that the individual consultant lobbyists who work for Crosby Textor should reveal who employs them. The Opposition want transparency, and the Minister says she wants the same thing. We therefore want to hear more on why Ministers do not believe that revealing employers is required.

In speaking to amendment 4, I shall also refer to new clause 1 and amendment 42. Unless the Minister makes a dramatic speech, the Opposition will press amendment 4 to a Division. New clause 1, and amendments 4 and 42, require the establishment of a code of conduct. Such a code of conduct would be introduced after full consultation with all relevant stakeholders. It would have as its top line the need to avoid any inappropriate financial relations between registered persons and parliamentarians. It would also, of course, be available for parliamentary scrutiny.

The absence of a code of conduct from the Bill means there is currently no mechanism for removing or taking other sanctions against consultants who act in an unethical manner. Indeed, as the excellent Political and Constitutional Reform Committee has pointed out, if there is no code of conduct at the end of the Bill’s passage through both Houses, we will have the bizarre situation whereby the registrar can punish lateness in providing or submitting information, but cannot punish unethical behaviour. Arguably, the absence of a code of conduct means that some on the register will describe themselves as registered or approved without having to meet any minimum standards.

[Andy Sawford]

Given the role of the Association of Professional Political Consultants on standards within the industry, the bizarre consequence of the Bill could be that organisations that are self-regulated will be less regulated than they are currently.

[Mr Thomas]

I fear that my hon. Friend’s intervention strikes a chord. I will come on to some of the points made by the Association of Professional Political Consultants shortly. Gavin Devine, the chief executive of one of the big lobbying firms, says that

“there is a risk that the register will give a kitemark or endorsement to some who do not deserve it.”

I read the APPC code of conduct, to which my hon. Friend has just referred, with interest. One key element is that

“practitioners”—

lobbyists who have signed up to the code—

“must use reasonable endeavours to satisfy themselves of the truth and accuracy of all statements…by or on behalf of clients to institutions of government.”

I struggle to understand why Ministers would not want to ensure that all consultant lobbyists ensure their clients tell the truth to them. A code of conduct with such a provision, properly policed, would help to raise the bar—raise the standards—of the whole industry, rather than just those who subscribe to the APPC code.

Consultant lobbyists who sign up the APPC code are expected to be open in disclosing the identity of their clients and must not misrepresent their interests. Having a code of conduct with such a provision would help to ensure that Ministers and MPs would know who was trying to meet us and allow us to explore whether there were other motives for consultant lobbyists asking for information or advocating particular causes. It seems hardly unreasonable for such a basic standard of behaviour to be expected of all lobbyists covered by the legislation.

The APPC code requires practitioners to have a duty to advise their clients if they think they are about to commit illegal or unethical acts. They have a duty to refuse to act for such a client if the client persists. It is surely not unreasonable, and not too burdensome on the consultant lobbyist, to expect lobbyists to be able to abide by such a requirement in a code of conduct. Ministers need to explain why such reasonable requirements are so burdensome that they cannot be included in a code of conduct, or why they do not think we need to uphold, or ask consultant lobbyists to uphold, such basic standards of behaviour.

[Richard Fuller (Bedford) (Con)]

Before the issue of burden is appropriate, there comes the question of efficacy, and a comparison between self-regulation in a code of conduct and a Government-managed code of conduct. What evidence can the hon. Gentleman bring to say that a Government-managed code of conduct is better than a peer group trying to maintain the integrity of their business?

[Mr Thomas]

The advantage of a statutory code of conduct is that it covers everybody. The problem with a voluntary code of conduct is that it covers only those who choose to submit themselves to it. Given the concerns about the lobbying industry—some of them unfair—surely it makes sense to have a code of conduct that everybody signs up to, after proper consultation, so that we achieve a basic standard of behaviour.

[Richard Fuller]

I appreciate that point, but one could argue that with an industry-based code of conduct to which people can voluntarily associate, peer group pressure and recognition will arise from people coming together to say, “We are approved in this way”. In some ways that might be a superior alternative to a Government registrar that is open to burdensome bureaucratic processes where, by the time they are resolved, people do not know what the issues are. In an area such as this, which is so open to public scrutiny, and the scrutiny of MPs and others, the pressures on a voluntary code would surely be even greater than they are for many other sectors of the economy.

[Mr Thomas]

I hear the point the hon. Gentleman makes, but I am sure he will have realised in the course of his research for this debate that there is not just one voluntary code prepared by the APPC, but a number. Although one must commend the efforts of the individuals who have initiated such codes, along with the firms and individuals who have signed up to them, surely it makes sense for everybody to sign up to one clear code of conduct, so that everybody knows what the basic standards are and nobody can be confused about whether certain principles apply in one code of conduct or whether a particular lobbyist is subscribing to another set of principles. That would create clarity for the consultant lobbyist and their client—and for us as the House, therefore—about what is expected of those who seek to engage with us.

[Andy Sawford]

The discussion seems to be going against the grain of recent experience and, when it comes to regulation in the UK, what I think would enjoy cross-party support. In the case of organisations such as the Royal Pharmaceutical Society and many other health organisations, the regulatory role has been split from the membership role. The regulatory role has emphasised a code of conduct and enforcement of standards, whereas the representative membership role has been about advocating for the profession. The two roles are quite different. The voluntary side is about working together, mutual support, peer support and advocating for the role that a profession plays in public policy making; the regulatory role is about ensuring that we can have confidence in the standards of that industry.

[Mr Thomas]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. One way to have transparency and clarity and to minimise the burden of regulation for the industry would be to ensure that there is one clear code of conduct and therefore one clear set of principles that everybody has to sign up to in order to do business.

Another provision in the APPC code—one that seems eminently sensible, at least on the face of it—says that

“practitioners”—

that is, lobbyists—

“must not make misleading, exaggerated or extravagant claims to clients about”

what they can do for them. That is hardly an unreasonable or burdensome principle to have in a code of conduct either, so I ask again: why do Ministers not want such a basic principle covered in a clear code of conduct? The APPC code contains other suggestions that we might take forward, including the proposal that

“Political practitioners must not…Make any award or payment in money or in kind (including equity in a member firm)…to any member of…the National Assembly of Wales or the Northern Ireland Assembly or the Greater London Authority”.

As I understand the drafting of the Bill, Ministers have not gone so far as to cover those bodies. Perhaps the Minister can use her response to this debate as an opportunity to explain why a code of conduct should not cover those organisations as well.

Including such requirements or versions of them—I do not want to be prescriptive; there should be proper consultation with all stakeholders about what should be in a code of conduct—would help to raise the standards of the whole profession and, as a result, give the registrar the means to begin to challenge any poor behaviour in the industry that he or she might come across.

New clause 2 would help to ensure proper oversight and better public scrutiny of any potential conflicts of interest when senior roles are taken up in Government by people who were—or, indeed, perhaps still are—lobbyists. It would require the Government to disclose the names of any professional lobbyists who work for them, including those employed directly by the Government and those employed by the political parties that form the Government. The new clause would help to prevent a situation in which the country did not know definitively whether a lobbyist working at the heart of government for a political party, with access to the inner sanctums of No. 10 and No. 11, was at the same time lobbying on behalf of commercial interests such as big tobacco or the alcohol industry.

It is surely worth drawing the Committee’s attention to the scandal surrounding Lynton Crosby. The reason that that will not go away as an issue for the Conservatives is that the country does not know whether he is lobbying Ministers on behalf of any big commercial business groups here in the UK. New clause 2—coupled with other amendments to widen the definition of lobbying and to require an estimate of expenditure on lobbying activity—would help to tease out whether Mr Crosby was able to use his position working for the Conservative party to raise the concerns of other clients that he or his business might have.

The issues relating to Lynton Crosby raise the question of whether other lobbyists are employed, perhaps part time, to work for the Government while separately working for their clients to lobby Ministers, permanent secretaries, other senior civil servants or special advisers. New clause 2 is a sensible proposal that would help to make transparent the role of lobbyists who pass from an area of commercial life to become more actively engaged in public life as well.

Big tobacco appears to have successfully exerted considerable influence on Ministers recently. Similarly, minimum alcohol pricing seems to have been dropped as a major Government priority. The presence in the Conservative party of a lobbyist who has access to No. 10, who is notorious in other countries for his other interests and who will not, at first glance, be covered by the legislation does not help to ease people’s fears that Ministers are not being quite so straightforward in their professed commitment to transparency as they might be.

[Sarah Newton (Truro and Falmouth) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman clearly sees the new clause as providing some kind of Lynton Crosby moment. Perhaps I can put him out of his misery by reminding him that the Prime Minister has made it clear that Lynton Crosby’s role was to help the Conservative party win the next election—that and that alone. Any meeting along the lines that the hon. Gentleman is suggesting or implying would quite properly be covered by existing rules on the disclosure of who meets whom. This is a complete red herring.

[Mr Thomas]

With all due respect to the hon. Lady, I do not share her view. New clause 2 would help to prevent any similar concern—

[Sarah Newton]

rose—

[Mr Thomas]

Just let me try to answer the question a little further. The new clause would stop the ongoing concern around Lynton Crosby’s role. I accept that the Conservative party is going to need all the help it can get at the next election, but we need to look further ahead in regard to the future of the lobbying industry. I gently suggest that new clause 2 would prevent further media storms of the kind that has evolved around Lynton Crosby’s role.

[Sarah Newton]

The hon. Gentleman seems keen to create a media storm around Lynton Crosby’s involvement, but it could not have been made more clear that he has an election role. He is involved in work on polling data, and the Prime Minister has made it extremely clear that he is not involved in policy development at all. He would therefore not be involved in the kind of lobbying that the hon. Gentleman is referring to. It would be interesting to find out whether Labour is going to apply the same standards to the team that it will undoubtedly be employing and has employed in the past for the purpose of winning general elections.

[Mr Thomas]

If Lynton Crosby is only doing a bit of analytical work on polling data, I would gently suggest that the Conservative party is paying rather a lot of money for that service. If the hon. Lady votes with us to ensure that new clause 2 becomes part of the Bill, I put it to her that when we form the next Government, as we surely will do, we will of course be covered by its provisions.

[Andy Sawford]

Let me clarify my interpretation of the debate on the amendments to which my hon. Friend is speaking. The general tone of the discussion from the Opposition Benches has been about the need to enhance transparency. There is no suggestion in the initiative that the organisations that might be encompassed by a proper regulatory code are engaged in something that is in any way wrong. I think that Opposition Members are therefore quite right to seek to broaden the provisions. I wonder whether Government Members do not protest too much and whether, in a sense, they have something to hide. There may be nothing wrong in the actions of Linton Crosby, but as far as the public are concerned—and I hope this is parliamentary, Sir Roger—it stinks. Nobody should have anything to fear from transparency if they are doing nothing wrong.

[Mr Thomas]

My hon. Friend makes the perfectly reasonable point that new clause 2 is an attempt to prevent the sort of concerns that have arisen, going wider than our Benches and our parties, about the role of Mr Crosby. New clause 2 seems to me to be a perfectly sensible provision to prevent any similar situation from happening in future.

New clause 7 is designed to make provision for professional lobbyists taking up employment in government. It deals with similar territory, albeit on a slightly different issue, to new clause 2. It would similarly deal with the potential conflicts of interest that can arise when a lobbyist seeks to take up a senior position in government. It is quite possible that someone with considerable skill and expertise who is working as a lobbyist at the moment might secure an offer to work as a senior civil servant. Such a person who has worked in a senior position in government before and has been seeking to widen their career profile might now successfully seek to return to a senior position in government. Having a system in place, which is what new clause 7 allows for, to check that there are no conflicts of interest around such employment is surely sensible and would help to build trust in the new appointment. Together with new clause 2, that new clause would allow the relevant Committee to probe whether there were any reasons to be concerned about any ongoing commercial lobbying interests that such a person might have. I say gently to Government Members that the new clause could have helped to prevent the ongoing concern about Mr Crosby’s role and his access within No. 10, so I commend it to the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth (Sarah Newton), who intervened on me earlier.

The most appropriate Committee would perhaps be the excellent Political and Constitutional Reform Committee. It has a mix of cross-party talent among its membership and it could explore with the relevant individual whether there were any potential conflicts of interest and, if not, how the situation should be handled, leaving the individual free to go about their public role, with the worry and concern that something improper is somehow going on and is attached to them no longer being an issue.

[Mr Allen]

It is very generous of my hon. Friend to offer the creation of a more effective Bill to the tender mercies of my Select Committee, but we are not looking for that job. There is a process whereby a special Committee can be created in order to review a Bill effectively and pre-legislatively. It is also important from my hon. Friend’s point of view, however, that the Opposition make it clear that pre-legislative scrutiny, which has barely taken place in this case, must become part of the Standing Orders of this House so that every Bill as a matter of course—apart from in emergencies—goes through proper pre-legislative scrutiny. This must not be a convention gifted to us by courtesy of the Government of the day, of whichever political colour, but must be something that this House does as of right to every appropriate Bill.

[Mr Thomas]

I agree that pre-legislative scrutiny would have been extremely useful in respect of the Bill. New clause 7 seeks to create a more distinct scrutinising role for a Committee of the House in the event of any concern about a commercial lobbyist who takes up a senior position in government, and my hon. Friend’s Committee might be the appropriate one to establish whether there are any conflicts of interest and then put them to bed. I certainly share his aspiration, indeed determination, to ensure that more pre-legislative scrutiny takes place.

Amendment 31 seeks to probe the Government over the appointment of the registrar. It is crucial for whoever performs that role to enjoy the confidence of as wide a cross-section of political life as is possible, and it would not be good enough for the Government simply to pick one of their friends or cronies. We believe that allowing my hon. Friend’s Committee to be involved in the appointment would ensure that the most appropriate and most independent person was appointed, thus providing an important safeguard. I hope that the Minister will feel able to give a commitment in that regard.

Amendment 34, and the consequential amendments 36 and 37, underline our view that information about spending on lobbying should be available for scrutiny. It would be useful to hear from Ministers why they do not think that we should know how much is being spent on lobbying for a particular cause at any one time. In the United States, an approximate good-faith estimate of the amounts that are spent must be published every quarter. It is surely right, in the interests of transparency, for the public to be able to make a judgment about how much is being spent on trying to secure particular outcomes at particular times.

We know from today’s media reports—thanks to a leak of confidential documents from Philip Morris International—that huge sums are, on occasion, spent on lobbying in pursuit of particular ends. Philip Morris appears to have spent well over £1 million and employed some 160 people in an attempt to keep a proposed tobacco products directive from coming to fruition. Apparently, more than 230 Members of the European Parliament were met at least once. Freedom of information documents have revealed that Philip Morris was not alone among the tobacco giants in wanting to stop the proposed directive, but in just that one instance the picture is of a mammoth and very expensive lobbying operation.

I think that Philip Morris is perfectly entitled to lobby, but I also think that we are entitled to know for what it is lobbying and why, and how much it is spending in pursuit of its own interests. Our amendments seek to tease out the scale of the finance that is devoted to lobbying on particular issues at any one time. That would help to increase the transparency of the discussions that legislators have about particular proposals, and would improve our governance as a result.

Amendment 40 seeks to delete the self-incrimination defence that the Bill currently allows lobbyists to use in order to avoid answering questions asked by the registrar. It would be helpful to hear the Minister’s thinking. We believe that the inclusion of the self-incrimination defence restricts the registrar’s ability to get to the truth. Like so much of the Bill in its current form, clause 10 casts a shadow over the Government’s aspiration for more transparency in the lobbying industry, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s explanation of why the defence is necessary.

Amendment 43 cuts to the heart of the concern of many outside this House as to whether the registrar can be self-financing. There is a widespread belief that far fewer lobbyists will have to register than the Government estimate. Their estimate differs greatly from those of outside experts. Witnesses appearing before the Select Committee suggested only 300 would need to be registered, and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah) pointed out, the estimates sometimes sink to as low as 100. The Government’s impact assessment, however, suggests between 550 and 1,000 consultant lobbyists would need to register.

If the Government are wrong and all the expert witnesses are right about that, the registrar could be faced with a substantial cost gap, and that would have to be picked up by the public purse. The Government seem to be very relaxed about wasting money, as they have happily written off the disastrous IT projects for universal credit and borrowed billions of pounds to fund the welfare costs of those who cannot find jobs, but it would be useful to hear from the Minister how the apparent fairy tale of a budget for the registrar that the impact assessment suggests has been cobbled together. What is the thinking behind the budget? How have these estimates been arrived at?

Our amendment underlines the point that the public should not have to pay for the regulation of lobbying. If the Government are sensible and accept the definition of lobbying that the majority of those outside the House—and, I suspect, inside this House who have actually studied the Bill—believe is appropriate, there is no reason why the public purse will need to fund any of the costs of the registrar.

We believe that these amendments will improve the Bill, and I commend them to the Committee.

[Lady Hermon]

It is a lovely surprise to be called to speak so early in this debate. First, I must say that I am absolutely delighted that the Leader of the House is present, particularly as amendments 136 and 138 in my name and those of other hon. Members were prompted by his comments on Second Reading, when he said, with great enthusiasm:

“To ensure the independence of the system, the register will be administered and enforced by an independent registrar of consultant lobbyists”—[Official Report, 3 September 2013; Vol. 567, c. 176.]

His use of the phrases “independent registrar” and “independence of the system” fascinated me because I read the Bill very carefully from beginning to end and those phrases never appear in it. Instead, the Bill states that the registrar is to be appointed by the Minister—a term which, of course, includes the Secretary of State—but, it is stated in paragraph 3(6) of schedule 2, the poor old registrar can also be dismissed by the Minister

“if the Minister is satisfied that the Registrar is unable, unwilling or unfit to perform the functions of the office.”

So the Minister does not even have to have reasonable cause to dismiss the registrar. He does not have to have reasonable suspicion or reasonable belief. Under the Bill as currently drafted, the Minister appoints the registrar and can dismiss the registrar if he is “satisfied” of those things. That is far too weak.

We must remember that the powers of the registrar as set up under this Bill are quite extensive. More to the point, my constituents have lobbied me—written to me; “lobbied” is almost a bad word—on many topics, and it was not fair for the Leader of the House or for the Deputy Leader of the House to suggest on Second Reading that we were all alarmed because of trade union scaremongering. That is not the case. I have not received a single letter or e-mail from a trade union, but I have received them from charities, which want reassurance that the registrar will be independent of Government. The registrar will have the power to keep and publish the register. They must keep the register up to date, they have the power to monitor compliance with obligations, and they can issue information notices if they believe that consultant lobbyists have not registered.

There are significant penalties, including criminal conviction and civil penalties for non-compliance with the terms and conditions of part 1. It is essential for public confidence in the new register that, as the Leader of the House promised on Second Reading, the new system is independent of Government and the registrar enjoys independence. The amendments that I have tabled would require the Minister to allow the registrar to act independently. There must be an assurance in the Bill that the functions of the registrar will be exercised independently of any other person.

The Leader of the House suggested on Second Reading that the register would be funded by the lobbying industry via a subscription charge. Again, I urge the coalition Government to heed the lack of confidence engendered in the general public because of lobbying scandals. It is incumbent on all of us to do all that we can to restore that confidence. For the Leader of the House to suggest that the lobbying industry would pay for the register through a subscription is not helpful. My amendments would ensure that the independence of the registrar and of the register is guaranteed, and I hope that the Government will look at them sympathetically.

[Mr Allen]

I strongly support the points that have just been made, and I am happy to add my name to the amendments.

We should return to the point that I made briefly about pre-legislative scrutiny. It would have saved a great deal of grief if we had undertaken such scrutiny, and it is incumbent on all of us to consider how we do so in future, so that we avoid the mistakes and so that the Government—I do not mean just this Government but the one before and the one to come—listen to Parliament. As a result of that sentiment and the fact that Parliament has a contribution to make, the report that members of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee hurriedly put together after having returned early from the recess to take evidence made it clear that the Standing Orders of the House should be amended to say:

“No public Bill shall be presented unless a) a draft of the Bill has received pre-legislative scrutiny by a Committee of the House or a joint Committee of both Houses, or b) it has been certified by the Speaker as a Bill that requires immediate scrutiny and pre-legislative scrutiny would be inexpedient.”

Let us try to avoid, for the sake of all future Governments, getting into this sort of shambolic mess—a mess whereby people push through a Bill, do not discuss it with Parliament or with any of the relevant organisations before releasing it into the public and parliamentary domain a day before the recess, where it is then debated on the Floor of the House a day after our return from recess.

[Mr Thomas]

Does my hon. Friend agree that one of the many benefits of pre-legislative scrutiny might have been more time to go through the finances of the registrar and to understand which set of estimates on who would register—the estimates of the industry or those of the Government—was most likely to be correct?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Allen]

Therefore it is important that the issues in this group are debated. That is what I want to get to, as you kindly indicated, Sir Roger, after that preamble.

[Mr Thomas]

Is not one of the concerns about the short time that we have to debate even this group of amendments the fact that we will not be able to explore the case for a code of conduct, which so many organisations outside the House and so many of those on both sides of the House who have studied the Bill believe is essential if we are to give a registrar the teeth they need to make a difference?

[Mr Allen]

Sir Roger, my hon. Friend on the Front Bench deserves a severe reprimand for trying to mislead me again into talking about matters not covered by the present group of amendments. It is a matter of great regret that that issue is another one that, as he points out, will not be discussed. This is not to make a point for or against either Front-Bench team, but Members have a right to voice an opinion on key aspects of legislation. That will not now take place. I do not point a finger at anybody. I merely say that that is not an acceptable way to run a sweet shop, let alone a Parliament.

To describe the heart of what we are considering in the present group, I shall quote extensively from the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee report, which states:

“There was a significant degree of agreement that the additional information should include disclosure of the subject matter of the lobbying, and some agreement around the idea of including the purpose of the lobbying and a list of who had been lobbied.”

I talked earlier about an evidence base. However hurriedly it took place in the time frame we had to put our evidence base together, a wide variety of organisations, which are listed in the report, submitted evidence, quotations from which are included. Spinwatch said that the information required under the Bill was “wholly insufficient”, adding

“For a register to meaningfully allow public scrutiny of lobbying, it must include information from lobbyists on their interactions with government. In other words: whom they are meeting and what issues they are discussing. Members of the public wanting to see which outside organisations are exerting influence on a particular policy area, for example, will be unable to do so under this proposal.”

We also had a joint submission from three eminent academics, Dr Hogan, Professor Murphy and Dr Chari, who argued for the inclusion in the register of

“the subject matter and purpose of the lobbying”.

The Royal College of Midwives said:

“It is hard to see how the information requested will add greatly to the transparency of the lobbying process…Would it be too burdensome, at the very least, to ask for the register also to spell out the issues on which clients are seeking to lobby (e.g. improved conditions for farm animals), and the nature of the lobbying that has taken place (e.g. an all-party group on road hauliers established)?”

The oft-quoted tonight Iain Anderson, the deputy chair of APPC, supported publishing information about the purpose and subject matter of lobbying, but suggested that this could be done most effectively and efficiently when details of ministerial and official meetings were published rather than in the register. That is a perfectly acceptable matter for the Committee to explore, but time will not allow us to do so, although we could make a serious contribution to the development of the Bill.

The Committee on Standards in Public Life also argued that information on the subject matter could be included, either on the register or in the details that were published of meetings. The difficulty with including the information in the data about ministerial and official meetings is that if the definition of lobbying is expanded to encompass contact with the rest of the civil service, special advisers and others who do not necessarily publish details of their meetings, such information would necessarily be quite patchy.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miss Chloe Smith]

I want to respond to a couple of the amendments before we wind up. Amendments 3 and 4 would alter clause 1 and provide that lobbying was prohibited unless a lobbyist had both registered and signed up to the register’s code of conduct. Amendment 42 would establish a civil sanction in relation to breaches of the code of conduct. New clause 1 provides that the registrar must produce a code. However, there is little detail about what provision such a code would make other than that it would forbid inappropriate financial relations between registered persons and parliamentarians. The amendments reveal that, as we perhaps knew already, the Opposition intend not only a register of lobbyists but a full-blown regulator of the industry.

[Mr Thomas]

The hon. Lady says that the amendment makes no provision for a description of what might be in the code of conduct. I gently say that that seems a bit presumptuous. The point is that there needs to be wide discussion with the industry and those who watch its activities about what should be in a code of conduct. Why will she not allow provision for a code of conduct and then ensure that there is proper discussion across the industry on what might be in it?

[Miss Smith]

It is interesting that the Opposition have spent a good four hours telling us to do what the industry wants and are now advocating something that the industry does not want, which is a fully statutory code of conduct. I will make further arguments as to why there is a problem with putting all this on to the statute book.

I have already dealt with what the Government are trying to do through the Bill, which is to shine the light of transparency on a specific element of the industry. In doing so, we recognise the industry’s efforts to improve lobbying practice by introducing its own codes of conduct, and we are confident that that would continue; we have no reason to believe that it would not. It is right that those codes then promote the ethical behaviour that we need for the integrity—

[Mr Thomas]

rose—

[Miss Smith]

It might be helpful if the hon. Gentleman allowed me to make a few points in response to his intervention.

While such codes contain laudable principles and good practice guidance, their translation into statute is not feasible or practical. The experience of regulators in other jurisdictions clearly shows that statutory codes of conduct for lobbying can be unworkable and unenforceable. That is what I seek to guard against in opposing the amendment. The question then hangs in the air of what provisions the Opposition would expect to see in a code of conduct. They have provided very little indication other than that it will, rather intriguingly, forbid any inappropriate financial relations between registered persons and parliamentarians. Can the Opposition give us an example of what an inappropriate relationship might entail? Can the hon. Gentleman explain whether it would not already be prohibited by Parliament’s own code of conduct or laws on bribery and corruption? He is silent, which is rather worrying. This is another example of the rather lazy and imprecise draftsmanship that we have seen from the Opposition today, and that is not good enough. He does not provide any notion about how the code’s provisions might be enforced and what resources the registrar would be required to use to monitor it. The Opposition are setting the registrar an impossible task in expecting them to do that kind of thing. I urge him to withdraw the amendment.

The Opposition’s amendment 31 would alter paragraph 3 of schedule 2 to provide that the registrar’s appointment must be approved by the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee. I think I heard its Chairman say that this was a new job that he had not necessarily asked for.

[Mr Thomas]

I intervened to give the hon. Lady an opportunity to correct the record. It is not true that the whole lobbying industry does not support a code of conduct, although it is certainly true that a number of people want a hybrid version. However, many within the industry do support a code of conduct. She is yet to explain why a code of conduct is not necessary.

[Miss Smith]

I have just gone to the lengths of providing the hon. Gentleman with an argument, with international examples, as to why making something statutory from a voluntary position can often be unfeasible. That argument stands. In fact, my reference to the industry relates particularly to the APPC.

The Opposition’s amendment 43 would amend the reference to the setting of the subscription charge from requiring the Minister to “seek to” recover the full costs to requiring them to recover the full cost. That seems unnecessary. I can assure the whole Committee that we are well aware of the importance of ensuring that the register is fully funded by the industry in order to protect the taxpayer. As I said earlier, the Canadian register costs £3 million to run. The Opposition have not fully considered how they would ensure that such costs would be recovered from, no doubt, the charities, playgroup volunteers and vicars whom they intend to register.

Amendments 136 and 138, tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen), demonstrate his desire to secure the independence of the registrar. I share that desire and hope that I have reassured him. I was glad to hear the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) refer to this point as well. It is important that the registrar will be independent of both the lobbying industry and the Government and will have a clear remit to operate independently. Ministers will be able to dismiss the registrar only if they are satisfied that he or she is unable, unwilling or unfit to perform the functions of the office. I urge hon. Members not to press amendments 136 and 138.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Thomas]

I indicated in my opening remarks that amendment 3 was a probing amendment. Even though the Minister has skipped over the concerns that led the Opposition to table it, I shall seek to withdraw it.

The shadow Cabinet Office Minister tried hard to cover up the weakness of the Bill and the absence of a case for a code of conduct—[Interruption.] I beg your pardon, Mr Hoyle; I meant to refer to the Cabinet Office Minister rather than the shadow Minister. The Government have given no proper explanation why a code of conduct is absent from the Bill, or why a code of conduct would not improve it. Without a code of conduct, the registrar will have no teeth and no ability to tackle poor or unethical behaviour by lobbyists. For that reason, I shall press amendment 4 to a Division.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 4, in clause 1, page 1, line 8, after ‘lobbyists’, insert

‘and

(c) the person has signed up to the Register’s Code of Conduct.’.—(Mr Thomas.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.