Piper Alpha Disaster

Frank Doran Excerpts

Thursday 11th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Frank Doran (Aberdeen North) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the 25th anniversary of the Piper Alpha disaster.

On the night of 6 July 1988, an incident occurred on the Piper Alpha platform that led to the deaths of 167 men. It was the worst tragedy in the offshore oil and gas industry anywhere in the world. It was the direct consequence of negligence, bad management at every level, poor maintenance, extremely weak regulation and failure to have proper work systems in place or a proper safety strategy for major incidents. The regulation management and safety systems failed at every level. Those 167 men died, survivors suffered the most traumatic experience that any of us could imagine, many of them being seriously injured, and of course the families and relatives of those involved have been irrevocably damaged.

I am very pleased and proud to have the opportunity to open this debate to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the Piper Alpha tragedy and to remember those who died and their families, and, of course, the rescue services involved and those who supported the survivors and families after the incident. As well as the Piper Alpha victims, it is important to remember all those who have died during the lifetime of the UK oil and gas industry, whether at sea, on land, on a platform, or on transport.

Last Saturday, along with several hundred others, I attended a memorial service in the Piper Alpha memorial rose garden in Aberdeen. I met many of the survivors and the families of victims. I was delighted to see the Secretary of State for Scotland and the shadow Secretary of State, my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow East (Margaret Curran), at that event representing the Government and the Opposition. Four hundred of those who attended were survivors or families of victims. Most of the individuals and families have moved on, but the mood on Saturday was as sombre as the mood in 1988. It was quite clear that for most of the people involved the memory of the horror of that day in 1988 remains just as vivid and distressing as it was then. The pain does not go away. Many things stand out about that service, but the most poignant and difficult was the roll call of victims—as graphic and emotional a way of underlining the sheer scale of the tragedy as any.

The 25th anniversary of the tragedy has had a good deal of media coverage, and it does not serve any real purpose to go through again all the detail of what happened on that night. However, I would like to focus on just a couple of issues relevant to the present and possibly also to the future.

As colleagues are well aware, following the disaster Lord Cullen was appointed to lead an inquiry into the disaster. He made 106 recommendations. The Cullen report was welcomed on all sides. It has changed the safety culture in the North sea and throughout the global oil and gas industry. Aside from the practical workplace and management issues, the most important recommendation was on the question of who should be the regulator. From the beginning of the North sea industry, the Piper and all other North sea installations were regulated by the then Department of Energy. The Department had two fundamental problems. The first was the conflict between its responsibility to maximise oil production and its duty as a regulator. More importantly, the Cullen report made the Department’s inadequacies abundantly clear. Cullen recommended that responsibility for offshore safety should be handed over to the Health and Safety Executive, where it resides today.

In the main, the HSE, through its offshore division, has been a good regulator, and there has been substantial improvement in the industry’s safety record. Recently, however, concerns were raised when the HSE announced that the offshore division was being merged into a new energy division. The announcement was made without any apparent consultation with the industry, unions or Members of Parliament. That raised concern on all sides, particularly as to whether the decision was driven by cuts in funding. However, we eventually received from the chair the rationale for the move. Ministers also came in with a promise of some extra inspectors.

The most recent information I have on staffing in the offshore division is that it has 109 full-time equivalent staff—14 more than 2010, so that is significant progress. However, across the HSE the total number of inspectors has fallen by 75 from 1,316 to 1,241. In future, with a merged division, it might be much more difficult for us to identify the precise numbers of dedicated offshore inspectors. Broadly speaking, there has been a steady improvement in the safety regime and in accident rates, but the industry remains dangerous compared with other UK industries. In 2011-12 the fatality rate was 6.9 per 100,000 workers compared with 0.6 for all UK workers. The major injury and fatality rate per 100,000 workers for offshore oil and gas is 130.8, compared with 90.4 for all UK workers. However, at a major event last week, a representative of one of the major oil companies cited a statistic suggesting that, on the basis of last year’s figures, the industry was the third safest, behind banking and education, but I have not seen that information.

Beyond safety, the other major issue facing the industry is the continuing problem of gas escapes on offshore platforms. We should remember that a gas leak led to the Piper Alpha tragedy. In 2011-12, there were 94 hydrocarbon releases, 44 of which were classified as significant. Nine of those were identified as a major incident, which is a leak that, if ignited, would cause an explosion capable of causing multiple casualties. Those nine cases were therefore very serious incidents. Last year, the Elgin-Franklin complex, which is operated by Total, was closed down because of a major gas leak. It was restarted, but then shut down again, and it was not fully operational until March this year. Gas leak statistics, like those for injury rates, are showing a steady improvement, but the volume of escapes and the scale of the Elgin-Franklin problem show that there is still a lot of work to do.

[Anas Sarwar (Glasgow Central) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this important debate. Does he agree that one life lost is one life too many, and that that is why all the authorities and companies must work together to achieve maximum safety and security for all those working in such dangerous places to ensure that no life is lost in the future?

[Mr Doran]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. A successful process is in operation, but there is no room for complacency.

[Ann McKechin (Glasgow North) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this valuable debate. Does he share my concern about reports that the number of planned inspections throughout the HSE’s entire operation in Scotland is likely to be significantly reduced this year? Given that last year, unfortunately, the number of casualties in Scotland increased overall, there is utterly no room for complacency on health and safety at work.

[Mr Doran]

I will come to that point later in my speech, as I am dealing with the offshore oil and gas industry at the moment, but I recognise the point that my hon. Friend makes.

The HSE has been increasingly proactive. It has embarked on several projects, one of the most important of which is the key programme project, which involves an assessment of the integrity of offshore installations. The KP3 report, which was published a few years ago, followed an assessment of 100 platforms. It told us that, in a number of cases, the industry was slipping back on areas such as the maintenance of platforms. In the run-up to the 20th anniversary of the Piper Alpha disaster, the then Secretary of State for Work and Pensions ordered a review of KP3, which showed that the industry had responded to its findings and that improvements were being made.

We have now reached the KP4 stage, and the interim report identifies several issues relating to ageing plant. Oil and Gas UK, the industry body, has established working groups to produce guidance and promote improvements. I understand that, as at the end of March, HSE had undertaken KP4 inspections of more than 75% of operators. The Department of Energy and Climate Change has also set up a senior oversight group, which includes the HSE, to supervise the implementation of the review’s recommendations. Such an integrated approach is necessary and appropriate.

While the industry is making progress on safety, the KP3 report shows that the regulator needs to be ever vigilant. A good job has been done, but several points still need to be considered. The trade union side recognises that progress has been made in the industry, but its officials are aware that there are several installations on which workers are afraid to bring up safety issues with their employers. Some employers tell union officials that they are put under pressure by the staff of the operator—the client—to cut corners.

The regulator also identifies problems. At the Piper 25 conference, Steve Walker, the retiring head of the offshore safety division, made several points, including about the control of work. The inadequacy—and failure—of the permit-to-work system led directly to the Piper Alpha disaster, and it is still a key weakness for the industry. Poor isolation and inadequate adherence to permit systems remain a common thread during incident investigation.

Another key Cullen recommendation is not being fully adhered to by some companies. The regulator is regularly taking enforcement action for maintenance and testing temporary safe refuges. A Health and Safety Executive inspection in 2011 found that there was still variation in the implementation of safety representative legislation. In other words, it is not being applied properly.

That last point is important, because one of the major steps that has been taken by the industry, with the full support of the HSE, is to recognise that safety offshore can only improve with the full engagement of the work force. That process is being led by Step Change in Safety.

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this very important debate. I was on the energy desk at the Treasury when the Piper Alpha accident happened and it was truly terrible. One of the things I remember is that there were communication difficulties, because at that time quite a lot of foreign workers working offshore on British and American-managed platforms simply did not understand what was going on. Does my hon. Friend know whether that situation has improved in the past 25 years?

[Mr Doran]

That certainly was not an issue for Lord Cullen. I think that the communication difficulty was the failure to have a proper management structure in place with a process to deal with such an incident. The only message that was put out was a mayday message. From recollection, I think that two foreigners—a Frenchman and, I think, a Spaniard—were killed in the Piper Alpha incident, so there was no issue there.

Under Step Change in Safety, materials have been produced and conferences held to encourage employers to accept that top-down management does not work. Full engagement and involvement of the work force at every stage of the work process is crucial. There is no doubt that there is a great deal of traction in the principles being set out by Step Change in Safety and most operations offshore are embracing the changes, some more enthusiastically than others.

At the Piper 25 conference, I attended a session where employees of Maersk Oil, which is fairly new to the North sea, spoke about its approach. It has gone for full engagement and has introduced a system that involves new rules about handling safety issues, encouraging workers to come forward with ideas to improve safety and to report safety concerns without fear of sanction and so on. Maersk Oil has produced statistics which show that since the inception of the new ideas, accidents have declined significantly and profits have increased. They present a win-win scenario—safer workplace, increased profit.

Others, while accepting the basic principle and making some progress, have been less enthusiastic. Old habits die hard and trade union officials and regulators tell me that as soon as they step off the helicopter and on to an offshore platform they can read the mood of the work force and what sort of approach the employer is taking to work-force engagement.

Despite that, there is no doubt that serious progress is being made. I have been involved with the oil and gas industry in one way or another for nearly 40 years. For most of that time, management was top down, harsh and very anti union, with a few exceptions on the contracting side. I would be a fantasist to suggest that the industry fully embraces trade unions. However, significant progress is being made. The industry recognises that the unions can make a valuable contribution to the workplace and safety. Trade unions are represented on the board of the industry training body OPITO—the Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation—and one of the representatives chaired it for a number of years. Two full-time union officers were appointed to the separate taskforces set up to look into the Super Puma helicopter disaster a few years ago and the consequences of the Macondo incident in the gulf of Mexico. At this year’s industry safety awards the keynote speaker was the general secretary of the Scottish Trades Union Congress.

One of the major issues for the industry this year has been the threat from the European Union to take control of offshore safety. A number of very senior figures in the industry have assured me that the turning point in a meeting with the Commission was the presentation made by John Taylor, a full-time official of Unite who would put to shame the Prime Minister’s cartoon image of Unite members—I guarantee it—and who is totally dedicated to the interests of his members.

I raise these issues because my biggest fear about the integrity of the steadily improving safety environment in the offshore industry is that the process is running in direct contradiction to Government policy. If we leave the union relationship aside, the industry is putting huge effort into its worker engagement and involvement strategy. It recognises the value of the worker on the shop floor, seeing him or her as a vital part of the business, contributing to the safety of the enterprise and—if we follow the Maersk line—its profitability.

Meanwhile, at the national level, we have various reports, including the Beecroft report, whose objective seems to be to take us back to Victorian times, chipping away at rights at work and job security, and changes to health and safety legislation. At a time when the oil and gas industry is still operating in one of the most dangerous work environments in the country, placing responsibility for safety on its work force and valuing each individual as a key part of the enterprise, I do not want to see these gains whittled away by Government action. Out of the Piper Alpha tragedy, there is clear evidence of serious progress on safety brought about by the close working together of industry workers and trade unions, but the North sea is a dangerous place and we cannot be complacent. The memory of the fate of the workers on that night in July 1988 should spur us on to achieve and maintain a safe working environment for all workers.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Doran]

First, I thank all colleagues who have contributed to the debate. It is an important debate not only, as has been said, for those of us in the north-east who are in direct contact with the industry, but for those whose constituents work in the industry. Those workers come from all over the country and from many other countries. As everyone has recognised, it is a significant industry that makes a huge contribution to the Exchequer.

Two thoughts occur to me. First, it is always helpful to have a debate about the reality of health and safety and the consequences for those who work in any industry of poor safety systems, a lack of safety systems, or poor management of safety systems. We have been talking about the awful reality in, yes, an admittedly extreme case. Away from the cauldron of party and ideological differences, we have made the important point that health and safety is fundamental, as Bob Keiller said and as many others involved in the North sea are recognising, as are, I hope, people throughout the country.

Secondly, my right hon. Friend the Member for Stirling (Mrs McGuire) reminded me of Gavin Cleland, whose son tragically died in the incident. I first met Gavin in the Shadow Cabinet Room after it happened. He was part of a group I had brought down to London because they wanted to meet the various politicians involved, including the then Secretary of State for Energy. One of Gavin’s ambitions was to campaign for a prosecution, because that is one of the key things that is missing from the case. Despite all the evidence in the Cullen report and everywhere else, there was no prosecution. I am not calling for a prosecution at this stage, but at a time when many historical cases are being looked at in retrospect, such as Hillsborough and events in Northern Ireland, re-examining the Piper Alpha case is worth considering. What holds me back, however, is the fact that that might be difficult for a lot of those who were involved, especially the survivors and the families—