Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:

To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, with reference to his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026, (a) who wrote the document and (b) whether AI technology was involved.

Answered by Sharon Hodgson - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

• has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;
• is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;
• is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and
• requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:

To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, with reference to his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026, for what reason the strategy does not include modelling.

Answered by Sharon Hodgson - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

• has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;
• is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;
• is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and
• requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:

To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, with reference to his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026, how the word pandemic is defined.

Answered by Sharon Hodgson - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

• has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;
• is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;
• is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and
• requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:

To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, when his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026, was written.

Answered by Sharon Hodgson - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

• has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;
• is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;
• is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and
• requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:

To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, with reference to his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026, what type of pathogens the strategy is concerned with.

Answered by Sharon Hodgson - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

• has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;
• is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;
• is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and
• requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:

To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, whether he considered including hospital-acquired infections in his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026.

Answered by Sharon Hodgson - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

• has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;
• is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;
• is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and
• requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:

To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, pursuant to the Answer of 5 March 2026 to Question 118172 on Folic Acid, for what reason people with (a) stents and (b) having kidney dialysis have been removed from the NHS list of people who cannot take folic acid.

Answered by Sharon Hodgson - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)

The information on folic acid was shortened and simplified as part of the process of redesigning medicines information on the NHS website. The NHS website sets out that before taking folic acid, patients, which includes those with stents or receiving kidney dialysis, should tell their doctor if they have any medical conditions. It also advises patients to check the information provided in the leaflet that comes with their medicine or contact a health professional to ensure that the medicine is suitable for them.

Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:

To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what is the current (a) position title, (b) post and (c) duties of the interim Chief Executive Officer of the Information Commissioner's Office.

Answered by Ian Murray - Minister of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)

The Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 established the Information Commission, a new body corporate that will assume the ICO's regulatory functions to become the UK's independent data protection regulator. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) and the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) are working closely on this transition, and while a date for it has not yet been set, work is well advanced.

The Information Commission will be led by a chair, chief executive, and other non-executive and executive members with shared decision-making responsibility. The new Board will be appointed as part of the transition process.

For clarity, there is no role titled “interim Chief Executive Officer of the Information Commissioner’s Office”. Following an open competition run by the ICO in March 2025, Paul Arnold was appointed as Interim Chief Executive of the Information Commission, a position which he will formally assume when the transition to the Information Commission takes place. He may serve in that role for a period of up to two years, after which time a recruitment process will be undertaken to fill the role on a permanent basis.

The Data (Use and Access) Act provides that the permanent Chief Executive will be appointed through open and fair competition by the Commission's non-executive members, in consultation with the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology.

Paul Arnold is currently serving as Interim Chief Executive Designate of the Information Commission, alongside his Deputy Commissioner responsibilities at the ICO. In his interim CEO designate role, Paul is leading and overseeing the transition to the new Information Commission. As for the use of titles, this, like other day-to-day operational matters, is a question for the independent regulator. I expect the ICO may have used "CEO" for brevity, but that would be for them to confirm.

Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:

To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what is the process by which a permanent Chief Executive Officer of the Information Commissioner's Office will be selected and appointed.

Answered by Ian Murray - Minister of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)

The Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 established the Information Commission, a new body corporate that will assume the ICO's regulatory functions to become the UK's independent data protection regulator. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) and the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) are working closely on this transition, and while a date for it has not yet been set, work is well advanced.

The Information Commission will be led by a chair, chief executive, and other non-executive and executive members with shared decision-making responsibility. The new Board will be appointed as part of the transition process.

For clarity, there is no role titled “interim Chief Executive Officer of the Information Commissioner’s Office”. Following an open competition run by the ICO in March 2025, Paul Arnold was appointed as Interim Chief Executive of the Information Commission, a position which he will formally assume when the transition to the Information Commission takes place. He may serve in that role for a period of up to two years, after which time a recruitment process will be undertaken to fill the role on a permanent basis.

The Data (Use and Access) Act provides that the permanent Chief Executive will be appointed through open and fair competition by the Commission's non-executive members, in consultation with the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology.

Paul Arnold is currently serving as Interim Chief Executive Designate of the Information Commission, alongside his Deputy Commissioner responsibilities at the ICO. In his interim CEO designate role, Paul is leading and overseeing the transition to the new Information Commission. As for the use of titles, this, like other day-to-day operational matters, is a question for the independent regulator. I expect the ICO may have used "CEO" for brevity, but that would be for them to confirm.

Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:

To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, how long does the current interim Chief Executive Officer post for the Information Commissioner's Office last.

Answered by Ian Murray - Minister of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)

The Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 established the Information Commission, a new body corporate that will assume the ICO's regulatory functions to become the UK's independent data protection regulator. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) and the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) are working closely on this transition, and while a date for it has not yet been set, work is well advanced.

The Information Commission will be led by a chair, chief executive, and other non-executive and executive members with shared decision-making responsibility. The new Board will be appointed as part of the transition process.

For clarity, there is no role titled “interim Chief Executive Officer of the Information Commissioner’s Office”. Following an open competition run by the ICO in March 2025, Paul Arnold was appointed as Interim Chief Executive of the Information Commission, a position which he will formally assume when the transition to the Information Commission takes place. He may serve in that role for a period of up to two years, after which time a recruitment process will be undertaken to fill the role on a permanent basis.

The Data (Use and Access) Act provides that the permanent Chief Executive will be appointed through open and fair competition by the Commission's non-executive members, in consultation with the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology.

Paul Arnold is currently serving as Interim Chief Executive Designate of the Information Commission, alongside his Deputy Commissioner responsibilities at the ICO. In his interim CEO designate role, Paul is leading and overseeing the transition to the new Information Commission. As for the use of titles, this, like other day-to-day operational matters, is a question for the independent regulator. I expect the ICO may have used "CEO" for brevity, but that would be for them to confirm.

Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:

To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, why the interim Chief Executive Officer is referring to himself as Chief Executive Officer of the Information Commissioner's Office.

Answered by Ian Murray - Minister of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)

The Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 established the Information Commission, a new body corporate that will assume the ICO's regulatory functions to become the UK's independent data protection regulator. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) and the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) are working closely on this transition, and while a date for it has not yet been set, work is well advanced.

The Information Commission will be led by a chair, chief executive, and other non-executive and executive members with shared decision-making responsibility. The new Board will be appointed as part of the transition process.

For clarity, there is no role titled “interim Chief Executive Officer of the Information Commissioner’s Office”. Following an open competition run by the ICO in March 2025, Paul Arnold was appointed as Interim Chief Executive of the Information Commission, a position which he will formally assume when the transition to the Information Commission takes place. He may serve in that role for a period of up to two years, after which time a recruitment process will be undertaken to fill the role on a permanent basis.

The Data (Use and Access) Act provides that the permanent Chief Executive will be appointed through open and fair competition by the Commission's non-executive members, in consultation with the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology.

Paul Arnold is currently serving as Interim Chief Executive Designate of the Information Commission, alongside his Deputy Commissioner responsibilities at the ICO. In his interim CEO designate role, Paul is leading and overseeing the transition to the new Information Commission. As for the use of titles, this, like other day-to-day operational matters, is a question for the independent regulator. I expect the ICO may have used "CEO" for brevity, but that would be for them to confirm.

Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:

To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, when the new board for the Information Commissioner's Office will be put in place.

Answered by Ian Murray - Minister of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)

The Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 established the Information Commission, a new body corporate that will assume the ICO's regulatory functions to become the UK's independent data protection regulator. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) and the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) are working closely on this transition, and while a date for it has not yet been set, work is well advanced.

The Information Commission will be led by a chair, chief executive, and other non-executive and executive members with shared decision-making responsibility. The new Board will be appointed as part of the transition process.

For clarity, there is no role titled “interim Chief Executive Officer of the Information Commissioner’s Office”. Following an open competition run by the ICO in March 2025, Paul Arnold was appointed as Interim Chief Executive of the Information Commission, a position which he will formally assume when the transition to the Information Commission takes place. He may serve in that role for a period of up to two years, after which time a recruitment process will be undertaken to fill the role on a permanent basis.

The Data (Use and Access) Act provides that the permanent Chief Executive will be appointed through open and fair competition by the Commission's non-executive members, in consultation with the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology.

Paul Arnold is currently serving as Interim Chief Executive Designate of the Information Commission, alongside his Deputy Commissioner responsibilities at the ICO. In his interim CEO designate role, Paul is leading and overseeing the transition to the new Information Commission. As for the use of titles, this, like other day-to-day operational matters, is a question for the independent regulator. I expect the ICO may have used "CEO" for brevity, but that would be for them to confirm.

Question to the Ministry of Justice:

To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, what the a) average, b) shortest and c) longest time taken is to settle a civil claim for injury from the letter of the claim to the settlement outcome i) pre-and ii) post-covid.

Answered by Sarah Sackman - Minister of State (Ministry of Justice)

Neither the Ministry of Justice or HM Courts and Tribunal Services hold data on the time taken to settle a civil claim for injury from the letter of claim to the settlement outcome pre - or post-Covid.

The Ministry of Justice does publish Civil Justice Statistics quarterly which includes details of the number of trials and the average time (mean/median) from claim issue to trial. It is important to note that the vast majority of civil cases are settled before reaching trial and of those that do (approx. 3%), the time that parties take to come to trial is not solely in the control of the courts. That said, the latest data for January to March 2026 show that the median time taken for small claims to go to trial was 5.1 weeks faster than the same period in 2025 and for the fast/intermediate/multi track claims to go to trial was 10.7 weeks faster than the same period last year. These statistics can be found at: Civil justice statistics quarterly: January to March 2026 - GOV.UK. Statistics covering previous quarters can be found within the main tables of this publication.

Question to the Department for Work and Pensions:

To ask the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, what estimate he has made of the average cost to the public purse of households in receipt of benefits made up of (a) 1 husband and 2 wives in a polygamous marriage and 6 children, (b) 1 husband and 2 wives in a polygamous marriage and 4 children, (c) 1 husband, 1 wife and 3 children, (d) a single parent with 3 children, (e) 1 husband, 1 wife and 2 children, and (f) a single parent with 2 children.

Answered by Stephen Timms - Minister of State (Department for Work and Pensions)

I refer the Rt. Hon. Member to the answer I gave on 9 June 2026 to Question UIN 4348.