Mandatory Digital ID

Emily Darlington Excerpts

Tuesday 21st October 2025 Westminster Hall

[Jo White (Bassetlaw) (Lab)]

Thank you, Mr Turner. Wow, that is a big announcement!

Just over a month ago I visited Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, a country that has been using digital ID for 30 years and a country we can learn from—how it works, how it reaches the digitally excluded and how it protects people’s security. What struck me most was that everyone I spoke to said the same thing: with digital ID, they know exactly what information the Government hold on them, and most importantly, they know who has looked at it and why.

That level of transparency and personal control should be the gold standard, but here it often feels the opposite: social media giants and private companies know more about us than we realise—often more, I would say, than our nearest and dearest. We need to have absolute control.

[Emily Darlington (Milton Keynes Central) (Lab)]

It is interesting that my hon. Friend talks about the Estonian experience, as I often hear my constituents’ frustration that they do not know what the Government are doing with their data, and how they even have trouble accessing it. Does my hon. Friend think that a scheme like Estonia’s would help the citizen to be in charge?

[Jo White]

I totally agree with my hon. Friend.

From the moment we are born, the state begins to gather data: our birth is registered; the NHS stores our health records; we are issued with national insurance and NHS numbers; and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs tracks us. By having a digital ID, we can see the information the state holds on us, who has been accessing it and why. We can even determine that other people cannot see our data. It is about us having control over our own data.

It is also about security, because the way it is divided and split up means there is absolute security as nobody can see data from one Department to another. It is about people having personal control, which is what people in my constituency are calling for.

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[Emily Darlington (Milton Keynes Central) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. For reasons of timing, I will not repeat what my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (Jo White) said about the important change in the relationship between citizen and state that could come from digital ID—putting the citizen in charge rather than the state knowing too much about us without our knowing what they know.

However, there is another reason why we might want a free, digital, Government-backed ID: £11 billion is lost each year to fraud, and ID theft costs us about £2 billion a year. People need to prove who they are at each and every moment. For too many people, that involves a passport or driver’s licence, which is not affordable for many. Having an ID that allows us to prove who we are could be more secure. We will also need it to show that we can work—there has been a 40% increase in illegal working—and to prove our age, including for the big changes made by the Online Safety Act 2023.

[Peter Swallow (Bracknell) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend raises the Online Safety Act. Some of my constituents have raised concerns about identity checks to access material online. Would it not have been far easier to prove one’s age online safely and securely if we already had a digital ID, and would that not have helped us to introduce safer checks online?

[Emily Darlington]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. All the complaints I have received are about people giving their information to third-party verifiers. If they had a free, digital, Government-backed ID, they could have proved their age to access any over-18 content. People are also concerned that those who should not be accessing the NHS are doing so. The reality is that if there were a Government-backed digital ID, it would be clear whether a person can access the NHS.

I have come up with a list that debunks what the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire (Pete Wishart) said, and I am happy to pass it to him afterwards. I think we need to add a few scientific facts, but I do not have time.

[Jo White]

I would like to hear some of my hon. Friend’s list, please.

[Emily Darlington]

I am happy to go through it. First, it is not about centralising data. Rather, digital ID allows the citizen to access federated data. The data stays in the individual Departments; it does not stay on a card—this is not about a card. Digital ID adds a level of security to Government datasets. There is no travel or location data. There is no access to external providers. It uses sovereign tech that allows citizens to know what the Government hold and who is accessing it. There is no new data that the Government do not already hold, and a single login is actually better for a person to prove who they are with a digital ID.

[David Davis]

Why do the Government’s cyber experts disagree?

[Emily Darlington]

I think the right hon. Member will find there is a split in the community because there is a lack of detail.

[David Davis]

No.

[Emily Darlington]

I agree, but there is a lack of detail. When we are at the beginning of the conversation and going out to consultation, which is exactly what we are doing, we have to ask the public what they want. Do they want either of the two scenarios that my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw and I presented, or do they not want access to their Government data in a way that enables them to know what is happening, and so that they can prove who they are without having to pay for a passport or driver’s licence?

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[Iqbal Mohamed (Dewsbury and Batley) (Ind)]

I thank the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire (Pete Wishart) for securing this debate. This is one of the most controversial and divisive issues currently supported by the Government, who have form. I am here on behalf of my constituents, as nearly 100 have written to me opposing the scheme, and nearly 4,000 have signed the e-petition.

We have heard the risks and the issues around data privacy, surveillance culture, user profiling, exclusion, focus creep and scope creep. Having worked in the IT industry for over 20 years, as well as in the cyber-security industry, I can say that there is no safe system at the moment. Relying on third-party software, owned by foreign states or companies—

[Emily Darlington]

Is the hon. Member aware of the Government’s statements that the system would be held internally and use sovereign tech?

[Iqbal Mohamed]

I am, but that will not solve the issue.