Representation of the People Bill (Second sitting)

Ellie Chowns Excerpts

Wednesday 18th March 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I will use the last minute to squeeze Dr Chowns in.

[Dr Ellie Chowns (North Herefordshire) (Green)]

Q You both mentioned disinformation. Do you think the Bill does enough to tackle disinformation? Are there additional measures that are not yet in the Bill that you would welcome—for example, a real-time repository of online adverts, or further measures to tackle online disinformation? I am open to your suggestions.

Harriet Andrews: For me, part of that democratic education piece would include support for young people to engage with disinformation. A really important part of preparing them is preparing them to engage with that work on disinformation. Also, as I said at the very beginning, we need to think about where the sources of information for young people are. I worry that if we focus too much on just, “We need young people to be educated about how to engage with disinformation,” and we do not try to create places they can go to that are trusted sources of information, we are putting a huge amount of pressure on young people to deal with a really complicated information landscape.

[The Chair]

You have 20 seconds, Dr Mycock.

Andy Mycock: I would think very strongly about how political parties can play their role in terms of connecting with young people. Young people’s membership of political parties is at an all-time low, as it is in trade unions and other organisations. The fact that you are engaging is commendable, but political parties need to do much more.

Those who are opposed to votes at 16 need to think about the unequal situation where young people in Scotland and Wales now have voting rights that young people in England and Northern Ireland do not. If the argument is about citizenship, there is an inequality with the voting age being 18 for the majority, but not for others. Moreover, there is a need for—

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[Zöe Franklin]

Q Can I go on to the issue of online attacks on candidates, their families and people involved in elections? Social media platforms play a massive role in the distribution of things like misinformation, disinformation and deepfakes. Is there more that the Bill could do to put a requirement on social media platforms to act more swiftly to address those issues?

Chris Morris: My one-word answer is yes, but let me explain it in various ways.

Broadly speaking, it is not unreasonable for us to ask the most powerful companies in the world—who have enormous power over our information environment and, therefore, increasingly over how everyone in this country gets information—to take on a more responsible attitude, some of which we believe should be made statutory.

As part of media and political literacy campaigns, for example, there could be education about why harassing candidates is not a good thing to do. Some of that behaviour comes from ignorance, and from people seeing how others behave on social media.

One of the recommendations we have made, and it is in our written statement, is that there should be a statutory obligation for the big tech companies, the online platforms, to make sure they are fully involved in media and political literacy campaigns. They do some good things, but we have to recognise, and we have to be realistic, that in the end their bottom line is their share price. Regulating how information flows is difficult. At the moment, we are essentially allowing them to regulate themselves, and I think sensible regulation of these companies—we know there will be howls of protest—is exactly what the Members of this House should be doing.

Azzurra Moores: Maybe I can quickly explain why we have gone for such a narrow scope in our recommendation on deepfakes. We recognise that deepfakes are a really complicated topic to regulate, and they need something far bigger than an elections Bill to regulate. Really, wholesale AI regulation is needed.

While the section 106 recommendation does not put new requirements on platforms, it starts to test the bounds on how you would regulate political deepfakes, which we appreciate is a really complicated topic. It is a slow and steady approach to amending legislation, rather than coming in and making big mistakes straightaway. This would be a first step, but obviously there need to be conversations within Government about how we could go further on that as well.

[Dr Chowns]

Q Thank you both for your work. You have made a powerful case for the danger of not better regulating disinformation. Can you share any lessons observed from how other countries have perhaps done this better? We have talked about the proposal for a repository of digital adverts. We have talked about deepfake labelling. What about other forms of disinformation, such as bot campaigns?

Secondly, do you agree that we need to regulate not just during the regulated period but all year round, because disinformation has corrosive effects all year round? Thirdly, do you have any comments on the need for better enforcement of existing imprint laws? Finally, you referenced the Rycroft review, which of course covers only foreign interference. Are we paying enough attention to domestic disinformation?

Azzurra Moores: There were lots of good questions there. You ask what more could be done on bots. Chris raised a proposal to increase the Electoral Commission’s investigative powers. For those of you looking at the amendment paper, that is new clause 25 tabled by Emily Darlington.

Tackling bots is going to be really complicated, but we think a really important first step is to give the Electoral Commission investigative powers on the back end of platform data, to try to understand the scale and scope of the problem. Part of the reason we cannot do much more at the moment is that we have a real evidence gap—a real evidence deficit. We need to start giving our regulators, which are on the frontline, more ability to understand the scale of the problem. For us, that would be a first step.

I am intrigued to see what the Rycroft review publishes. Demos gave evidence to Rycroft, and we highlighted that foreign misinformation is obviously impacting our democracy, but so is domestic misinformation. We are waiting to see what he publishes before going further on that.

On international counterparts, we have recommended that this Government establish a critical election incident protocol, modelling what happens in Canada. It is quite a complicated protocol, and it is proposed in new clause 26, but essentially, if there was any interference with an election—if there was an information crisis that impacted the integrity of the election—there would be a published protocol on what officials would do to react to that.

We are a real outlier here in the UK, compared with the other Five Eyes nations, in not having a public protocol. We think this elections Bill is another really important opportunity to say, “We know there are vulnerabilities. We know there are risks. We need to establish transparent public protocols so that, should any of these interferences happen, we have a set of measures that mean we know how to react in that instance.”

[The Chair]

You have 10 seconds.

Chris Morris: To add to that, Full Fact first put forward the idea of a critical election incident protocol in 2022, and really nothing has been done. The problem we have is that there are plenty of people working on this behind the scenes—the joint election security preparedness unit and the defending democracy taskforce—but it is all very much being done in the shadows. This is not always a case of democracy dying in darkness; this is about democracy under threat in the bright blue backlit light of a million scrolling phones.

That is the scale of the challenge we are facing now. It is not just about making sure we have an electoral framework that is fit for purpose; it is about making sure that there is a public perception that it is fit for purpose. That is why the issue of transparency is so important. If there were to be a major information incident—by that, we mean in the last days of the campaign, clear evidence emerging of a concerted attempt to alter the course of the outcome of an election in some way or another—the more transparent and public the process is for revealing that, the better.

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[Lloyd Hatton]

Q I have a very quick final question, taking a step back and responding to what you have just said. You feel that in the current landscape no single law enforcement body has overarching responsibility for enforcement, and particularly enforcement of electoral finance laws. It feels a bit patchwork at the moment: sometimes it is the police; sometimes it is the commission. Do you feel that is something that we need to look at overhauling so that we can have a much more comprehensive response that works more robustly, and hopefully more swiftly, in response to the issues that you just mentioned?

Dr Susan Hawley: We really welcome the recommendation of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy—published today—that there should be a specific unit. I think that there is growing recognition within law enforcement bodies that that is required. Up to now, the problem has been that those law enforcement bodies will argue that they do not have the laws or the sentences that would empower them to use the serious investigative tools that they have at their disposal to get to the bottom of some of this behaviour. That is why the criminal offence in section 54 and section 54A really needs to be looked at. We welcome the amendment recently tabled by Matt Western to address the knowledge test so that it is not set too high.

We also need to look at sentences because we hear again and again from law enforcement that if you do not have a serious crime-level sentence, you cannot use the skills that you can deploy for serious crime for this kind of offending. If we are talking about foreign interference, those are the tools that need to be deployed against impermissible donations.

[Dr Chowns]

Q You have answered many of the questions that I had. Thank you all for your work. Briefly, do you have a view on where the cap on political donations should be, or how it should be set? That is a question for each of you. And should we have a cap on annual spending, to get away from the gaming of the system around regulated periods that Dr Power referred to? Where should it be set, and how?

Duncan Hames: We propose that a cap of £50,000 annually from any one donor is reached by 2030. That would still be much higher than in a number of other jurisdictions that have introduced donation caps, such as Canada, France, Italy and—from July—Australia. If it were phased in, with a cap reducing year by year between now and then, that would provide time for political parties to adapt.

We have done our own modelling, which I would be happy to share with the Committee, in which we look at the effect of that cap on overall party fundraising. I think you will find that, although we have recently had an arms race in campaign spending—not least because the spending limits were raised so dramatically just before the last general election—political parties fought all sorts of elections and referendums in the previous decade without needing anything near the kind of money that was available in the last general election, when nearly £100 million was spent.

Dr Power: I agree that we absolutely need a cap on donations. I am less wedded to a level as much as to the idea that there needs to be a cap that people can get around the table and agree to, and which seems fair. To not have a cap on donations risks much more than to have one. It is absolutely essential. We have seen the effect that can have in countries that do not have caps on donations, particularly the USA, and the effect that the very rich can then have.

What I mean by that is not an effect on the outcome of politics but an effect on the process of politics. You end up with about 400 individuals accounting for 75% of total party donations. Given that we are discussing the Representation of the People Bill, that is not a situation in which people are represented. It is essential that we find some way—in a Bill called “Representation of the People”—to fix the system properly such that the people feel represented. A cap on donations is essential and well within the remit of the Bill.

On a cap on spending, I align with the 1998 CSPL review, as well as Jack Straw when he introduced the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. He said that there has been an “arms race” in spending and that we should always set a spending limit below the extent to which we expect to spend at an election. Until 2023, that limit was set at £19.5 million, if you stood a candidate in every constituency, which does not happen. If we say that the limit was £19.5 million, that should have been the baseline, and there was no good justification for it to be uprated in 2023—in fact, I think there is a good case for bringing the limit down further still. It would not have an effect on the good that money does in a system, which is to enrich debate and to allow political parties to get their positions across.

[The Chair]

That brings us to the end of this panel. On behalf of the Committee, I thank all our witnesses for their evidence.

Examination of witness

Samantha Dixon MBE MP gave evidence.