Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Baroness Laing of Elderslie Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons & Carry-over motion & Carry-over motion: House of Commons & Money resolution & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion & Programme motion: House of Commons & Ways and Means resolution & Ways and Means resolution: House of Commons
Monday 30th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

The Government have acknowledged the need to protect critical communication infrastructure and that is welcome, particularly so as it comes on the heels of the National Security and Investment Bill. Telecoms provision is more important than ever. We have always lived in a data-rich world, but what has changed is how readily we access that data as the way in which we gather, exchange and distribute information has changed. I am left wondering whether T.S. Eliot was not right that wisdom is lost in information. Nevertheless, it is the world in which we live and that world means that the way in which we control or, if necessary, prohibit provision of that data, by which I mean the technology, the networks and those that supply and manage them, is critical to our security. To that end, this Bill is indeed, as the Intelligence and Security Committee was told, an important first step, but only that. We do need to look at other factors, to which I will draw the House’s attention in my brief contribution this evening.

Of course the main purpose of the Bill is to raise telecommunications security standards across the board by means of a new and more rigorous telecoms security framework, but the Bill also gives the Secretary of State particular powers to designate vendors of telecommunications equipment as a risk to national security. All dependence is, by definition, a risk, for dependence creates risk. Over-dependence means unsustainable risks and, in terms of national security and national interest, there are three kinds of risks: monopoly or near-monopoly provision; malevolence; and corporate failure.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. I hesitate to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, and it is for a very unusual reason. I just feel that I ought to point out to the House that, having exhorted the right hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Alun Cairns) to be rather more brief than he was going to be—though I have to say that he took only one minute longer than the eight minutes that Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton) had previously asked people to take—I should point out most unusually to the right hon. Gentleman who currently has the Floor that, as four of his colleagues who have immediately preceded him have spoken incredibly —I mean incredibly—briefly, the exhortation to take only eight minutes no longer applies, though I would not recommend taking no more than about 12 minutes.

[Sir John Hayes]

Not only is that typical of your generosity, Madam Deputy Speaker, but for me it is what amounts to nirvana, and for the House, something similar I hope.

All of those aspects of risk are mitigated by market diversification, but as we have heard from many speakers during this debate, this market is anything but diversified. The concentration of provision has exacerbated the very risk that this Bill seeks to deal with. It is vital that, as well as the taskforce, which we have heard the Minister has established, a strategy emerges on exactly how we are going to diversify this market, because competition not only counters dependence, but competitive pressure drives up innovation and quality. The telecoms supply chain review judged that, should the UK become dependent on a single vendor of telecoms equipment—particularly a high-risk vendor—it would pose a range of risks to the security and resilience of UK telecoms networks.

The issue of national dependence goes beyond high-risk vendors, however. The number of suppliers in the UK telecoms market—as we have heard repeatedly, currently Huawei, Ericsson and Nokia—is already critically low. While the security of the network can be improved by removing Huawei equipment, the wider problem of potential dependence will be exacerbated by the power to designate vendors and introduce directions unless there are new entrants to the market. We really need to hear from the Minister either in his wind-up or later, if he does not have time tonight, precisely when the diversification strategy will be brought to the House for consideration and what legislation will be necessary. I understand that a Bill may be forthcoming, following this one, to give life to that strategy.

My right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) emphasised that diversification is by far the best way to secure UK telecoms. The Government judged in their assessment that there is a global market failure in the telecoms market. While the Government will intervene to take the measures necessary and facilitated by the Bill, unless we grapple with that global failure, we will, I fear, come back to this House time and again and need to do more. As I said when we spoke a week or a two ago about the Bill that I just mentioned, I suspect that security considerations will increasingly feature in Government strategy and policy and that this House will need to debate security issues with much greater regularity than it has historically, given the dynamism that we now face.

I have spoken about market failure and the need for diversification. Let us speak about malevolence, because much has been said, of China in particular, and Russia has been mentioned too. There is no doubt that, as the Government have acknowledged, there are malevolent powers who seek by a variety of means to disrupt the lawful activities of this country and so endanger its citizenry by whatever method they deem most appropriate. We should not be naive about this and, frankly, for too long successive Governments were. This Bill is welcome but again, as my right hon. Friend mentioned, it has been a long time coming, given the warnings that were issued from the ISC and others.

Let me re-emphasise to the Government that we certainly need a diversification strategy urgently. We need the legislation that supports it but there are other matters, too, that I want to conclude with, Madam Deputy Speaker, despite your invitation to speak at appropriate—I will not say “excessive”— length. These questions are critical but not, in my judgment, designed in any way not to recognise the achievement of the Minister and the progress made by the Government.

When will the strategy come forward? I would like to hear about that as soon as possible. Given that the ISC raised this matter 18 months ago, I think we need a firm timeline and an assurance that there will be no more prevarication. My right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East is right that national security must be an overriding consideration in this field of work. In being deployed, the powers conferred by the Bill must, at heart, always gauge national security as predominant. How will that be determined? Threats are subtle and dynamic, and yet the means and methods by which the Department will both define national security and apply that definition through the provisions of the Bill to differing circumstances have not been made crystal clear. I am mindful that this is a Department for sport and culture without a security role apart from this one— perhaps more skiing than spying, and more existentialism than espionage. What specific processes, structures and procedures will the Department use to access the expertise of the National Cyber Security Centre and the wider intelligence community in designating vendors?

We heard earlier about the expertise, skills and resources of Ofcom, but given that the Bill gives new powers to Ofcom, how will it be held to account? I know that my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East would share my view—I have not discussed this with him so I am making that assumption—that Ofcom ought to be scrutinised by the Intelligence and Security Committee, given the particular nature of its new responsibilities: to proactively assess the security practices of larger telecoms providers; to take action where security is, or is at risk of, being compromised; and to make information available to and provide annual security reports to the Government.

Finally, will the Minister say more about related telecommunications challenges such as Russian involvement with undersea cables that carry comms data and the future security and resilience of satellite technology? The covid crisis emphasises the need to build resilience to risk. It can be done by making more of what we consume, and by recognising that in the fragility and imperfectability of our socioeconomic order, the market is no guarantor of wellbeing, so it must be shaped, guided and, where necessary, constrained by people with power for whom communal interest is the defining purpose. Those people with power are the Minister and others who govern and we here in this House who hold them to account.