EU Exit Preparations: Ferry Contracts

Edward Leigh Excerpts

Tuesday 5th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

Earlier, the hon. Gentleman said that the Secretary of State was being used as a human shield. Is he aware that many Conservative Members have considerable sympathy with the Secretary of State? We believe he has been urging his colleagues for the past two years to undertake contingency planning for no deal but was frustrated by other people, perhaps in the Cabinet, who did not want to do that. If mistakes are to be made because these decisions have been taken at the last moment, it is not the fault of the Secretary of State, but he is too much of a gentleman to argue that in his own defence.

[Andy McDonald]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for that revealing clarification about the obvious chaos that the Government are in over these important issues. They do not speak with a concerted and singular voice, and people are falling out with each other left, right and centre. That comes as no surprise to me whatsoever.

--- Later in debate ---

[Charlie Elphicke]

I do not represent the tunnel, which is in Folkestone and Hythe; I represent Dover. However, I have been keen to press the Secretary of State to ensure that Dover receives similar investment and that it does not lose out, and I look forward to his confirmation that that will be the case.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

Away from the party games, we all know that the problems in the British transport system are so intractable that any Secretary of State would face them. Many Conservative Members think that if the rest of the Cabinet had listened to my right hon. Friend the Transport Secretary two years ago and started no-deal planning at the time, not only would the EU have taken us seriously and offered a much better deal, but we would not have made the mistakes that have clearly been made. It is not the Transport Secretary’s fault.

[Charlie Elphicke]

I thank my hon. Friend for making exactly the point that I am coming to. I set out how we needed to invest to be ready on day one, deal or no deal; as I argued at the time, to get the best negotiation, we needed to be able to get up and walk away from the table. I also set out detailed legal reasons why we did not owe any of the divorce bill—another point that was important to our negotiation.

The Government as a whole—the Cabinet—decided not to spend money at that time. The Cabinet decided not to invest at that time. The Cabinet decided not to take forward contingency planning at a substantial level until after the Chequers discussions. To visit that on the Secretary of State would not be fair, right or proper.