Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Edward Argar Excerpts

Thursday 5th February 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Laurence Turner]

If I have understood the hon. Member’s point correctly, the key is openness and transparency. We need some degree of understanding that, if GBR itself is responsible for delays, that information should be recorded so that improvements can be made. I am not convinced that GBR paying money to itself in a legal or quasi-legal process is the best use of public resources.

That transparency is lacking under the current system. The Delay Attribution Board does not publish any records of its proceedings. Some months ago, I made a freedom of information request for the minutes of the board, and the response was that they were too commercially confidential to disclose. Given the vast amounts of public money that are spent through this process at the moment, I think that is a severe limitation of the current system. This is a real opportunity to do things better.

[Edward Argar (Melton and Syston) (Con)]

I will not get into whether a peacock or a pheasant is a large or small bird—it takes me back to my days as a Health Minister, when we had a debate about whether a scotch egg is a substantial meal in the context of the regulations. However, my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon made a very valid point: even if the money is going back to GBR, there needs to be some degree of transparency so that it can be seen where the attribution is, whether it is GBR that has caused the problem, and whether it is improving or going backwards. Does the hon. Member agree that, even if actual cash is not transferred in and out, a notional payment or a schedule of payments that would have been paid should be published to give the travelling public transparency as to where the challenges lie and give GBR an incentive to improve its game?

[Laurence Turner]

I think I agree with at least most of what the right hon. Gentleman says. The issue is whether actual payments are made, but we questioned the noble Lord Hendy in the Transport Committee on this matter, and he agreed that there needs to be some data accountability where there are delays.

I am sorry to detain the Committee on this matter. As is sometimes said, man is born free and everywhere he is in trains—I just wanted to get that one on the record. I thank Committee members for their time.

[Keir Mather]

How can I top that? I am not going to try.

This group of amendments concerns performance schemes, which, as hon. Members are aware, are designed to improve the performance of the railway network by incentivising operators and infrastructure managers to enhance punctuality, reliability and overall service quality, underpinned by compensation, bonuses and penalties. For example, performance schemes can require operators to pay penalties if their services cause unplanned disruption, or can offer bonuses for better-than-planned performance.

The performance scheme provided for by clause 65 will apply to GBR itself, both in its capacity as a service operator and as the body responsible for maintaining the infrastructure. The clause supports one of the overall goals of the Bill: to dramatically improve service performance for passengers and freight operators, and to make a railway that really works.

I thank hon. Members for their amendments, which I will speak to in turn. Amendment 85 seeks to remove the provision that protects GBR for liability for performance scheme payments or penalties where the disruption is not its fault. To be clear, that provision is not designed to prevent GBR from ever paying penalties or compensation. Clause 65(2) clearly provides for GBR to pay penalties, compensation and bonuses. Where it is at fault for disruption, there is no question but that it must compensate other operators.

GBR will have the flexibility to design a bespoke performance scheme for its network. The Bill is intentionally broad, including at clause 65(3)(b), which does not define what constitutes disruption outside GBR’s control. Instead, GBR will consult the industry on its policy on the extent to which disruption after an unplanned event has occurred, and whether it is or is not outside GBR’s control. It will consider any legal requirements before publishing all agreed terms for transparency.

[Edward Argar]

The Minister says that GBR will be able to design a bespoke performance regime, but does that not go to the heart of what my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon highlighted, which is essentially that it will be designing a performance regime against which its own performance will be managed? It gets to set the rules, determine what the parameters are, and then decide whether it meets those criteria. Subsection (7) says:

“A person aggrieved by provision contained in a scheme…may appeal to the ORR.”

Will the ORR have binding powers to make an adjudication, and will GBR be compelled to follow it?

[Keir Mather]

The right hon. Gentleman pre-empts my later comments about the role of the ORR in this process.

On the principle of whether GBR should be able to design a performance scheme for its own network, that is completely in keeping with the aspiration of the Bill to create a single uniting mind for the railway. We are cognisant of the fact that GBR has a threefold obligation in this process. First, it must create a scheme that it can use to deliver the efficiencies and operational realities of the railway in a way that suits the interests of the travelling public. Secondly, operators that use the service need to be able to ensure that they can have fair service under it. That is why consulting with the industry is so important.

Thirdly, and arguably most importantly, GBR must protect taxpayers’ interests where it is reasonable to do so. A scheme is being created that directs GBR to run the railway in a purposeful way but with robust consultation and enforcement mechanisms, which I will come to in a moment, embedded within it. I believe that strikes the right balance. We are giving GBR control over the system but not allowing it to mark its own homework in every way, as the Opposition might see it. I will go into that in more detail in a moment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Mather]

Clause 67 provides a route of appeal to the ORR for a person aggrieved by a GBR decision about access, capacity allocation and charging, including decisions made under those schemes. Clause 68 then sets out the principles for how appeals to the ORR will operate and empowers the ORR to issue a document setting out the detailed practice and procedure to be followed. Together the clauses establish the ORR’s reformed and independent appeals role, providing a clear, credible and accessible route of redress against GBR’s access and charging decisions.

Opposition Members have consistently raised the view that basing the appeals role on judicial review principles is not strong enough. However, the rationale for the ORR deciding appeals based on judicial review principles is simple: we do not want the ORR to opine on best use. That is GBR’s job and if the ORR could simply disagree with GBR because it had a different opinion, we would be leaving the system as it is today, with parallel decision makers and unclear accountability. We would not gain the benefits of a body that is truly in charge of rail. That is precisely how we ended up with mistakes like the recent 7 am Manchester service that was set to travel with no passengers on it. The ORR admitted it did not have the adequate information or resource needed to make an informed decision on the operation of that service. That is exactly why we need a consolidated directing mind for the industry that can take decisions confidently and with passengers and freight users at its heart.

Basing the appeals system on judicial review principles ensures that appeals are considered independently and on a recognised basis of fairness, legality and rationality, and without the fragmentation of decision making that plagues the current system. The appeals process will provide a robust accountability framework to ensure the railway delivers for passengers and freight customers. It is not judicial review principles that are weak; perhaps the hon. Member for South West Devon would suggest it is the powers available to the ORR to act on any wrongdoing that are flawed. I will turn to that next.

[Edward Argar]

Does the Minister not see the challenge that if GBR is the single directing mind, we need to ask how it is held to account for individual decisions that it makes? Where is its accountability to the public, be it through this place or others? Secondly, the Minister talks about judicial review principles. As constituency Members of Parliament, we all know just how high that judicial review bar is when people wish to challenge a planning decision, or something else. It cannot consider the individual merits of the decision, merely how it has been reached and whether due process has been followed. It is also incredibly costly. Is the Minister not concerned that in setting these principles, he is setting that bar at an unattainably high level, rather than striking the appropriate balance between being able to appeal and challenge something, but not unduly burdening the day-to-day decision making of the railways?

[Keir Mather]

I thank the right hon. Member for that contribution, because he gets to the nub of the principles. GBR will be held accountable through compliance with its duties as set out in legislation, which ensures that it has to have regard to passengers, including passengers with disabilities, and regard to the need to promote rail freight. It also has public law accountability built into it, through its legal obligation to act in a manner that is transparent and fair. The right hon. Member asks a broader question about whether the JR principles threshold is too high. We would argue it is not too high, precisely because of what it unlocks if we get to the stage where an appeal is upheld.

The ORR will have strong powers to dismiss the appeal or remit the decision to GBR for reconsideration, with legally binding directions that GBR cannot ignore. It is right and it is the stated principle both of the policy and of the overall notion of nationalisation that GBR can be a directing mind for the railway and have the power to do so, but there is a strong buttress against it if it is found that it has acted incorrectly as a matter of law.