Local Government Finance Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateEarl of Lytton
Main Page: Earl of Lytton (Crossbench - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Earl of Lytton's debates with the Department for Transport
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeI am grateful to the noble Lord for giving me an opportunity to explain. I referred a few moments ago to the number of amendments tabled on the first part of the Bill that would make quite substantial changes, particularly about the division between the central and local shares of business rates revenue. That would be a change that, if my noble friend Lady Hanham could persuade her colleagues that it might be accepted, would go a long way towards meeting the concerns not only of London Councils but of the Local Government Association and local authorities generally, which are anxious to see a faster process of the localisation of business rates revenue. I will no doubt have an opportunity to talk about this a little later, but I do not think that the questions of timing and of the changes that we are proposing are in any way inconsistent. As my noble friend Lord Tope said, there would be some regret if this were to be delayed. I think that both he and I were making that point. Perhaps that is a way of explaining to and satisfying the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, that there is no inconsistency in what we were arguing.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, made a perfectly correct reference to some comments that I put to him. Indeed, I have made comments in the context of this Bill before. Before I go any further, I ought to declare various interests: as a practising chartered surveyor, a member of the Rating Surveyors’ Association and a member of the Institute of Revenues, Rating and Valuation, which explains my interest in the valuation aspects of business rates.
There is a growing issue that creates a greater than usual level of uncertainty with regard to the yield of business rates. I referred previously to the number of outstanding non-domestic rating appeals. I believe that the current total is around 144,000 or 146,000. Even if you get rid of the repetitious ones, the true total probably sits at around slightly more than that—so, 80,000 or 90,000 appeals. Some of these go back to the 2005 rating list.
Business rate payers are getting increasingly concerned that access to justice is effectively being denied to them. A typical lead-in period from the time when an appeal is lodged to the time when the Valuation Office Agency is able to make any sort of substantive comment, I am advised, is in the order of two years—and that is not to the time when it actually gets before the valuation tribunal, when the valuation officer can actually open his book and address the issue. I do not blame the Valuation Office Agency for that. I think that the Committee should be aware that this is fundamentally to do with the agency being starved of the necessary resources. It is being starved of the personnel and starved of the resources to upgrade its computer technology; its computers do not interleave with the valuation tribunal’s computers, and so on and so forth.
Businessmen are particularly concerned because the non-domestic multiplier—that is, the multiplier that is applied to the rateable value in order to provide, as it were, the gross amount of the rates payable before transitional relief and other things—contains an element for potential losses to the tax base arising from successful appeals. So businesses up and down the country are bearing the cost of this contingent risk factor which is implicit in the fact that we are dealing with a system that is lacking in the necessary resources.
My point in raising this on Second Reading was to outline that this is the nature of the animal that is about to be bestowed—or, rather, its risks are about to be bestowed—on to billing authorities. I think that this needs to be addressed. I do not know how this relates to whether the Bill should be brought into force in 2013 or subsequently—I make no comment about that. I just say that there is an in-principle issue about the maintenance and management of the tax base that, if you do not get it right, will be in the nature of passing the buck, an issue that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, raised on Second Reading. This is a risk factor. I think that it would be entirely wrong, although— I declare another interest as president of the National Association of Local Councils—that does not make me unaware of the risks that are being imposed on the principal authorities, which are represented here by their president, my noble friend Lord Best. I think that it is right that, when we are dealing with these matters of principle, we actually address them at this stage. This is part of the tapestry—the backdrop—over which an awful lot of the other bits that we discuss will have to be viewed.
My Lords, I thank everybody who has contributed. I particularly thank my noble friends Lord Tope and Lord Jenkin, who have broadly said what I will say. I do not think that local government really wants us not to proceed at this stage. This has been in the offing for some time; people are well aware of what is coming about and there have been many discussions with them. Therefore, the suggestion that local government will not be able to implement the rates retention system from 2013 is not correct. Local government will have all the information that it needs to implement the rates and retention scheme effectively, before it has to do so. We will be publishing draft regulations before Report in October. Other information in terms of consultation of the technical detail of the scheme is going to be available over the summer and there will be draft secondary legislation in the autumn before the draft local government finance report is due. Therefore, by autumn, all the information necessary for the implementation of the business rates scheme will be out, even if some of it is in draft. Other information will then be available tying in to the local government finance report, which has to be laid, as it is part of the whole system.
The noble Earl, Lord Lytton, has raised a question that I hope we may defer, because he has tabled a major amendment about it for later in the debate. Indeed, some of the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, are also the subject of amendments. We might have a better opportunity to discuss them later. While I understand the noble Earl’s views that this is, or should be, part and parcel of the scheme, we think that that could and should be dealt with separately. As I said, we will come to points on appeals later on, but in setting up the retentions system we will make an adjustment to reflect the cost to local government of outstanding and future appeals, so there will be some amelioration.
We have worked pretty collaboratively with local government throughout the development of these proposals. In March 2011, we published the terms of reference of the local government resource review and in doing so we clearly set out the aims and the scope of our proposed reforms, as well as the timetable for implementation. We have since consulted local government on numerous occasions. In July 2011, we published a consultation on the design of the rates retention scheme and, in August 2011, we published a further eight technical papers to provide more details on these proposals.
We have listened to what local government has said. This was evident in our response to the consultation published in December 2011 and, indeed, that consultation continues today. The Bill that we are debating is the product of this attentive engagement and consultation. It has, of course, received pretty considerable scrutiny—perhaps unlike the Localism Bill—in the other place and there has been a gap since then for people to think about it and to ask for any information that they do not have.
We will continue to work with local government as we proceed. First, there is our working group made up of local government representatives, including the LGA, which is contributing to the policy and technical debate for the information that will be coming out shortly. There is a further consultation later this month on the technical details underpinning the scheme. There is plenty going on still to shape the legislation going forward.
In terms of our approach to the implementation, we believe firmly that the existing timetable should be adhered to. Before the new rates retention scheme is introduced in April 2013, local authorities will be consulted on their baseline funding before the end of this year, and after a debate in the other place they will receive their final settlement in early 2013. That follows the normal practice that has existed for years. I can remember discussions on local government finance taking place: we always thought that it was a bit tight, but it has always been at the end of the year, sometimes in December. That will be there. This means that the timescale for agreeing baseline funding in advance of April 2013 will be the same as happens currently for the first year of a multi-year settlement. Local authorities will be able to use that information to inform their local budget setting in a timely manner, as they always have done.
I strongly believe that we should be able to implement the rates retention scheme from 1 April and that it is desirable to do so, because local government is expecting it. Moreover, the Bill contains provisions to amend the date of introduction to a subsequent financial year should this be absolutely necessary, although I do not think that noble Lords should hang on to the coat-tails of that. It seems inevitable that such a clause would be included in legislation; there often are clauses in case the absolutely extreme happens. I do not expect the extreme to happen over business rates; I expect them to be implemented by 2013 for all the reasons that I have given noble Lords about the consultation, the discussions and the information that has been presented. Broadly, unless there are major changes to the draft regulations—and I suspect that, even if there were changes, we would be able to cope with them—we will be able to proceed as I propose and get there satisfactorily by the beginning of the next financial year.
For all those reasons, I reject the amendments. I am conscious that I have not commented on the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Smith, but perhaps I can pick up those points later.
I will accept the reverence. My noble kinsman was, like my noble friend, Chief Secretary to the Treasury. In fact, he was the first, so he was allowed by Harold Macmillan to invent the title. In those days, the UGC of semi-beloved memory was a Treasury function for which my noble kinsman was responsible. Two decades later, I became Higher Education Minister. When I entered office, the hand of the Treasury was still in evidence in relation to higher education institutions, particularly in relation to the disposal of assets. If a higher education institution disposed of an asset, it had to hand back to the Treasury the entire financial fruit of its decision to so dispose. I was Higher Education Minister for two and a half years. About halfway through that period I persuaded the Treasury that its policy was not conducive to higher education institutions disposing of assets and it allowed higher education institutions to retain 50% of the assets they sold—a percentage that is germane to today’s debate. Before I left office the Treasury had come round—although it did not execute it until just after I left office—to letting higher education institutions have the whole lot. I say this simply to encourage not only the rest of the Grand Committee but even conceivably the Minister that it may be possible that concessions may be made at some stage in the future.
My Lords, I apologise to the Minister. I would like to follow the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin of Roding. Not being a financial expert, but with my experience of the local government finance system, I liken this to that time-honoured competition that used to appear in some newspapers, the spot-the-ball competition, which I am afraid rather dates me. I refer to where the money goes and all these labyrinthine methods of checks, balances, benefits, credits and grants for this, that and the other.
However, I would like to concentrate on the question of the 50% share of the business rates under the business rate retention scheme. I say that as a veteran of development schemes of one sort or another by virtue of my profession. By the time there has been a redistribution to various other precepting bodies, a 50% take of the business rate is hugely unlikely to be any real incentive to a billing authority in terms of encouraging the growth in the tax base. Ultimately, it is the growth in the tax base that is the key to this. Unless the rate of tax per property band or per square foot of business space goes up, with all the consequences in terms of public opinion that that might involve, we have to grow the base. The other thing that will come up later is the question of making the system fundamentally more efficient, on which I have various amendments later on.
The development process represents a great number of hazards in terms of the finance of organising it and, particularly until recently, the growth of the front-loading of all manner of planning applications with a plethora of things related to sustainability and compliance with planning. Local electorates, furthermore, bearing in mind that they tend to be council taxpayers, often view large-scale development, particularly commercial development, in a negative light. So there is a downside to the whole process. A series of political risks has to be underwritten by this, and that requires a careful balance of what the yield will be before one can expect a billing authority to embark on this road with regard to so little a sum as 50%. That has to be reviewed, particularly because I understand that 50% would also apply to new space that comes on stream, so there will be no gain there either unless you happen to be in a son-of-enterprise-zone area, in which case a different set of rules will happen.
One particular question was put to me by the chief executive of the Institute of Revenues Rating and Valuation, a body of which I am a member. I am not expecting an answer to this, but it is worth pointing out at this juncture. The current council tax benefit scheme is financed by the Department for Work and Pensions by way of the subsidy paid to the billing authority. The current amount that I have been given for England is £4.3 billion. That might be for England and Wales and if I have not got the sums quite right, I apologise to the Grand Committee.
Under the new local support for council tax—the LSCT scheme set out in the Bill—the grant for this new scheme is to be paid out of the central share of business rates and the amount is to be the same £4.3 billion less 10%, because we know that the whole process will be scaled back by that amount. If one is doing a spot-the-ball competition, the question is whether and, if so, how will the Department for Work and Pensions reimburse the Department for Communities and Local Government the £4.3 billion—minus the 10% of course—which is being financed by the business rate? I should say straightaway that I do not expect an immediate answer from the Minister.
My Lords, not having had at the forefront, or indeed at the back, of my mind details of Schedule 8 to the Local Government Finance Act 1988—or indeed Schedule 7, if that be the correct schedule—I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Best, for having explained what was to me, frankly, an unintelligible amendment, but it is entirely intelligible now. I find myself in the odd position of already having spoken to it, in a sense, because I addressed some of the same issues and used some of the same terms as the noble Lord, Lord Best, when I spoke to an earlier amendment. I share the concern about the temptation to incentivise what the noble Lord described as new rateable floor space rather than enhanced rateable values. To that extent, I support the thrust of his argument.
However, I am less convinced about some of the other aspects. For example, massive taxpayer investment in Crossrail will presumably generate increased rateable values in the authorities in London that it will serve. Many of them are quite deprived authorities, so in one sense that is a good thing. On the other hand, that was not a decision of those authorities; the decision was taken by central government, funded by all taxpayers, including those in equally deprived parts of the country such as the one in which I live. The London chamber, to which I and the noble Lord referred, was right to say that authorities should be rewarded and incentivised for the decisions that they take. It is not necessarily appropriate that they should benefit significantly from an increase in business rate generated by taxpayers in the way that, for example, Crossrail might be argued to have induced. Presumably, it will take some time for that to happen.
I am also slightly concerned about the basis on which the claim is made that effectively we should be looking at a rise in rental values. I am not an expert in the property market but at the moment I anticipate that, although there are some exceptions, there is no great buoyancy in the commercial property sector. Many of us see empty shops, offices and factories. In my city of Newcastle we have seen the closure of one significant employer in a very modern factory in one part of the city, and we are seeing the almost certain closure of engineering works in an enterprise zone, for which the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, was originally responsible—I give him credit for that. It was formerly Vickers and is now BAE. It will close with the loss of many jobs and the site will come on to the market. To put it mildly, I think that the anticipation that rental values will rise in the foreseeable future is incredible. It does not seem to me to be a firm basis on which to base these calculations.
Therefore, there is something in this argument—particularly the points that the London chamber raised—about trying to connect the reward to the positive actions of an authority. The converse is that an authority should not be penalised for things beyond its control when the rateable value falls, either because of general economic effects or because of an impact on general levels, leading no doubt to appeals against valuations. I have no doubt that the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, would be able to elucidate on the kinds of effects that might develop.
Therefore, the Committee needs to look at how we can tie the incentivisation to the actions of the local authority in the broad sense that the London chamber and the noble Lord and I referred to earlier—with investment in infrastructure and particularly skills and training, as well as, depending on the circumstances, community safety or other features in the local economy—rather than rely on the actions of the national Government or their agencies. The Highways Agency can transform a situation in certain areas, just as Crossrail might have done, and perhaps other bodies would have the same function or effect.
I take it that the amendment is from the Local Government Association, from which we have heard so much this afternoon. Some of us should go back to the LGA to explore this issue in greater depth to see whether we can come up with something more related to the activities of its members. I should be interested to hear the views of the Minister. I do not know whether the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, proposes to speak on this part, but it would be very interesting to hear his comments on these points, which relate very much to his professional expertise.
My Lords, with that invitation I had better rise to my feet. First I should declare an interest that I have not declared previously and probably should have done—that I have a small involvement with a local chamber of commerce, although I do not know that it especially informs this bit of the debate.
The noble Lord, Lord Best, mentioned a very important factor—that the constant incremental renewal and upgrading of our infrastructure and townscapes, as I believe he was chiefly referring to, is directly related to concepts of added value and therefore has wider application. The confidence to invest in such schemes is clearly dependent on certainty of outcomes. I said previously, on Second Reading, that I was concerned at the lack of certainty of outcomes. Like all uncertainty, it adds to risk and is a highly corrosive factor in getting good levels of net present value, to use valuer-speak.
The Bill’s laudable intentions are to a large degree overshadowed by some very difficult times, with the possible exception of central London. That colours everything, including the way in which these schemes can be financed independently and the sort of risks that you can afford to take with taxpayers’ money, if you are not financing them through conventional means. That obviously applies to central government just as it does to billing authorities and local authorities. My concern is about the migration of commercial floor space to other uses; I refer in particular to losses to residential uses. That may be the only certain outcome that delivers a sufficient return on capital invested to justify the financing. We live in the real world where finance is very difficult. Even if you have retained finance because you are a larger company, unless you can make a robust case to your finance director and the other key decision-makers, it is not going to go ahead. Things which are slow and drawn out and which have long timescales all add to the risk, even if there are no other issues.
I know that the coalition has tried to make sure that the planning process is simplified. None the less, as I mentioned on the earlier group of amendments, there are sufficient uncertainties with all the boxes that developers have to tick. Many of these boxes have to be ticked up front and much of the ticking process costs real money up front. That is the problem that the real commercial world faces. I do not see how the classic role of government, which is to intervene in circumstances of market failure, can be shifted from central government, effectively backed by the political backcloth with central government resources and finance. I do not think that you can move that intervention to overcome market failure to a local government scenario. It will not work. The whole thing is too complicated, the finance is too tight, and matters are too uncertain.
The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred to Crossrail, and of course there are other large infrastructure schemes across the country on a wider scale. One thinks of HS2, the high-speed rail system. Many of these create blight. Although in the long term they are considered to bring benefit, they create short to medium-term blight of the most acute nature—in other words, people are unable to sell their properties and business premises are unlettable and so on. This, too, has a highly corrosive effect but, as I see it, it is not in the gift of local government to deal with these large-scale issues of blight.
The real question goes back to what the noble Lord, Lord Best, was asking: how do we deal with the necessary incremental improvements to and upgrading of our infrastructure without this driver of a commercial outturn? In a sense, the commercial outturn is there because value and satisfaction are added. More trade may be brought to an area. For instance, if it is a seaside town the number of beds let per annum in lodging houses and hotels may increase. There can be all sorts of things that go with that. However, it is a slow and diffuse process, and that means that the benefit is not sufficiently directly connected to the investment for the authority to claw that back. It is not a bankable benefit in the authority’s hands, and that is where the disconnect arises.
It may be that this whole consideration goes much wider than the context of the Bill. However, we are transferring duties and powers and supposedly finance streams to local government, and I think that it is right to consider this issue in its wider context. At the beginning of this afternoon’s proceedings, I mentioned that it is part of the backcloth in which we operate. I certainly hope that the Minister will be able to give some comfort that the cause and effect—in other words, the risks and costs of investment and the returns that can be gained from it—will be better looked at and better managed, even if they cannot be dealt with through the business rate retention scheme. There need to be other ways in which this issue is dealt with; otherwise, we will see areas going into wholesale decline with a considerable loss in values and, with that, risks to the loan books of the mortgage sources that have lent against those investments, as well as risks to the whole financial structure. We do not need to do that. Once we start going down that road, huge perils lie there. We really need to make this constant investment in order to make sure that that does not happen. We have to move forward; there is no stand-still position.
In either case, I understand that the local authority would get the benefit of the rate and the growth.
My Lords, I am thinking about the current process of recording hereditaments, as they are known, in the local rating lists. I call to mind that as a result of the riots last year, one or more commercial premises were totally destroyed. As I understand it, there is a vacant site awaiting redevelopment that is described as a shop and premises, and it is in the list at £1. The Prime Minister had in fact said in the wake of the riots that properties with damage would be taken out of assessment altogether. Now, there is a little wrinkle here. If a site remains in the assessment, effectively as a cleared site, but is still called a shop and premises or a department store and premises, or whatever it was, at a £1 rateable value then it is still in the list. When it comes back into the list again as a refurbished property, it will be at whatever the level is of the new premises. If it was a redevelopment process—not riot damage or anything like that—in which the local authority was a key player, the question is whether it stands to be disenfranchised because the hereditament has not been taken out of the list altogether and is not therefore really a new entry in the list. It is a revaluation of an existing one.
This might be looking for trouble where there is none, but I want to be very careful. As I made clear both in the debate on the Queen’s Speech and at Second Reading of this Bill, there are a number of little wrinkles creeping in because of the way in which Treasury policy now appears to influence the work of the Valuation Office Agency in handling the entries in the valuation list. I want to be absolutely sure that by dint of this business of not taking things out of assessment when in fact they probably should be, we are not going to find that we have disenfranchised the authority from that gain in rateable value, which is undoubtedly the work of its own hands.