Armed Forces Bill
Debate between Earl Howe and Lord Tunnicliffe(8 years, 4 months ago)
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Earl Howe
My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendment 4 in my name. These amendments deal with a matter raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of your Lordships’ House in its 21st report. That matter concerns the regulation-making powers in new Sections 304D(10) and 304E(9), which are inserted into the Armed Forces Act 2006 by Clauses 10 and 11 of the Bill. These powers allow regulations to be made in relation to appeals against reviews of sentence.
It would perhaps be helpful to remind the House that Clauses 10 and 11 of the Bill are part of the statutory framework that we are creating for offenders assisting investigations and prosecutions. New Sections 304D and 304E provide that a person who has been sentenced by the court martial may have their sentence reviewed to take account of the assistance that they have given or offered to give to an investigator or prosecutor, or a failure by that person to give the assistance that they offered to give to an investigator or prosecutor, and in return for which they received a sentence that was discounted. A person whose sentence is reviewed under new Sections 304D or 304E may appeal against the reviewing court’s decision on sentence. The Director of Service Prosecutions may also appeal against a decision. New Sections 304D(10) and 304E(9) allow regulations to be made in relation to the conduct of proceedings on such appeals. Both provide as follows:
“In relation to any proceedings under this section, the Secretary of State may make regulations containing provision corresponding to any provision in Parts 2 to 4 of the Court Martial Appeals Act 1968, with or without modifications”.
Such regulations are subject to the negative procedure.
The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee noted in its report that most provisions of the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1968 are provisions governing proceedings before a court, and that it is reasonably common for such provisions to be set out in subordinate legislation, subject to the negative procedure. However, the committee noted that the 1968 Act includes provisions about the recovery of costs and expenses in appeal proceedings, the effect of which may be modified by the Lord Chancellor by regulations, subject to the affirmative procedure. For example, under Section 31A of the 1968 Act an appeal court is prevented from directing the Secretary of State to pay legal costs to a successful appellant except where affirmative procedure regulations made by the Lord Chancellor provide otherwise. The committee is concerned that it would be possible for regulations under new Sections 304D(10) and 304E(9), which are subject to the negative procedure, to make provision corresponding to the costs provisions of the 1968 Act but with modifications that, if made to the 1968 Act by the regulations under that Act, would be subject to the affirmative procedure. The committee takes the view,
“that as a matter of principle the powers conferred by sections 304D and 304E should be limited so that they do not allow the making of modifications which under the 1968 Act would require the affirmative procedure”.
I therefore propose to amend Clauses 10 and 11 to limit the regulation-making powers in new Sections 304D(10) and 304E(9) so that they may not be used to make provision corresponding to a provision that may be included in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor under Sections 31A, 33, 33A, 46A or 47 of the 1968 Act, and that they may be used to confirm regulation-making powers corresponding to the powers in Sections 31A, 33, 33A, 46A and 47 of the 1968 Act, only if the powers are, like the powers in the 1968 Act, subject to the affirmative procedure.
It may be helpful if I give one example of the effect of the proposed amendments. As mentioned previously, under Section 31A of the 1968 Act, an appeal court is prevented from directing the Secretary of State to pay legal costs to a successful appellant, except where affirmative procedure regulations made by the Lord Chancellor provide otherwise. The effect of the proposed amendment is that regulations under new Section 304D(10) could not make provision allowing an appeal court to direct the Secretary of State to pay legal costs to a successful appellant, but could confer a power on the Lord Chancellor to make regulations providing that an appeal court may direct the Secretary of State to pay legal costs to a successful appellant, but only if the Lord Chancellor’s regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure.
This is somewhat complicated but I hope noble Lords will accept that the amendments address the committee’s concerns regarding the parliamentary procedure to which regulations under new Sections 304D(10) and 304E(9) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 are subject. I therefore hope noble Lords will support the amendments. I beg to move.
Lord Tunnicliffe
My Lords, discharging our responsibility as the Opposition, I have carefully read the Minister’s letter of 11 April and studied the 21st report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and Amendments 3 and 4, and I am satisfied that they meet the committee’s concern. They have our support.
Armed Forces Bill
Debate between Earl Howe and Lord Tunnicliffe(8 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Tunnicliffe
The noble Earl seemed to say something fairly profound there about support for service personnel who may come under investigation in the Iraq cases et cetera, and about legal and historic pastoral support. Could he flesh that out, particularly the extent of legal support that he sees being provided? I recognise that might require a somewhat delicate answer so a written response could be more appropriate.
Earl Howe
I shall be happy to write to the noble Lord with further and better particulars on that issue. I add to the noble Lord, Lord Empey, that the aim of the Iraq Historic Allegations Team is to try to compete the majority of its investigations by the end of 2017. The team believes that that is within its grasp, although it may slip. I hope that is helpful as an indication of the timescale to which it is working.
Lord Tunnicliffe
Following the precedent of other Bills, when the Minister writes to me could he copy in any other noble Lord who has participated in the debate?
Lord Tunnicliffe
The Minister mentioned necessary legislative changes. Is it the Government’s intention to use the Bill as a vehicle?
Armed Forces Bill
Debate between Earl Howe and Lord Tunnicliffe(8 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
My Lords, the first two groups for debate today discuss the generality of military law. The first group relates to how an individual is found guilty and sentenced, while the second group deals with the extent and scope of the body of military law. I make the point because I take a very different view about the extent to which we should consider changing the two groups, and hence these groups of amendments. We will come on to debate the second group, but I approach the first group from the point of view of the rights of the citizen who, as a member of the Armed Forces, has become the accused. I find the arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, persuasive. With that individual having committed an offence and gone into a process which is now so analogous to that of a civil court, I find quite strong the idea that the individual should have the right to a trial that is analogous to that in a civil court.
The amendments before us would, first, create more of a jury of the individual’s peers and, secondly, produce a voting system that is much closer to that of a Crown Court, which seeks unanimity. The proposals put by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, are close to unanimity in their form. The reforms the noble Lord is suggesting would mean that the rights of the individual who has been accused would become increasingly similar to those of a normal civilian in a criminal case. Since 2006 we have developed the three bodies of law, brought them together and introduced civilian best practice—there is probably a better way of putting that, but it is essentially what we have done—so I find this next step very attractive.
As an alternative or as a supplement, the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, has suggested a minimum number of 12 on the board. That is an interesting suggestion which again is in step towards achieving similarity, and I would guess that he has suggested the figure on the basis that while such a revolutionary change might not appeal to the Government, there is also the idea of an inquiry to see how courts martial work to see if that could be a step towards reform.
Clearly, and I have sat on that side, these amendments will not work and there will be something wrong with them. However, that is irrelevant. What matters is: should we make steps in this direction using this quinquennial Act? We do it only every five years and I would find unconvincing the argument that it is not appropriate. I am putting a burden on the Government, today and perhaps in subsequent meetings and in writing, to argue the case for why we should not move in the general direction of these amendments and make the whole process for the defendant more analogous to that of a civil court.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)
My Lords, I am very conscious of the close interest taken by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and my noble friend Lord Attlee, as well as by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, in the operation of the court martial and I welcome the opportunity to discuss these matters today. The first amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, would amend Section 155 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, which makes provision with respect to the constitution of the court martial. It provides that only officers or warrant officers may be lay members of the court martial. As the noble Lord explained, Amendment 1 would change this; it would also provide that court martial rules may provide that lay members must,
“be drawn from each and every branch of the armed services”.
The noble Lord’s next amendment, Amendment 2, would insert a new Section 155A into the 2006 Act. The effect of proposed new Section 155A would be to allow serving personnel of any rank to be lay members.
The court martial consists of a judge advocate and between three and seven lay members. Lay members of a court martial, who are also referred to as the panel or the board, have a role in relation to findings on a charge and sentencing. The lay members for any proceedings are specified by or on behalf of the court administration officer. Only commissioned officers and warrant officers may be lay members. Amendments 1 and 2 would change this, as I have said, by allowing members of the Armed Forces of any rank to be lay members.
It will not surprise the Committee to hear that I am resistant to the proposals that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has put forward. The first point I wish to make in response is that the existing rules governing lay membership of the court martial result from the fact that the court martial is part of an overall system of justice and discipline. Those rules recognise the importance of experience of command and the exercise of service discipline at a sufficiently high level to enable lay members to assess the actions of those who appear before them in the court martial in the appropriate command and disciplinary context. The role of a lay member in the court martial differs from that of a juror in a Crown Court trial. In the Crown Court, the jury’s role is limited to findings of fact: sentencing is a matter solely for the judge. In the court martial, the lay members and the judge advocate vote on the sentence. In considering sentencing, they must have regard to the maintenance of discipline, so must have a strong understanding of what things affect discipline and what things do not.
All service courts have to apply the statutory principles set out in the Armed Forces Act 2006 as to the purpose of sentencing. These are closely based on the civilian sentencing principles but include, in addition, “the maintenance of discipline” and the reduction of “service offences”—that is, both service discipline offences, such as looting or absence without leave, and criminal offences.
These principles reflect four special aspects related to the service justice system. The first is the existence of disciplinary offences unknown to the general criminal law, such as absence without leave. The second is the fact that the military context of an offence may be relevant to sentencing—for example, an assault against a superior or an inferior may make an offence more serious, and then there is the well-known naval concern about the effect on morale and discipline of mess-deck theft.
Lord Tunnicliffe
My Lords, as I said earlier, I see this debate as being in two parts, of which this is the second part. The development of service law in this country has been going on for several hundred years and we have seen important movements in the past 10 years with the 2006 Act and now with these proposals. I am unsympathetic to what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, proposes in this area, because it goes too deep into the body of military law. There is presumably an argument that you do not need military law on any offence that is covered by an equivalent piece of civil law, but we are not there yet in the minds of either the public or the military. We are on a journey and I think that we are at the right place in that journey, so to carve these offences out of the scope of military law at this point would be wrong. I shall read with great care the speeches that have been made and listen with great care to the Minister’s response. We will ponder on those views but, as a generality, the scope of military law is probably right at this time. I repeat that we should address the courts martial system to make the judgment process analogous but leave the scope substantially as it is.
Earl Howe
My Lords, these further amendments address other aspects of the service justice system about which the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, is exercised. I agree that it is right that this Committee should engage in close and careful scrutiny and assure ourselves of the rationale that underpins the system.
Amendment 4 would limit the jurisdiction of the court martial. It would prevent the court martial from trying certain offences: murder; manslaughter; the wide range of sexual offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003; and any offence committed overseas that a civilian criminal court in the United Kingdom has jurisdiction to try.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, explained that his intention with Amendment 15 is to extend the jurisdiction of civilian criminal courts in England and Wales by giving them jurisdiction to try members of the Armed Forces and civilians subject to service discipline for acts overseas that, had they been committed here, would have constituted sexual offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The Committee may be aware that service courts are able to exercise jurisdiction in respect of acts overseas. Section 42 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 provides that a member of the Armed Forces is guilty of an offence under service law if they do an act outside the United Kingdom that would constitute an offence under the law of England and Wales were it done here.
Amendment 16 would give members of the Armed Forces accused of committing certain crimes overseas a right to elect whether to be tried by the court martial or by a civilian criminal court. The crimes in question are those that the civilian criminal courts may try even if the events in question took place overseas. Those offences include murder and, although the noble Lord explained that this was an alternative to his previous proposal, would also include sexual offences if Amendment 15 were accepted as well.
I note one point in passing. Amendment 16 does not appear to propose that members of the Armed Forces should have a right to elect civilian criminal trial in respect of conduct in the United Kingdom or in respect of conduct overseas other than on active service in operational circumstances, yet it is not immediately apparent why such cases should be treated differently.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, may not be too surprised to hear that the Government do not support these amendments, which imply that there are problems with the court martial system. Yet the service justice system has been scrutinised by the UK courts and by Strasbourg, and has been held to be compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights for both investigations and prosecutions within the UK and abroad, where the civilian police do not have jurisdiction.
As regards the implication about the competence of the service police and prosecutors, the service police are trained and able to carry out investigations into the most serious offences, with members of the Special Investigations Branch having to pass the serious crime investigation course before being selected for that unit. In addition, selected members of the service police attend a range of specialist and advanced detective training at either the Defence College of Policing and Guarding or externally, with the College of Policing or training providers accredited by the college.
At the Service Prosecuting Authority, prosecutors are trained to effectively prosecute serious cases. For example, prosecution of serious sexual offences requires attendance on the CPS rape and serious sexual offences specialist training course, and the SPA ensures that decisions on charging in such cases are taken only by prosecutors who have completed that training. The Government believe that the service justice system is capable of dealing with the most serious of offences and should be able to continue to do so. In the case of offences which both the civilian criminal courts and service courts have jurisdiction to try, it is recognised that it is necessary for prosecutors to consider in each case whether the offence is more appropriately tried in the civilian criminal courts or in a service court. This applies not only to offences committed overseas in respect of which the civilian criminal courts have jurisdiction but to offences committed in the United Kingdom.
The existing protocol between service and civilian prosecutors recognises that some cases are more appropriately dealt with in the service system and some more appropriately in the civilian system, particularly those with civilian victims. The principles of the protocol were approved by the Attorney-General for England and Wales, and by the Ministry of Justice. The protocol recognises that any offence can be dealt with by the service authorities. The main principle in deciding who acts is whether the offence has any civilian context, especially a civilian victim. The protocol therefore provides that cases with a civilian context are dealt with by the civilian criminal justice system. However, where a case has a service context, it is important that the service justice system—which is specifically constructed to deal with that unique service dimension—is able to manage the case in question. But were we to create a right to elect of the kind contained in Amendment 16, I submit that it could undermine the service justice system, as an accused could make an election which would see the types of cases which civilian and service prosecutors currently consider should be dealt with in the service system—because of their service context—instead having to be dealt with by the civilian criminal courts.
The noble Lord, Lord West, referred to the importance of mitigation in certain cases. Partly for that reason but also for others, many cases which concern conduct outside the UK will have a service context such that both service and civilian prosecutors would consider that they would be more appropriately tried in the service system. That is significant because of the key point that I made on the previous group of amendments: court martial is part of an overall system of justice and discipline, and the existing provisions governing sentencing in the court martial reflect this.
As I mentioned earlier, all service courts have to apply statutory principles set out in the Armed Forces Act 2006 as to the purpose of sentencing. These are closely based on the civilian sentencing principles but include, in addition, “the maintenance of discipline” and the reduction of “service offences”. These principles reflect special aspects related to the service justice system, including those factors that I touched on earlier and shall repeat: first, in service courts the military context of an offence may be relevant to sentencing, and I mentioned an assault against a superior or an inferior; secondly, in service courts a heavier sentence may be justified by reference to the fact that the offender is in the Armed Forces, and I mentioned a drugs offence in that context; and, thirdly, certain penalties are available only to service courts, requiring an assessment of whether they are appropriate from a broadly disciplinary point of view—for example, service detention or dismissal. Allowing a case with a purely service context to be dealt with in the civilian system on the election of an accused therefore risks undermining the system of justice and discipline in the Armed Forces.
Armed Forces (Service Complaints Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2015
Debate between Earl Howe and Lord Tunnicliffe(8 years, 8 months ago)
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The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)
My Lords, my department has laid a single instrument for the Committee’s consideration today. These regulations are required as part of a package of measures to implement a new service complaints process and a Service Complaints Ombudsman for the Armed Forces.
The new legislation is designed to provide a streamlined and more effective internal redress system for our Armed Forces, and new, strengthened external oversight through an ombudsman. It will come into being on 1 January 2016. The new system is provided for in new Section 365B and Part 14A of the Armed Forces Act 2006, as inserted by Sections 1 to 3 of, and the schedule to, the Armed Forces (Service Complaints and Financial Assistance) Act 2015.
This instrument is intended to promote fairness in the new system by preventing conflicts of interest and ensuring that complaints are dealt with by those who have the right experience and knowledge to properly assist the complainant. It also covers procedural matters that provide essential safeguards and aspects of independence for our Armed Forces personnel.
The regulations include four important things, which I shall deal with in turn. First, as for the existing system, we have made rules on who cannot be appointed to deal with a service complaint; for example, because they are implicated in the matters complained about. The second important aspect of the regulations is that we have set out those matters that cannot be raised as a service complaint. This is not a new aspect to the complaints process. These are provided for in the regulations that cover the current system, and have been updated in this instrument to take account of the new process and of experience.
We are excluding for the first time challenges to decisions made in the internal redress system because under the new legislation the ombudsman will be able to review or investigate them. Similarly, the regulations exclude complaints about decisions made by the ombudsman. It is the ombudsman who provides external oversight of the complaints system so it would be contradictory for the complaints system to be able to overturn decisions of the ombudsman. Challenges to the decisions of an external ombudsman are best made in the courts.
A newly excluded matter, which I should mention in particular, is that we have decided to exclude complaints alleging clinical negligence or personal injury against the Ministry of Defence, so these have been added to the list of excluded matters. The redress system is not appropriate for deciding the complex, specialised medical and legal issues that can arise in clinical negligence and personal injury cases. It will remain possible, however, to make a service complaint if a person believes that we have not provided medical care when it was our responsibility to do so. As under the existing system, the regulations also exclude matters for which there are more appropriate alternative remedies. For example, challenges to decisions made at court martial are best decided through the appeals system.
The third important effect of these regulations is to set out when at least one independent person must be appointed for deciding a service complaint. The main circumstance is where a complainant alleges bullying or similar misconduct. This is the same as under the current system and it is there to provide an extra safeguard for fairness in such sensitive cases, and to give a measure of external oversight as part of the internal system.
The fourth main effect of the regulations is the setting out of the matters that must be reported to the Service Complaints Ombudsman when an allegation of a wrong suffered by a service person has been referred by the ombudsman to the chain of command. As with the Service Complaints Commissioner now, the ombudsman will be able to receive allegations of wrongs done to service personnel. For example, a family member of a service person will be able to approach the ombudsman with their concerns. The ombudsman will be able to refer those cases to the chain of command and to track what happens. The regulations will ensure that the ombudsman is kept updated on progress and is able to respond to queries, if raised, without compromising her investigative role.
The Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments has scrutinised this draft instrument and, in doing so, has brought to our attention three drafting points, which we will seek to correct at the earliest available opportunity. However, we do not expect that these points will affect the practical working of the regulations.
On the first point that has been raised with us, we accept that the definition of the expression “in writing” has been included unnecessarily in Regulation 2(1).
On the second point that the committee has brought to our attention, we will seek to provide further clarity at Regulation 6. This regulation provides for the start of the three-week period within which the ombudsman is to be notified of certain events in connection with the progress of a matter that has been referred by the ombudsman as a potential service complaint. It also provides that the ombudsman is to be notified of each event that is listed in the regulation. We will seek to clarify the exact moment of the day from which the three-week period applies and to clarify that the period applies separately to each event that appears in the list.
The third of the JCSI’s points relates to a provision in the schedule to these regulations that excludes a right to make a complaint where there is a right of review as to certain service police or prosecution matters. The committee has said that the regulations refer incorrectly to those rights of review being “under” the code in which they appear, rather than being mentioned “in” that code. Again, we will look to make the correction at the earliest available opportunity.
I hope noble Lords will support these regulations. I beg to move.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this instrument, which effectively—with, I believe, four other negative instruments—gives effect to the Service Complaints Ombudsman, established by the 2015 Act, which some of us were privileged to flog through a few months ago.
The concern goes back to the tragic deaths at Deepcut between 1995 and 2002 and the subsequent inquiry. The outcome of that inquiry was the creation of the Service Complaints Commissioner. That role was taken up by a splendid lady, Dr Susan Atkins, who, having taken up the role, declared it not effective, efficient or fair. I commend the Government for reacting to her criticism. My party has long been calling for the introduction of an Armed Forces ombudsman, so we welcome the Act and the instruments designed to put it into effect. Labour is determined that all members of the Armed Forces who serve this country with such professionalism and distinction should be saved from bullying, harassment and other inappropriate or illegal behaviour. Ensuring that this is achieved forms a core component of the Armed Forces covenant. Hence, we support not only this affirmative SI but the negative SIs that go with it.