Financial Services Bill

Debate between Earl Howe and Baroness Fookes

Committee stage
Monday 8th March 2021 Grand Committee

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has taken us into an interesting topic area: regulatory equivalence.

The UK has long been a global leader in financial services. As we adapt to our new position outside the EU, it is essential that we continue to support a stable, innovative and world-leading sector. We have already considered the UK’s international standing in another debate. With these amendments, we are considering equivalence and the UK’s relationship with the EU in relation to financial services. I know that there is a lot of interest in this issue, so I will take this opportunity to provide an update on where we are, to the extent that I am able to do so at this point in time. Perhaps, though, I could begin by saying something about our approach to making these decisions.

Amendment 90 seeks to impose an obligation on the Government to make an equivalence determination only where they have determined that the relevant overseas jurisdiction has legal and supervisory standards equivalent to those of the UK. It also seeks to prohibit the Government granting an equivalence determination based only on an agreement to make determinations on a reciprocal basis.

I am happy to confirm that the Government are already committed to conducting their equivalence assessments of overseas jurisdictions on the basis that the relevant legal and supervisory framework of that jurisdiction provides equivalent outcomes to the UK’s. This is outlined in the guidance document on the UK’s equivalence framework which was published in November 2020.

In addition, an example of the legislative requirement for granting equivalence can be seen on page 35 of the Bill. It amends the money market funds regulation to allow the Treasury to make equivalence determinations and states:

“The Treasury may not make regulations under paragraph 1 unless satisfied that the law and practice of the country or territory imposes requirements on MMFs which have equivalent effect to the requirements imposed by this Regulation.”


There is a key point for me to make here. This is not a so-called “line-by-line approach”, where we require a country to have identical rules. We believe that compliance with internationally agreed standards and equivalent regulatory outcomes in different countries can be achieved in different ways and through different legal frameworks.

In that context, there is a further important point that I invite noble Lords to note: granting equivalence is a decision we make independently with no reciprocity requirement. The UK would not grant equivalence just on the basis of reciprocity but would always carry out an assessment to ensure that the other jurisdiction is equivalent. The Government must lay a statutory instrument in Parliament to make an equivalence decision. This will give all noble Lords the opportunity to consider and scrutinise Her Majesty’s Treasury’s decisions as part of the normal legislative process.

I turn to consider our relationship with the EU. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that there is no question of us dismissing this relationship with a wave of the hand or otherwise. Amendments 100 and 105 seek to impose obligations on the Government to report on the status of the EU’s considerations about UK equivalence and on the status of negotiations on the regulatory co-operation memorandum of understanding between the UK and EU. I have already said that the granting of equivalence is an autonomous matter for the UK, and this is equally true for the EU, so the Government are not in a position to report on what the EU may or may not be thinking at a given point in time, even if we wanted to.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, characterised the UK regulatory system as a squidgy balloon and hence difficult for the EU to grapple with but, as I have previously set out, the EU is well used to assessing regulator rules and practice as part of its equivalence assessments, and we see no reason why it would not be able to assess the UK in the same way if the will is there.

However, I can provide an update on our own actions. In November, the Chancellor announced a package of equivalence decisions for the EU and EEA member states. We did this to provide clarity and stability for industry. My noble friend Lord Hodgson asked me a number of factual questions about the existing equivalence decisions between the UK and the EU. If he will allow, to ensure a full and accurate response, I am happy to write to him on those questions.

We are not ruling out further equivalence decisions for the EU in the future, and we continue to believe that comprehensive mutual findings of equivalence between the UK and EU are in the best interests of both parties. The Government remain ready and willing to work with the EU to achieve this. For their part, the EU has granted only minimal decisions for the UK. As per our joint declaration with the EU on financial services, which was agreed alongside the trade and co-operation agreement, we have agreed to establish structured regulatory co-operation on financial services by the end of this month. My noble friend Lord Trenchard will be glad to note that we believe we are on track to do that.

This co-operation will support engagement on issues of mutual interest, including facilitating transparency and dialogue around the process of adopting, suspending and withdrawing equivalence decisions, but I should be clear that it is not envisaged, in the joint statement or elsewhere, that the agreement of the MoU on regulatory co-operation will directly entail any new equivalence decisions. This MoU will be publicly available to Parliament after the conclusion of negotiations. I reiterate that the Government are committed to operating an open and transparent approach to equivalence with the EU, but I am afraid that the Government cannot provide updates on this discussion in real time.

My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe expressed concerns that we may have given EU firms some kind of advantage over UK firms. In the absence of clarity from the EU, the UK has acted to provide clarity and stability to industry, supporting the openness of the sector, and to deliver our goal of open, well-regulated markets, but these decisions should not be seen simply as altruistic. They will allow firms to pool and manage their risks effectively and to support clients on both sides of the channel in accessing our world-leading financial services and highly liquid markets, so there are benefits for the UK as well as for the EU.

Finally, Amendment 100 also seeks to impose a legal obligation on the Government to publish a strategy to provide security to UK retail investors in the event of equivalence being withdrawn. I reassure noble Lords that, as set out in the guidance document on the UK’s equivalence framework, the Treasury will seek to ensure that withdrawal of equivalence is undertaken in line with the principle of transparency. That means that the Treasury will endeavour to engage with interested parties as part of the process and will seek to provide Parliament with appropriate scrutiny. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, that I recognise the importance of clarity and stability regarding the potential withdrawal of equivalence. When withdrawing an equivalence determination, it will be undertaken in an orderly and controlled manner to ensure that investors are protected.

The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, made clear a similar concern in relation to the overseas funds regime, given that the provisions of the Bill also create a new equivalence regime there. I assure him that we do not envisage that in the event of equivalence being withdrawn investors would be forced to divest their investments in the fund, but instead that the fund should continue to service them. The Bill also includes a power so that the Treasury may take steps to smooth the transition for funds if equivalence has been withdrawn.

I realise that noble Lords might have wished for a slightly fuller account of our discussions with the EU on the MoU and equivalence issues, but I trust that the reasons for me being constrained on those matters are clear. I hope nevertheless that I have provided the Committee with a sufficient update on this topic and ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

I have received a request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Northbrook.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Earl Howe and Baroness Fookes

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 24th February 2021 Grand Committee

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, perhaps it will be helpful if I take as my starting point Clause 3, which enables the Treasury to revoke provisions in retained EU law to enable the PRA to implement the remaining Basel standards. As I discussed in an earlier debate, the UK Government are committed to the Basel prudential standards as a member of the G20. While a member of the EU, our adoption of the latest Basel standards was achieved through EU legislation. The capital requirements regulation implemented the previous set of Basel reforms in the EU and, therefore, in the UK. However, regulation is not static: it must continually evolve to mitigate emerging threats and respond to developments in the financial markets.

As I set out in earlier remarks, the most recent set of internationally agreed Basel standards now needs to be implemented in the UK. The capital requirements regulation, or CRR, forms part of retained EU law in the UK and therefore continues to form the basis of the UK’s prudential framework for credit institutions. In order to comply with the latest Basel standards, the CRR needs to be updated. The EU is updating its own standards through the second capital requirements regulation, CRR2. Rather than implementing the new provisions through detailed primary legislation to amend the retained CRR, Clause 3 gives the Treasury a power to revoke relevant provisions of the CRR that need to be updated in order to comply with the latest Basel standards. This then allows the PRA to make rules implementing the latest standards.

As I have already set out, the Government stand by the delegation of the responsibility for implementing those standards to the PRA but with an enhanced accountability framework. In that general context, and in response to the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and for that matter the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, I might usefully repeat something that I said in an earlier debate: the rules that will replace the EU legislation being deleted are already available in draft form. The regulators and the Treasury are working to make sure that the final rules are published ahead of the debate on the relevant statutory instruments, which have also been published in draft.

It is the PRA that has the technical expertise to implement these essential post-crisis reforms. This is a novel approach, so the Bill ensures that there are checks and balances in place. First, Clause 3 ensures that we transfer only some elements of the CRR to the PRA. The extent of the Treasury’s powers to delete will be confined to those areas of the CRR that are necessary to ensure that the UK upholds its international commitments. It is for the PRA to write the rules. The Treasury’s involvement is merely to enable the rules to be updated by deleting old rules that no longer meet international standards.

Secondly, the clause ensures that the deletions the Treasury makes take place only when it is clear that adequate provision has been made by the PRA to fill the space. Deletions will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure, providing the proper opportunity for scrutiny. The clause also allows the Treasury to make consequential, supplementary and incidental deletions to parts of the CRR. This is to ensure a coherent regime across the CRR and PRA rules, which are critical to industry.

Furthermore, Clause 3 gives the Treasury power to make transitional and savings provisions to prevent firms facing cliff edges from the deletion of a provision in the UK CRR. This will allow the Treasury to save, for example, permissions to modify capital requirements that have already been granted to firms under the CRR and avoids the need for firms to reapply for those permissions under the new PRA rules.

Amendment 24 would remove the requirement on the Treasury to ensure the PRA’s rules “adequately replace” revoked parts of the CRR. It would replace this requirement with ensuring that the rules “replicate or otherwise reflect” them. I understand that the intention of this amendment is to probe the degree of flexibility allowed by the current drafting. The intention is not for the new PRA rules to completely mirror the CRR provisions that they will replace. The PRA rules will update the CRR provisions they replace to achieve compliance with the revised Basel standards, and the language of “adequately replaced by” is intended to allow for this.

The wording in the Bill— “adequately replaced”—is also phrased to ensure that the rules are written in a language appropriately tailored to the PRA’s rulebook, which is specifically for the UK sector, and that the regime remains coherent. The amendment replaces this with the word “replicated”, which suggests that the language of the EU CRR is copied over exactly into the rulebook. This may not be the most suitable language for the UK’s rulebook and may prevent the PRA making the necessary changes to ensure compliance with the latest Basel standards.

In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, the EU—as I am sure she will recognise with her immense experience—is an outlier in the extent to which it specifies these matters in the equivalent of primary legislation. The approach taken in the Bill will bring us more into line with other major financial centres. This means that the EU is used to assessing rules set in the equivalent of regulator rules.

Amendment 25 would bind the Treasury into setting out why it thinks it is appropriate for the rules not to be replaced before laying the relevant regulations before Parliament. Clause 5 already provides for the PRA to prepare a document setting out whether its rules correspond to the revoked provision and, if so, how. The Government’s view is that that should be the primary document to explain why a CRR provision is not being replaced to provide a coherent explanation. If that document does not reflect a revocation where the CRR rule is not being replaced, this can be explained by the Treasury in the Explanatory Notes accompanying the statutory instrument revoking the rules. The amendment is therefore unnecessary, and I hope noble Lords will feel able not to press it.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

I have received no requests to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe.