Earl Attlee
Main Page: Earl Attlee (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Earl Attlee's debates with the HM Treasury
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, in moving my Amendment 223, I will speak to my Amendment 241FB. They both deal with the unintended and undesirable effects of the anti-money laundering regime in the UK. I do not profess to have any expertise here; my relevant experience is in defence and security.
I fear that I am obliged to weary the Committee with a little detail. Russia has launched an unprovoked attack on Ukraine and, presumably, HMG have an absolute minimum strategic objective of preventing Ukraine being defeated. Failure to achieve this would result in significantly increased world insecurity and the need at least to double UK defence expenditure. EU and NATO Governments have been providing Ukraine with a range of armoured fighting vehicles—AFVs—through Government-to-Government arrangements. Armoured personnel carriers and armoured reconnaissance vehicles allow troops to move around the battlefield without unnecessarily falling victim to artillery or small arms fire.
To supplement Government-to-Government arrangements, the Ukrainians, through commercial agents and UK SMEs, have also been buying up privately and commercially owned AFVs in the UK. There are only a few businesses and individuals in the UK who can efficiently acquire and export these privately owned AFVs. They are generally small. To undertake this activity, they need to have the necessary technical knowledge, workshop facilities, ingenuity, innovation and contacts; have finance and premises; be seen as a fit and proper person to be granted an export licence for controlled goods on the military list; and, most importantly, be trusted by both Ukrainian buyers and UK private sellers.
The Committee needs to understand the facts of the real world. These small businesses simply do not have the resources to perform due diligence on Ukrainian businessmen and their intermediaries. Even if they could, the Committee will recognise that they would soon find red flags galore. However, the Government have the ability to check that the export of these AFVs is in line with their overall strategic objective.
The Export Control Joint Unit at the Department for International Trade grants export licences for controlled goods on the military list, among other things. So far as I can discern, it is doing a very good job. It is important to note that the Export Control Joint Unit has all the facilities of HMG at its disposal to determine whether military equipment should be exported to a certain customer or not. The money laundering regulations add nothing useful to this process.
I now turn to the mischief which my amendment seeks to address. During our debate on Ukraine on 9 February, I explained the problems that “Peter”—not his real name—is experiencing with the provision of banking services in the context of his exporting AFVs to Ukraine. I will continue to use his pseudonym for continuity reasons. I understand that Peter has export licences for around 100 AFVs and has already delivered a considerable number. Although the high street bank’s name is in the public domain, I will not name it, as it has done nothing wrong and has been extremely helpful. Apparently, in these circumstances, MPs will just get stonewalled by the banks, but I have very good relations with Peter’s bank.
On 20 December 2022, Peter’s bank wrote to him, closing his accounts with the bank without any explanation why. Peter was going to completely lose his banking services on 20 February. This would have put him out of business, as he cannot secure banking services from any other provider, and he would not be able to export any more AFVs to Ukraine. Other banks will not step in because they will have the same difficulties as Peter’s current bank. Peter’s bank made it clear to him that it was not prepared to discuss the matter further. This is standard practice, and I understand why. However, I have found out that the problem is that Peter’s current bank cannot accept the regulatory risk of supplying banking services involving large sums of money when Peter does not have the correct anti-money laundering systems in place. But even if he did, he would surely find red flags, as I have already mentioned, because he is dealing with Ukrainian businessmen. Fortunately, I managed to negotiate with the bank an extension to 20 March, which was yesterday.
Initially, I thought that the problem lay with an overzealous junior bank official and that a quick engagement at a senior level in the bank would get it sorted. I then discovered that it was a money laundering problem, as described, but the problem could be solved if a Treasury Minister wrote to the bank relaxing the money laundering regulations in a specific and minor way. I thought all this could be done discreetly and behind the scenes. How wrong I was. Ministers have refused to relax the money laundering regulations because, as I understand it, they believe that the complete integrity of the regulations is more important than facilitating the export of armoured fighting vehicles to Ukraine.
I repeat the question that I asked my good and noble friend Lord Ahmad on 9 February. Is it settled Government policy that the complete integrity of the money laundering regulations is more important than facilitating the export of armoured fighting vehicles to Ukraine? I look forward to the Minister’s reply. The reality is this: each and every additional armoured fighting vehicle that we send to Ukraine will give another group of Ukrainian soldiers protected mobility on the battlefield. Conversely, stopping the export of AFVs will result in avoidable loss of Ukrainian lives, which is quite immoral.
My Amendment 223 works by requiring Ministers quickly to amend the money laundering regulations so that banks do not have to suspend provision of banking services to SMEs that are exporting AFVs or other military equipment to Ukraine under a relevant export licence granted by the Export Control Joint Unit—in other words, a relaxation under very limited circumstances. Of course, my amendment is unnecessary because Ministers can simply write to the bank asking it to relax the money laundering regulations in the way that I suggest.
On my Amendment 241FB, during my investigations it became apparent that there is a wider problem with banks withdrawing provisions of financial services from aerospace and defence SMEs, for two reasons. The most important reason is again the money laundering regulations. In addition, there is a reluctance within some banks to have anything to do with the defence industry, particularly with things that go bang. However, these are highly regulated businesses, and they are dealing with other businesses and Governments, often outside the OECD. Thus the regulatory risk is far too high for the banks when the potential income is often quite small. It is simply not worth the bank’s while to accept the regulatory risk. I accept that my Amendment 241FB is imperfect and does not necessarily solve the problem. At this stage, it is only a probing amendment. I have been briefed by ADS Group, the relevant trade association, on this problem, and it is clear that it is a growing problem that will not go away.
On my Amendment 223, this is a serious and urgent matter. Clearly, the Minister intends to resist, or she would already have relaxed the regulations and saved a lot of the Committee’s time. I am afraid that thus far, I have not been able to generate much interest in this issue. His Majesty’s Opposition in your Lordships’ House do not appear to be very interested, and neither are the media. It does not currently look as if I will be able to win any Division at Report. In view of these circumstances, I was not in a position, nor was it my role, to seek a further extension of service from Peter’s bank when I could not offer any evidence that the policy was likely to be changed. As a result, Peter lost his banking facilities yesterday and will have to stop exporting AFVs to Ukraine. No one can step in, because they will experience the same problems.
The sense of the Committee will be unusually important on this occasion. Your Lordships can merely listen to an interesting debate or make it very clear to my noble friend the Minister that the Committee will not tolerate the money laundering regulations that are causing avoidable loss of Ukrainian lives by preventing the export of AFVs to Ukraine. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Attlee in his amendment. His story about Peter reminded me that I have had considerable time-consuming discussions—not with my noble friend’s Peter, whose acquaintance I have not had the pleasure of making, but with another Peter. He is a person like Peter, a former military officer in the British Armed Forces of some distinction who now operates an SME and is closely connected with manufacturers of arms that the Ukrainians are importing from other sources and which they badly need, arms which our own Ministry of Defence is happy to assist in the Ukrainians receiving.
I have listened to my Peter—he is not called Peter; let us call him Jonathan—who has had a nightmare time. He is approved and holds an export licence with the SPIRE system in what is now the Department for Business and Trade; I think that the SPIRE system is the same as the export control system.
Thank you. So, Jonathan is licensed—and has been for many years—with the SPIRE system, formerly under DIT. This means that the security services have carried out a considerable amount of due diligence on him. Nevertheless, he found it completely impossible to persuade any bank to open an account to handle the funds necessary to enable him to assist the Ukrainians in this way, not just at the working level. The moment you fill in a form that suggests any military connection in the goods, red flags fly and bells ring all over the place.
However, these anti-money laundering regulations are considered so important that it is difficult to find any way of obtaining exemptions to go round them, even in situations such as this. It is just a pity that, even at the senior director level, banks are completely prevented under any circumstances—even when the individual is approved under the SPIRE system, as my noble friend Lord Attlee explained. I have sympathy with and support his amendment.
I completely accept that we need to comply with the Financial Action Task Force regulations but, as we discovered the other day when we were discussing PEPs, the regulations we have in the UK have in some instances gone beyond what is actually required by the Financial Action Task Force. The issue with the KYC regulations is one of immense bureaucracy and great irritation for people to no particular end. It is worth looking again at whether the way we have drafted our regulations, to the extent they go beyond what we are required to do, has in turn led to more problems for individuals.
I am sure we have all had problems but I will share one with the Committee. My husband had a very small investment—way below the level at which it would have to be declared as one of my interests in your Lordships’ House—and there was periodic updating of the know your client regulations. Because of the way that firm’s forms were comprised, it refused to accept my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe’s signature attesting that the document was a fair copy, because she could not tick a particular box on the form. It was completely ludicrous.
That permeates the way many financial service institutions have come to apply these rules in practice. They have become highly bureaucratic, operated by people who probably have no common sense and possibly not even a brain. To go back to the regulations and see what is absolutely required and then follow it on through the FCA seems a really important thing.
My Lords, although I agree with everything my noble friend Lady Noakes said, I point out that I have discussed Peter’s case at a very senior level with his bank and I can absolutely understand the decision the bank made. It looked at it very carefully, but it cannot take the risk because it is dealing with Ukrainian businessmen of whom it knows very little.
There is no official Labour Party position on this, but I feel enormous sympathy for the position of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. I hope the Minister will take this away, not as a legislative proposal but as a problem to be solved, and ensure that it is considered at a very senior level in the Treasury.
My Lords, before I speak to his Amendments 223 and 241FB, I first thank my noble friend Lord Attlee for his engagement and for bringing to my attention the specific example he has raised today as context for his amendments. I commend his staunch support for Ukraine, and the Government remain fully committed to supporting Ukraine in the face of the relentless Russian bombardment.
I reiterate to the Committee that the money laundering regulations are a vital part of the UK’s comprehensive economic crime response. The regulations are designed to combat illicit finance but should not be barriers to legitimate customers, including those connected with the export of military equipment to the Ukrainian defence forces.
As the Prime Minister has set out, the Government are fully committed to helping Ukraine emerge from the war with a modernised economy that is resilient to Russian threats. Of course it is important that those contributing towards this are not prevented unnecessarily from carrying out their business, but this needs to be balanced with the existing controls which protect this country, and international partners, from risks of money laundering.
It is important that we do not take steps that might allow the money laundering regulations to be circumvented by bad actors, even in circumstances such as this. It is therefore right that financial services firms continue to be empowered to carry out their own, risk-based due diligence when financing the export of armoured vehicles or military equipment, or individuals who are engaged in the international defence industry.
The money laundering regulations are purposefully not prescriptive and are designed to allow firms to make their own decisions about how to comply, balancing their understanding of the risk with proportionality. The Government do not and will not involve themselves in commercial decisions of individual firms but we can be clear that, where all the correct licences are in place, the money laundering regulations should not be a barrier to the financing of legitimate export activity.
I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend, but I would like to make it clear that Peter does not need any financing. The other cases that I have come across in the aerospace and defence sector are very well financed; that is why their businesses are not very attractive to the banks, which can withdraw financial services because there is no money in it. Peter does not need finance; all he needs is the bank to process the money, but the bank has a real difficulty processing money from Ukrainian businessmen.
My Lords, I was making the point that there is a wider context here that there should be no barrier to the financing of legitimate export activity.
Turning to the point made by my noble friends Lord Attlee and Lord Trenchard, the government process for the granting of export control licences focuses on the end use of goods rather than the source of funds paying for them. It is therefore distinct from the due diligence checks that a bank would carry out before conducting the transaction. I assure noble Lords that, through the Government’s engagement with my noble friend on this, we have engaged with the Export Control Joint Unit, the Financial Conduct Authority and other partners on this issue. While I appreciate the frustrations of individual cases, we are not aware of a systemic issue. The Government will continue to monitor reports of similar problems; if we identify a systemic problem, we will act to address it.
I turn to the solutions suggested by my noble friend. The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, and my noble friend Lady Noakes are right that our obligations around anti-money laundering regulations stem from our international obligations to the Financial Action Task Force. The approach set out in these proposals would very likely be in contravention of those obligations. My noble friend Lady Noakes is right that the current version of our anti-money laundering regulations reflects our membership of the EU, which is consistent with those obligations from the Financial Action Task Force, but in some areas goes beyond them.
I turn to Amendment 238, tabled by my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond. The Government undertook a review of the money laundering regulations, which was published last year. This was a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of their implementation and whether they had led to unintended consequences for businesses or consumers. It explicitly assessed whether aspects of the money laundering regulations remain appropriate and proportionate in light of the UK’s exit from the EU and the additional flexibilities that affords us. It identified a number of areas for reform to make the regulations more proportionate and reduce unnecessary burdens on legitimate customers, which we will take forward through future updates to the regulations. These reforms will further tailor the regime to the UK’s risk profile, following the removal of specific European requirements from the money laundering regulations last year.
While the Government remain committed to ensuring the proportionality and effectiveness of anti-money laundering regulations and the regime around it, and monitor the effects on financial inclusion, the review required by Amendment 238 would largely repeat the exercise conducted last year, of which we are still to implement the full results.
My noble friend referred to the previous group on digital identity. He is absolutely right; we recognise that greater clarity on how digital identity services are certified against the Government’s digital identity and attributes trust framework would support requirements under money laundering regulations that will be key for market uptake, so we see the opportunity there and the role for government in providing assurance on that process of uptake as a potential technical solution to make some of these processes easier. As set out in our 2022 money laundering regulations review response, we have committed to consider this fact too.
For the reasons I have set out, I hope that my noble friend Lord Attlee can withdraw his amendment and that my noble friend Lord Holmes will not move his when reached.
My Lords, I am grateful for the attention that my noble friend the Minister has paid to my concerns. One thing I would like to pick her up on is that she seems to have been briefed that there is not a systemic problem with the money laundering regulations. I have found out very quickly that there is, and have been briefed by the ADS, which is the aerospace and defence sector trade association and was the Defence Manufacturers Association.
The problem is that where they are exporting around the world, especially outside the OECD, they are immediately coming into contact with money laundering problems. In fact, I had a meeting with a gentleman in Portsmouth who deals in helicopter parts and helicopters. What tends to happen is that he might spend 24 months organising a deal, and then he suddenly gets a cheque for quite a large sum of money from some far-flung part of the world; that is a huge risk for the banks. When we come to Report, I will come back with further examples from the ADS briefing, where sadly this is a systemic problem that is not going away.
I am particularly grateful for the support from the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and do hope that the Minister pays attention to what he said. In the meantime, subject to the usual caveats, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.