Civil Aviation Bill

Earl Attlee Excerpts

Monday 9th July 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, the purpose of these amendments is to stop the Bill from apparently removing the Treasury’s oversight on non-executive pay at the Civil Aviation Authority, which was provided for in the 1982 Act that established the CAA. Under the Bill’s proposals, decisions on pay, allowances, pensions or gratuities will be determined solely by the Secretary of State for Transport.

Following recent failures to take action over excessive pay until forced into it by political and public pressure, as with RBS and Network Rail where the Secretary of State for Transport initially denied that she could do anything about the level of bonus payments to top executives, there should not be any weakening of oversight on remuneration payments. At this time of increased and justified public concern about levels of pay and bonuses, it is hardly appropriate for the Government to be seeking to remove a layer of checks and balances on the setting of CAA non-executive board members’ pay.

The CAA non-executive members were paid varying amounts up to some £77,000 in 2010-11. Non-executive board members are not there simply to make up the numbers or to add a veneer of outside independence and challenge. They are there as critical friends to challenge and question the senior executives on both the policies that they are pursuing and the policies that they are not, including accounting and financial policies, and to ensure that appropriate corporate governance arrangements are not only in place but are being properly implemented and applied.

Under the Bill, the CAA non-executive members will also determine the terms and conditions on which the chief executive is to be employed and who should be appointed. Other executive members are to be appointed by the chief executive with the approval of the chair and at least one other non-executive member who also will have to approve the terms and conditions under which other executives are employed. The role and importance of the CAA non-executive members is further enhanced not just by the more influential role that the CAA will have but also by the fact that the Secretary of State and the chief executive must exercise their powers to secure that, as far as practicable, the number of non-executive members exceeds the number of executive members.

So at a time when there is increasing concern about remuneration packages and bonuses; at a time when CAA non-executives will be involved in the major senior executive appointments and their terms and conditions; at the same time as the role of the Civil Aviation Authority is being increased; and at the same time as the importance of non-executives is being increased by there being a requirement in this Bill for the number of non-executives to exceed the number of executive members, the Government decide that this is the appropriate time to remove the oversight that the Treasury has on non-executive pay at the CAA. The Treasury can provide a degree of impartiality over decisions on the remuneration of Department for Transport appointees, as well as having knowledge of what remuneration levels are for non-executive members appointed through other departments of state. The Government’s logic does not add up. I beg to move.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I am grateful for the explanation given by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and I hope that I can clarify the Government’s position on these probing amendments. In the current political environment and with the public interest in these matters, I can quite understand why the noble Lord has tabled them.

There are several reasons why I cannot support all these amendments, to which I will come shortly. By way of background, the changes introduced by the Bill that these amendments seek to overturn complete a series of governance reforms recommended by Sir Joseph Pilling following his 2008 strategic review of the Civil Aviation Authority. Sir Joseph’s conclusion was that the involvement of two government departments in remuneration decisions was unnecessary. He said:

“In evidence to the review the Treasury explained that the CAA was the only regulator it looked at in this way … The statutory requirement for the Treasury to approve the Civil Aviation’s members’ remuneration and pensions is an anomaly. I recommend that the Department for Transport seek to amend the legislation so that the responsibility lies solely with the Secretary of State”.

He also asked the Department for Transport to consider the approach of some other UK regulatory bodies where the board appoints executive directors without ministerial involvement. The previous Government accepted those recommendations and consulted on the proposals reflected in the Bill. The Government agree with Sir Joseph’s conclusions that the oversight of the Treasury is an anomaly that adds no value. The Committee should note that there is no equivalent requirement for any comparable regulatory body, so Clause 96 implements an important aspect of the Pilling report. It would remove Treasury involvement in approving the remuneration of non-executive members. Removing Treasury oversight will also remove unnecessary government duplication; there is no need for two government departments to be concerned with CAA board remuneration. It will also reduce unnecessary delays in the appointment of non-executive members of the CAA.

There is nothing so special and different about the CAA board appointments that they alone of all regulatory appointments require the approval of two government departments. The Secretary of State will continue to be responsible for appointing non-executive directors and determining their remuneration. They are part-time posts that currently pay under £25,000 with some small additions, where applicable, for extra work. I note that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, suggested that some were paid £75,000. They are not in a CAA pension or bonus scheme. It is therefore quite unnecessary for the Treasury to undertake the administrative burden of checking the decisions of the Secretary of State. I hope that that provides the Committee with the reassurance required and that the noble Lord will consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

Obviously, it is my intention to withdraw the amendment, but before doing so perhaps I may ask the noble Earl whether he said that the posts would receive less than £25,000. Is he saying that that was the case in the financial year 2010-11 for which we appear to have the figures?

[Earl Attlee]

The non-executive directors are currently paid between £22,000 and £25,000 and are not eligible for pensions or bonuses, although they can receive extra payments for extra days of work. I hope that that helps the noble Lord.

[Lord Rosser]

I note with interest the Minister’s response. Either the figures that I have are incorrect or an awful lot of extra work is undertaken, but obviously I can look at that. The key part of the Minister’s argument is that no other regulatory bodies have Treasury and appropriate department involvement. The Minister has been clear on that. I shall certainly want to reflect on his response, but I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Trefgarne]

My Lords, while the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, makes an interesting case for Amendment 67, I am somewhat neutral on the matter, and look forward to hearing the Minister’s reply. I must say that I am a good deal less enthusiastic about Amendment 68; general, somewhat ill defined duties such as those contained in that amendment are best left out of legislation, and I hope that the noble Lord will not press it.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I fully agree with noble Lords on the need for the CAA to be efficient in carrying out its functions. Identical amendments to the ones now tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, were also tabled in the Commons both in Committee and on Report, and were defeated in Divisions.

I shall speak first to Amendment 67 on introducing a role for the National Audit Office. In Commons Committee the Minister announced a strengthening, outside the Bill, of the scrutiny to which the CAA is subject. Having considered this issue further myself, I remain unconvinced that there are compelling reasons to believe that NAO scrutiny of the CAA would deliver a different result from the current and new mechanisms by which the CAA’s functions are already audited and scrutinised. Moreover, the CAA is overwhelmingly funded by the aviation industry. Parliament recognised this in removing the NAO’s role from the CAA and certain other bodies in 1984. The issue was considered by Sir Joseph Pilling, in his 2008 strategic review of the CAA, who concluded that there was no need for NAO involvement. The recommendation was subsequently accepted by Ministers under the previous Government, and I have yet to be convinced that they were wrong.

It is true that other industry-funded regulators come under the scrutiny of the NAO but, unlike the CAA, they are generally either non-ministerial government departments or rely on government funding for a significant proportion of their income. The CAA’s situation is very different from regulators such as the Office of Rail Regulation. Although the ORR is funded by industry licences, it is distinct because of the high level of public funding that the rail industry receives.

I reiterate the strength of the scrutiny mechanisms already in place with the CAA. As was said on Report, the Secretary of State appoints the CAA’s external auditors. She presents the CAA’s accounts to Parliament by placing the annual report statement in the Library of the House of Commons; she is involved in the development of the corporate plan; with the Treasury’s consent, she approves the CAA’s borrowing and sets its required rate on return on capital; and she will continue to approve the remuneration of the chair and non-executive members of the CAA board. In addition, the CAA consults on its charges and fees. Clause 100 makes such consultation an explicit requirement. I therefore currently see no reasons why the NAO should audit the CAA, and ask the noble Lord to withdraw that amendment.

On Amendment 68, regarding efficiency, in practice the CAA is already subject to conditions and obligations that ensure that it is efficient. As announced by the Minister in the Commons, from 2013 onwards the Government will include in their annual accounts direction a requirement for the CAA to include an efficiency statement in its annual report. This would be subject to validation by the CAA’s external auditors, and the Secretary of State for Transport will approve the terms of reference for that work. The efficiency statement is likely to include a summary of value-for-money audits and post-project completion reviews, developments in processes and technology and a report on the remuneration and deployment of staff. The external auditors’ published statement in the annual report would contain a summary of their findings on the efficiency statement in the interests of transparency. Industry representatives on the CAA’s finance advisory group would be given an opportunity to discuss the statement before and after the external auditors had completed their activity. This establishes an annual process of scrutiny, with transparency to the industry and to Parliament, to which the Secretary of State will continue to present the CAA’s accounts.

During the past nine years, the CAA has reduced its workforce by 15%. It employed 1,057 full-time equivalents in 2003 and had reduced that number to 870 in March 2012. The CAA’s strategic plan contains the objective:

“To ensure that the CAA is an efficient and effective organisation which meets Better Regulation principles and gives value for money”.

Clause 1(3) and (4) and Clauses 83 and 84 already build in proportionality safeguards. The CAA is also required to follow the good regulation principles in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 and the statutory regulator’s compliance code requires that regulators,

“should be accountable for the efficiency and effectiveness of their activities, while remaining independent in the decisions they take”.

I am aware that this is very important to airlines represented by the British Air Transport Association.

I will continue to reflect on the matter and consider what further reassurances can be given to your Lordships on Report. In light of that, I hope that, at the appropriate point, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Lord Soley]

Amendment 67 is still puzzling me, because the Minister’s argument seems to be that, because the airlines fund the CAA so heavily, there is a relatively small contribution from the taxpayer and, for that reason, the NAO need not be involved. I do not have the figures with me, but I do not think that the contribution from the taxpayer is so small as to be really insignificant. If we are saying that a public body such as this can be excluded from the NAO audit simply because it receives a fairly small amount of public money, that logic could be extended to almost any other public body of this type.

To use the Minister’s argument, if in time the railway industry was able to pay rather more for the Office of Rail Regulation, as one would hope, one would no longer need to have that looked at by the National Audit Office. The Minister seems to saying that this is purely a ministerial discretion issue; that is, “We will simply look at it. If the amount of taxpayers’ money is small enough, we won’t bother to put it under the NAO”—I do not use “won’t bother” in a dismissive sense; I mean that the Government will not bother to have the NAO look at it. However, there will come a point when we want the NAO to look it. Can the Government indicate what the trigger would be? Are we talking about £1 million or £5 million? What amount would suddenly trigger the Government saying that the CAA would be put under the National Audit Office? Alternatively, to use my example of the Office of Rail Regulation, if the railway industry suddenly started paying for most of it, would we say, “Well, they’ve reached this point. Therefore, we will no longer put it under the National Audit Office.”? I am not quite clear about what the policy is.

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[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, noble Lords have advanced various arguments as to why the CAA should be audited by the NAO, but the Committee has not convinced me that the CAA would become any more efficient if we went down that route. If noble Lords want to make any progress with their argument, they will have to convince me that it would give a better outcome.

The noble Lord’s implied question was how much of the CAA’s budget comes from public funds. It is only 6%.

[Lord Soley]

Six per cent of how much? Six per cent of a large amount can be a large amount, too.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I am afraid that I will have to write to the noble Lord on the CAA’s budget. As ever, I will give Members of the Committee a comprehensive answer to any of their more technical questions.

[Lord Rosser]

In writing that letter, can the Minister also give the relevant comparable figures for the other regulatory bodies to which we have referred—Ofgem, Ofwat, Ofcom and the ORR—and which are also funded in part by their industries? If the Minister’s argument on this issue is that the figure for the Civil Aviation Authority is particularly low in either percentage or actual terms when compared with other regulators, which are also partly funded from within their own industries, perhaps in sending that letter he could provide the comparable figures so that we can have a look at them.

I would comment only that while the Minister says that it is up to us to show the case for why a current arrangement should continue, there is to be a changed Civil Aviation Authority under the Bill. We are not talking about that authority as it is now but about one with enhanced powers and influence. I would have thought that the onus lay with the Minister to show us why the arrangements for the CAA should be different from those for other regulators, rather than the context in which he put it: of seeking to say that we have to make the case. It is the Minister who has failed to make the case, frankly, but I will leave it until we receive the letter from him with the information that he has said he will provide.

I am still not clear which clauses the Minister is saying provide the general duty of efficiency. I see a reference in Clause 1(3), to which I think the Minister referred, to the CAA having,

“regard to … the need to promote economy and efficiency on the part of each holder of a licence”,

for example, but that does not relate to the CAA’s efficiency. I can find references, which I think the Minister used, to activities being,

“transparent, accountable, proportionate and consistent”,

but those do not necessarily refer to being efficient or efficiency so I do not know what the noble Earl’s argument is. Which clauses is he saying cover the general duty of efficiency? My understanding is that this is not some unique clause that we are proposing to put in, as one can find examples of it applying elsewhere. Once again, why is the Minister saying that it should not apply to the CAA when, from what I have heard from him and from my understanding of the Bill, I cannot see such a clear reference as he can to a general duty of efficiency in any other clauses at present? I wonder if he can assist with that.

[Earl Attlee]

On Amendment 68, the noble Lord’s points are well made. I said that I will continue to reflect on the matter and consider what further reassurances can be given at Report. My reason for saying that is that the noble Lord has put his point very well.

[Lord Rosser]

I am grateful to the Minister. I heard him say that the first time round, but I am grateful to him for having reconfirmed that he is looking at this matter. I appreciate that he has not given any commitments. While I would not want to suggest that when the noble Earl says he is looking at a matter he is not doing it seriously, if I say that he is looking at it seriously I hope he does not take that in the wrong spirit and infer that I think he sometimes does not. However, in view of what the noble Earl has said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Trefgarne]

My Lords, being 110 years old, naturally I am resistant to innovation of all kinds, although I hope not in all branches of aviation. None the less, one needs to take care with imposing duties of this kind upon the CAA in this particular area. For example, if it were to be pressed to incorporate a new kind of material in an engine, perhaps to make it quieter, the cost of certifying a new innovation of that kind can be substantial. My noble friend Lord Rotherwick refers to the desirability of introducing GPS approaches in more airports. One has to remember that GPS systems are outside the control of the CAA, the operators and NATS, and in the past have been subject to interference from hostile agencies, which is much to be regretted. I remember an occasion some years ago when the GPS system in the UK collapsed for a couple of days because there was some technical difficulty about which the CAA and NATS knew nothing.

One needs to take a little care about these things. The ground approach facilities, for example, to which my noble friend referred, are under the maintenance and control of the airport authority and therefore, you may say, more reliable, at least when the shortcomings are more readily known. That said, I do not want to stand in the way of these worthwhile innovations, and the advantages of GPS approaches to which my noble friend referred are very real and important, but one needs to take care. The CAA has taken a careful—if that is the right word—approach to the approval of GPS systems. That was right. It is being slowly convinced of their merit, which is right, too, but it did not jump in their direction as hastily as perhaps some others did. I am not standing in the way of innovation, but I ask the Minister to explain how the costs of all this will be met. Some of them may fall on the operators—to their advantage, no doubt, so that is a good thing—but we should take a little care.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, for introducing this interesting, probing amendment, because it gives me the opportunity to say something about how innovative the aviation sector in this country already is and the CAA’s role as the regulator. My noble friend Lord Rotherwick spoke about innovation in navigational aids. I look forward to debating his Amendment 73, which will deal with these issues, but his comments were valuable nevertheless. He indirectly illustrated why the CAA should concentrate on regulation.

My view is that market forces should be allowed to drive innovation in industry and the regulator should be responsive to it. This is how things have worked so far between the aviation sector and the CAA. Indeed, just how innovative our aviation sector is is a measure of how well this arrangement has worked.

Let us consider one aspect of the aviation sector, the aerospace industry. Our aerospace industry is the world’s largest outside the USA, with a 17% share of the global market. Its annual turnover is more than £20 billion, and it directly employs more than 100,000 people, supporting a total of 230,000 jobs across the UK economy. Its workforce is highly skilled: 36% of its employees have university degrees or equivalent.

The aviation travel industry is equally innovative. In my opening speech at Second Reading, I paid tribute to this fact, saying:

“In 2010 … UK airports served nearly 400 international destinations. That level of activity is possible because over the past 30 years the aviation industry has changed to meet the needs of the customer. The emergence of low-cost carriers is one example of how the industry has innovated and diversified. There has also been an increase in the number of people travelling by air in this country, from 59 million passengers in 1982 to 211 million in 2010”.—[Official Report, 13/6/12; col. 1364.]

The CAA has its own international consultancy, Civil Aviation Authority International, or CAAi, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of the CAA. It is a leading, globally recognised aviation consultancy company that delivers and promotes best practice in aviation governance and education. CAAi provides technical advisory services across a range of aviation-related activities, environmental consulting, professional training, aviation examination services and certification against internationally recognised quality management standards. CAAi’s work contributes to enhancing safety standards worldwide.

The CAA is also quick to respond to innovation in the aviation industry. I have come across two examples in the past few days. The noble Lord, Lord Sugar, has raised with me the issue of PDAs in the cockpit. The CAA is assisting many UK commercial air transport operators to gain approval for the use of electronic flight bags. An electronic flight bag approval will allow an operator to replace many of its cockpit paper-based processes with an electronic solution such as a laptop or tablet device or with an aircraft manufacturer’s own certificated system. The CAA is working with EASA and ICAO to standardise and simplify the requirements for operational approval of electronic flight bags.

The second example is the CAA’s work on its future airspace strategy, alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham. As the noble Lord reminded the Committee, I offered some aviation briefing sessions to Peers shortly before Second Reading. As part of those, the CAA’s Director of Airspace Policy, Mark Swan, gave a presentation on its future airspace strategy. Through the strategy the CAA is modernising how we use our airspace in this country with the aim of achieving a,

“safe, efficient airspace, that has the capacity to meet reasonable demand, balances the needs of all users and mitigates the impact of aviation on the environment”.

Mark Swan explained that this aim depends on the ability to take advantage of technological developments. For example, new communications, navigation and surveillance improve situational awareness of users and controllers; increased navigational accuracy enables closer-spaced routes; and the amount of noise experienced by communities will be reduced as aircraft fly their routes more accurately and consistently. Operators will be able to free route in the upper airspace along the most fuel-efficient track. This is important. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, touched on emissions and the need to tackle them with technology and innovation. The future airspace strategy is an example of how the CAA can facilitate innovation in the civil aviation industry without the need for a new duty.

The noble Lord, Lord Soley, spoke previously about using advanced biofuels in the aviation sector, as did the noble Lord, Lord Davies, today. Today the noble Lord, Lord Soley, talked about quieter aircraft. He will recall that the quota system of regulating noise at Heathrow airport strongly encourages quieter aircraft. Indeed, under the quota system some aircraft cannot fly at all at night. While there are some obvious barriers, the Government believe that sustainable biofuels have a role to play in reducing carbon emissions from transport, particularly in sectors where there are limited alternatives to fossil fuels, such as aviation. The Committee on Climate Change has carried out studies on the potential for biofuels to reduce emissions from UK aviation in the long term. Its latest estimate is that biofuels could supply 10% of jet fuel demand by 2050, suggesting the impact that future innovation might have.

I said that it is my view that market forces, rather than regulators, drive innovation. I believe that the examples I have provided together show that the industry and the CAA have got the balance right.

[The Countess of Mar]

Does the noble Earl agree that in some cases market forces can have a derogatory effect on the industry? For example, it can lead to cutting corners. I think particularly of my own interest, the cutting of corners in reporting incidents on aeroplanes. Because an aeroplane has to be grounded, it means time out of action and competition within the airline industry is so great that it leads to reluctance on the part of employees to report incidents when they should. This leads to a backwards step as far as innovation is concerned, because, if they did report these things, maybe innovation would lead to improvements in facilities. I hope that the noble Earl sees what I mean.

[Earl Attlee]

I entirely agree with the noble Countess that market forces can have an undesirable effect. That is why we need a highly skilled and competent regulator, such as the CAA, to ensure that those undesirable effects of market forces are eliminated as far as possible.

I would like to quote from the Government publication Principles For Economic Regulation:

“The Government will not seek to add objectives, responsibilities or duties to regulators’ remits without detailed consideration of the impact of the addition on the overall framework, and consideration of cross-sector impacts and even then only when it is clear that the addition is the optimal way to achieve the outcome sought”.

I am not convinced that the addition of an innovation duty is,

“the optimal way to achieve the outcome sought”.

For the reasons I have identified, I believe that we are already in a good place with regard to innovation in the aviation industry. There is a risk that giving the CAA an innovation duty would oblige the CAA to meddle in the market and may even restrict the way in which the aviation industry would be able to innovate. This has been an interesting short debate. I can well understand why the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, has tabled his amendment, but I hope that he will withdraw it at the appropriate point.

[Lord Davies of Oldham]

There is no appropriate time like the present, so I will withdraw the amendment after I have given a few words of thanks, first, to those Members of the Committee who support the clear need for innovation. I also think that we needed reassurance from the Minister that the Bill provides sufficient powers and incentives to ensure that the limited part that the CAA can play in its role with regard to the industry is played as fully as possible against the very challenging objectives that we all need to meet through change, particularly those in aircraft engine design. However, I was extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rotherwick, for indicating that there are other aspects of technology that could be of great significance to the industry, to which the Minister also paid due regard.

I accept entirely what my noble friend Lord Soley said about government incentives for the development of new technologies in motor cars, and the licence system is a very effective weapon in those terms. But, as I understand it, neither the vehicles that airports use for towing things around nor their emissions are in any way subject to licence. Therefore, no incentive can be placed on the industry as regards those traction engines for a fresh, new design through the way in which they are licensed. I hope that the Minister has taken on board that we need some imaginative strategies. In fact, he has taken it on board because he is going to tell me about it.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, the noble Lord has suggested that ground vehicles at airports are not subject to regulations. I expect that I will be writing to him to point out that even non-road vehicles have limits on their emissions. There are complex and quite tough regulations to ensure that any ground vehicle reduces its emissions as much as possible. Even a vehicle that is not an on-road vehicle is still subject to regulations on emissions. I think that my letter will go into that.

[Lord Davies of Oldham]

I am grateful for that reassurance but it raises an obvious question. Some airports have taken this issue very seriously already but others have not. I therefore ask the Minister not to tell me how these machines can be improved but rather what is the incentive, compulsion or challenge given to those airports which are not improving to ensure that they do so in the future. That is the nub of this issue with regard to emissions on the ground and at airports.

Without any doubt, the biggest challenge is to the aircraft manufacturing industry. As the Minister indicated in his response, we are not negligible players in these terms and already have had one or two interesting innovations in which we have shown ourselves to be world beating. With this amendment, I was merely seeking to get reassurance from the Minister that he took these issues seriously and that the Bill empowers people sufficiently to give their spur to this development in any way that they can, while always bearing in mind the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, that all new technology is more expensive than that which it replaces if it is going to do a more challenging job unless we have real breakthroughs in terms of design, which from time to time in certain areas occur. In the past, the aviation industry has not failed us in that respect, but the challenges ahead are obviously very intensive. With the Minister’s largely constructive reply, I am happy to withdraw the amendment, as this is a timely moment to do so.

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[Lord Davies of Oldham]

My Lords, I have only one brief comment to make, one which I never thought I would make in Parliament or elsewhere. Oh the joys of Opposition for the Minister to reply.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, before turning to the detail of the points made, I must emphasise the importance of the clause that the amendment would alter. My noble friend Lord Trefgarne mentioned the congestion charge. I have been caught by it but I never dared to appeal. I just paid up. That might be because I knew that I was wrong.

The noble Lord talked about the higher success rate if you bring your lawyer. It may be that the appellant brings his lawyer because he is certain that he is right, so not surprisingly he wins his case. The noble Lord also asked about the appeal process. If someone who has been issued a fixed penalty notice is unhappy about that, he can take it to court in exactly the same way as a motorist can take a matter to court—like the McCaffrey case.

[Lord Trefgarne]

I confess that my memory is perhaps slightly hazy but my recollection is that one cannot take Transport for London to court. If one loses the appeal, that is that.

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[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, the offender will be able to take the matter to an independent appeal tribunal. I will write to the noble Lord with full details of how that system will work.

Clause 102 amends Part 3 of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 to enable the CAA to make use of civil sanctions where it currently relies almost exclusively on criminal prosecutions, which are not always appropriate for technical infringements. The Bill will enable the Secretary of State by order to give the CAA access to a range of civil sanctions provided under Part 3 of the 2008 Act as an alternative to prosecution. We believe that criminal sanctions are disproportionate in relation to some offences, such as minor breaches or offences of an administrative nature.

I do not agree with my noble friend Lord Rotherwick when he suggests that the CAA will be encouraged to issue fixed penalties. The fines will go to the Consolidated Fund, as accepted by my noble friend. I think that he goes a little too far when he suggests that the CAA would abuse its powers and I totally refute the suggestion that these are revenue-raising powers. I was asked for examples. When the commander of an aircraft fails to produce licences for his or her flight crew in a reasonable time when requested to do so by an authorised person, he or she is guilty of a criminal offence and liable to summary conviction and a fine not exceeding level 3 on a standard scale. Should an offender fail to comply with such rules, a fine or civil penalty for breach may be a more appropriate enforcement action than a criminal prosecution, thus ensuring better compliance. I should point out that offenders will not find themselves in the dock because it is a civil penalty. I can assure my noble friends that secondary legislation will be required to grant the CAA these powers. It will be subject to full consultation and impact assessment. Any order will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure in Parliament.

My noble friend Lord Rotherwick asked about the expected scope of compliance changes. The appropriate time to consider costs and benefits of the power is at secondary legislation stage. It would not be good use of public resources to calculate extensive options for what may not be the impact until Parliament has agreed the powers. In particular, Clause 102 inserts certain provisions of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 to the list of enactments in Schedule 7 to the 2008 Act. That enables the Secretary of State by order to give the CAA access to a range of civil sanctions in relation to offences contained in secondary legislation made under the 1982 Act. The provisions of that Act include Section 61 which enables the Secretary of State to make provision for offences to secure compliance with Air Navigation Orders. Such orders are key to the regulation of air navigation in the UK. I am sure that all noble Lords in the Committee would agree with that. They set wide-ranging rules that the CAA largely polices.

Turning to the amendment, as described by my noble friend, it would exclude Section 61 from Schedule 7 to the 2008 Act and thereby deprive the CAA of the use of a range of civil sanctions in relation to offences contained in the Air Navigation Order. This would dilute the intended purpose of Clause 102.

My noble friend Lord Rotherwick asked what the provisions will achieve. The inclusion of Section 61 of the 1982 Act in Schedule 7 to the 2008 Act is important, as it could give the CAA flexibility to use civil sanctions to enforce the provisions of the Air Navigation Order. That would be done only in appropriate cases where the application of criminal penalties was not a proportionate response to the offence which had been committed, particularly in the case of minor administrative breaches. The CAA will not automatically impose fixed monetary policies for breaches of the Air Navigation Order; the CAA will have available a range of civil sanctions under RESA, including fixed monetary penalties, variable monetary penalties, compliance notice and acceptance of enforcement undertakings for imposition. The CAA must publish guidance on the use of such sanctions under a duty to act proportionately under the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006.

In evidence to the Public Bill Committee on the Civil Aviation Bill in another place, a risk was raised that the inappropriate use of new civil enforcement powers could damage the open flow of information between the industry and the CAA. A recommendation was made that the CAA be required to consult on a formal policy before exercising the new powers. I hope that that will give my noble friend some comfort. I do not agree with any suggestion that the CAA would use the new enforcement powers disproportionately. That is because the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 requires regulators to carry out their regulatory functions transparently, accountably, proportionately, consistently, and target them only where action is needed. That includes the CAA, and we are confident that the CAA will abide by those requirements. The Department for Transport intends to consult fully on any secondary legislation which will make civil sanctions available to the CAA in respect of relevant offences and to develop a full impact assessment—a point that I know concerned my noble friend.

For those reasons, I hope that my noble friend will consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Lord Trefgarne]

My Lords, is my noble friend willing to write to me with more detail about the intended appeal processes for the fixed penalty notices? I recognise, as he says, that secondary legislation is likely to be required before these processes come into place, but this is a subject of considerable concern, at least for me. As I explained, the present processes for dealing with appeals against, for example, fixed penalty notices from Transport for London, are unsatisfactory and I hope that they can be improved in respect of whatever the CAA is empowered to do.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I will be delighted to write to all Members of the Committee explaining the Government’s intent on that issue.

[Lord Rotherwick]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his full reply. He went a long way to try to answer all my questions. He still did not answer the question about whether the CAA asked for this.

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[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I can easily do that: it did.

[Lord Rotherwick]

That helps a lot: I now know who to hold responsible. I must point out that within the limited scope of the Bill, which pays hardly even any lip service to general and business aviation, in the one area where we are mentioned, we find ourselves caught on the stick, the discipline area; there are no carrots around. I know that my noble friend is a very generous Minister and I hope that there will be some carrots, having had the stick first.

I am grateful that he will write to my noble friend Lord Trefgarne about the consultation. In past consultations, general and business aviation has not always been represented. I would be most grateful if my noble friend feels able to go as far as to say that that will be the case this time: that there will be general and business aviation members of the consultation and, most importantly, that we are not treated like commercial pilots. We do not earn our living from our licence, we are private pilots who do our best to abide by the rules.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I assure my noble friend that the GBA community will be included in any consultation.

[Lord Rotherwick]

My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister bending over backwards on all my questions. I will read everything with consideration and I hope that we might have the letter before Report stage, which, after all, will be at the end of the summer, in order to make a decision as to whether to come back to this issue again. In the light of that, though, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Rotherwick]

My Lords, I have great sympathy with my noble friend Lord Trefgarne’s opposition to the clause. I would be very interested to hear what the Minister has to say because I think that my noble friend’s concerns are those of many similar pilots.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I would oppose my noble friend Lord Trefgarne’s intention. I believe that Clause 104 should remain part of the Bill. My noble friend said that his pilot’s licence was properly suspended for medical conditions. I currently have the same problem with my HGV licence because my blood pressure is too high—but the Summer Recess is coming soon.

My noble friend was concerned that it might be possible to identify a pilot’s condition because of those small cohorts. It is more likely that medical research would be into large cohorts, such as all pilots with condition X or all class 1 medical certificate holders. Should a smaller cohort be of interest, the data controller would normally look to seek consent first.

There are several reasons to keep the clause part of the Bill, by no means the least of which is that the Government are seeking to enact this change because it was recommended by your Lordships’ Select Committee on Science and Technology in 2007 and this is the first legislative opportunity that successive Governments have had to give effect to your Lordships’ recommendation.

I shall turn to the specific points raised by my noble friend so that I can give him the reassurance that he seeks. First, he has suggested to me—certainly in private; I cannot remember whether he has said this publicly—that the CAA may sell on medical records. I make it very clear that this is not the intention of the legislation and that the CAA has no plans to do this. There is also perhaps the prospect of the CAA requiring even more medical data from pilots and flight crew, because it might be useful for the purposes of later medical research. The CAA cannot ask for more medical information than it needs to consider an application for a medical certificate. The CAA has no intention or wish to ask for extra medical information and no mechanism under which to do so without obtaining individual informed consent. The CAA abides by the data protection principle of keeping the minimal data required for the purpose of medical fitness assessments. If an applicant were asked to provide medical information that appeared to have no relevance to their licence application, it could be expected that they would challenge the need for it.

Clause 104 does not provide the CAA with any further powers to collect medical information. Those powers are already there as part of the CAA’s licensing obligation under the Air Navigation Order. The CAA has no intention to expand the scope of the medical information that it requires of applicants, and this provision would not allow for that. The clause is there solely to permit the CAA to disclose the medical information that it already collects for medical research purposes, subject to the strict safeguards contained in Clause 104(3).

The Committee will note that the CAA does not set out to collect medical data but acquires such data from people wishing to be licensed as pilots, navigators and so on because it has to make a judgment on whether those people are medically fit enough to be licensed. We also think that making this change is a good thing to do. The Civil Aviation Authority receives medical information relating to flight crew and air traffic controllers in the course of its licensing functions. Clause 104 provides for the CAA to be able to disclose this medical information to medical researchers by amending Section 23 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982, subject to the strict safeguards included in the Bill. This information could be used for important medical research into the major functional and incapacitation risks to those individuals—for example, the risks of heart problems. We believe that an increased understanding of the main health risks may in turn lead to an improved understanding of the risk to public safety, which is vital in the aviation industry.

The types of important research envisaged here include the analysis of the electrocardiogram tracings of pilots over an extended period to determine whether small anomalies—that is, differences—seen in the tracings translate to heart problems later in their careers. Given the important benefits of this research, we consider that the provision represents a proportionate response to the legitimate aims pursued. I also remind the Committee that this proposal was supported in public consultation on the Bill, where the vast majority of respondents agreed with making anonymised medical data available for ethically approved research. It is of course vital that in doing this we include strong and effective safeguards to protect individuals’ privacy. The Government are committed to ensuring that medical research will not compromise the rights of individuals to have their confidential medical information protected. I have already answered one of my noble friend’s very good questions, which was about small cohorts.

Individuals’ rights under the Data Protection Act 1998 and Article 8 of the ECHR will be fully respected. The CAA will act as the data controller at all times. We have included strong safeguards in the clause to protect those individuals. First, medical information must be anonymised by the CAA before it is released to medical researchers. Secondly, the disclosure must be for medical research purposes approved by a research ethics committee. Thirdly, the CAA must consider that the research is likely to improve the understanding of health risks to those individuals required to provide medical information to them. Fourthly, the CAA must consider that it would be difficult or expensive to take the steps required by existing legislation to enable disclosure of all the information that is to be disclosed—for example, where the research cohort is particularly large. As the information disclosed by the CAA would be anonymised, any published research would also be in anonymous form. These cumulative safeguards will ensure the appropriate balance between enabling important medical research and protecting privacy rights. I therefore hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his opposition to the clause standing part of the Bill.

[Lord Trefgarne]

My Lords, I am very much persuaded by the arguments that the Minister has put forward. It is important that this information is kept confidential.

I have just one other question to which I suspect my noble friend will not have answer off the cuff, but if he could write to me on it, I would be grateful. Am I not right in thinking that the CAA has access also to medical information on pilots held by the Ministry of Defence? It is important that that information, too, should be kept confidential, but it is also important that the information is available for the researchers if it can be done in a proper way and with proper safeguards. My noble friend may not have that information at his fingertips, but if he could write to me about the MoD position in this matter, I would be greatly obliged.

[Earl Attlee]

I can undertake to give what information I can. However, we both know a little bit about the Ministry of Defence and I am not entirely confident that it would have the data that the CAA would have.

Clause 104 agreed.

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[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I shall resist my noble friend Lord Trefgarne’s intention to oppose this clause and I urge that it should remain part of the Bill, with which I am sure my noble friend will agree. Clause 105 repeals Section 81 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982, which creates an offence of dangerous flying where an aircraft is flown in such a manner as to cause unnecessary danger to any person or property. In practice, prosecutions for dangerous flying have invariably been brought by the CAA under successive Air Navigation Orders, currently the Air Navigation Order 2009, rather than under Section 81 of the 1982 Act. I understand that my noble friend’s concern is about the relative penalties under the Act and the order, and I shall come to that matter in a moment.

The 2009 order is used because it sets out what needs to be proved for an offence to have been committed, including recklessness or negligence, more clearly than does Section 81 of the 1982 Act. Any prosecutions of dangerous flying would be carried out under one of the two articles in the Air Navigation Order. The first is Article 137, which provides that:

“A person must not recklessly or negligently act in a manner likely to endanger an aircraft, or any person in an aircraft”.

The second is Article 138, which provides that:

“A person must not recklessly or negligently cause or permit an aircraft to endanger any person or property”.

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[Lord Rotherwick]

It may help if I jump in. I suspect that planes landing in the Scilly Isles were under CAT—Civil Air Transport. In certain situations, a private plane can be landed under VFR when a public plane cannot under IFR. I only suggest that that might be the case

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, if the aircraft was being operated under the terms of the Civil Aviation Act, it is a matter for the CAA to regulate and investigate. It is not a matter for me to comment on. If it was an aircraft of the Ministry of Defence, it is not covered by the Civil Aviation Act.

[Lord Trefgarne]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for explaining all the penalties. Were I still authorised to fly, I should be very careful not to fly dangerously and fall foul of all the penalties he described.

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[Lord Davies of Oldham]

I hear what the noble Countess says, and I heard that case deployed at the time when we met previously on this issue. Overall, though, my experience is that, whatever risks to livelihood, people have the greatest concern about threats to their long-term health and it is therefore not the case that they conceal these issues. The issue with the asbestos problem was not that people were concealing the impact; what was not being substantiated sufficiently was cause and effect, which is exactly the issue here.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. On the first amendment tabled by the noble Countess, airline pilots and crew members are already protected in this area by Part IVA of the Employment Rights Act 1996, which was inserted by Sections 1 to 2 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, both as workers who can make a protected disclosure to their employer and as individuals who can make one to the CAA. The CAA is a prescribed person for the purposes of that Act, which means that it can receive “protected disclosures” or whistleblowing from the civil aviation industry.

As for awareness of these rights, the CAA has a published statement on its website in relation to its whistleblowing policy which makes it clear that it will investigate all complaints in an appropriate manner, endeavouring to maintain confidentiality at all times.

I add for the sake of completeness that, as well as the protection afforded by the Act, the CAA has long established processes in place for incident-reporting and to safeguard confidentiality. The chief of these is the mandatory occurrence reporting scheme established in 1976. Consequently, the noble Countess’s amendment refers to protections already in place and is unnecessary.

The second amendment proposed by the noble Countess is also unnecessary. However, it also has an important and possibly unintended consequence which makes it unacceptable. The amendment would substitute the existing provision in Section 60 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 with the wording that it proposes. This would be a backward step because it would cause the removal of the power which enables an Air Navigation Order to contain provisions,

“for safeguarding the health of persons on board aircraft”.

That power has already been used.

The duty on the Secretary of State of,

“organising, carrying out and encouraging measures for safeguarding the health of persons on board aircraft”,

now in Section 1(1A) of the 1982 Act, as inserted by Section 8(2) of the Civil Aviation Act 2006, was a widely welcomed reform. The existing Section 60 power is part of delivering that general duty. We do not want to lose that. I suspect that the noble Countess does not want to lose that either, but the effect, perhaps unintentional, of this amendment would be to remove the relevant subsection of Section 60. That is why I regard it as a backward step and why it is opposed by the Government.

There is also a second objection to this amendment. The matters listed in it are a mixture of UK legislation, European legislation and European Aviation Safety Agency technical specifications. They are already enforced by the appropriate regulators in relation to the protections that they give, including safety, technical integrity of aircraft and working conditions for those in the aviation industry.

The principal enforcement agencies are the Civil Aviation Authority and the Health and Safety Executive, and there is a memorandum of understanding, referred to by the noble Countess, between these two bodies setting out their respective responsibilities for enforcing occupational health and safety in relation to public transport aircraft while on the ground and in the air. It was drawn up by the two organisations with the aim of avoiding duplication of effort in the areas of overlapping mutual interest. There is therefore no need specifically to provide for the enforcement of these in an ANO.

The noble Countess suggested that the CAA was complacent. This is far from being the case. Successive UK Governments have investigated the matter thoroughly. The UK has an excellent safety record in aviation which we would not wish to lose by being complacent. Allegations of ill-health caused by cabin air have not been upheld by research. The main research study, published by Cranfield University in May last year, found no evidence of pollutants occurring in cabin air at levels exceeding available health and safety standards and guidelines.

However, I am well aware that the noble Countess has very strong views about the standards and guidelines. Levels observed in the flights that formed part of the study were comparable to those typically experienced in domestic settings. The department has now formally referred the published research studies to the Committee on Toxicity, the independent adviser to the Government on matters concerning the toxicity of chemicals, for it to consider the matter.

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[The Countess of Mar]

My Lords, that is precisely what they are doing. The people I have contact with are ex-BALPA pilots and they are now complaining. If the Minister was to go to a meeting of the GCAQE, he would see a lot of ex-BALPA pilots.

[Earl Attlee]

What I find odd is that the noble Countess has been raising the issue for some time, but no pilot or any member of cabin crew apart from a very few who are in contact with her has ever approached me on the issue. I have received nothing about it.

The noble Countess also asked me about medical data. The swab test research undertaken by the Institute of Occupational Medicine in Edinburgh found concentrations of organophosphate compounds consistent with previous measurements. I remind the Committee that the main research study published by Cranfield University in May last year found no evidence of pollutants occurring in cabin air at levels exceeding available health and safety standards and guidelines. Levels observed in flights that formed part of the study were comparable to those.

[The Countess of Mar]

I remind the noble Earl that in none of those aircraft was there a fume event, but they still found TCP in the aircraft.

[Earl Attlee]

The noble Countess has made that point before. As a mere parliamentarian, I have to rely on the academic research being conducted in an appropriate manner and subject to peer review. All the published research studies have now been formally referred to the Committee on Toxicity which is, as I said, the independent adviser to the Government. When I first came into the House in 1992, I was rapidly aware of the noble Countess’s work regarding organophosphates and sheep dips.

In answer to a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, I am sure that the law is being properly applied. The noble Lord asked: how frequent are fume events? Incidence of fume events is extremely low. The most recent figures show that in 2010, there were 207 contaminated air events reported to the CAA mandatory reporting scheme out of 1.12 million passenger and cargo flights by UK carriers. That is 0.018% or less than 1 in 5,000.

[The Countess of Mar]

Does the noble Earl agree that the Science and Technology Committee found severe underreporting of fume events?

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I am not sure what would drive underreporting of fume events.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, talked about his role in this matter and his discussions with the noble Countess some time ago. As I said, the UK has undertaken research where no other country has done so.

[The Countess of Mar]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Earl, but Australia and the United States have done so.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I am afraid we will have to have a difference of opinion on that matter. In view of what I have said, I hope that the noble Countess will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[The Countess of Mar]

Will the Minister kindly address my question about the ability of the CAA to regulate through COSHH? I repeat: the CAA has no authority to enforce the COSHH regulations—this is from the CAA—and it is therefore inappropriate for the CAA to investigate any breaches of the COSHH regulations.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, in my answer I explained to the Committee that I am certain there is no gap in responsibilities between the HSE and the CAA.

[The Countess of Mar]

But the HSE has the ability to enforce COSHH regulations. The CAA has no ability to enforce COSHH regulations, on its own admission, and it is important that it should be able to.

[Earl Attlee]

Yes, my Lords, but as I explained to the Committee there is a memorandum of understanding, which the noble Countess referred to, to ensure that there is no gap between enforcement by the CAA and the HSE.

[The Countess of Mar]

I thank the Minister for his response but I find that really inadequate. The facts are there: the Health and Safety Executive has the ability to apply COSHH but the CAA, on its own admission, has not that ability. It is important because engine oils and their effects would come under COSHH. I thank the Minister for addressing my other points and I am also very grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Wigley, Lord Rotherwick, Lord Empey and Lord Davies of Oldham, for their contributions and kind comments, which I found quite embarrassing.

This is an important subject. I highlighted problems with sheep dip and I was told at first that it was perfectly safe. I was proved right on that occasion and I hope that noble Lords will listen to me because there are serious effects. What concerns me perhaps as much as anything is that passengers are never told when there has been a fume event. You might get a lady who is newly pregnant—perhaps she does not know that she is— and whose baby, when it arrives, has either a cognitive problem or a deformity. We know that foetal exposure to tiny amounts of organophosphates can be quite serious.

We really need to be looking at this more thoroughly. I know that when the Cranfield work was done, it was agreed that pilots would not be looked at until it could be established whether these toxic chemicals were in fact arising in airplanes. That work has been done and there has been a lot of criticism of it. I am not too happy about it, personally, because I have seen how such research can be twisted in order to provide the answer required and I mentioned intellectual corruption at Second Reading. I am not going to let go of this. I shall pursue it even beyond this Bill. I realise that it is difficult but the noble Earl will hear more of it. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Rotherwick for putting forward this amendment. I can appreciate his desire to remove where possible unnecessary regulation and requirements on the aviation industry, which accords with the Government’s intentions on the red tape challenge. My noble friend has rightly drawn the Committee’s attention to whether there continues to be a compelling need for the mandatory carriage of automatic direction finding, ADF, equipment on some aircraft. I did a little research myself: I looked up ADF and it appeared to be Amsterdam Density Functional, which is,

“a Fortran program for calculations on atoms and molecules”.

I thought that that had got nothing to do with aviation and that I had therefore better stick to my notes.

My noble friend has a passion for ensuring that regulation is appropriate and that we take into account technical developments which can often make regulations out of date. The Civil Aviation Authority has advised that it agrees with my noble friend that the existing arrangements are no longer appropriate, given the recent progress in navigational equipment. I am therefore pleased to learn that the industry now benefits from some alleviation in a general exemption issued by the CAA.

I agree with my noble friend Lord Rotherwick that this matter is worthy of further investigation. It is of course an important safety issue and I am sure that the Committee will agree that it needs a proper and thorough safety assessment before we could remove this requirement. A meeting between my noble friend and the Civil Aviation Authority may be the first step to considering how best to proceed, including an assessment of if and when it might be possible to amend the Air Navigation Order. That would be a more suitable approach than through this Bill, as pointed out by my noble friend Lord Trefgarne. If my noble friend agrees, I would be happy to make the necessary arrangements. I note that my diary is already littered with protected dates for such a meeting with my noble friend. Therefore, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw the amendment at the appropriate point.

[Lord Trefgarne]

My Lords, just before my noble friend withdraws his amendment, perhaps I may point out that automatic direction finding equipment operating on the medium wave is very useful when it is not being used for navigational purposes—for example, for listening to the test match. The noble Lord may or may not use that in consideration.