Eurozone

Douglas Carswell Excerpts

Monday 10th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point about the financial burden. Obviously we bear a burden as an economy that is closely inter-connected with the eurozone, but we took a decision that we wanted to get Britain out of the EU27 mechanism, and we put considerable negotiating effort into doing that. That meant not just the current mechanism, with its €60 billion capacity which had been established—we are still part of that—but ensuring that the permanent bail-out mechanism did not include people who were not in the euro. If the members of the euro want monetary union and want to move towards greater fiscal union, it is not reasonable to ask countries that are not in the euro to be part of one of the key mechanisms of that union, which is a bail-out fund.

[Mr Douglas Carswell (Clacton) (Con)]

The bail-out-and-borrow approach to dealing with the crisis in the eurozone has not worked. We can call it the three R’s —ring-fence, recapitalise, resolution—but it is still bailing out, and bail-out simply begets more bail-out: more public liability to rescue rich men from the folly of their investment decisions. When will my right hon. Friend advocate a new approach, one that works: instead of bail out and borrow, default and decouple?

[Mr Osborne]

The first thing I would say to my hon. Friend is that he is right to allude to the debt dynamics in some of the countries involved, and I mentioned that specifically in the case of Greece. The difference between the Greek situation and the Irish situation at the moment shows that countries can take different paths, and with political will they can deal with their problems. However, if the political system is unable to address those problems, the rest of the international community has to step in.

My hon. Friend’s second allusion—the decoupling—is, I guess, a reference to the break-up of the euro. As he knows, I was against Britain joining the euro—I perhaps did not argue the case on quite as many occasions as he did—but as the world stands today, the break-up of the euro would be absolutely calamitous for the British economy, and it is not in our interests to advocate that. It is profoundly in our national interest to try to make monetary union work. Monetary unions can be made to work, but greater fiscal integration and fiscal union are needed, and—this is a crucial additional part—we also need the competitiveness of the other, peripheral European economies to be greatly improved.

Eurozone (Contingency Plans)

Douglas Carswell Excerpts

Monday 20th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that we need stability in the eurozone, but I do not think that speculation here will help to deliver that stability to the Greek economy or the wider eurozone.

[Mr Douglas Carswell (Clacton) (Con)]

Most previous IMF rescue packages that I can think off have generally involved first a currency devaluation and secondly a debt default—or, should one prefer the term, a restructuring. Does the Minister agree that the IMF should be consistent with that approach in regard to Greece, and should not the IMF oversee a decoupling from the euro and a default on the debts, which would be consistent with its approach in other instances and rescue packages?

[Mr Hoban]

The IMF is the body best placed to decide the conditions to be attached to any rescue package that it puts forward. Strict conditionality is attached to the rescue package for Greece, including significant privatisations, tax collection reform and wider structural reforms. However, I think that this is a judgment for the IMF to make.

Eurozone Financial Assistance

Douglas Carswell Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Douglas Carswell (Clacton) (Con)]

We are told that the Government’s priority is to cut the deficit, and rightly so—but why, therefore, are we assuming the vast liabilities of other countries? Having struggled for the past year to cut £6.2 billion from our public spending, why do we sign up to bail-out commitments twice as great, all in order to bail out a currency we chose not to join? We have been told that the bail-outs are to help our friends, but since when do we help a friend in debt by pressing upon them a high-interest loan? A year of bail-outs has not removed the debt burden from our neighbours and friends; it has merely increased it.

We have endlessly been told that by bailing out the countries in question we are rescuing the people of Ireland, Portugal and elsewhere. I am not sure that the people of those countries quite see those bail-outs as such a salvation. Like the people of Argentina a decade ago, they increasingly recognise that their economic well-being is being sacrificed by politicians in pursuit of grandiose dreams of monetary union. We have heard how these bail-outs will buy time, but time for what? Are they buying time for the bondholders to pass the weight of their losses on to the shoulders of taxpayers? Ministers have sought to reassure us that UK liabilities for the bail-outs will be limited until 2013, but we need to look at the sheer volume of debt that needs to be rolled over in the affected countries in the next 18 months —limiting our liabilities until 2013 is little comfort to those who care to look at the maths.

We have been told that Britain will get this money back, yet at the very moment that Greece hovers on default we proceed to lend £4.2 billion to Portugal. We have also been told that there is something unavoidable about the bail-outs. It is supposedly a deal struck by the former Chancellor at the ECOFIN meeting on 8 May last year, but I can find no evidence to suggest that we sought to challenge it in the ECOFIN meeting in the week that followed. If Ministers were really reluctant participants in the stabilisation mechanism, why did the Economic Secretary to the Treasury write on 18 July last year:

“While these decisions were taken by the previous government, this Government judges them to be an appropriate response to the crisis.”?

That does not sit entirely comfortably with the idea of Government reluctance to join in the bail-outs. If this Government were reluctant about the deal that they claim they inherited, why are we promoting the senior official behind it to be the next ambassador to Brussels?

We have sat here for too long listening to what Ministers tell us. We have been fed too many bogus assurances and too many reasons that have turned out to be excuses. The bail-outs are not only ruinous and quite possibly illegal; they are indefensible. They mean that although we may not be in the euro as a currency union, we have been dragged into it as a debt union. It is not enough simply to listen to further assurances given from the Dispatch Box as Ministers regurgitate what officials permit them to say. This House needs to instruct the Government to act. It is not time for spoiler amendments designed to stop short of instructing the Government to act. It is not time for carefully calibrated wordplay intended to create the illusion of opposition to the bail-out when such opposition does not exist. There is only one way to vote today to halt the haemorrhaging of our cash. I urge colleagues to support the motion in the Lobby, and to reject the Whips’ efforts to water it down with this disgraceful amendment.

Oral Answers to Questions

Douglas Carswell Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

What we did on coming into office was set out a credible plan to reduce the budget deficit that has moved this country out of the financial danger zone. One month ago, the shadow Chancellor told his entire Front-Bench team not to make any spending commitments, and after that they committed to more than £10 billion of spending commitments. They have opposed £50 billion of the cuts. It is completely incredible, and that is why they cannot find any reputable organisation in the world to agree with them.

[Mr Douglas Carswell (Clacton) (Con)]

How high would inflation need to be before we halted further quantitative easing, stopped printing money and raised interest rates?

[Mr Osborne]

The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee is of course independent. It is set a target by the Chancellor, and I expect the Bank to pursue that target.

Oral Answers to Questions

Douglas Carswell Excerpts

Tuesday 8th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

The Monetary Policy Committee is independent of this Chancellor—and, indeed, of previous and future Chancellors—and that is how we intend to keep it. On the hon. Gentleman’s point about the devaluation of the currency, I would just observe that it is incredibly important that the manufacturing industry makes itself even more competitive, and it could use the devaluation as an opportunity to do that. Some Government policies—on taxation and on employment law, for example—will also help in that regard, but the thrust of his question is right: we should not rely solely on the devaluation to make our manufacturing industry globally competitive.

[Mr Douglas Carswell (Clacton) (Con)]

The Chancellor is entirely right to emphasise the need to be careful with public money. Will he therefore please explain his role in approving the deal to make the UK taxpayer liable for billions of pounds to bail out the euro under the European stabilisation mechanism? Will he respond to my freedom of information request, and publish the advice that he was given on the agreement on assuming office?

[Mr Osborne]

First, I will look at my hon. Friend’s FOI request, because I have not seen it. The broader point that I would make is that my predecessor as Chancellor, in the weekend between the general election and the creation of the new Government, agreed to the creation of the European stability facility. That involves a UK commitment which takes place on the basis of qualified majority voting; we do not have a veto. I made it clear to the previous Chancellor at the time that I did not support what he had done. However, it has happened and we have to live with the consequences.

Court of Auditors 2009 Report

Douglas Carswell Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Justine Greening]

My hon. Friend demonstrates exactly why there is a far broader debate to be had on the EU budget and how the money is spent. Tonight we are debating whether the money has been spent in the way that member states agreed when they negotiated how and on what basis the investment would be split between different countries and what the priorities would be for our individual taxpayers.

The Government are determined to bear down on the size of the budget as a priority. We led the debate on limiting the EU 2011 budget in a way that other member states, at the time when we began to gather support, perhaps thought was ambitious. In fact, it worked. My hon. Friend will be aware that, as we go into the fundamental debate about the financial perspective and the longer-term budget, we will also set the parameters—with countries such as France and Germany, which, alongside us, are net contributors and, therefore, absolutely want to see that money spent effectively—within which that debate can take place.

Having led the debate on the amount, there is then a need to start leading the debate within that about priorities and ensuring, as my hon. Friend says, that we do not have wasteful spending on administration or, as the hon. Member for Luton North said, by individual member states. We have to drive out waste at the EU level. That is what we are trying to do at the national level, and it is unacceptable not to go through the same process at the EU level, too.

[Mr Douglas Carswell (Clacton) (Con)]

My hon. Friend talks a great talk about clamping down on the EU’s excesses, but will she please explain why our net contribution has gone up and will continue to go up, and why she is not reducing the amount that we contribute to the EU, when we are having to make reductions in Britain—at home?

[Justine Greening]

We are doing slightly more than talking a good talk. I share my hon. Friend’s concern that one key thing driving the budget up was the previous Government’s disastrous approach to negotiating the common agricultural policy, which saw us give away a huge chunk of our abatement and, over this Parliament, will cost the British taxpayer about £10 billion. That is totally unacceptable. He says that it is important we bear down on excesses, and I agree. That is one reason why we led the debate to stop the European Parliament’s proposal for a 6% rise in spending. We achieved that, and we are now trying to ensure that, when we go into the longer-term debate about the financial perspective over the next seven years, which starts in 2014, we begin to see real-terms reductions. Countries such as France and Germany are backing us up on that, and those are the first steps towards delivering what we want.

My hon. Friend is right that we need to go beyond words and start delivering, and that is absolutely what we want to do. For tonight, the key aspect is how we can ensure that, when we have “decisioned” the funds, the final building block, which is about financial management, is delivered professionally, robustly and with an integrity that companies would recognise. We have to move towards a better system than the one we have picked up.

We are also keen to see some quickly taken measures and short-term gains, such as a one-stop shop that provides better information to those member states implementing EU funds, and a published scorecard of recovery orders against member states. That sort of transparency will start to change the culture, but we have to question how we have reached the position of poor financial management in which we find ourselves. The answer is partly down to culture, which has to change and improve at the EU and member state levels.

Sound financial management is critical, and it brings us closer to our overarching aim, which is a budget that delivers value for money for British and EU citizens. As I am trying to get over, that is not a negative agenda, because securing better value for money is a positive thing to do. It is what we are doing; it is what taxpayers want to see us doing; and it is what all member states should want to do themselves. We believe that we have a positive agenda, and it is not just about picking or prioritising the right objectives. Last year, our excellent debate in the House about the EU budget was a good chance for Members to discuss those objectives. We should return to that over the coming months, but critically we have to ensure that, when we have “decisioned” EU money, it is spent and implemented effectively.

As I said, only yesterday I met Mr Donchev, the Bulgarian Minister overseeing the administration of EU funds in Bulgaria. I am pleased that alongside such meetings, including the meeting that I plan to have with the European Court of Auditors, and the work that we are doing with the European Commission and MEPs in the European Parliament, there is a sense that people are receptive to the need to improve financial management and want to see that happen.

I am keen and grateful for this House’s support for the Government in pursuing that agenda, because that is vital. It was important that we could go into the negotiations saying that as a Parliament we stood behind the motion on bearing down on the EU economy and our decision that a 6% rise was unacceptable. We can learn lessons from that. We as a Parliament need to stick together and show solidarity in tackling these issues. That is one step that we must take.

Even my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), in his role as Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee, has a role to play, together with his fellow-chairmen of scrutiny committees across Europe, in pushing this sort of issue to the top of the agenda. We have to be prepared to say in all channels that we must get an EU budget that becomes affordable, that is spent on the right priorities, and that is managed in the right way. His role is also vital in being able to back up some Governments while perhaps pressing those for whom this has been less of a priority to put it further up their list of priorities in future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Justine Greening]

To my mind, that is the work that we need to ensure happens. I met Commissioner Šemeta in October 2002 to discuss his plan to improve financial management across the EU. The challenge for the Government, which I set out for him and to which he was receptive, is to make that stronger and better, and to make it more of a priority for the EU as a whole. As hon. Members have pointed out, there is a long way to go, but I assure the House that we are making a start.

[Mr Carswell]

My hon. Friend was right to highlight that a very bad financial deal was negotiated for the United Kingdom under the previous Administration. Does she therefore think it right that we should promote some of the senior Treasury officials who were responsible for those negotiations to senior positions in UKRep?

[Justine Greening]

Let us be clear that the responsibility for the catastrophic decision on the EU rebate is fairly and squarely political. I hope that the shadow Minister will tell the House why somebody in the Cabinet and the former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, thought it was a good idea to give up the equivalent of £10 billion in rebate over the course of this Parliament, in return for a common agricultural policy review that has taken years to come through and will ultimately be part of an overall budget review and a discussion on the financial perspective. In other words, they gave it up in return for a debate. That was a terrible deal for the UK taxpayer.

I assure my hon. Friend that I will take every opportunity I get, as I am sure he will, to make sure that people remember just how badly the previous Government dealt with this whole area, and just how badly they let down the UK people when it came to standing up for our interests in Brussels and having the judgment to make the right call on behalf of the UK taxpayer. That relates not just to the rebate, but to the Lisbon treaty.

Loans to Ireland Bill

Douglas Carswell Excerpts

Wednesday 15th December 2010 Commons Chamber

I strongly support the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Stone, which I hope are accepted by the House. I hope that we make it clear that this is a loan from Britain to Ireland as a gesture of friendship to a fellow country in danger and that it is not to do with European Union arrangements. It is a friendship loan between two very close countries. Ireland is the country closest to us; it is a country with which we have deep historical links. I hope that all hon. Members will support the amendments if they are pressed to a Division—I certainly look forward to voting.

[Mr Carswell]

I wish to discuss amendment 6. It commands great interest across the House, although that may be difficult to believe given the swathe of green Benches that we can see, and I hope that we will have a chance to divide the House on it. It is right that we should be looking to help Ireland and debating how to do so, not simply because of this country’s economic self-interest, but because of the close cultural ties between Britain and Ireland. It is fair to say that there is not a street in any town in this country where there are not close kith and kin connections between our two countries.

The question is whether the Bill helps us to do that. My hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) spoke eloquently, making the point that this deal is not tailored to help the Republic of Ireland, but has been imposed on it. It is not a case of our passing this to bail out Ireland, so much as our passing it to bail out the euro. My right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) has said that, and he has blogged eloquently about how the European Central Bank triggered this crisis. It began when the ECB called into question Ireland’s ability to finance loans. Why did it do so? It did so because the ECB sacrificed Ireland to staunch the haemorrhaging of confidence in the euro and deal with the growing storm around it. The ECB put preserving a paper currency without a state ahead of the well-being of millions of Irish households.

Ireland is in debt because she is a victim of a credit bubble caused by euro membership, but when we consider amendment 6 we must ask how pushing a potentially high-interest loan on a friend reduces her debts. How does extending a debt as overdraft help that debtor to repay their debts? That will dig Ireland deeper into debt. Each of the eight tranches of this loan is yet another step towards debt. It is time that we stopped digging Ireland into deeper debt. The bail-out will not reduce the debt. People sometimes talk about the bail-out as though it were a solution to debt, but it is a deepening of debt. We need to make certain that the rate of interest and the terms of this extension of Ireland’s overdraft are in her interests and those of her people. To do that, we need to make sure that we in this House have the final say over the terms of the small print.

Amendment 6 seeks to ensure that the interest on this £3.2 billion overdraft extension is kept low. The small print is certainly not definitive on the subject. The summary of terms states:

“The rate of interest payable on a loan will be at a fixed rate per annum equal to the aggregate of:

(a) the Margin; and

(b) the Sterling 7.5 year swap rate at the date of disbursement.”

We are told by the Chancellor that, at the moment, that would be 5.9% and the document suggests that figure, but it is not definitive. We need to give the House of Commons the final say on the rate, and we need a formal means to allow the House to ratify the rate of interest.

Hon. Members will have heard some discussion about how Iceland got a significantly lower rate. Why is that? Is Iceland a better friend? It is for public debate, public concern and the legislature, not technocrats in the Treasury and watery eyed officials, to decide the rate of interest that we charge our friend.

The explanatory notes have, I think, been issued so that we believe that they are close to what amendment 6 suggests. We are asking for something that is not a million miles away from the explanatory notes, so why not formalise the arrangements? Why not require the approval of an order under the affirmative procedure in the House? We have only the explanatory notes to go on—[Interruption.] I am delighted that those on the Front Bench are paying such attention. We only have the explanatory notes to go on, so why not enshrine these arrangements by order? The last time that we left EU matters to Sir Humphrey’s explanatory notes, we were, bluntly, mugged. The explanatory notes to the Bill on sovereignty—the European Union Bill—were not even defended by the Minister in Committee. It is a cause of concern that we have only the explanatory notes. We must enshrine these arrangements in legislation to make certain that we in this House, who are accountable to the taxpayers who will ultimately have to stump up for this, are satisfied with the arrangements. That would be good for us and good for Ireland, too.

Over the past seven months, we have seen what happens when the House takes its eye off the small print. We have seen what happens when we leave it to Ministers, officials and Treasury negotiators to handle the small print. For example, we have seen how non-euro member countries, such as Britain, become liable through the small print for open-ended eurozone bail-outs until 2013. That is the price we pay as a House for taking our eyes off the small print. It would be quite wrong, incidentally, to blame the previous Government for that. The deal took effect after the coalition Government came to office.

When this House took its eye off the small print on Treasury negotiations on matters European, the Government managed somehow to sign us up to a European Council document that established a common legal framework for pan-EU economic governance. I suggest that this House should not form a habit of deferring the small print to the Treasury and its officials. It is prudent to require the Government to gain the approval of this House over the interest rate.

The amendment goes to the heart of why we are here and why we have a House of Commons in the first place. It is the purpose of us as MPs—and it has been for many hundreds of years—to oversee what Ministers do with our money. That should include the terms under which they lend our money and the terms under which they make taxpayers liable for debts incurred through such financial arrangements. The amendment is reasonable and in line with what the Government are seeking to do—or claim that they are seeking to do—in the explanatory notes drafted by officials.

The amendment would ensure that Ministers thought very carefully and wisely when they entered negotiations and finalised arrangements. It would also help to restore purpose to the House, which some of us would suggest has been in the past rather supine, submissive and spineless. Ultimately, it would ensure a fairer deal for our closest friend and our closest neighbour. I hope to press the amendment to a Division and to obtain the support of Members on both sides.

[Mark Durkan]

On amendment 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash), the amendment of itself does not preclude the fear that he and my hon. Friend the Member for Luton North (Kelvin Hopkins) have that at some point in the future there might be a loans to Spain Bill, a loans to Portugal Bill or something similar. The amendment would not preclude the possibility of any other such bilateral loans being arranged in future. I do not believe that the amendment, which is commended to us in those terms, will serve the purpose for which it was tabled.

Loans to Ireland Bill

Douglas Carswell Excerpts

Wednesday 15th December 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

From what I could tell from what my hon. Friend was saying in the previous debate, he thought it important to have parliamentary scrutiny. It is true that I could have issued the loan under the common-law powers available to me, and come back at a later point to seek parliamentary approval. I thought the House would prefer me to seek parliamentary approval first, before making the loan—but there we go; you can’t please everyone.

[Mr Douglas Carswell (Clacton) (Con)]

The Chancellor suggested that it is at his discretion that he has brought forward this Bill. Is it not the case that the 1932 convention requires him to do so—and does not that, rather than his discretion, explain why this legislation is before the House?

[Nadhim Zahawi (Stratford-on-Avon) (Con)]

rose—

Banking Reform

Douglas Carswell Excerpts

Monday 29th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Douglas Carswell (Clacton) (Con)]

I congratulate the right hon. Member for Oldham West and Royton (Mr Meacher) on securing this debate. He made some important, and actually rather sensible, points and gave a powerful critique of the status quo from a position on the left. However, as a free marketeer, I have to disagree with him. I believe that we need a free-market critique of the status quo, but the centre-right has failed to think critically about the status quo for too long. The right hon. Gentleman has therefore done us a great service by forcing Conservative Members to ask the questions that for years we have failed even to ponder. We are in this mess not because of an absence of the free market but because we do not have a proper system of free-market banking. It was not the markets that caused the banking mess that we are in; the markets called time on other people’s unsustainable folly. They called time on an unsustainable credit boom and on the folly and stupidity of central bankers.

Banking is undoubtedly corporatist. To put it another way, if one were to read Ayn Rand’s “Atlas Shrugged” and to replace the words “railroad” and “rail company” with the words “credit” and “bank”, one would get a pretty good description of what has been going on in recent years. We have had a failure of the free market in the allocation of credit in this country. It is extraordinary that we compound that failure by talking ourselves into seriously suggesting that politicians and technocrats should ration credit. The absence of a pricing mechanism at the heart of the banking system is ultimately what caused the credit boom and the banking failure. In a normal market, when demand for a product increases, the price for that product goes up. That, in turn, stimulates supply.

In banking, unfortunately, things are a little different. When demand for credit increases, the price—the interest rate—is kept low or constant. Pricing does not therefore stimulate increased supply. On the contrary, a supply of additional credit is not met through higher savings. It is met by the creation of candyfloss credit—by banks being able to conjure up credit out of thin air. Banks do not meet the additional supply of credit by encouraging more people to save; on the contrary, they continue to lend IOUs on the basis of IOUs on the basis of IOUs. At the height of the credit crunch, for every pound deposited in a bank, IOUs had been written out some 44 times through the miracle of fractional reserve banking.

Banks have a legal privilege to conjure up credit out of nothing that ultimately stems from their ability—this is an extraordinary fact—to call a depositor’s deposit their own, to treat it legally as if it were their own, and to lend against it many times. It is that practice that has resulted in a credit pyramid and runaway credit booms, unrestrained by the pricing mechanism that would normally apply and would normally restrain demand and supply. The demand is unrestrained, the supply is unrestrained, and the price is low. The result is Ponzi credit bubbles. An incredibly distortive and disruptive effect is created every 20 or 30 years in supposedly free-market economies that have corporatist banking at their heart, and it leads to sugar-rush booms.

If a whisky distiller sold empty bottles or a food manufacturer sold empty food packets, they would be done for selling thin air, yet banks are essentially allowed to sell empty IOU promises—and people dare to call that the basis of the credit system that fuels capitalism. No wonder capitalism appears to be at risk. We have a crony system of corporate capitalism rather than free- market banking.

Since the credit crunch, experts in orthodoxy have talked about three different solutions, the first of which is low interest rates. We have had pretty low interest rates, and do you know what? It has not really stimulated an increase in the supply of credit. That should not surprise us. Keeping prices low does not stimulate production. Secondly, people have printed more money: big government has shored up a big corporatist banking pyramid on the back of the real wealth creators. It is a system of indirect taxation, inflation and debauching the currency. Thirdly, people have talked about breaking up the banks.

I disagree with all those proposed solutions, but I take issue particularly with the idea of breaking up the banks. I think that instead of crude institutional separation of the banking system, we need an alternative that allows legal separation within existing banking structures. We need a new legal status for deposits, so that a depositor who opens an account can choose to ensure that his deposits are legally his property, and the bank cannot endlessly lend against them. That would not abolish fractional reserve banking, but it would allow us to decide over a long period, organically, whether we needed to move away from the banking system that we have at present, which allows endless candyfloss credit to be manufactured.

Banks do need reform, but I do not believe that they need more controls. We need to address fundamental flaws in the banking system, but in a way that ensures that the pricing mechanism allocates the supply of credit properly. We need less from central banks and fewer controls from central bankers, not more.

Financial Assistance (Ireland)

Douglas Carswell Excerpts

Monday 22nd November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

The plans to deal with Ireland’s budget deficit are a very important part of the Irish Government’s approach, but they are also part of the international package. The further fiscal tightening was specifically referred to in the statement issued by Finance Ministers yesterday. That will mean that Ireland has a budget deficit of less than 3% by 2014. If we had not taken the action that this Government have taken to accelerate the proposals we inherited, we would have been the only European country in that year with a budget deficit of more than 3%.

[Mr Douglas Carswell (Clacton) (Con)]

We might be outside the euro as a currency union, but does the small print of the Lisbon treaty not in effect make us, as we are discovering, members of the euro as a debt union? Notwithstanding protocol 15, article 122 of the Lisbon treaty means that we pay. Will not that mean enormous non-discretionary liabilities as and when other eurozone countries seek similar bail-outs?

[Mr Osborne]

As I said in reply to earlier questions, we entered into certain commitments about the mechanism that I did not support at the time; I have made that clear. I was an opponent of the Lisbon treaty, as were many hon. Members. However, I have to deal with the world as I find it today, and that is a world in which Ireland’s economic situation is unsustainable. One of the reasons for choosing to offer a bilateral loan is precisely so that this Parliament, including my hon. Friend, can have a view and a vote on it, and we can account for that to our constituents.