Gaza

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Monday 14th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement and, indeed, for giving me advance sight of it this afternoon.

Today, a spiral of violence has again engulfed Gaza, southern Israel and the west bank, bringing untold suffering to innocent people in its wake. Of course, I unequivocally condemn the firing of rockets into Israel by Gaza-based militants. No Government on earth would tolerate such attacks on its citizens, and we recognise Israel’s right to defend itself.

As the Foreign Secretary set out, in recent days hundreds of rockets have been fired from Gaza at Israel, and at least three Israelis have been seriously injured. However, he was also right to acknowledge that, since the start of the Israeli military operation in Gaza just seven days ago, more than 170 Palestinians have been killed and thousands more have been injured. The UN has reported that more than 80% of those killed were civilians, and that a third of those killed were children. Although this conflict cannot and must not be reduced simply to a ledger of casualties, the scale of the suffering in Gaza today must be fully and frankly acknowledged, because the life of a Palestinian child is worth no less than the life of an Israeli child.

The Foreign Secretary has rightly condemned the horrific kidnap and murder of three Israeli teenagers and the burning alive of a teenage Palestinian, but although these repellent crimes seem to be the proximate cause of the latest spiral of violence, does he accept that the underlying cause of this latest crisis is the failure over decades to achieve a two-state solution for two peoples?

The spiral of violence of recent days is grimly familiar to anyone who remembers Operation Cast Lead in 2008-09 and Operation Pillar of Defence in 2012. The same bloodstained pattern is repeating itself. In the first operation, Israel declared a unilateral ceasefire. In the second operation, the Egyptians brokered one. Both times, it was clear that the conflict between Israel and Hamas could not be solved through force of arms alone. Does the Foreign Secretary therefore recognise that there can be no military solution to this conflict? Does he further accept that the scale of the suffering in Gaza, compounding the effects of the continuing blockade, serves to fuel hatred and, indeed, to embolden Israel’s enemies?

Does the Foreign Secretary agree that if the operating logic of Hamas is terror and the operating logic of Israel is deterrence, then pleas by the international community for restraint alone will be insufficient? Today, the risk of an all-out escalation in the conflict and the threat of a full ground invasion are still palpable—and preventable, if Hamas stops firing rockets.

As the Opposition, we are clear not only on the need for an immediate ceasefire, but that a full-scale ground invasion would be a disaster for the peoples of both Gaza and Israel, and a strategic error for Israel. Does the Foreign Secretary agree, and will he now make that position clear to the Israeli Government in the crucial hours and days ahead?

The Foreign Secretary spoke of the statements made by the UN Security Council on Saturday calling for a ceasefire, which I of course welcome. Alongside the Arab League at its meeting today, the UN must be forthright in its role of seeking to bring the recent violence to an end. Will he therefore support calls for the UN Secretary-General to travel to the region to act as a mediator between the two sides?

We know from bitter experience that a spiral of violence that reinforces the insecurity of the Israelis and the humiliation of the Palestinians leads only to further suffering. For Israel, permanent occupation, blockade and repeated military action in occupied land will make peace—and, ultimately, security—harder, not easier, to achieve. Alas, it is not a strategy for peace; it is a recipe for continued conflict.

The Foreign Secretary rightly and generously paid tribute to US Secretary of State Kerry’s considerable personal efforts to advance the middle east peace process, but, in truth, today there is no peace and there is also no process; instead there are continued rocket attacks and continued settlement expansion, growing fear and anxiety, and ongoing occupation.

I of course welcome the humanitarian efforts by both DFID and UNRWA that the Government have set out, but we all know that a humanitarian response, while vital, is not itself sufficient to end the suffering. In the past few days, Israel’s overwhelming military might has been obvious. Hamas, weakened today by Sisi’s rise in Egypt and differences with Iran over Syria, can avert the risk of an imminent ground invasion by stopping the rocket attacks, but Israel needs a strategy for building peace, not just tactics for winning the next round of war. This is a time and this is a crisis that demand not revenge, but statesmanship motivated by justice. Only politics, and a negotiated solution, offers a way forward to peace.

[Mr Hague]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his questions, which show that we share the same analysis of the situation and offer a similar response. He said that he was clear that no Government on earth could tolerate such attacks, and that Israel had the right to defend itself. I also made that clear in my statement. We also share the analysis that, while what he called the proximate cause was the horrific murders that have taken place in recent weeks, the underlying cause is the failure to make progress in the middle east peace process. That is something to which we must continue to give our attention.

The right hon. Gentleman also mentioned the work of Secretary Kerry. I discussed these matters with Secretary Kerry yesterday afternoon in Vienna, and I can tell the House that he remains determined about the peace process despite everything that has happened, which is a great credit to him. He is determined that the United States will still play a leading role in pushing forward the process, and that this is a pause and not the end of the efforts to push it forward. We will continue to encourage him in that, and to help to deliver the support of the European Union.

I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman that there is no military solution to this, and that calls for restraint are important but not sufficient. We are very clear in our calls for restraint to all sides, including in the conversations I had with Israeli Ministers over the weekend, when I made it clear that we wanted to see restraint, proportionate response, de-escalation and the avoidance of civilian casualties. I think that the implications of such statements are very clear. We will support whatever role the UN Secretary-General can take in this.

The right hon. Gentleman was right to draw attention to the fact that Egypt played an important role in the November 2012 ceasefire. That is why I have been having discussions with the Egyptian Foreign Minister in recent days. On this occasion, other Arab states are also active in trying to bring about an agreed ceasefire. That is why I have been discussing this with other Arab Foreign Ministers before their meeting tonight, and we will continue to encourage them to do that. I believe that there is a common analysis, and a common appeal for a renewal of the peace process instead of a continuation of the violence, right across the House.

Oral Answers to Questions

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Tuesday 17th June 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

Let me say again that the new Government of the Palestinian Authority contain no Hamas members and have signed up to the Quartet principles, but I absolutely condemn any encouragement to foment further tensions, including the kidnapping of the three Israeli teenagers. That is exactly the sort of thing that obstructs a successful peace process and is presumably designed to do so. It is important that Hamas or anyone else desists from it.

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

Let me press the Foreign Secretary a little further on the subject of Iran. I welcome his announcement that the British embassy in Tehran will be reopened. Iran surely has a choice to make between being a stabilising and a destabilising force in an already volatile region, and Britain has a responsibility to try to ensure that Iran makes the right choice. Effective diplomatic links can surely assist in that endeavour. Will the Foreign Secretary set out his thinking on how engagement with Iran on tackling the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Iraq could be used to help encourage a change of approach from Iran in relation to the conflict in Syria more broadly, which we all agree is intimately linked to the violence engulfing Iraq today?

[Mr Hague]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I referred to this yesterday during my statement and in response to questions earlier: we would welcome, and we will press for, a wider change in the foreign policy of Iran. Nuclear negotiations are taking place now, and it is important that those issues are resolved between Iran and the rest of the international community. Iran has the capability to play a more positive role across the region. It has played, for many years, a divisive and sectarian role through supporting divisive and often terrorist groups in other parts of the region. We look to it to desist from that, and we will use the expansion of our bilateral relations to press for that as well as to encourage links between the peoples of our countries and to have a good understanding of each other’s positions.

[Mr Alexander]

Let me ask the Foreign Secretary specifically about the nuclear negotiations that are under way. As he well knows, the deadline of 20 July for agreeing a comprehensive nuclear deal is now fast approaching. Does he accept that it is vital, notwithstanding the renewed diplomatic engagement with Iran, that the United Kingdom continues to exert pressure on Iran in the coming weeks to make the necessary concessions to reach a final deal on that agreed international timetable?

[Mr Hague]

Absolutely. Those negotiations are entering a particularly intensive phase as we come towards 20 July, which is six months after the commencement of the interim deal on the nuclear issue. We made provision in the interim deal for that deadline to be rolled over for another six months, but no plan has been made to do so at the moment. It is important that the negotiations make major progress before 20 July, and that will require a more realistic approach by Iran in the negotiations than anything we have seen in recent months.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hague]

Yes, absolutely. The arrival in Ukraine of three Russian tanks further underlines how Russia is allowing arms supplies to go to illegally armed groups in the south and east of Ukraine. Desisting from that will be fundamental to any understanding between the two countries, which it is in the interests of Russia to achieve.

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

Given the Gazprom decision of recent days of which the Foreign Secretary spoke a moment ago, will he set out what steps are being taken by the British Government along with our allies to continue to pressure Russia to engage more constructively with the Ukrainian Government in the light of what many will see as an aggressive and reprehensible act?

[Mr Hague]

From across the European Union and from the United States pressure is being exerted on Russia to desist from supplying illegally armed groups, as I have said, and to ensure that they continue to talk to and work with President Poroshenko of Ukraine. That is a very strong message from across the western world and that work will continue, of course, over the coming weeks. We will discuss this among EU Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg on Monday and I believe that a strong and united message will come from that meeting.

Iraq and Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Monday 16th June 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement and for advance sight of it this afternoon.

Let me begin by turning to the Foreign Secretary’s remarks on Iraq. That country is today facing fundamental threats to its integrity, security and stability. Faced with a lightning advance by a few thousand Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant fighters from their base in Syria’s Raqqah province, the Iraqi army’s presence in the northern and western Sunni-majority provinces has effectively collapsed. Beneath these latest advances for ISIL lies the deeper and fundamental question, not just for Iraq, but for its neighbouring countries across the region: can they, in time, develop a pluralistic, democratic politics, where people live together as citizens, rather than dividing along sectarian, ethnic or religious lines? Alas, today, the answer to that question still remains uncertain.

Inevitably and understandably, these events have rekindled the debate around the military intervention in Iraq 11 years ago. For most British people, including many of us who supported the action at the time, the fears of those opposed to the intervention have been vindicated by subsequent events. It is futile to deny that subsequent history, as surely as it would be folly to repeat it. Yet it is also facile to suggest that the crisis affecting Iraq today can be attributed solely to the consequences of intervention. Such an account denies the truth that the slide towards crisis in Iraq has been exacerbated by the civil war in Syria. Today these are two nations sitting astride the Sunni-Shi’ite faultline, engulfed increasingly by sectarian violence, while the rest of the region has looked on as sectarian tensions rise.

Tragically for Iraq, the hallmark of Nouri al-Maliki’s Shi’a-dominated Government has been a sectarian rather than an inclusive approach. Indeed, the welcome progress made by the leadership of the Kurdistan Regional Government since 2003 serves only further to highlight the extent of the Iraqi central Government’s failures in moving the country forward. Will the Foreign Secretary set out what specific steps the UK Government are taking, in co-ordination with allies, to encourage that formation of a new Government in Iraq? Beyond his conversation yesterday, what contact is being planned to urge Prime Minister Maliki to take concrete measures to reduce sectarian tensions, empower regional Governments and re-professionalise the Iraqi armed forces?

Today and in statements made over recent days, the Foreign Secretary confirmed that British military intervention in Iraq is not being contemplated. I welcome this assurance. Will he further give the House the assurance that the Government will not agree to any proposals significantly to increase the nature or scale of support that we are already giving to the Iraqi Government without a much wider debate in Parliament, and indeed the country?

It is clear that Iran is heavily engaged in Iraq today, so it was disappointing to hear Tehran apparently rule out direct talks with the Americans earlier this morning. I welcome confirmation that the Foreign Secretary has been in touch with his Iranian counterpart earlier today, but does he agree with me that there is now an urgent case for ensuring an effective British diplomatic presence in Tehran to help co-ordinate such discussions and to advance dialogue?

As the crisis continues, the scale of the humanitarian suffering inevitably grows, so I welcome the additional humanitarian funding that the Government have already announced, but will any further requests from Iraq’s Government for additional humanitarian support be considered promptly?

Many British citizens will have watched the scenes both in Syria and Iraq in recent days with growing concern and anxiety, so it is right that we pay tribute today to the work of the British intelligence and security forces, which are doing vital work to keep us all safe. Will the Foreign Secretary set out the Government’s latest assessment of the threat posed by British citizens returning from the region? I know that the Foreign Secretary will be concerned, too, about the safety of British diplomatic staff in Baghdad, Irbil, and Basra, so can he assure us that all the necessary plans are in place to guarantee their safety? The most urgent task now is for Iraq’s leadership to unite and galvanise its response to this crisis—the future of the whole country and the fate of millions of its citizens depend upon that.

Let me turn now to the preventing sexual violence in conflict summit in London, which was a genuine credit to the work of campaigners and activists around the world who have tirelessly worked to raise this issue up the political agenda. The British Government, and the Foreign Secretary personally, have done a great deal in recent months to help do just that, and I commend him sincerely for his efforts.

The Foreign Secretary was right to say in his statement that the priority now must be to translate words into practical action. I welcome the further £6 million pledged by the UK to support survivors of sexual violence in conflict. The statement of action to tackle the culture of impunity surrounding sexual violence in conflict, to which the Foreign Secretary rightly referred, was indeed an important step forward. Alongside agreeing a coherent legal framework, will he set out what further steps will be taken to help tackle some of the underlying issues that contribute to impunity, such as the independence of the judiciary within conflict-affected states? I look forward to the publication of the comprehensive report on the summit. Could he give us an indication of when we can expect it to be published? The real test now is whether the summit in London can make a difference on the ground in conflict zones around the world. The Foreign Secretary will certainly have our support in his work to ensure that it does.

[Mr Hague]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. There is a huge amount of common ground on both these subjects. As he said, now is an important moment for seeing whether pluralistic, truly democratic politics can be created in Iraq. He made some references to the history and debates surrounding intervention, and I agree with what he said about that, too, in that there are many roots to what is happening here, including the growth of sectarianism, of religious intolerance across the middle east and, of course, the crisis in Syria. We must not think that everything that happens is a result of western action or inaction, although our actions can, of course, have a very important effect.



As for the specific steps that we are taking to encourage that pluralistic and inclusive politics, the primary step is, of course, persuasion. This is a sovereign country. I have put that argument—not for the first time—to Iraqi Ministers, who have been making the case directly to Prime Minister Maliki, among others, for some time, and our embassy is busily engaged in doing that with Iraqi Ministers now. However, I think that what has happened in Iraq over the past week will be a very vivid demonstration to Iraqi leaders that this is necessary, and is in their own interest. It is not just desirable as a point of political principle. It is essential for the future of Iraq that Sunni, Shi’a and Kurds work together—that all who support the existence of an Iraqi state work together—and if what is now happening does not demonstrate that clearly to them, nothing will. We will always try to persuade, but events on the ground are demonstrating the need for this.

The right hon. Gentleman endorsed what I had said about our approach to questions of military intervention. I am sure that, if there were a substantial change in that policy, I should be back here explaining it to the House, or asking permission for it, depending on the circumstances. He asked about relations with Iran. As I said in my statement, over the last few days I have talked to a number of Foreign Ministers around the region. As well as those whom I mentioned in the statement, I have talked to Ministers in Israel and Iran. Indeed, I spoke to the Foreign Minister of Iran on Saturday about a number of matters, including the situation in Iraq. He said that there was a case for a further step forward in our bilateral relations. I have discussed that with him, and I shall have something more to say about our discussions imminently—in fact, very imminently, if the right hon. Gentleman is here tomorrow. That is a heavy hint. However, our work on that is distinct from discussions on Iraq, which is partly why I shall address those separately.

As for humanitarian support, the right hon. Gentleman can be absolutely sure that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development and her Department are very quick to react. They have had the first field team in the north of Iraq in the last few days. They work closely with all the United Nations agencies, and envisage that more support may be necessary. Of course, we keep the safety of our staff in Baghdad under close review.

I was grateful for the right hon. Gentleman’s supportive remarks about the work of the Government and many people around the world on the preventing sexual violence initiative. As he said, the key thing now is to turn that into practical action. I am convinced that if everyone who was at the summit last week now did what is set out in the protocol and the declaration on ending sexual violence in conflict, it would make a huge difference throughout the world. We all understand that a great deal of work will still be necessary to ensure that practical actions are taken by prosecutors in independent judiciaries, in military training and in the changing of laws. However, I believe that we have given real momentum to that work, and that it is an essential part of what I have described as a great strategic prize of this century: the full social, political and economic empowerment of women everywhere. We in the Government will remain utterly dedicated to that.

Ukraine

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Monday 28th April 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I begin by thanking the Foreign Secretary for this statement and for advance sight of it.

Russia’s willingness to violate the territorial integrity of Ukraine is the gravest challenge to the European security order in decades. As this crisis continues, there are those who now argue that these actions are already undermining the belief of so many Europeans in recent years that further conflict on the European continent had become all but impossible.

The difficult but vital task of the international community, which is a matter of bipartisan agreement across the House, must be to ensure that, by demonstrating to the Russians the costs and consequences of their actions, we manage to secure a de-escalation of this continuing crisis. So I start by joining the Foreign Secretary in paying tribute to Members across the House who took steps to pass the recent motion that suspended the voting rights of Russian MPs on the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

At the weekend, I had the opportunity to meet a number of US Senators who were clear in their view that further action by Europe was now necessary. So I welcome the announcement made on 26 April by the G7 to extend existing sanctions against Russia, as well as today’s meeting of the Permanent Representatives in Brussels to finalise the extended list of individuals sanctioned by the EU. Similar measures have been in place since the conclusion of the EU Foreign Affairs Council on 17 March and yet, as we have heard, Russia has regrettably still refused to change course. By what criteria are individuals being identified for action? Is it those with the most concrete interests within Europe, those with the biggest capacity to affect the course of events in the region or those most implicated in previous illegal actions?

The Foreign Secretary has indicated that the G7 is also exploring the possibility of wider sectoral sanctions against Russia, and I welcome those steps. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary stated in an interview on Sunday that such measures would be implemented

“if Russia continues to escalate this crisis.”

The Foreign Secretary confirmed today that the Government’s view is that the recent events in eastern Ukraine are

“being carried out at the direction of Russia.”

In the light of growing evidence that Russia is indeed escalating the crisis, will the Foreign Secretary confirm whether a continuation of the Russian Government’s current approach would itself in time constitute grounds for the G7 to decide that trade and sectoral sanctions were now necessary and appropriate?

The crisis is naturally causing real concerns among our NATO partners, in particular the Baltic states and Poland. I therefore welcome the steps announced by the Foreign Secretary today, but will he say a little more about his discussions with those NATO allies about the vital and necessary co-operation in the light of their pressing concerns given the security situation in the region?

An additional priority in the coming weeks must be securing conditions for free and fair presidential elections taking place in Ukraine on 25 May, which will involve operational and diplomatic support for the interim Government in Kiev. The Foreign Secretary is right to highlight today the £1 million pledged by the UK to support the deployment of up to 400 additional observers to strengthen the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe mission. In the light of the appalling treatment of seven OSCE monitors, which the Foreign Secretary rightfully condemned, will he confirm whether the OSCE intends to continue its mission in the east of Ukraine for the foreseeable future? What steps can and should be taken to try to protect those involved in the monitoring exercise?

I welcome the high-level international meeting due to take place in London tomorrow to support the Ukrainian Government’s efforts to recover stolen assets. The Foreign Secretary is right to support International Monetary Fund plans for a two-year programme to help Ukraine to reform and to become more prosperous in the long term. However, so far, no commitments have yet been made about the time frame for the delivery of that IMF support, so will the Foreign Secretary update the House about the progress made on that matter? Will he confirm whether those discussions are taking into account the significance of the period leading up to the elections on 25 May?

The current crisis has seen a series of tactical steps taken by the Kremlin, but it has also revealed longer-term strategic issues for Europe. Russia supplies around a third of the EU’s gas, but the Kremlin is also dependent on revenue from oil, gas and coal exports to the EU. I therefore welcome the Foreign Secretary’s comments on the European Commission’s plan to reduce European countries’ reliance on Russian energy and the announcement by G7 Energy Ministers that they will hold discussions next week. Will the Foreign Secretary confirm whether a date will be set at that meeting for the publication of a report? Further, will he offer the House the British Government’s estimate of what actually is a realistic timetable by which the necessary infrastructure could be put in place to ensure a more meaningfully diverse supply of energy to Europe in the years ahead?

In conclusion, the days ahead mark a crucial juncture not just for Ukraine, but both for the European Union and our NATO allies. This is a moment of real geopolitical significance. Russian action, together with the international community’s response, is being watched not simply in the region, but right around the world. As in past weeks, in the days and weeks ahead, the Government will have our support in their efforts to help to ensure a de-escalation of the crisis by evidencing the costs and consequences to the Russians and by allowing Ukraine the opportunity to choose its own future.

[Mr Hague]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for setting out a bipartisan approach, which is very welcome at important moments in foreign policy; it helps this country to send, and other countries to hear, a clear and united message. He joined me in paying tribute to Members on all sides—and I mean all sides—of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe for their work over the past few weeks.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the criteria for placing people on the EU sanctions list. We have focused so far, including in the list that is about to be published, either on people in Crimea who have been part of what has happened there or on Russians involved in supporting the actions that have been taken in Crimea or eastern Ukraine—in other words, people with a direct political or other responsibility for what has happened. Of course, that could be broadened in future—the basis of the US sanctions is broader—but that is what we have focused on in the European Union. A question for the coming days will be whether to change the criteria for future rounds of sanctions if they prove necessary.

The right hon. Gentleman asked at what point in Russia’s escalations we will apply the third tier of sanctions, which is one of the major issues facing those countries applying sanctions. I do not think that it would be helpful to set out in detail a trip wire or red line, not least because that would invite Russia to go up to that point, knowing that it would not be subject to such sanctions. In the minds of many European countries, such sanctions are to be applied in the event of a Russian invasion of parts of eastern Ukraine. However, I think that it is important to hold out the option of applying such sanctions in circumstances that amount not to a military invasion, but to a political and forcible takeover by other means of large parts of eastern Ukraine.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about NATO Foreign Ministers. We are in close consultation across NATO. NATO Foreign Ministers met at the beginning of the month to discuss the situation in detail, and many of the measures that NATO has announced are the result of our discussions. The OSCE mission, which he asked about, is certainly continuing. The observers who have been taken hostage and paraded are not actually part of the special monitoring mission that is supporting implementation of the Geneva agreement; they are part of the military monitoring that the OSCE does anyway in an attempt to reduce tensions across eastern Europe. So far, the situation has not affected the OSCE’s determination to continue its mission. As of Friday, 122 observers have been deployed. As I mentioned in my statement, one of the reasons we have provided additional funding is so that up to 400 additional observers can be deployed, and we are in favour of the OSCE deploying a great many additional people.

The IMF support is a two-year programme, and its delivery depends upon the financial needs and performance of the Ukrainian Government over the coming weeks. It takes into account the proximity of the presidential elections. On the long-term strategic issues, I am in favour of being as transparent as possible at an early date about what the plans might involve, but clearly they still require further discussion.

The right hon. Gentleman asked how long it would take to change the infrastructure of Europe. Of course it would take many years to change the infrastructure in all the ways that could be considered, for example by completing construction of the southern gas corridor from the Caspian sea, or by changing infrastructure in the United States so that liquefied natural gas could be exported from its east coast. However, I think that a determination to embark on those and other measures would have an economic effect long before they were fully implemented. Russia has to take that into account in its actions now.

Oral Answers to Questions

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Tuesday 8th April 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

I think there was a good deal of naked aggression in what happened in Crimea. Of course, my right hon. Friend is right about the great seriousness of any further encroachment into Ukraine. That is something we should bear in mind, as well as his point that historical analogies can always be misleading.

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

As the Foreign Secretary’s earlier answers show, the protests across the east of Ukraine, in cities including Donetsk, highlight the continued risk of violent escalation and further bloodshed in Ukraine. In his first answer, the Foreign Secretary spoke of recent events bearing all the hallmarks of Russian involvement. Would he be willing to set out for the House in a little more detail his judgment of the form that the involvement of Russia has taken in recent days?

[Mr Hague]

Well, I said that it had the hallmarks of a Russian strategy to destabilise Ukraine and that is something we must expect in the run-up to the Ukrainian presidential elections on 25 May. It would be consistent with Russia’s strategy and behaviour over recent weeks to try to damage the credibility of those elections, to take actions that would make it appear less credible to hold the elections in eastern parts of Ukraine and to make it more difficult for Ukraine to operate as a democratic state. Those hallmarks are all present in what has happened in recent days.

[Mr Alexander]

I note and welcome the Foreign Secretary’s answer. The Prime Minister said in his statement to this House on Ukraine:

“The international community remains ready to intensify sanctions if Russia continues to escalate this situation”.—[Official Report, 26 March 2014; Vol. 578, c. 350.]

In the light of the Foreign Secretary’s answer, and if reports of Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine prove correct, does he believe that that would constitute grounds for widening the economic and diplomatic pressure on President Putin?

[Mr Hague]

That will depend on the course of events over the coming days and on the evidence of Russia’s involvement. The latest this morning is that the authorities in Kiev say that the situation is dangerous, as we have said in this House, but under control. Indeed, the administrative buildings in Kharkiv appear to be back under the control of the Ukrainian authorities. I think we will have to assess the situation over the coming days, but I say again that a deliberate escalation of the situation by Russia will bring serious political and economic consequences.

--- Later in debate ---

[Hugh Robertson]

Our allocations in this area are driven by need. I thank my hon. Friend for the various pieces of literature that he has provided to me, which I will follow up separately. There is a straightforward assessment of need. The situation of refugees, not only Jewish, not only Palestinian, across the middle east, particularly in Jordan and Lebanon—it is worth reminding the House that we have these questions at a time when the millionth Syrian refugee has arrived in Beirut—is a matter that we are addressing as a priority.

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

As we approach Easter, we know that millions of Christians across the world will be prevented from celebrating or will risk persecution for doing so. New research by the Pew research centre suggests that persecution of people who practise their religion increased in almost every major region of the world in recent years. In the light of such concerning reports, what specific steps are the UK Government taking as a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council to ensure that tackling the persecution of Christians and promoting freedom of religion is a key priority?

[Hugh Robertson]

That is a good question. As I said in my original answer, the Foreign Office picks up the issue through bilateral relationships with the countries concerned, through the multilateral institutions and through the Foreign Secretary’s human rights advisory group. This is an issue that we will concentrate on over the period. The reaction that we have had across the House and from those with whom we have had contact indicates that this is a serious issue and it is one that we will take seriously.

Ukraine

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Tuesday 18th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I welcome the motion and this debate on the ongoing crisis in Ukraine and the British Government’s response. At the outset, let me make it clear that the Government have our support in seeking an urgent de-escalation of the crisis and in their efforts to date to secure a sustainable diplomatic resolution that respects and upholds the international law of which the Foreign Secretary has just spoken.

The crisis in Crimea represents perhaps the most significant security threat on the European continent in decades, and it poses a real threat to Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russia’s recent actions have also reaffirmed the existence of a geopolitical fault line that the west ignores at its peril. Given the events still unfolding on the ground and the speech made by President Putin in the past couple of hours, few would claim that the international community’s response to date has been effective in securing a change of approach from Russia. Since the issue was last debated in the House, an illegal referendum has taken place in Crimea in the shadow of Russian guns, President Putin has signed an order recognising Crimean independence and approved a draft Bill on its accession, and Ukraine’s Parliament in Kiev only yesterday authorised a partial mobilisation of volunteers for the armed forces’ new reserve. The potential for further escalation of the crisis, therefore, remains real and deeply troubling. The international community must do more to encourage Russia to engage in constructive dialogue, while simultaneously applying greater pressure if President Putin refuses to change course.

I want to focus on three key issues. First, I will assess the international community’s response to date and why it is has so far not achieved the desired outcome. Secondly, I will outline the possible mechanisms by which the west can now engage Russia more effectively. Finally, I will look at a series of proposed steps that should be considered for raising the costs and consequences for Russia if the crisis is not swiftly resolved.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

What, in the right hon. Gentleman’s view, does Russia need to do to bring about a de-escalation of the situation?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Alexander]

First and foremost, we must avoid a situation in which escalation continues as a result of the arrival of Russian troops in eastern Ukraine. Secondly, there must be a meaningful dialogue between the Ukrainian authorities and the Russian authorities, and I will explain what I mean by that in the course of my remarks. Thirdly, there must be a recognition that the international community remains unyielding in its opposition to the illegal referendum that took place in Crimea last weekend. Alas, the Kremlin has not yet recognised or acted on any of those steps, but I hope that it will do so in the coming days. Why do I make that point? Ukraine’s future still hangs in the balance, so today’s debate is welcome and takes place at a crucial time.

The recent trajectory of Ukrainian politics hinges on the events of 21 November when Yanukovych’s Cabinet abandoned an agreement on closer trade ties with the EU, and instead sought closer co-operation with the Russian Federation. Days later, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians descended on Maidan square, and for months the various protests endured and grew on the streets of Kiev. On 20 February, in a vibrant European capital, Government snipers turned their fire on protesters and the day ended with makeshift morgues lining the pavements of that historic city. On 27 February, just four days after the end of the Sochi winter Olympics, Russian troops effectively occupied Crimea under the false pretence of protecting its Russian-speaking population.

Ukraine faces a generational choice: in the decades ahead, can it face both east and west? Russia, too, is faced with two alternative futures: greater integration or greater isolation within the existing international order. It is right that the international community’s approach to date has been characterised by engagement with Russia where possible but by appropriate diplomatic pressures where required, which is why I welcome the draft UN resolution criticising the referendum in Ukraine’s Crimea region. Recent events in Ukraine are a key test of resolve for the European Union in particular. This clear and flagrant breach of international law has happened on Europe’s doorstep, and the burden of responding to the crisis rests heavily on European Union leaders.

It is worth acknowledging from the outset that getting agreement among the EU 28 is always difficult, particularly when a number of member states are vulnerable to Russian action on issues such as energy supply. I therefore welcome the steps that have already been agreed by the EU, including the suspension of negotiations with Russia on visa liberalisation and targeted asset freezes and visa bans against those responsible for threatening Ukraine’s territorial integrity and independence.

Despite those important steps, I regret that, to date, the EU’s unity in condemning Russia’s military aggression has not been matched by a shared resolve to act more decisively in extracting costs and consequences for Russia’s actions. Only four days before this week’s Foreign Affairs Council, Chancellor Merkel made it clear that if Russia continued on its current course, it would cause

“massive damage to Russia, both economically and politically.”

Following her comments, and ahead of the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting, the press quoted reports that more than 100 names were being considered for targeted measures by the EU. At that Foreign Affairs Council meeting, a list of 21 individuals was agreed, and only 13 of them were Russian. Given that the objective of the sanctions is to alter the calculus of risk in the minds of the Russian leadership, it would be unfortunate if confused messages were sent to Moscow, however inadvertently, at this critical time.

[Ms Gisela Stuart]

My right hon. Friend mentioned the importance of the EU speaking with one voice. Does he not think that it was slightly naive of the French, German and Polish Foreign Ministers to take action without bringing the United States into the meeting? That would have shown unity not only within the EU but with our allies in north America.

[Mr Alexander]

I have no criticism of the French, German and Polish Foreign Ministers. We saw from the dynamic on the streets of Kiev that that potential agreement was overtaken by events, including the fleeing of the President from Ukraine. I do not believe that any reasonable criticism can be levelled at the European Union for somehow ignoring or being unwilling to work with our friends, colleagues and allies in the United States. Indeed, one of the brighter shafts of light amid the darkness has been the degree of effective co-operation between European leaders and the US Secretary of State John Kerry in the recent days and weeks. This is a big geopolitical moment and, as the Foreign Secretary made clear, all of us in the west—in the European Union and the United States—have a strong interest in upholding the international order that has lasted in Europe since the second world war.

[Mr Brooks Newmark (Braintree) (Con)]

Germany is particularly vulnerable to economic sanctions in relation to energy. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that we should work hard to convince the Americans to lift their restrictions on energy exports to Europe, as that would take pressure off Germany in this regard?

[Mr Alexander]

The hon. Gentleman’s point is well taken. My research in recent days has shown me that, notwithstanding the importance of looking again at the capacity for, say, liquid natural gas to be exported to the European Union from the United States, given its developing capabilities in shale gas and shale oil, this is not simply a matter of regarding energy as a strategic asset. We must also take into account the capabilities and facilities at the ports, for example. This is a longer-term endeavour and, critical though it is to be able to strengthen the resilience and diversity of the European Union’s energy supplies, the action that the hon. Gentleman suggests would not provide an immediate resolution to the crisis. It is important that we look at the issue, however.

[Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)]

Would my right hon. Friend like to correct the wrong impression that the Foreign Secretary gave—possibly inadvertently—when he referred to a Russian member of the Socialist Group of the Council of Europe? There is a tiny and uninfluential group of Russians in the Socialist Group, but the group of which the Conservatives have been members for a long time is dominated by Putin’s representatives and those of a similar character from other countries. Will my right hon. Friend pay tribute to the long record of the Socialist Group in opposing Putin, especially on Chechnya?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Alexander]

I am certainly happy to echo my hon. Friend’s point about the actions of the Socialist Group in relation to Chechnya, but given the severity of this moment in international affairs, it ill behoves the House to descend into a partisan exchange on which groups our respective representatives belong to in the Council of Europe. I understand that action has been taken by Conservative members of the Council of Europe—I am sure that the Leader of the House will set out the details at the end of the debate today—but it is important to speak with one voice at this critical moment in international affairs.

[Mr Charles Walker]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that Russia is not the power that it once was? It is riddled with corruption, and with a population of only 143 million, it has a failing demographic. Male life expectancy there is barely 60. Russia is not the great bear that it pretends to be.

[Mr Alexander]

I find myself in agreement with the hon. Gentleman. There has been too much commentary in recent days on the strategic genius of President Putin. In fact, he has been obliged to act out of weakness, rather than strength. Let us remember that this was the Russian President who viewed a Eurasian union as a credible alternative to the European Union. He has been unable to use soft power to secure the support of his potential allies and neighbours; instead, he has had to use hard power as a consequence of his unpopularity and of his sense of a loss of control following the events that we witnessed on the streets of Kiev.

This is not simply a matter of Russia facing demographic challenges, or of its abject failure to diversify its economy beyond the primary extraction of energy to move towards a more advanced form of economy, or of the very real corruption that continues to bedevil Russian society and the Russian economy; this is also about the fact that Putin is unable to secure the willing support of neighbouring countries, and that he is having to secure support through the use of military force. That represents a significant failure, rather than a success. Let us remember that President Putin has just spent $50 billion trying to accumulate soft power with the Sochi Olympics. What a waste of $50 billion, given that the international community is now seeing the Russian leadership’s true character through its action in Ukraine.

[Geoffrey Clifton-Brown]

Is it not another important factor that the Russian Federation is now much more dependent on the international community than was the case in the old days of the Soviet Union? In those days, it had no stock exchange, and the rouble is now much more exchangeable than it was. Putin reportedly had to spend £2.5 billion shoring up the rouble in one day when he first went into Crimea.

[Mr Alexander]

The hon. Gentleman’s point is well taken. Russia is now significantly more integrated in the global economy than it was at the time of the invasion of Georgia in 2008, let alone during the earlier era of Soviet expansionism, to which many people have drawn comparisons recently.

[Mark Lazarowicz (Edinburgh North and Leith) (Lab/Co-op)]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

rose—

[Mr Alexander]

I want to make a little more progress.

Today, the European Union is Russia’s largest economic partner, with an annual trade of £275 billion. The UK alone handles at least £2 billion of Russian business in financial services a year. Let us also remember that as a result of the corruption that I have mentioned, the Russian economy has witnessed significant levels of capital flight in recent years, as well as rising levels of Russian prosperity as a consequence of energy. In that sense, there is a real and enduring vulnerability among the Russian elites to the travel bans and asset freezes that have been put on the table by other European leaders in recent days. Let us also not forget that a central part of President Putin’s claim to legitimacy in the Russian Federation has been based on a guarantee of rising prosperity. However, we have already seen the effect that the proposed actions by European leaders has had on the rouble and the Russian stock exchange.

In the immediate term, the most powerful means to alter the Kremlin’s course is to target those elites on whom it relies for its support. That is why I hope that at the European Council meeting due to take place later this week, EU leaders will consider further expanding the list of Ukrainian and Russian officials subjected to these targeted measures. I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s indication that that appears to be the British Government’s approach, ahead of the Council meeting on Thursday and Friday. I would also be grateful if the Leader of the House could confirm in his winding up whether, at that Council meeting, the UK Government will be urging the cancellation of the EU-Russia summit, which is still scheduled to take place in Sochi in June.

Labour has also argued that further diplomatic pressure can and should be applied in the short term by seeking agreement among the G7 on suspending Russia from the G8 group of the world’s largest economies unless President Putin changes course. I was intrigued by the Foreign Secretary’s remarks at the Dispatch Box on that subject. I understand that indications have been given by No. 10 since this debate began that the British Government could take further action in relation to the G7, as distinct from the G8. Will the Leader of the House clarify the position, not only on the cancellation of the G8 meeting but on Russia’s suspension from the G8? I think that the Foreign Secretary has indicated the willingness of the G7 countries to meet together as an alternative grouping to the G8, as a result of the Russians’ recent flagrant breach of the law.

Given the precedents that have been set by Russia, the European Union must also be prepared to increase the pressure if the short-term measures are unsuccessful. I certainly welcome the bilateral measures, which we heard about for the first time this afternoon, relating to UK-Russian military co-operation and to the steps that the UK Government are taking in relation to arms exports. In the medium term, the European Union must be prepared to consider stronger sanctions against Russia’s broader economic interests, such as its energy exports or its banking sector. Such decisions should not be taken lightly, and the burden on EU domestic markets must not be ignored, but, if required, those options must remain available to European leaders when they gather in the coming days.

Alongside short and medium-term pressure on Russia, it is also surely vital that the European Union considers the long-term strategic implications of the current crisis. I welcome the fact that at yesterday’s meeting EU Foreign Ministers met the EU Energy Commissioner. I encourage the EU to undertake urgent work on exploring ways of proliferating and diversifying European energy imports in the future.

Let me turn now to my final substantive point. As the Opposition, we do not believe that the crisis can be resolved simply by applying ever more pressure on Russia to change course. Effective engagement with Russia remains key to helping secure the diplomatic de-escalation and resolution of the crisis. In particular, the work done by EU High Representative Cathy Ashton in engaging with President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov in recent weeks has been welcome. I also welcome the dialogue that took place last week in London between the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, and the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov. At that meeting, the Secretary of State made it clear that in the view of the United States, Russia has legitimate interests—historical, cultural and strategic—in Ukraine.

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for the tone of this part of his speech. Despite everything that has been said over the past hour, we do have a bit of a problem in that a majority of people living in Crimea want to be part of Russia, and they had been part of Russia for 300 years, apart from administrative diktat in recent times. They also have a right to self-determination.

[Mr Alexander]

The hon. Gentleman’s point is a moot one given the circumstances in which the referendum took place. No one disputes the fact that there is a significant number of Russian speakers within Crimea, but it is a dangerous path to walk to suggest that the circumstances in which that referendum was conducted—in the shadow of Russian guns—in any way provide a free and fair expression of the will of the people of Crimea. Incidentally, it was also a flagrant breach of the Ukrainian constitution. Although it is important to recognise that Russia has legitimate interests, it is equally important to be clear and categoric in our condemnation of the referendum that took place at the weekend.

[Ian Austin (Dudley North) (Lab)]

Is it not also the case that just last year, opinion polls showed that only 23% of people in Crimea wanted to be part of Russia?

[Mr Alexander]

As my hon. Friend knows, in circumstances such as this I am often given to say that opinion polls come and go, but I can assure him that he is absolutely right in recognising the fact that the poll that took place this week cannot be taken as a serious reflection of the breadth of opinion across Crimea. As the Foreign Secretary said, the Tatars, who for understandable historical reasons have very deep anxieties about what the future holds, given the past experience of deportation to Siberia, largely boycotted the poll. There are clear instances of intimidation, and anything that would be considered free and fair is very far from what took place in Crimea this weekend.

[Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. As I expected, he is making some measured comments. Is not the more fundamental point here that if we concede a precedent in Crimea, we are saying that it is open house for Russia to annex what ever part of its zone of influence it likes?

[Mr Alexander]

The hon. Gentleman eloquently highlights the extent of cross-party agreement on this issue. This is a huge geopolitical moment, and if we take our multilateral obligations seriously—as a permanent member of the Security Council, a member of NATO and a member of the European Union—these moments test us as an international community. In that sense, the signal that would be sent out, however inadvertently, by an isolationist attitude that says that this is a far away country and that there is nothing to worry about has very dangerous historical precedent. The point that the hon. Gentleman makes is a necessary corrective to some of the commentary that we have read in newspapers in recent days.

[Simon Danczuk (Rochdale) (Lab)]

What has not been mentioned is that we have a large Ukrainian diaspora in the UK and indeed in Rochdale, some of whom I met on Saturday night. Many of them are extremely worried about their family in Ukraine and the fact that the problem might spread. Is there any reassurance that can be given to those people?

[Mr Alexander]

I fully appreciate that this must be a deeply troubling time for all those with friends, relatives and kith and kin in Ukraine. The best mechanism by which they can get the assurances they understandably want on behalf of their families is the diplomatic resolution which I trust the British Government are endeavouring to deliver, and which we need to work in co-operation with our international partners to secure.

[Zac Goldsmith (Richmond Park) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Alexander]

Let me try to make a little more progress because I am conscious of the need to wind up, given the enthusiasm of Back Benchers to make their contributions.

There is an important point in relation to the tone of the exchanges with Russia. As the Foreign Secretary acknowledged, it is vital that in those exchanges a clear message is sent that this is not a “zero-sum game” between Russia and the west. I hope that it will be in that spirit that EU leaders agree the political part of the association agreement with Ukraine, which is due to be signed in the coming days. As well as sustaining this dialogue between Russia, the US and the EU, we should not forget the urgency of facilitating direct dialogue between the Russian and Ukrainian authorities.

I note that the EU has previously supported the establishment of a contact group, and note further that only yesterday Russia proposed the establishment of a support group for Ukraine. The Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement that this group would push for Ukrainian recognition of the Crimean referendum, which is clearly a difficult issue for the international community; urge Ukraine to implement portions of the 21 February peace deal; encourage Ukraine to adopt a new constitution setting out broad powers for the country’s regions; and require Ukraine to uphold military and political neutrality.

When the Leader of the House winds up the debate, I would appreciate it if he could set out the British Government’s thinking on both these proposals—on the contact group that has been advocated by Germany and the European Union and on the contact group that was proposed by the Russian Foreign Minister yesterday.

In conclusion, the Russian invasion of Crimea demands international condemnation. We should uphold the principle of international law and recognise Ukraine as a sovereign state. Its cultural, linguistic, and historical affinities with Russia do not, and never will, justify the recent breaching of the international multilateral legal norms that have guided our actions since world war two. Furthermore, what those who oppose further specific economic and financial measures must understand is that there will be real and lasting consequences for the west of not demonstrating resolve in the days and weeks ahead. I fear that the consequences are already clear. We have a Russia emboldened in its ambitions towards Ukraine; a central Europe ever more fearful of future political destabilisation and military insecurity; and a United States increasingly concerned about Europe's willingness to act, even diplomatically and economically, in the face of such threats. A combination of deft diplomacy, shared resolve and a unified response are the best means by which we can de-escalate this continuous and dangerous crisis, and ultimately re-affirm Ukrainian sovereignty and preserve European security. The British Government will have our support in working to achieve that desired outcome.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

Oral Answers to Questions

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Tuesday 4th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

We will do that. My right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe attended the Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels yesterday while I was in Kiev. There will be a meeting of the European Council—the Heads of Government of the European Union—on Thursday to discuss these matters, which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will attend. Yesterday evening, he telephoned President Hollande and Chancellor Merkel to co-ordinate our approach. I therefore can assure my hon. Friend that we will play a leading role in a united European approach.

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I have stated previously my support for the Foreign Secretary’s efforts to find a diplomatic resolution to this crisis, and I repeat that today. However, yesterday in Downing street, there was a very serious blunder at a very serious time, with Government briefing documents mistakenly entering the public domain. Does the Foreign Secretary accept that the impact of that blunder risks being much more than ministerial embarrassment, and that it risks compromising the UK’s influence with Russia and our key allies at what remains a crucial and, indeed, dangerous time?

[Mr Hague]

Any such photographing of documents or making documents available for photographing is absolutely regrettable and should not happen. I hope that all officials will ensure that it does not happen in future. Nevertheless, it must be seen in perspective. I do not agree with the right hon. Gentleman that it has those implications. I want to make it absolutely clear that anything that is written in one document that is being carried by one official is not necessarily any guide to the decisions that will be made by Her Majesty’s Government. Our options remain very much open on this subject.

[Mr Alexander]

I find the Foreign Secretary’s words reassuring, in part. However, let us pursue the implications of what was revealed by the document. Does he accept that, given the gravity of the moment, if every country were to refuse to countenance any economic or diplomatic action that would affect its bilateral standing with Russia, the cumulative effect would be damaging not just for that individual country, but for regional stability and international order?

[Mr Hague]

Yes, very much. I absolutely accept that, which is why I repeat that anything photographed, or a partial account of a document from one photograph, should certainly not be taken as a guide to the views of the Foreign Secretary, and not necessarily as a guide to the decisions that will be made by Her Majesty’s Government. Our options remain open, and I agree with the point made by the right hon. Gentleman.

Ukraine

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Tuesday 4th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement and for advance sight of it this morning.

This crisis represents the most serious threat to European security in decades. Russia’s actions are a clear and unambiguous violation of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine. There can be no justification for this dangerous and unprovoked military incursion. None the less, the Ukrainian Government are indeed to be commended, as the Foreign Secretary has done, for their calm response to this severe provocation.

The immediate priority must now be diplomatic action to secure a de-escalation of the crisis. Achieving this requires the international community to show both unity and resolve in pursuit of a twin-track approach aimed at stabilising the current situation. First, the international community needs to alter the calculus of risk in the minds of the Russian leaders by developing a graduated hierarchy of diplomatic and economic measures that make clear to the Russians the costs and consequences of this aggression. At the same time, the international community must make it clear to Kiev that the new Ukrainian Government must be inclusive, protect the rights of Russian-speaking populations within Ukraine, and make it clear to Russia that strengthening ties between Ukraine and the European Union should not be seen as a zero-sum game that will necessarily prejudice its own bilateral relations.

The obligations on Russia are clear, but so too must be the consequences of inaction. Yesterday’s decision at the EU Foreign Affairs Council to suspend further talks on the EU-Russia visa liberalisation programme was an important initial step, but will the Foreign Secretary inform the House of whether the UK was advocating further diplomatic measures beyond that?

It is right that the EU Council has called an emergency session for Thursday, but given yesterday’s events in Downing street, it is also right that there should be more clarity from the British Government, ahead of that meeting, about the types of costs and consequences that they are willing to impose on Russia. So will the Foreign Secretary reaffirm specifically that for the United Kingdom not only all diplomatic but all economic options do indeed remain on the table, going into the talks on Thursday? I am afraid that the United Kingdom’s words will count for little without more credence being given to these options and a willingness at least to countenance their use in the days and weeks ahead.

The House should understand that the costs and consequences to the European Union of not achieving unity and resolve at this time are clear: a Russia emboldened in its ambitions towards Ukraine; a central Europe fearful of future military intervention; and a United States increasingly concerned about Europe’s willingness to act, even diplomatically and economically, in the face of such threats. Therefore, as well as pulling out of the Sochi G8 preparatory meetings, will the Foreign Secretary specifically confirm whether the UK remains open to withdrawing from that June summit?

Alongside diplomatic pressure, it is also right that the international community should give appropriate assurances to both sides about the potential dividends of avoiding a descent into further violence. Recent estimates suggest that the Ukrainian Finance Ministry needs $35 billion of support over the next two years in order to avoid economic collapse. I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s announcement today of technical assistance for economic and political reform in Ukraine and, of course, he has previously highlighted the very serious and real concerns about ongoing corruption in Ukraine. However, given the acknowledged weakness of the present Ukrainian Government, will the Foreign Secretary confirm whether, in his judgment, the IMF will be able to respond in a timescale that avoids the present security crisis being rapidly followed by a financing crisis in Kiev?

Russia’s incursion into Ukraine was, of course, unjustified and illegal, but the Ukrainian Government none the less have a key role to play in helping to diffuse the situation by providing the appropriate assurances to Russia about their conduct, intentions and priorities. That includes being clear about the status of minorities in the country, the attitude to the Russian language and the conduct of fresh elections in the months ahead.

Will the Foreign Secretary set out what specific assurances he sought from the Ukrainian Government during his welcome visit to Kiev yesterday regarding the status of minorities and in particular the Russian language, given the steps previously agreed and then vetoed by the Ukrainian President? It is vital, as the Foreign Secretary has indicated, that these assurances are given as part of an open and direct dialogue between Kiev and Moscow. Indeed, a contact group may certainly have a constructive role to play.

The inviolability of Ukraine’s borders and territorial integrity reflects deeply held principles of the international system. The situation on the ground certainly remains tense, uncertain and, indeed, vulnerable to misunderstanding or misjudgment. That is why this is a time for cool heads and considered words.

As upholders of that international order, the United Kingdom and our allies have responsibilities that extend beyond regard for each individual country’s bilateral relations with Russia. The Ukraine crisis is surely a moment of real geopolitical significance, so the United Kingdom must not now retreat into a new isolationism and should instead keep all diplomatic and economic measures open to us and our partners as we work to achieve unity and resolve in the international community’s diplomatic response, and so contribute to the de-escalation of the crisis.

[Mr Hague]

The right hon. Gentleman called for all diplomatic measures to be used, which, as he and the House will have gathered from my statement, is absolutely what we are doing. Indeed, I think from his questions that there is very strong agreement about the gravity of the threat and the principles that should guide us in responding to it.

The right hon. Gentleman spoke, as I have done frequently over the past few days, about the violation of Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty. Like me, he commended the Ukrainian Government on their restraint. I certainly urge them to continue with that and to continue to do everything they can to show that they are being inclusive within Ukraine and that there is no threat to Russian-speaking or other minorities. Indeed, I put it to them yesterday that they could consider positively additional changes to language laws to give an extra assurance. I very much welcome the decision of the acting President not to allow any laws that infringe Russian language rights to go ahead.

On the subject of the Ukrainian Government, the right hon. Gentleman asked whether I thought the IMF would be able to respond. I think there is strong recognition among the Ukrainian Ministers I met that they need to do something quite different economically and that they have to tackle the deep-seated issues that I described in my statement. I think it is entirely possible that the IMF will be able to respond, although possibly in a two-stage process, with the second stage following the elections on 25 May. I met three of the likely presidential candidates while I was there—they are not in the Government, but they are likely to run for President—and I encouraged all of them to support economic reforms, including an end to corruption and much greater transparency in government in Ukraine. I think there is a reasonable prospect of agreeing a programme on the basis of such commitments.

The right hon. Gentleman welcomed the initial step—I think that is the right way to describe it—taken at the Foreign Affairs Council. Certainly, the United Kingdom has strongly advocated that we need to be ready to take further actions. Those actions, however, must be on a united basis and, of course, be well judged and well targeted. Therefore, I do not think it would be helpful for different countries to announce ahead of the European Council what they want to see. It is important that the European Council agree a united position and whatever measures it decides to take on Thursday.

The right hon. Gentleman asked whether all diplomatic and economic options remain on the table, and the answer is yes, as we discussed during oral questions earlier. No partially photographed documents should be taken as any guide to Her Majesty’s Government’s decisions on these matters. Those options remain open.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the June summit. We have suspended the preparations for it. As I told the media yesterday, the G7 will be able to hold meetings of our own if that suspension continues and that, of course, is an option. It will be necessary not only to take well-judged measures in our response, but for there to be recognition across the European Union that Russia needs the EU economically just as much, or more, than the EU needs Russia. We need to have the common political will and to organise ourselves in a sufficiently cohesive way in order to have the political will and economic leverage in future to make that much clearer than it is today. I think that doing that may be one of the longer-term consequences of what Russia has done in Crimea.

Ukraine, Syria and Iran

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Monday 24th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement and for advance sight of it.

On Syria, I join the Foreign Secretary in welcoming UN Security Council resolution 2139. Despite the progress made in securing this resolution, however, the UN’s humanitarian appeal sadly remains chronically underfunded. Will the Foreign Secretary join the calls we have made for a fresh donor conference urgently to secure additional funds? If not, will he set out for the House the mechanism by which he judges the funding gap can be better closed? The Foreign Secretary acknowledges that those supporting the regime’s side, including the Russian and Iranian Governments, need to do far more to press the regime to take the process seriously and to reach a political settlement. Will he therefore explain his continued opposition to the establishment of a Syria contact group that could get these Governments around the table?

On Iran, we welcome the agreement on a framework for negotiations on a comprehensive deal in Vienna last week, but progress on a comprehensive deal must be made explicitly contingent on Iran adhering to the terms of the interim joint action plan signed up to in November. Iran is reportedly still operating more than 10,000 centrifuges, yet the interim deal sets out a much lower target. Will the Foreign Secretary set out what ongoing steps are being taken to bring Iran into line with the existing demands of the deal it has already signed up to? Will the Foreign Secretary set out the Government’s most recent estimates of the benefits that limited sanctions relief has so far brought to the Iranian economy, and whether the UK has any plans to push for extending, or indeed limiting, the existing relief package agreed by the P5+1, so as not to undermine the twin-track approach supported on both sides of the House?

Turning now to the events in Ukraine, may I join the Foreign Secretary in offering condolences to the families of those killed and injured during the latest violence? Recent days have seen protest, tragedy and change on the streets of Kiev. The first priority must of course be to ensure that the transition to an interim Government is peaceful and that further bloodshed is avoided. We welcome the work already done by the EU High Representative, including on her most recent visit to Kiev today, to try to facilitate this transition, but does the Foreign Secretary believe that the EU should now appoint a dedicated special envoy to support these efforts?

Alongside political turmoil, the Ukrainian economy has been in a long decline and is now on the verge of collapse. Will the Foreign Secretary confirm whether he has established, during his call with Foreign Minister Lavrov, whether the Russian offer of financial support, which was previously made to the Yanukovych Government, has now been withdrawn? In December, I asked the Foreign Secretary about his readiness to call on International Monetary Fund reserves to be used to help to stabilise the Ukrainian economy. At that time, he said:

“If Ukraine is to make use of that facility, it is necessary for it to engage in important structural reforms.”—[Official Report, 3 December 2013; Vol. 571, c. 764.]

Yesterday, two months since I first raised the issue, the Foreign Secretary confirmed that he believes the IMF should be prepared to act. We have all seen in recent months the geopolitical risks of delay in delivering effective financial action, so does the Foreign Secretary recognise that while conditionality is of course necessary, there are potentially urgent issues around solvency that may need to be addressed? If he does accept that, how does he propose that they should be addressed?

The European Union association agreement which sparked the recent crisis could still prove vital in helping to revive the rebalancing of the Ukrainian economy in the long term. Will the Foreign Secretary be pushing for negotiations on the reopening of the agreement, and should the terms of the deal itself be kept closed or be revisited? President Obama was right to say that Ukraine could no longer be seen simply as a “cold war chessboard”, but will the Foreign Secretary tell us whether he was aware of any guarantees from Foreign Minister Lavrov that Russia would not encourage southern and eastern regions of Ukraine to break away from the rest of the country? Of course Ukrainians have divergent views on the future of their country, strongly shaped by geopolitics, language, economics, and indeed geography, but the territorial integrity of Ukraine remains a matter of significance not just to Ukraine itself, but to the whole wider region.

The Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and Poland, alongside Catherine Ashton, have done vital work in recent days, and the Foreign Secretary was right to praise their efforts. Indeed, recent events in Ukraine have made it clear that—as in other instances—the influence of the United Kingdom Government, acting alone, would have had much less impact without our ability to amplify our influence through our membership of the European Union. However, although that important work has been done in recent days, all of us in the European Union and the international community should acknowledge that much work still lies ahead in relation to this troubled but important country.

[Mr Hague]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his support for Security Council regulation 2139, which was passed at the weekend. As he said, only part of the $6.5 billion for which the UN appealed has been provided; $2.2 billion was secured at the pledging conference in Kuwait last month, which means that much more needs to be raised. Given that that conference was held only five weeks ago, I do not think that holding another now would greatly change the position, but it is very important for us to follow up last month’s conference. Ministers from the Foreign Office and the Department for International Development are doing that all the time, and are pressing for other donations. I do not rule out the need for further such conferences—indeed, I am sure that no supportive Government would do so—but if we are to achieve the momentum that will enable us to secure more donations, we shall need a wider gap than the five weeks that have elapsed so far.

The important aspect of the resolution that was passed at the weekend is that, while it does not change the amounts involved, it does allow us to try to help in new ways. The provisions relating to the delivery of aid across borders, which the UN has not previously authorised, and to aid for civil society in Syria, are very important if they can now be followed up. If implemented, the resolution will help to improve the humanitarian situation.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about a contact group. I do not think that I have ever said that I was opposed to such a group, but, as with any issue, a useful contact group must be cohesive in its purpose. I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that one commodity we are not short of, in relation to Syria, is meetings about Syria. I do not know how many hundreds I have attended over the past three years, but if they were the solution, everything would have been resolved a long time ago.

Progress is made—and it has been made in relation to chemical weapons and the resolution passed at the weekend—when the five permanent members of the Security Council achieve some cohesion, in this case with the strong encouragement of Australia, Jordan and Luxembourg on the Security Council, and that remains the most promising way in which to move forward on Syria. However, if we could achieve more cohesion in regard to purposes and pressure on both sides, contact groups could be established in the future. I am not opposed to that.

Iran is currently implementing the agreement, as far as everyone—including the International Atomic Energy Authority—can see. We are not considering extending or limiting the sanctions relief of approximately $7 billion in the current six-month period, which is the amount specified in the agreement. The agreement can be renewed after six months, for further periods of six months. If it were renewed, further sanctions relief would need to be negotiated, but within this six-month period, we must and will stick to the agreed amount, and will not extend or limit it. The estimated amount of about $7 billion must be set in the context of about $60 billion to $100 billion of Iranian assets frozen worldwide. That is small relief, relative to the total, but it is an important signal of our seriousness, and it will maintain the pressure on Iran to come to a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear issues.

On the right hon. Gentleman’s questions on Ukraine, it is not clear at the moment how Russia will proceed with financial assistance. He appeared to suggest that there should be unconditional IMF or other assistance for the country. He rightly pointed out that I said, months ago, that there were important conditions to be attached, and I still say that today. It is vital that such economic assistance, through international financial institutions, should not be wasted and that it should not indirectly subsidise Russia. Any such money therefore has to be accompanied by serious reform in Ukraine. The IMF could put together a package very quickly; a programme has been almost ready to go for some time, and the groundwork has all been laid, but the Ukrainian Government’s commitment to much-needed reform is important—as it is in any country receiving support from the IMF.

Ukraine needs to demonstrate the stability of its public debt burden as well as strong prospects for access to private capital markets and the political capacity and will to deliver reform. There is no reason why a new Government should not do those things very quickly. The association agreement remains on the table, but the priority now is to achieve an end to violence, to establish a unity Government and to hold free elections that are fair to all concerned. The appointment of a special envoy is a matter for the High Representative to consider, but it is something that the United Kingdom would support.

Sri Harmandir Sahib

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Tuesday 4th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

May I thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement and for advance sight of it this morning?

May I also take this opportunity to thank colleagues who have campaigned to help uncover the truth about the tragic events of 1984? I pay particular tribute to my right hon. Friends the Members for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) and for Warley (Mr Spellar) and my hon. Friends the Members for West Bromwich East (Mr Watson) and for Wolverhampton North East (Emma Reynolds). They have done important work on behalf of many of their constituents, and it is only right that this House offers them its collective thanks for their determined efforts.

As the Foreign Secretary has made clear, the 1984 raid on the Golden Temple complex—code-named Operation Blue Star—resulted in hundreds of deaths, devastating damage to the temple itself and rising levels of sectarian violence, which ultimately saw the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi later that year.

I welcome what light the report sheds on the British Government’s alleged involvement in those events and the fact that some of the key documents relating to the event in question, and the British Government’s alleged involvement, have now been published.

Serious questions continue to be asked, however, about the involvement, conduct and contribution of the British authorities at the time—going up to the highest level—in the events that surrounded the storming of the Golden Temple and that ultimately cost so many innocent lives. In the light of that, I would like to ask the Foreign Secretary the following questions.

First, I regret that the Government have so far refused to accept our call that all relevant documentation relating to the incident that can be should now be made public. I welcome the publication of five further documents as part of today’s report, but, given that the report itself cites “officials interviewed” over the course of this investigation, will the Foreign Secretary now commit to publishing a list of those officials, and will he confirm whether any surviving Ministers who served at the time were interviewed as part of the investigation? Will he also confirm whether these testimonies will be made public?

Secondly, on the terms of this investigation led by the Cabinet Secretary, I welcome the fact that, following representations by the Sikh community, the Cabinet Secretary published a letter detailing the scope of the inquiry. Will the Foreign Secretary explain, however, why there was a more than three-week delay in publishing those terms of reference? Will he further explain whether the terms of the inquiry changed over the course of the inquiry?

The terms of reference, as published in a letter from the Cabinet Secretary on 1 February, did not include specific reference to the time period covered by the investigation, yet the final report sets out a time frame of December 1983 to June 1984. Will the Foreign Secretary explain why that time frame was not made public at an earlier stage?

Many have already expressed regret that the investigation seemed to be covering only the first part of 1984, given the significance of events in the weeks and months after June 1984 and their direct link to the storming of the Golden Temple.

Will the Government therefore task the Cabinet Secretary with setting out whether he believes that there might be grounds for a full inquiry covering a longer period?

Turning to the substance of the findings, the report states that the UK military adviser in India from 8 to 17 February 1984 advised the Indian Government that

“this type of operation should only be put into effect as a last resort when all other courses of negotiation had failed”.

Based on the documents that he has seen, but for understandable reasons may not be able to publish, will the Foreign Secretary set out what type of operation was referred to in that case?

The report also sets out that a “quick analysis” by current UK military staff confirms that there were differences between the June operation and the advice from the UK military officer in February. Will the Foreign Secretary explain the nature of the quick analysis undertaken on such a central part of the investigation? Does he expect a fuller review of that aspect of the evidence to be conducted?

The report touches on the allegations that the potential sale of Westland helicopters was linked to the provision of military advice. It claims that no evidence was found to substantiate that allegation, but none of the annexed documentation so far released pertains to that issue. The report cites

“ongoing contacts between UK and Indian officials around the time of Operation Blue Star on potential defence related sales”.

Will the Foreign Secretary commit to publish this correspondence?

A few moments ago, the Foreign Secretary spoke about the exchange of correspondence between Prime Minister Gandhi and Prime Minister Thatcher, yet only Prime Minister Gandhi’s letter appears to have been published today. Will he undertake to publish the response of Prime Minister Thatcher?

Everyone in this House is aware of the continuing pain felt by the Sikh community around the world at the events of 1984—not just at the storming of the Golden Temple in Amritsar and the deaths and destruction that followed, but at the anti-Sikh violence that followed the assassination of Prime Minister Gandhi, and the emergency period that saw arbitrary arrests, and accusations of torture, rape and disappearances that are still unresolved today.

Although there are of course differences within the Sikh community on the issue of a separate Sikh state, there is unanimity in their horror at those events. For British Sikhs over recent weeks, there has been the additional burden of worry that their own Government may have been involved in those actions. The Government therefore have a responsibility—indeed, a duty—to address those very widespread concerns and fears. If they can provide answers to all those concerns and questions, we as the Opposition will support them in that endeavour.

[Mr Hague]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his questions. He is right to draw attention to the efforts of several of our colleagues, on these and other issues, always to find out the truth about events in the past as well as in our own times. My hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South West (Paul Uppal) is another example.

The right hon. Gentleman is quite right to refer to the anxiety about these events that many people have expressed during recent weeks. That is why we should do everything we possibly can to set out the truth of the matter, in so far as that can be discovered from documents and from discussions with officials. Taking what I said earlier as a whole, I think that the story is a reassuring one for the House, the public and the Sikh community.

The right hon. Gentleman asked certain specific questions about the process. He asked whether we would publish a list of officials. No, I do not think that that would be appropriate. It is important to protect the anonymity of some of the officials and military personnel involved. He asked whether Ministers have been spoken to. Yes, the Cabinet Secretary’s investigation included discussions with the senior Ministers of the time. He asked whether the terms of the inquiry changed. No, they did not change, except that the Cabinet Secretary’s work was expanded to cover some additional concerns that were raised during the past few weeks—we may come to some of them later during questions—but the terms of the inquiry remained the same.

There is no mystery about the dates. At the beginning, the Prime Minister asked the Cabinet Secretary to investigate the specific events—whether there had been UK involvement in the specific events leading up to and during Operation Blue Star in June 1984—and the time frame was therefore from the start of what happened at the location in question in December 1983 to the Indian operation in June 1984. As the right hon. Gentleman will have gathered from my statement, the Cabinet Secretary was able to go beyond that to say that in the 23,000 documents he has seen no circumstantial evidence of British involvement in any subsequent military operation in the Punjab. One of the questions raised is whether there could have been British military involvement in subsequent Operations Black Thunder I and II. From everything that the Cabinet Secretary has seen, having examined hundreds of files—200 files—the answer to that is no.

The relevant documents—those that can be published while, as I have said, upholding the publication principles that all British Governments have always observed—that relate specifically to Operation Blue Star have been published. There will of course be publication over the coming years of many more documents concerning British relations with India at the time. I certainly do not want to suggest that no more documents will be published that can shed light on relations between Britain and India through the 1980s. As I understand it, the 30-year rule—it will become the 20-year rule—is implemented on the basis of 30 years from files coming to an end, but such files contain documents from earlier years. Therefore, other documents will of course be published about this period. However, the relevant files have all been searched, and these are the documents that shed light on Blue Star.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the quick analysis by the military. I do not think that the word “quick” should be used in a pejorative sense. The report has been quite quick, given that concerns arose only a few weeks ago, and military experts have provided an analysis, but it is clear even to a layman that the military operation mounted was very different from any that was discussed in the documents. As I mentioned earlier, it was entirely different: it did not have the element of surprise; there were no helicopter-borne forces; and it was conducted by the Indian army, not by the paramilitary forces present when the UK military adviser was there in February. Even to the non-expert on such matters, the military operation mounted in June was clearly fundamentally different from any discussed in February 1984.

Overall, I therefore think that this report has the right degree—a strong degree—of transparency, and is a thorough and good job by the Cabinet Secretary, and we should be prepared to support it as such.