Military Covenant

Denis MacShane Excerpts

Wednesday 16th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Dr Liam Fox)]

Let me too begin by expressing our condolences to the family and friends of Private Lewis Hendry, 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment; Private Conrad Lewis, 4th Battalion the Parachute Regiment; Lance Corporal Kyle Marshall, 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment; Private Dean Hutchinson, 9th Regiment the Royal Logistic Corps; and Private Robert Wood, 17th Port and Maritime Regiment the Royal Logistic Corps, all of whom have died in action in Afghanistan. Every death is a personal tragedy; they are not simply numbers, and their loss is felt by families and friends. We in this House remember them all in our thoughts and prayers.

There is no doubt about the general desire in this country to improve and develop the armed forces covenant. It encompasses those of all ages and social groups, those with different politics and those with none. It does not and cannot exist in the abstract, however. It cannot be a wish list separated from the economic reality in which we find ourselves. A covenant between the armed forces and the British people cannot ignore the financial predicament in which the British people and their Government find themselves.

The starting point of this debate has to take account of the economic situation inherited by the coalition Government and the state in which the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence find themselves at the end of 13 years of Labour Government. In short, the issue for the Opposition, as set out in their motion, is one of credibility, so we should examine the credibility of Labour Members on the issues that the shadow Defence Secretary described as important.

[Mr Denis MacShane (Rotherham) (Lab)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Dr Fox]

In a moment.

There are three charges that still hang around the necks of Labour when it comes to defence, the armed forces and the military covenant. In 13 years of power, their response to equipping our forces was often too little, too late; their spending priorities were wrong; and there was too much waste and inadequate budgetary control.

We have learned from the Chilcot inquiry—an independent inquiry—that it was purely for political reasons that the Labour Government failed to order enough equipment, including body armour, for troops in the lead-up to the Iraq war. They did not want to send the message that they were preparing for war, and the result was under-prepared, under-equipped forces sent into conflict.

In 2006, they failed to send enough troops and equipment into Helmand province and were painfully slow at providing more capable armoured vehicles to counter improved explosive devices. That led to a number of high-profile subsequent resignations from the Army, as has been pointed out. They went 12 years without a defence review, even though, according to numerous former Defence Ministers and service chiefs speaking at the Chilcot inquiry, the 1998 SDR was never properly funded. They overstretched our armed forces by fighting two wars on a peacetime budget.

[Dr Fox]

I will give way in a moment.

The Labour Government overspent and overheated an equipment programme that contributed to a £38 billion black hole in the defence budget. In Labour’s final year in power, the MOD saw a record overspend of £3.3 billion in the equipment programme. In fact, we inherited an equipment programme that has its top 15 projects £8.8 billion over budget and a cumulative delay of 32 years. When we were fighting two wars, their idea of commitment to defence and our armed forces was to appoint four different Defence Secretaries in four years, including one who served simultaneously as Defence Secretary and Secretary of State for Scotland.

Labour left a situation in which 42% of service single living accommodation in the UK, and 52% of overseas single living accommodation, was in the worst grade on a four-point scale—although in a speech that lasted half an hour, the shadow Defence Secretary did not once mention the quality of accommodation for our armed forces.

With all that going on, Labour Defence Secretaries spent almost £250,000 on modern art for the Ministry of Defence. As former Chief of the General Staff General Sir Mike Jackson said in his autobiography, they

“preferred to spend on abstract art money which might otherwise have directly benefited soldiers and their families. It may seem a small point, but to me it was so indicative of the cultural divide in the MoD”.

The list goes on. In this country, we judge politicians not by their words but by their actions. The Labour Government had 13 years to put matters right; we have had nine months so far, and I will set out what we have done already.

[Mr MacShane]

I am glad to give the Secretary of State a moment to calm down from his election speech. On 11 January last year, he wrote to Mr Yeomans in Clevedon that the Conservative Government would review the rules on awarding medals, particularly the proposed national defence medal, which has been supported by nearly 200 right hon. and hon. Members in an early-day motion. Earlier this week, however, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, Lord Astor of Hever, stated in the other place that the Ministry of Defence would not review the role or membership of the committee that would award the national defence medal if it is granted. That is a remarkable U-turn in one year. Will the Secretary of State address that point and discuss it with his ministerial colleague?

[Dr Fox]

I can give the right hon. Gentleman the news that we have completed the review on military medals, and today I signed off the report, which will be published, and no doubt discussed in the House, before Easter. He will get a clear answer to his questions.