European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debbie Abrahams Excerpts

Wednesday 13th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[The Solicitor General]

I hear what the hon. Lady says, but I disagree with her. I think that the arguments in the Lords were very finely balanced. I am sure she has read parts of the Lords Hansard and will have noted the force of the arguments that were put against the position that she occupies—and, indeed, the view of the House of Commons when we dealt with this issue in Committee and on Report.

I was disappointed that the Lords were not even willing to consider our own significant amendment in respect of the general principles, which I will come on to. I understand fully the concerns that have been raised about the protection of rights. It is, of course, vital that as we leave the EU, we do not see any dilution of domestic protections for our rights and liberties. I do not, however, accept that these amendments are necessary to the realising of that aim.

The charter did not create any more rights. It reaffirmed the rights that were already recognised in EU law—the law being retained in the UK under the Bill. The charter applies to EU institutions and member states only when they are acting within the scope of EU law. It is not—I repeat, not—as broad a body of law as the European convention on human rights and should not be compared to it.

[Debbie Abrahams (Oldham East and Saddleworth) (Lab)]

Article 26 of the charter concerns disability rights. Liberty and Amnesty International specifically say that it

“goes further than domestic laws and provides for specific measures to ensure the ‘independence, social and occupational integration and participation’ of disabled people in community life.”

That provision is stronger than domestic law. How will the Government ensure that it is protected?

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. Lady and I share an interest in—indeed, a passion for—the position of people with disabilities in this country. However, I think that that analysis is wrong: I do not think that article 26 enhances rights in the way that both she and I would understand. It does not give any extra domestic remedy to people with disabilities who might face discrimination or other injustices. I know that she is familiar with recent important Supreme Court decisions relating to benefits. We already have an important and vigorous domestic legal system whereby people who live with lifelong conditions or, indeed, other disabilities can challenge the authorities and seek redress of grievance.

[Debbie Abrahams]

rose—

[The Solicitor General]

With respect to the hon. Lady, I must press on.

I am concerned that some people—including no less than the former Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith—seem almost to be contradicting themselves 10 years on. Lord Goldsmith, who was the Attorney General, made his position absolutely clear to Parliament:

“The United Kingdom’s position, like my position, has always been that the charter affirms existing rights, it does not create any new justiciable rights in any member state and does not extend the power of the courts.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 9 June 2008; Vol. 702, c. 427.]

It was not the noble Lord but, I think, the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) who described the charter as having no more significance than a copy of The Beano. I simply ask: what has changed? For that reason, I do not accept that the rights contained in the charter will add anything to the rights of individuals in our country. Equally, I do not accept that rights saved by the Bill will not be justiciable if general principles challenges are excluded. Other sources of rights will continue to exist and operate in UK law.

None the less, we have listened to the concerns that have been raised, particularly in relation to accrued rights. We want to get the balance right. When we last debated the matter here, I agreed to a change that delayed the prohibition of certain rights of challenge on general principles grounds, when the cause of action arose before exit day, for three months after exit. This week, we tabled an amendment in lieu that goes considerably further. It delays that prohibition for three years, subject, of course, to the normal statutory limitation periods, which will continue to apply.