(3 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the hon. Lady for that intervention, which gives me the opportunity to clarify again that the difference between a flu virus and a coronavirus virus may be significant in medical terms, but it is not what we are talking about. We are talking about climate change—the existential challenge. We are not saying that it should be one part of climate change. To say that it is like preparing for one virus as against another virus is not an equivalent comparison. This is a much vaster challenge. Indeed, I think that she answered her own question. If something more important than climate change comes along in the next 10 years, with climate change being the existential challenge of our times, we would have significant issues to face as a Parliament. If she can think of something more important than climate change coming along in the next 10 years, would she like to intervene on me and suggest what that might be?
The UK Government have set the most ambitious climate change target, which is to reduce emissions by 78% by 2035. Would it not be ridiculous if ARIA were to pursue something that undid that good work?
Absolutely. As my hon. Friend says, the UK has set the most ambitious climate change target, but the Committee on Climate Change has said that the Government are currently on course to miss their manifesto commitment of achieving net zero by 2050. Amendment 12 aims to support the Government in that mission.
I now wish to make some significant progress in my comments, so I will not take any more interventions for a while. The lack of mission is a concern shared by many. The renowned economist Mariana Mazzucato suggested during the evidence sessions that achieving net zero should be ARIA’s mission. The Secretary of State said that ARIA needs a “laser-like focus”, but failed to provide it. The Institute of Physics said that a clear mission is “essential”, and the Chair of the Science and Technology Committee, the right hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark) raised concerns about ARIA’s lack of focus and purpose. The president of the Royal Society said that
“£800 million is not a large sum of money, so if we have a plethora of missions, then I think we will go wrong. ARIA has to have focus of mission and a commitment to the model over the long-term”.––[Official Report, Advanced Research and Invention Agency Public Bill Committee, 14 April 2021; c. 63, Q62.]
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI beg to move amendment 21, in schedule 3, page 13, line 37, leave out paragraph 11.
This amendment would remove ARIA’s exemption from the Public Contracts Regulations 2015.
Amendment 21, which stands in my name and those of my hon. Friends, is a key amendment that will ensure that ARIA merits and deserves the confidence of the public at this time of great debate about sleaze and cronyism. The amendment would remove ARIA’s exemption from the Public Contracts Regulations 2015. As drafted, paragraph 11 of schedule 3 excludes ARIA from the definition of a “contracting authority” under the 2015 regulations; as a consequence, ARIA is exempted from the usual public procurement rules. The Opposition do not understand why ARIA’s exemption from those rules is justified. Indeed, we are truly concerned that exempting it in this way opens a side door to sleaze in science.
My hon. Friend is absolutely correct in her presentation: we fail to understand why ARIA is exempt from the Public Contracts Regulations 2015. The Government are embroiled in the PPE and VIP lane scandals. It has been exposed that companies were put into the VIP lane by mistake—for example, PestFix was awarded £32 million. For ARIA to be exempted from any regulation risks this exploding to a larger extent with £800 million of public funds.
I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention, and she is absolutely right. It would be a cause for concern at any time to exempt an agency of this importance and public funding from procurement rules, but it is particularly worrying when the Government are already embroiled in a cronyism and procurement scandal.
In support of the point that my hon. Friend made, Transparency International—a well-known and reputable organisation—found that, of 1,000 procurement contracts signed during the pandemic and totalling £18 billion of public money, one in five had one or more of the red flags commonly associated with corruption. Is that not a figure of which we should be absolutely ashamed? That has happened within the existing rules, and the Minister proposes to exempt ARIA from those rules.
In her letter to the Chair of the Science and Technology Committee on 2 March 2021, the Minister explained that the Bill will
“provide ARIA with an exemption from Public Contracts Regulations so that it can procure services, equipment and works relating to its research goals at speed, in a similar way to a private sector organisation.”
We have several concerns about that explanation. What assessment has the Minister made of the ways in which private sector organisations procure services? Has she compared this with the success or otherwise of Government procurement processes for PPE during the covid crisis? Is she saying that private sector procurement is more effective, more honest and fairer; or is it simply quicker?
What the exemption is for is also a concern. The Minister implies that it is for services, equipment and works relating to ARIA’s research goals. Is it for equipment, services and works, or is it actually for research? Will ARIA be considered to be procuring research? We had been led to understand that it would a funder of research and development, not a body conducting its own research in a lab, so what actual procurement needs will it have, beyond office space and office equipment? There are months and months before ARIA is operational, so what will it need to procure at speed, or is the intention to enable ARIA to procure research without oversight? What is the justification for not having appropriate oversight for its procurement of research?
We absolutely understand, and support, providing ARIA with additional flexibility in terms of its funding activity, but the benefit of exempting ARIA’s procurement of goods and services is not clear. We suggest that ARIA’s procurement needs are not different from those of other Government funding bodies. We hope that the Minister will explain why that is the case. In terms of safeguards, the Government are proposing that in a future framework agreement BEIS will require ARIA to appoint an independent internal auditor to report its procurement activities. It is therefore going to have an internal bureaucracy, as the Minister puts it, rather than be subject to the procurement rules that have been developed, debated and put in place over time.
Will that framework agreement set out procurement rules for ARIA? Otherwise, what is the auditing requiring compliance with? How can we audit if there are no rules to benchmark against? Without safeguards, we have significant concerns about the risk of sleaze. What is to prevent ARIA from buying its office equipment from a mate of the Secretary of State or of the chief executive? Can the Minister say which of the regulations she objects to? The Public Contracts Regulations 2015, for example, state that a person awarded a public contract must
“be linked to the subject-matter of the contract.”
Does she object to that? What will prevent ARIA from operating effectively?
In the evidence sessions, we heard a number of times, including from Professor Glover, that there is a need for openness and transparency. David Cleevely said:
“The more open you are about what you are doing, the less easy it is to hide the fact that you have let particular contracts and so on, so there ought to be a mechanism within the governance structure of the agency to do that.”—[Official Report, Advanced Research and Invention Public Bill Committee, 14 April 2021; c. 75, Q78.]
The Minister is removing such mechanisms as there already are. We heard that having rules and regulations in place was part of the culture of DARPA, on which this agency is supposedly based, with one of its directors, Dr Highnam, saying:
“Honour in public service is top of the list.”—[Official Report, Advanced Research and Invention Public Bill Committee, 14 April 2021; c. 39, Q32.]
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI am not daunted by the 6:9 defeat that we have just experienced. We will continue in the hope of winning over Government Members to the improvements that we wish to see in the Bill. The amendments, which stand in my name and those of my hon. Friends, are just such constructive amendments to improve the Bill and, more specifically, to actually give the Secretary of State greater powers than he, perhaps in his modesty, has set out in the Bill.
Amendment 11 would allow the Secretary of State to refuse consent to the appointment of an executive member of ARIA on the basis of their unfitness or inability to carry out the functions of the office. Amendment 12 would allow the Secretary of State to remove an executive member of ARIA on the basis of their unfitness or inability to carry out the functions of the office. The amendments are necessary because greater oversight and responsibility are needed to avoid even the suggestion of the taint of sleaze being attached to science.
This morning, in response to amendment 10, through which we intended the Science and Technology Committee to review the appointment of the chief executive, I think the Minister said that we needed a different model of trust. The public need the existing models of trust to be upheld by our Parliament, our Ministers, our Executive, and the executives of agencies such as ARIA. It should also be clear that the Government are taking responsibility for who is on ARIA’s board and has control of £800 million of public money and, more important, control of our scientific—and therefore economic—future.
The Bill places huge responsibility and power in the hands of ARIA’s CEO with little ongoing accountability. The Secretary of State is responsible for appointing the chair, other non-executive members of the board, and the first CEO. All subsequent CEOs and all other executive board members will be appointed by the chair after consultation with the other non-executive members, as set out in paragraph 3(2) of schedule 1. Such appointments cannot be made without the consent of the Secretary of State, but as the Bill stands, the Secretary of State can refuse consent only on national security grounds. Why are national security grounds the only grounds on which somebody might not be fit or suitable to serve on the board of ARIA?
Should other grounds, such as wanting to pursue eugenics in great depth, not be considered reasons not to appoint somebody to a board?
My hon. Friend raises an important point. As we heard in earlier discussions, there are concerns about the areas of science, such as eugenics, that might be championed or accepted by potential board members. I would hope that belief in eugenics was sufficient to consider someone unfit for the board, but, as it stands, the Secretary of State would currently have no power to refuse consent for an appointment on that basis. I find it interesting to consider the workings of the Secretary of State’s mind here. National security is clearly a critical issue, and it is the first duty of any Government to protect their citizens, but are there no other reasons why somebody might not be suitable?
I accept that it is indeed the USS Enterprise, and I thank the hon. Member for that correction. On the rest of his contribution, I will say once again that I have a great deal of respect for the hon. Member, but to boldly go where no one has gone before is not a mission. It is not even a direction—it is explicitly not a direction. As I said, the USS Enterprise’s mission was to seek out new civilisations, so it was anthropological rather than another domain of science. ARIA has no mission.
We do think we have to talk about the Haldane principle, given that we have seen the acceptance of mission-oriented research, including the grand challenges that were discussed during the evidence sessions. That makes it clear that we can ascribe a mission to ARIA without breaching the Haldane principle. The Government should not outsource their responsibility to direct the transformative change that ARIA can bring to our greatest challenge, which is one that—the hon. Member is familiar with this—inspires so many young people and that can get public buy-in: climate change and the need to address the impact it will have on our planet.
Should we not be proud as a Committee to say that ARIA will achieve net zero in whatever project it pursues? That is essentially working on the edge of the edge—looking at forward technology, ensuring that we save the planet and ensuring that we do not add to the erosion of the ozone layer—so is it not progressive and transformative to set a parameter around net zero?
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend; I think that it is progressive, transformative and very necessary. We heard today that the Prime Minister has decided to set another target for our emissions—I think that it is to slash UK emissions by 78% by 2035—undaunted by the fact that he has not met any of the targets that he has set previously.
This issue is not about setting targets; it is about changing the way in which our economy and our society work, to reduce our emissions. Just think of the role that ARIA could play in that process. My hon. Friend suggested that achieving net zero is not a narrow mission; it is a broad mission, because net zero impacts every aspect of our life. An ARIA CEO would have plenty of discretion in choosing which aspects of the climate and environmental emergency to address.
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesBefore I give way to my hon. Friend or address the latest intervention, I will finish addressing one of the points made by the hon. Member for South Basildon and East Thurrock. He said that he could not imagine that any chair or CEO of ARIA would not agree to give evidence to the Science and Technology Committee. I remind him that Dominic Cummings, who was not the chair of ARIA but was certainly its chief architect, refused to give evidence to this Committee on the basis that he had already given evidence to another Committee, and once was enough in terms of accountability.