NATO and the High Arctic

David Reed Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Westminster Hall

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. I echo the initial comments of the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Dr Pinkerton), in thanking the hon. Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger), a fellow former Royal Marine, for bringing this debate to the House today. This is a massively important subject, and I am glad that we have the opportunity to discuss it. I hope that we will continue to discuss it because the area will only increase in importance.

We all know that the High North is no longer a distant theatre of academic interest or a place for explorers’ delight. It is fast becoming the new frontier of great power competition. As the ice retreats through climate change—we have heard about that from many Members today—strategic rivalry advances. Sea routes are opening, undersea infrastructure is exposed and military activity is increasing.

The Arctic is no longer insulated by geography or climate, and it is becoming a central arena in the contest between major powers. The decisions that we take now will shape the security of the north Atlantic for decades. The hon. Member for Halesowen outlined that very clearly in his opening remarks. Russia views the Arctic as a core strategic bastion. Its northern fleet operates from heavily defended bases in the region, protecting its nuclear deterrent and projecting power into the north Atlantic. Moscow treats Arctic territory and resources as central to its long-term security and economic resilience.

On the other hand, the United States sees the Arctic as integral to homeland defence and the security of the transatlantic alliance. Greenland, which we have heard about today, and the wider north Atlantic have returned to prominence in American strategic thinking, as reinforcement routes and early warning systems regain importance.

Lastly, China, although not an Arctic state—it claims to be a near-Arctic state, whatever that means—has steadily expanded its presence through research, commercial investments and polar shipping, signalling long-term interests in Arctic trade routes and resources. That will only increase as climate change reduces the ice.

The Arctic is a theatre where Russian militarisation, American strategic recalibration and Chinese expansion intersect, as many Members have set out clearly. That is why NATO now treats the defence of the High North as a strategic imperative. The accession of Finland and Sweden has transformed the strategic geometry of the region, as the hon. Member for Halesowen rightly said. We have seen over recent years that NATO’s northern flank is stronger and more coherent.

The GIUK gap and the north-Atlantic sea lanes—the arteries through which reinforcements would flow in a crisis—have regained their cold war significance. NATO’s launch of Arctic Sentry earlier this year reflects that reality, and I am glad that has happened. It signals a recognition that deterrence in the High North must be persistent, co-ordinated and credible.

The United Kingdom says that it understands the shift. Under the last Government, the 2023 “Looking North” policy framework set out a whole-of-Government approach across security, science and the environment. Fast-forwarding to this Government, the strategic defence review acknowledged that developments in the High North have direct consequences for the Euro-Atlantic and the United Kingdom’s place within it. Ministers have also highlighted the Royal Navy’s approach to Atlantic Bastion, which is intended to secure the north Atlantic through a networked mix of warships, aircraft and autonomous systems.

Important steps have been taken. The United Kingdom is strengthening co-operation with Norway through the Lunna House agreement and the JEF, to counter undersea threats and protect NATO’s northern flank. The Royal Marines—my old outfit, and the hon. Member for Halesowen’s—continue to train in Norway, including through exercises such as Cold Response and our training presence at Camp Viking, which is set to expand. I put on the record my thanks to the Royal Marines delegation that recently came to Parliament, under Brigadier Jaimie Norman, to educate us on the High North. It was a fantastic day that left a lasting impression on us all.

The UK will contribute to NATO’s Arctic Sentry mission, with the carrier strike group deploying to the north Atlantic later this year under Operation Firecrest. I hope the Minister will expand on the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty).

The actions I have mentioned demonstrate intent, but the House must distinguish between intent and delivery. The Government have chosen not to publish a refreshed stand-alone High North defence strategy; instead, Arctic policy has been folded into broader defence frameworks. I am sure there is a good reason for that and look forward to hearing the Minister’s rationale for it, but the Opposition, if we are playing a good friend to the policy, think it risks diluting focus.

If the High North is truly the new frontier of great power competition, the United Kingdom’s objectives there should be clearly defined. Are we primarily focused on securing reinforcement routes across the north Atlantic, or on protecting critical undersea infrastructure, which the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) referred to? We need a much better strategy across all our partners. I think that is being developed, but the question is whether it is being developed fast enough.

It has been made quite clear in the debate that the United Kingdom does not currently maintain capabilities dedicated specifically to Arctic operations. Without additional capacity, Arctic ambition risks becoming a competition for scarce assets rather than a sustained strategic commitment, as I think would be acknowledged by anyone who sees themselves as our adversaries.

The Royal Marines are a good microcosm through which to see the challenge clearly. They are being asked to pivot towards High North operations—they are specialists in that environment—while continuing special operation roles and global deployments.

I want to put on the record, as the hon. Member for Halesowen did, that I never spent any time in the Arctic, even though I am a former Royal Marine, and it is said that until someone has spent time in Norway, they are not a proper bootneck. Given that the hon. Member for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin) has spent five more days in the High North than me, I defer to her more recent knowledge. Before the debate started, the Minister offered to join me back up again; I am still unsure whether that was a threat or some sort of treat; given that the hon. Member for Strangford also wants to join the Royal Marines, maybe we can do it together.

Cold weather warfare cannot simply be improvised, as the hon. Member for Halesowen will know, having been deployed up in that area, nor can credible specialist capability exist without, as he said, the lift, logistics and sustainment that enable it. In the undersea domain, the stakes are even higher. The North Atlantic seabed carries the cables and energy links that underpin our economy and communications; the hon. Member for Strangford talked about the economic security that we all rely on.

Deterrence in the High North will increasingly be measured below the surface, in the submarines tracked, cables monitored and infrastructure protected. The Lunna House agreement with Norway, which includes co-operation on anti-submarine warfare and the protection of undersea infrastructure, is strategically sound, but the interoperability on paper must translate into persistent operational presence at sea. That means modern anti-submarine capabilities, sufficient hulls available for deployment, and the crews required to sustain them.

The strategic defence review acknowledged that the Arctic is a region of increasing competition in the United Kingdom’s wider neighbourhood, yet it did not outline specific capability adjustments tailored to the theatre. If the High North is becoming central to NATO deterrence, treating it simply as an adjunct to other priorities will not suffice. To go back again to the overriding point that we keep hearing, I really hope there is clear detail in the defence investment plan, whenever it is released, and that the Minister can give a clearer view on when that will be. The House of Lords has also raised concerns that the United Kingdom risks aspiring to a meaningful security presence in the High North without the resources to sustain it. Those concerns have not yet been fully answered.

Recent events elsewhere underline the importance of readiness. When crises escalate, forces held at high readiness must deploy rapidly. Air and missile defence must be integrated, munition stockpiles must sustain operations over time, and the growing cost imbalance between high-end interceptors and low-cost threats cannot be ignored. These challenges go to the heart of credibility. NATO deterrence in the High North depends on the confidence that allies can reinforce Europe across the Atlantic, defend sea lanes and protect the northern flank under pressure. If we speak of Atlantic Bastion, we must demonstrate the ships, aircraft and trained crews required to make it real.

Let me be clear: the Opposition support a strong NATO presence in the High North, and we want to work with the Government to strengthen it wherever we can, but we cannot support some of the plans without being a critical friend. We will therefore ask the Government to define clearly the objectives of the United Kingdom’s contribution to Arctic Sentry. We will ask how Atlantic Bastion is being resourced and crewed, how the expansion at Camp Viking will be sustained alongside global commitments, and how the protection of undersea infrastructure is being operationalised in practice.

The High North is becoming the northern gateway to the United Kingdom’s security. It is the corridor through which allied reinforcements would flow, and it is where deterrence will increasingly be tested below the surface. If this is the new frontier of great power competition, we must treat it with the seriousness that such a frontier demands. The strategy must be clear, the capability must be credible, and the resources must match the ambition.