UK’s Withdrawal from the European Union

Debate between David Lidington and Neil Parish

Thursday 14th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

I really do not think that there is a big difference between what the right hon. Lady quotes and what I said earlier. The commitment is there, in Hansard, as she says, from the Prime Minister to seek to agree in those circumstances an extension with the European Council and to introduce the necessary legislation, but the legislation would have to provide for the duration, purpose and condition of any extension that had been agreed with the Council. We cannot operate in a vacuum here. We are dealing with a process that flows from article 50 of the treaty. It is not something that the House can simply resolve on its own. The job of the House is to come to agreement on a deal.

[Neil Parish (Tiverton and Honiton) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Lidington]

I will give way to my hon. Friend, who is a former distinguished Member of the European Parliament.

[Neil Parish]

For over two years now, since we invoked article 50, we have been absolutely incapable as a party, a Government or a Parliament of reaching a decision on a withdrawal agreement. Why would my right hon. Friend ask me to vote for an extension of article 50 so that we can just argue for another couple of months? We have to have a withdrawal agreement before we extend anything.

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. Members of this House, whichever side they have taken in the numerous debates that we have had on European matters, should not underestimate the exasperation not just in the EU institutions but in the democratic Governments of the EU member states at the inability of the House to decide what it is prepared to get behind.

Iranian Nuclear Programme

Debate between David Lidington and Neil Parish

Thursday 2nd July 2015 Westminster Hall

[The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)]

I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr Amess. I congratulate the hon. Member for Dudley North (Ian Austin) on securing this debate. I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Tiverton and Honiton (Neil Parish) and for Central Suffolk and North Ipswich (Dr Poulter) for their contributions, and the two Opposition Front-Bench spokesmen for theirs.

It will be no surprise that I am unable to speculate about quite a few details, because negotiations are continuing in Vienna today. Although all questions asked during the debate were perfectly reasonable, many can only be answered if and when there is a final agreement between the E3+3 and Iran. At present, there is an interim agreement—the so-called Lausanne parameters—and ongoing negotiations. The Foreign Secretary is in Vienna today to take forward conversations with the Iranian negotiators, having met his five counterparts a few days ago.

I can tell the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) that throughout this process, which it is fair to say has commanded broadly bipartisan support under successive Governments, Foreign Office Ministers have sought to keep Parliament informed about negotiations, and we will certainly continue to do so. I expect that, in the event of a final agreement being reached, a statement to Parliament will be made by the Foreign Secretary or another Minister, so that Members have the chance to see the detail of what was agreed.

When we and our E3+3 partners and Iran agreed the key parameters for a comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme on 2 April, we set ourselves a deadline for reaching a final deal. That deadline passed on Tuesday, as hon. Members mentioned, without an agreement being reached, but that does not mean that the process has definitively ended in failure. It demonstrates our resolve not to be hurried into an unsatisfactory agreement on the substance, including on the vital technical details—I accept what Members from all parties said about consideration of the technical details being essential to any judgment about the nature of a final deal, should one be secured. It is important that all sides have the assurances they need and that we get those details right. We have to be confident that any deal is verifiable, durable and addresses our concerns fully. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman: substance is the key to this, not any particular question of timing.

All parties remain committed to achieving a deal. Nobody wants another long extension, so the interim agreement—the joint plan of action—has been extended for seven days to allow negotiations to continue.

Just over two weeks ago, the House debated these issues, and the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), replied on behalf of the Government. I have picked up from this debate, as I did from the record of the previous one, that hon. Members in various political parties are concerned about the detail and worry that Iran might be granted too many concessions.

Although I cannot give a running commentary on the detail of the negotiations, I reiterate my strongest possible assurance on behalf of the whole Government that we will not do a bad deal. Any deal must achieve the Government’s prime objective of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. That means more than just a verbal or written commitment: it means the inclusion of detailed undertakings by Iran that are sufficient to give us confidence that their nuclear programme will be entirely peaceful. Anything less is completely unacceptable.

We have an historic opportunity to find a solution to a long-standing source of tension, instability and global concern that, if unresolved, will undoubtedly threaten our security and that of our partners. In a week when we have seen tragic violence and bloodshed in the wider region, we should reflect on how much progress we have made towards reaching a solution through peaceful, diplomatic and negotiated means. A great deal is at stake—for this country, for our partners and for the people of Iran.

Let me give a bit more detail on the parameters within which we hope to agree a deal and its implications for Iran, for the region, and for the UK. In addressing the Lausanne parameters, I hope that I will answer at least some of the questions and concerns raised during this debate.

The parameters for a deal agreed in Lausanne are a sound basis for what could be a very good deal that is durable, verifiable and addresses our concerns about proliferation. Under the Lausanne interim agreement, Iran’s enrichment capacity, enrichment level and enriched uranium stockpile would all be limited, and the facility at Natanz would be Iran’s sole location for enrichment.

Hon. Members mentioned research and development capability. Iran’s research and development on centrifuges will be carried out under the Lausanne parameters, based on mutually agreed details relating to scope and schedule. When I say “mutually agreed”, I mean agreed not just by Iran, but by Iran and the six international partners with whom it is negotiating. The Lausanne deal also requires the Arak heavy water research reactor to be redesigned and modernised to exclude production of weapons-grade plutonium. Taken together, these measures will ensure that Iran’s break-out time—the time taken to produce sufficient fissile material for a nuclear device, should Iran ever attempt to do so—will be extended to at least 12 months.

A robust and credible regime for monitoring compliance by Iran will be put in place under the Lausanne parameters. Iran would need to implement the modified code 3.1 and the additional protocol to the comprehensive safeguards agreement. The International Atomic Energy Agency must be able to use the best modern monitoring technologies and have enhanced access to sites to make sure that if Iran ever tried to break out towards a nuclear weapon, the international community would be alerted and have sufficient time to respond.

[Neil Parish]

What faith have we that this agreement, which should deal with enhanced access to nuclear sites in Iran, will happen? We have had agreements like this before, but still have not had access to the sites.

[Mr Lidington]

I want to say a little bit more about access in a few moments, but to answer my hon. Friend directly, questions about access and verification lie at the heart of the detailed negotiations going on today. Unless we and our partners are satisfied that the IAEA will have the access that it believes it needs, there will not be a final agreement.

European External Action Service

Debate between David Lidington and Neil Parish

Wednesday 14th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

I am certainly not resiling from anything that I or my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said when we were speaking from the Opposition Benches. But as my hon. Friend has acknowledged, we are in the legal and constitutional position in which we find ourselves, and in those circumstances I believe it to be the duty of the Government of the United Kingdom to fashion the best way forward we can, in alliance with like-minded member states, to provide the maximum possible safeguards for the freedom of individual European nations to act in pursuit of national interests when it comes to foreign policy.

[Neil Parish (Tiverton and Honiton) (Con)]

Whatever the rights and wrongs of the Iraq war, would it not have been an interesting situation if the High Representative had been in place and had been trying to represent the whole of the European Union at that time, because different countries were taking very different positions? I would like the Minister to spell something out. When the High Representative is going around the world putting a particular slant on a European policy that we oppose completely, how are we going to make sure that we can tell the world, and a particular country, that we have a position different from that of the European Union?

[Mr Lidington]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that question, because he brings me to the next passage in my speech. The important point is that the EEAS will have two key functions, the first of which is to speak on behalf of a common position on foreign policy agreed unanimously by the Council and embodied in a mandate given by the Council to the High Representative. So in the case of Iraq, or any comparable foreign policy issue where member states were divided, that unanimity—and hence that mandate—would not exist. Therefore, the High Representative and the EEAS would not be entitled either to speak or to act in the way that my hon. Friend fears.

The second responsibility of the EEAS is to support the Commission in implementing the external aspects of policies over which the Commission already, under the treaties, has competence, such as international trade. The fact that the High Representative is now, in effect, wearing two hats, whereby she is accountable to the Council for common foreign and security policy decisions but also works as a Commissioner on those matters that are properly the responsibility of the Commission, means that we have the potential for a rather more cohesive international engagement by the EU than has previously been the case. The Government would like this new institutional arrangement to complement our own commitment to an active British foreign policy and help to deliver the diplomatic objectives of the United Kingdom.