(2 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesAbsolutely. Agencies such as the Environment Agency, Natural England and the Office for Environmental Protection use these regulations and case law all the time. They have evolved over time in many areas—water, nature and so on. There is now a real danger to those provisions, so I hope the Minister will consult with her colleagues in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and ensure we are not unable to undertake regulatory and enforcement action on the environment.
Having seen the opinions of different agencies—my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow mentioned the Office for Environmental Protection—and heard the evidence of the Bar Council, I am not sure that is the case.
I hesitate to intervene again, but it is specifically provided for in clause 7(2) that, although precedent may not apply in the case of European decisions, it does in the case of domestic decisions. Of course, European courts are not bound by precedent, so we have a significant safeguard in clause 7(2) against the risks that the hon. Gentleman mentions.
I know from my brief in the shadow DEFRA team that some very important enforcement actions are extrapolated from European case law, because we were under the aegis of the European Court of Justice for a very long time. It is important that we are mindful of that.
(2 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Sir Richard Aikens: You start from the fact that supremacy no longer exists unless it is retained by UK law. Half speaking as a lawyer, but I suppose half speaking as a commentator, I do not myself see why there should be any part of our UK law that is regarded as more supreme than another, unless specifically identified by Parliament as being necessary for some reason. In many other countries, there is the principle of the constitution, which is inevitably supreme and cannot be crossed; we do not have that and have never had that in our law, except perhaps in very specific circumstances.
In general, therefore, I would say that the whole idea of supremacy should be done away with, unless there is some specific reason in specific areas of law why it is necessary to retain it. For my part, I cannot think of anything that immediately comes to mind that is not already dealt with in our law—I am thinking in particular of human rights.
Q
Jack Williams: I would start by not necessarily having what George Peretz KC calls the gun to your head, so that by the end you do not have time to scrutinise, because if you did take the time to scrutinise it, you might be left with the choice on the last day of what is there or nothing at all. That is obviously a difficult position for Parliament to be put into, having to save its own law somehow without a set procedure.
A direct answer to your question, however, is more scrutiny from Committees. One can imagine, for example, a Committee that was set up specifically to analyse all the changes that are coming to certain practice areas, with consultation and independent experts assisting—much like this Committee format. There is also the legislative reform order super-affirmative procedure, which builds and bakes in consultation and I think extra time in the process—the downside is exactly that last point, which is that it leads to delay. If you have a cliff edge of 2023, it is not particularly suitable, but it might give some ideas for inspiration. It is under a 2006 Act, but I think it has been used fewer than 50 times, precisely because it takes so much time and involves so much scrutiny—but if you are looking for an example.
Q
Dr Fox: It will probably not be that dissimilar to what we were talking about in terms of what we went through with the Brexit process. On sifting, the process proposed is that all negative instruments will be laid before the sifting committee in draft form. They would have 10 sitting days to decide whether to upgrade it to the affirmative procedure. The implications for parliamentary time will depend on what their decisions and recommendations are and whether the Government accept them, and therefore whether there has to be a delegated legislation Committee.
So yes, the potential is for an increased number of delegated legislation Committees. The reality is that doing all that before December 2023 is clearly nigh-on impossible; if your deadline is 2026 or 2028 and you smooth it out over time, then it is achievable. Again, it will depend on what the numbers are and what proportion of negative and affirmative instruments there are, depending on what the Government propose to do.
Q
Dr Fox: It would depend on what the enhancement was—improvement, but if the improvement implied obstacles to trade or innovation, financial cost or administrative inconvenience, then no, it could not. It is hard to see how the kinds of enhancements that have been talked about—for example, in relation to animal welfare—would not necessarily imply an administrative burden; they therefore could not be done under this provision. That said, my understanding is that the former Secretary of State who was the architect of the Bill took the view that it was not appropriate for imposing new regulations through delegated legislation. That is not a bad thing, but the problem is that the nature of the exercise does not work in that context, because of the cliff edge.
Sir Jonathan Jones: May I add a brief comment? First, the power in clause 15 is undoubtedly very wide, so the Minister has huge discretion in deciding what is appropriate. The test about regulatory burdens is quite a slippery test, not least because the assessment is whether the overall effect of the change is to increase regulatory burden. All sorts of factors might weigh within that burden. It may be that the Minister decides to increase some procedural burden and reduce some other, and makes the assessment that overall the effect is to reduce the burden. Within that, however, could be all sorts of complexity. It is very difficult to predict in the abstract exactly how the power might be used.
(2 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Sir Stephen Laws: Yes, I do. I think that that is part of the confusion. If we are going to work out what the law means, it is important that the system for retained EU law should fit the system that we have for all other law, which is that the latest views of Parliament should count.
Q
Sir Stephen Laws: I did not intend to imply that every one of the laws that will disappear needs to be replaced. A rational approach is to say that everything will cease to have effect unless we replace or retain it. There is a fallacy around legal reform that was criticised by Cass Sunstein, the American jurist and adviser to President Obama, which is that the law is very fond of the status quo: the law thinks that if we know the law already, changing or removing it must be less clear. I think that the status quo is something that needs to be justified just as much as any proposal for change needs to be justified.
We have had six years to look at all this law and to decide what of it is so valuable that we need to keep it. If people are now not able to defend specific bits of the status quo that they think are important, it is likely that they never will be able to. People will keep relying on the fact that it is the law already and must be clearer than a change, but to say that we should not change law because change is always more uncertain than keeping things the way they are is an argument against all legislation. We might as well wind up Parliament all together if we are to pursue that argument.