Business of the House

Debate between David Davis and Penny Mordaunt

Thursday 25th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[Penny Mordaunt]

I thank the right hon. Lady for again diligently raising this matter. I met the Paymaster General yesterday to get an update on progress. Progress is being made, and I know that the Paymaster General will want to come to the House to make a statement on that. I know that he will do so as soon as he has something substantial to say, but I can assure the House, which I hope knows my interest in this area, that he is working to ensure that justice is served as swiftly as possible.

[Sir David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

Some time ago, the Scottish Government refused an instruction from the Information Commissioner to publish written evidence from the Hamilton inquiry into the conduct of the former First Minister Nicola Sturgeon. Last month, I attended the Court of Session hearing at which the Scottish Government were humiliated, at great public expense, in their attempt to reject the request. Despite a unanimous ruling against them by the highest civil court in Scotland, the Scottish Government still refuse to release that information. That extraordinary behaviour would appear to be in breach of the ministerial code, the civil service code and, indeed, the rule of law. May I ask the Leader of the House whether the rule of law in Scotland is at risk and whether we can have a debate and a statement on this matter?

[Penny Mordaunt]

I thank my right hon. Friend for raising this matter and the disturbing issues surrounding it. Although there is a debate about whether the court decision is binding or is binding in a particular way, we consider it to be a matter of accountability to the Scottish Parliament. I am sure that the Scottish Parliament will be asking questions of their Government in relation to those very serious matters, which my right hon. Friend has raised today.

Coronavirus Bill

Debate between David Davis and Penny Mordaunt

Committee stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Committee: 1st sitting & Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Monday 23rd March 2020 Commons Chamber

[Penny Mordaunt]

The hon. Gentleman might wish to say that some of the provisions cannot be applied. We do not wish to do that. The whole purpose of the Bill is that the bulk of the powers—apart from ones that are live at Royal Assent—are at the direction of either the devolved nations or the UK Government, to respond to a very dynamic situation. We do not wish to call on these powers. We only wish to use them in extreme cases. There are several that we think we will never use, particularly on food supply and so forth, but we need to allow that flexibility in what will be an incredibly unpredictable situation. The safeguards we have put in place will allow us to have that flexibility.

[Mr David Davis]

Let me give the Minister a straightforward, practical example. One element of the Bill allows the delay of the oversight of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. That is the case because we have 15 commissioners, only one of whom is younger than 70—that is the reasoning behind it. Were the Government to do something sensible, such as appoint 15 deputy commissioners, all under 70, this would no longer be required. But we have seen the Government before resisting attempts to improve accountability, and we know that that they may want to keep it in, whereas we may want to take it out. This is a precise example, so why can we not do that?

[Penny Mordaunt]

In his earlier remarks, my right hon. Friend was talking about things that we might wish to do in a year’s time and so forth. I do not think any of those things are being ruled out, but we think that extensive work has been done on this Bill, which is looking only at powers we know need to be enshrined in primary legislation, not at other issues, many of which have been raised by colleagues. I do not think those very practical options are removed from us by supporting this Bill today.

I also wish to emphasise another point, because in this Bill the Government are legislating for areas of devolved competence. I should highlight that the devolved Administrations could have legislated to create their own powers through their own primary legislation. However, they have agreed, given the urgency of the situation, that the UK Government should do it on their behalf. This Bill consequently engages the legislative consent motion process for all the devolved legislatures. The amendment in the name of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care requires the continued operation of certain key powers contained in the Bill to be reviewed every six months. Unless the UK Parliament consents to their continued operation, UK Ministers would be under an obligation to switch off the relevant powers by way of regulation.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between David Davis and Penny Mordaunt

Thursday 27th February 2020 Commons Chamber

[Penny Mordaunt]

As the hon. Gentleman knows, we are considering what reforms we can bring in. We have set out clearly the principle that this is not just about the immediate return on investment; it is about the long-term opportunities that procurement would open up for every part of the UK.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

2. Whether his Department has made an assessment of the extent to which the use of voter identification will tackle voter fraud.

Use of Torture Overseas

Debate between David Davis and Penny Mordaunt

Monday 20th May 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if she will make a statement on the Ministry of Defence’s policy on co-operating with the use of torture overseas.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Penny Mordaunt)]

The UK Government stand firmly against torture and do not participate in, solicit, encourage or condone the use of torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment for any purpose. Our policy and activities in this area are in accordance with domestic and international law. The Ministry of Defence’s policy is aligned with the Government’s policy on sharing and receiving intelligence, and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has been satisfied with our activities and has not identified issues of concern. However, the Prime Minister has asked the commissioner to review the Government’s consolidated guidance and submit proposals on how it could be improved. Once it has done so and the Government have had the chance to consider them—I anticipate that this will be a matter of weeks—the MOD will review its internal guidance as necessary in the light of any updated guidance that is published.

[Mr Davis]

I thank the Secretary of State for that answer. Our most senior living soldier, Field Marshal Lord Guthrie, said 10 years ago:

“Torture is illegal. It is a crime in both peace and war that no exceptional circumstances can permit…We need to distinguish ourselves from our enemies. We must not, in the false name of moral equivalence, degrade ourselves to their level.”

He was right. The prohibition of torture is one of our few absolute incontrovertible rights. There can never be a reason or justification for torture; what is more, it does not work. It leads to bad intelligence and bad decisions. The decision to undertake the Iraq war, which led to hundreds of thousands of deaths, the destruction of the stability of the region and the destruction of the reputation of the west, was based on so-called evidence obtained on the basis of torture.

We cannot ignore the morality or the law. Paragraph 15.9 of the Ministry of Defence’s policy document states that information sharing should not proceed

“unless ministers agree that the potential benefits justify accepting the risk and the legal consequences that may follow”.

The fundamental problem with paragraph 15.9 is that it presumes that Ministers can overrule the law, even international law, including that on absolute rights such as the prohibition of torture: they cannot, they must not, and I hope that my right hon. Friend will ensure that they do not.

Given the Ministry of Defence’s claim that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, the investigatory powers oversight body, approves of this, will she publish the documents showing that? It seems to me that the IPCO might have approved the overall approach but not the precise policy document that I refer to, which I understand was published after the consultation. Will she ensure that that document, which appears to give Ministers the right to overrule the law, is published along with any commentary on it?

Armed Drones

Debate between David Davis and Penny Mordaunt

Tuesday 1st December 2015 Westminster Hall

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Penny Mordaunt)]

I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) for securing this important and extremely interesting debate, and I thank all the other Members who spoke and attended. I also thank my right hon. Friend for recognising that this new technology has great potential to keep our armed forces safe and reduce civilian casualties. He and other Members spoke about its capacity to be a decisive tool and a force multiplier, about its precision, and about its role in keeping our armed forces safe. An important point that has not been touched on is that because the crews who operate armed drones are not themselves in a combat zone—although there are unique stresses, which I will address later in my speech—and may build up many hours of experience in operating and flying missions, they might actually make better judgments.

I shall first try to answer some of the technical legal questions that my right hon. Friend focused on, after which I will address the other points that Members have made. Our doctrine and rules of engagement are compliant with international law—including international humanitarian law—and underpinned by the principles of distinction, humanity, proportionality and military necessity. We are confident that the existing provisions in international law are sufficient to regulate the new weapons systems.

Our rules of engagement—as opposed to our static doctrine—are tailored to specific missions and will include policy, legal and operational guidance. They are typically given in a series of permissions and prohibitions that must be followed during a particular operation. We do not put the rules of engagement in the public domain, because it would give our opponents a considerable advantage if they understood that aspect of our operations.

A lot of what my right hon. Friend was driving at and a lot of the assurances he wants are contained in our doctrine. In 2011, the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre produced a joint doctrine note on our approach to unmanned air systems, to capture some of the issues we knew about at the time. Although it was a thorough piece of work, it was meant to be only a temporary document. There has clearly been a huge evolution in our understanding of unmanned air systems and the related issues, some of which were touched on earlier. That document initiated a debate about a whole range of legal and ethical issues. The original note was agreed by a wide stakeholder group in 2011, and the next version, to be called the UK air power doctrine, is anticipated towards the end of next year. It will develop the concepts and framework that will underpin our rules of engagement and policy development, and will be the receptacle for a lot of the issues raised by my right hon. Friend.

This whole subject area is clearly complicated by the current wider debates about international humanitarian law, where it applies and in what situations. We are used to dealing with state-on-state conflicts, but we are moving into very different territory these days, and that is becoming the norm. I devote a large proportion of my time to the subject, and one of the first meetings I had as Armed Forces Minister was with the International Committee of the Red Cross, to look at how we secure the primacy of international humanitarian law and deal with the questions around non-state conflicts.

[Mr David Davis]

Will the Minister give an undertaking that the MOD will co-operate fully with the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which will hopefully provide information about exactly that issue?

[Penny Mordaunt]

Yes, I can give my right hon. Friend that assurance. If we have been tardy in responding to the Committee, I apologise, and I am very happy to follow that up. The Secretary of State is due to speak to the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) shortly, and I will follow that up after the debate. We certainly wish to co-operate, because putting more information into the public domain about the seriousness with which we take such issues will reassure hon. Members.

We have focused on air systems, but there are all sorts of other systems. We are investing massively in underwater systems, for which there is another set of legal requirements. My right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden referred to operational areas and war zones. Clearly, we might have to use these systems and others to respond to a range of situations, including hostage situations and so forth. The picture is complex, but we take it extremely seriously. An enormous amount of time is going into developing the doctrine as the technology develops. We want to operate in a good framework with best practice, and we want our allies to do the same. There is wide international consultation, and we will be playing a full role in helping others to raise their game.

Let me turn to some of the other points that hon. Members have made. The particular weapon or platform type that we use has no bearing on our decision about whether to use force. I assure the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) that the targeting boards and processes are identical for these and other weapon systems.

Several hon. Members focused on the effect on pilots. That issue is often framed in terms of the emotional effect of taking a life on the pilots conducting the strike activity, whether they become detached from the situation and whether they have access to the same support—decompression and so forth—that people on more conventional operations can access. It is often about not what people do, but what they see. I have spoken to pilots who have said that most distressing and frustrating thing is to see something take place that they are unable to prevent, in part because of the strict restrictions placed on them, which cause stress. Of course, the health and wellbeing of our armed forces personnel is of the utmost importance, and we are mindful of the pressure and stresses that such operations cause. The personnel involved are carefully monitored and, where appropriate, have access to the highest levels of military physical and mental healthcare. Looking after them is key, and that is one of the main roles that our front-line commanders are tasked with.

The RAF stress management and resilience training team has delivered stress awareness briefs to units operating these systems, to make personnel aware of the subject and of the range of assistance and support that is available to them. We recognise the unique nature of such operations, and we have embedded TRIM—trauma risk management—providers in RAF Reaper squadrons. As hon. Members know, TRIM provides a model of peer group mentoring and support for use in the aftermath of traumatic events.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) and the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire (Martin John Docherty) asked about others having access to such systems and our ability to combat that. I assure all hon. Members that that was a key strand of our recent strategic defence and security review, and there will be ongoing work to ensure that the right defensive systems and practices are in place to prevent such technology from being used against us.

Hon. Members spoke about the effect on hearts and minds. We understand that whatever means we use to deliver precision weapons in conflict zones—air strikes, operations on the ground or remotely piloted air systems—there will be a negative effect on the civilian populations in the vicinity. However, we do not take the decision to conduct strikes lightly, and we take every step to minimise the impact on civilian populations, including using precision-guided munitions.