(11 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberI rise to support my hon. Friend the Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (John Thurso) and new clause 4. However, before I speak briefly about that, I want to respond to the comments made by the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David) at the beginning, because I am afraid to say that I largely agree with him.
I do not hold much of a brief for any of this Bill, but part 2 as it stands seems to be a very serious mistake. I am particularly concerned because it used to be a convention, at least when I came into the House, that we did not guillotine constitutional Bills, yet part 2 goes to the heart of our democracy and free speech, as demonstrated by the opponents to the Bill. I know of no previous Bill that had ranged against it Christian Aid and the British Humanist Association, Greenpeace and the Countryside Alliance, or the Royal British Legion and the Salvation Army. It is a Bill that has attracted opposition precisely because it goes to the heart of all that those organisations do—not what they stand for, but what they do and how they execute their duty in society.
The right hon. Gentleman makes an important point. Although it is not such a broad constitutional issue, is it not also the case that the points we have raised about the implications for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are genuine concerns, not just points we are making today, and that if we do not get them right, there is a danger that we will produce legislation that is, frankly, unworkable?
That is why I start from my concern about the guillotine, because this is a Bill that in past decades—not past years, sadly—would have spent hours, days and weeks on the Floor of the House. It would have been preceded by a proper consultation, a cross-party agreement, a Green Paper and a White Paper—there was a White Paper, but as far as I could tell, it did not refer to part 2 at all. The Bill has not gone through what in my view would be a proper constitutional process and so will of course be subject to unintended consequences all over the place.
I accept that the Government will not have intended many of the consequences—I will come to some that they do intend in a minute. I accept that the deleterious consequences of the Bill were not intentional, but they arise directly from how the Government started the process. We had a brilliant report from the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, as chaired by the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen), which could have provided a basis. That Committee could have been the vehicle for the process. The hon. Gentleman is right: there will be deleterious consequences, most of them unintended, but most of them because of how we have addressed this Bill.
(14 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberWith only seven minutes, I must be brief on the issues I want to raise.
The Deputy Prime Minister will not be surprised that I am a strong supporter of much of his great repeal Bill which, after all, is the natural conclusion of the great battle over freedom that has taken place in the past five years. I hope that that Bill represents a step change not only in the law, but in attitudes in the Government, so that they will not think that in order to catch the guilty, we must punish the innocent, or that to prevent terrorism and crime, we must treat the whole country as suspects. If that step change happens, it will augur well for the future.
It is a paradox that the new politics is ushering in a return to some ancient rights. The reform of the libel laws re-establishes freedom of speech; the reform of freedom of information re-establishes open government; and reform of the DNA database re-establishes the presumption of innocence. In addition, the prevention of unnecessary intercepts, along with measures against the retention of data and the proposals on CCTV, re-establishes privacy. All those are worth while, and by themselves would justify the existence of the coalition if nothing else did.
Of the three pillars of our national traditions—liberty, justice and democracy—those proposals support the first two, so I offer two cheers for the great repeal Bill, not three. The reason for two rather than three cheers is that some things are missing from it. There is nothing on those great blots on our judicial landscape, by which I mean, first, the use of secret trials in which suspects—usually, but not always, terrorist suspects—are tried without knowing the allegations or the evidence against them, which is completely inimical to British law. That was introduced by the previous Government and I hope that this Government will remove it.
There is nothing yet on control orders—another measure inimical to British traditions, using house arrest and effective internal exile for suspects rather than for the convicted. There is still nothing yet—I hope we will see it and I hope that the Home Secretary will respond to the point when she concludes the debate—on reduction of the 28-day period for which prisoners can be held without charge. We fought over 42 and 90 days, but 28 is still too many, and I hope that the Government will take that on board. I trust that these are deferrals, not oversights, by the Government.
Another issue for the Government to think about in connection with the great repeal Bill is the need to revisit the Digital Economy Act 2010. It was passed in the final stages of the previous Parliament, and it was an error for us to allow it through, as we did in the wash-up.
Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Like the right hon. Gentleman, I voted against the Digital Economy Bill on Third Reading, before Dissolution. Given that the Liberal Democrats also voted against that Bill being given a Third Reading and given that the Secretary of State now responsible for that measure is indeed a Liberal Democrat—the right hon. Member for Twickenham (Vince Cable)—would it not be particularly appropriate for the Liberal Democrats now to act on this issue in the way that both the right hon. Gentleman and I would like?
The hon. Gentleman restates my wish for the Government to take that issue on board. I hope that they do, and that they do so in the great repeal Bill as part of a process that the Deputy Prime Minister quite rightly laid out—a process in which the Government were listening for proposals on things to be repealed.
The trouble with the Queen’s Speech from my point of view rather coincides, I am afraid, with some of the comments made by the shadow Lord Chancellor, particularly when he quoted from an article that I wrote for the newspapers about the 55% proposal. Indeed, I have problems with three elements of the proposed Bill. One element is the alternative vote, which is no surprise; one is the issue of recall, which I believe the Deputy Prime Minister has gone some way to meeting. However, the 55% requirement is undoubtedly a significant constitutional change. We cannot sidestep that fact. It was not in a manifesto, so the proposal is, by definition, likely to be ill thought through and to require greater consideration by the House.
The issue has been represented as one that is a necessity for fixed-term Parliaments. I am in favour of fixed-term Parliaments and I have absolutely no problem with the Prime Minister giving up his right to call an election at any point in time. He can do that and I am happy that he has done so; it is entirely proper. By contrast, altering the circumstances under which Parliament can dismiss a failing Government is a massive constitutional change, which goes to the heart of Parliament’s ability to hold Government to account. One of the leitmotifs of this Government, I hope, will be giving Parliament more powers, not fewer. Such a major change would normally involve prior consultation, a prior manifesto commitment, a White Paper and ideally both the acquiescence of the Opposition and a referendum. That is the sort of pattern that should precede a major change in the constitution.
Let us think about what the proposal entails and whether we can give it the sort of scrutiny and reform that it needs. For a start, it has not been very clearly explained and it may have changed to some extent in the course of negotiations, but it is basically in two component parts. One part—and I do not think that the shadow Lord Chancellor understood this—is that a vote of confidence will still exist at 50% plus one. What usually happens now under such circumstances is that the royal prerogative is exercised to judge whether to have a Dissolution thereafter or to allow a reforming of some other Government. That is the current situation. What is being proposed, I think, is replacing that system with a Scottish-type situation under which if, 28 days after a vote of confidence, no Government can be formed, Dissolution will then automatically occur. That is my understanding of the proposal as it now stands, and it is based on what happens in the Scottish Parliament. However, I have to say—and the Scottish nats will have to forgive me—that the Scottish Parliament does not represent an independent state. For the Scottish First Minister not to exist, or to be a lame duck or retired and not replaced for 28 days, would be a problem for Scotland, but it would not be a disaster internationally.
The nature of confidence votes is that they happen only four times a century. That is the first point. Secondly, confidence votes almost always happen under circumstances of crisis—wars, depressions, breakdowns in society. Under such circumstances, for us not to have an effective Prime Minister for 28 days seems untenable. Let me say to the Deputy Prime Minister that I hope those on the Front Bench will take that point on board, because as it stands, what is proposed is not a zombie Government, but at least a zombified country for 28 days, and possibly at a difficult time.
What is the other part—the 55%—for? It is for dissolving the House without the embarrassment of a vote of confidence and for the Executive, effectively, to use their power—their whipping capability—to dissolve the House. That does not seem to be a proper thing for us to do as a Government. It is not the sort of approach that I would expect from the new politics, frankly. That is why I have some sympathy for the suspicious view that says, “Why 55% and not 66%?”, when the Government have 56 or 57% of the vote. That approach diminishes the proposals and it diminishes the Bills that the Government are bringing before the House. In truth, I would like to see my Government—because that is how I see them: as very much representing my views—putting that aside and recognising that it is something that the House will not take.