European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between David Davis and Dominic Grieve

Tuesday 12th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Davis]

With great respect, the hon. and learned Lady is a lawyer, and she knows that the words in an Act of Parliament matter, and matter very precisely, rather more than an individual word—[Interruption.] They matter very precisely. Let me explain why.

As I said, “necessary” is not a synonym for sensible, logical or proper. In many cases, changes such as correcting inconsistencies, changing terminology, removing redundant provisions, or improving clarity and accessibility could be left unmade, even if the consequences were perverse. That is not the best outcome for businesses or individuals across the United Kingdom. I do not believe that their lordships intended to constrain our ability to change the names of documents such as European aviation documentation. Nor do I think that they intended to require us to use cumbersome terms such as “national regulatory authorities of member states”, and then to have to designate our national regulators underneath that. That would be an inefficient way of making Ofcom the regulator for our open-access internet legislation, for example. This will be UK law, applied only in the UK. It would be confusing to businesses and individuals to keep laws that suggest otherwise, but such changes, while appropriate, might fail the “necessary” test.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

I understand the point that my right hon. Friend is making, but I have to say that I am not sure that I agree with him. I think that all the examples that he has given would meet the necessity test without any difficulty at all. Where the necessity test provides a higher bar is that if it were thought that a Minister was using powers to change legislation in a way that was not necessary, he would be prevented from doing so. My right hon. Friend cites examples, but I just do not think that the test would be a problem for a Minister at all.

[Mr Davis]

My right hon. and learned Friend, as I have known for a long time, is a very good lawyer, but I am afraid that other lawyers disagree quite seriously.

The Lords amendments effectively increase the risk of judicial review. What that does—[Interruption]. This is an incredibly serious point, because that process asks judges to make a policy decision that this House should be making by saying yes or no to a statutory instrument. It really is as simple as that.

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[Mr Davis]

If there were no deal for some reason other than the House rejecting it—it is incredibly, almost implausibly, unlikely, but let us imagine that the Government decided that they would not have a deal at all—we would of course do the same thing and come back and make a statement to the House, and the House would then have the right to respond.

[Mr Grieve]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way. I recognise some of the problems that he has and why the Government came forward with their amendment in lieu, and some of the deficiencies that can be identified in the Lords amendment. But the simple fact is that the Government have not made provision for no deal, and there is a way of doing it. The amendment that I have tabled provides a mechanism for doing that. One of the key issues for me at the end of this afternoon will be whether we make some progress on having a proper structure to address no deal. I do not think that this Bill can finish its course and get Royal Assent until we have that.

[Mr Davis]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for his view on this. He sort of expressed it in an amendment that he tabled late last night, so I only saw it this morning. I have not really had a lot of time—[Interruption.] Well, this is an interesting demonstration of the Labour party’s perception of how easy it is to make constitutional law on the fly. Its own voters will come to a view on that.

Let me say this with respect to my right hon. and learned Friend’s proposed amendment—as he knows, I am always open to have a conversation with him on this although he seems to have fallen foul of my telephone security system—I always want to keep three principles in mind. First, we must never do anything that undermines the Government’s negotiating position, or encourages delays in the negotiations. That is very, very important. Secondly, we cannot change the fundamental constitutional structure, which makes the Government responsible for international relations and international treaties.

EU Exit Negotiations

Debate between David Davis and Dominic Grieve

Monday 13th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Davis]

I am stating Government policy from the Dispatch Box.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

I greatly welcome my right hon. Friend’s statement in respect of there being a statute for us to implement the final deal, but if that is the case—unless my amendment were to be now accepted—it must be right that clause 9 becomes redundant. I do not see how it is acceptable that we should implement Brexit by means of clause 9 to have a statute after the date of our departure. My anxieties are greatly heightened by the extraordinary amendment tabled by the Government on Friday. If we run out of time, surely the answer is none of the suggestions that have been put forward; in fact, the answer is that the time has to be extended under article 50, so that all parties are able to deal with it. That is the mechanism provided, and surely that is the mechanism that the House and the Government should be following.

[Mr Davis]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for his welcome of the Bill, but the extension of article 50 can be done only by unanimity, and that is its weakness.

Leaving the EU: Parliamentary Vote

Debate between David Davis and Dominic Grieve

Thursday 26th October 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Davis]

I am afraid the right hon. and learned Gentleman altered the quotation from yesterday slightly. What the Chairman said, and I refer to exactly what he put to me, was that “it is possible”—possible—“that Parliament might not vote on the deal until after the end of March 2019. Am I summarising correctly what you said?” I said, “in the event we don’t do the deal until then.” That is the point I was making.

I will take up the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s point about the European Parliament, because I have said at the Dispatch Box and we have said that it is our intent and our expectation—those were the words used; I crafted them—that we will vote on this in this House before the European Parliament does. That stands. If it goes to the timetable that Mr Barnier expects, or wants to go to, which is October 2018, it is likely that the European Parliament will vote in December or January, under the normal processes that apply to that Parliament; it has a committee stage to go through first. We will vote on that and we will have it put before the House before then. There is no doubt about that. That undertaking is absolutely cast iron.

The issue that I raised yesterday, because I take it as a responsibility always to be as forthright and open as I can with the Select Committee, was to go through what has happened in the past in European Union treaty negotiations. This time, there is an expectation by the Commission; there is an incentive on the part of the various countries to get it done as quickly as possible; and there is our expectation and intention. None of the undertakings given at the Dispatch Box have in any sense been undermined. The issue here is one of practicality and what we control. What we control, we will run to give Parliament a proper and meaningful vote at the right time.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

I understand my right hon. Friend’s concern about hypothetical situations that might arise at the end of the negotiation, but is not the reality that if the negotiation leads to an agreement, it will be necessary for not only the European Parliament but ourselves to act in accordance with our constitutional principles in deciding to approve it? The only way we can do that properly is by statute in this House. In those circumstances, is not it rather fanciful to imagine that, having reached a deal with the European Union, it would hold us in some strange way to ransom because we pointed out that we needed the time to enact the necessary statute? That flies in the face of reality. It would just tone down the debate a little and introduce a bit of rationality if we understood that our European Union partners would expect us to reach our own conclusion in accordance with our own constitutional requirements.

[Mr Davis]

My right hon. and learned Friend has a point. As I understand it, the reason why Mr Barnier wants to conclude the negotiations, including that element of article 50 that refers to the future arrangements, by October is to enable that ratification process to take place. In that respect, I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between David Davis and Dominic Grieve

Thursday 7th September 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Davis]

I will make some progress now, and I will give way a little later. I am conscious of the point made by the Father of the House that time will be tight at least on this day. I will give way as much as is reasonable, but I do not want to dilate too long.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

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[Mr Davis]

I will make some progress now.

Overall, then, the Bill provides for very significant continuity in the law, but there are some elements that simply—

[Mr Grieve]

Will my right hon. Friend give way on that point?

[Mr Davis]

In a moment.

There are some elements that simply will not make sense if they remain on the UK statute book once we have left the EU and in the years and decades to come. It would not make sense, for example, for the Bill to preserve the supremacy of EU law or to make the preserved EU law supreme over future legislation passed by this Parliament. Laws passed in these two Houses after exit day will take precedence over retained EU law.

We also do not believe that it would make sense to retain the charter of fundamental rights. The charter applies only to member states when acting within the scope of EU law. We will not be a member state, nor will we be acting within the scope of EU law, once we leave the European Union. As I said to the House when I published the White Paper on the Bill, the charter catalogues the rights found under EU law that will be brought into UK law by the Bill. It is not, and never was, the source of those rights. Those rights have their origins elsewhere in domestic law or relate to international treaties or obligations that the UK remains party to—for example, the European convention on human rights.

[Mr Grieve]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Mr Davis]

Let me be clear: the absence of the charter will not affect the substantive rights available in the UK. As I have said before at the Dispatch Box, if an Opposition Member or anyone in the House—I am thinking of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve); I will come to him in a minute—finds a substantive right that is not carried forward into UK law, they should say so and we will deal with it.

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[Mr Davis]

I will come to the details in a moment, but there are a number of limitations, one of which is that we cannot impinge on the Human Rights Act 1998. That goes straight to the point that the right hon. Lady raises.

[Mr Grieve]

I understand my right hon. Friend’s point about the charter, because I agree with him that general principles and the charter should be identical—although that does raise the question of why, in those circumstances, the charter should go—but schedule 1 says quite clearly that after we have done this:

“There is no right of action in domestic law on or after exit day based on a failure to comply with any of the general principles of EU law.”

He must agree that that means that the right of the individual to challenge on the basis of the principle of EU law—the law that will be imported into our law by the Bill—will no longer be possible. That is in our own courts—forget about the European Court of Justice. That seems to me a marked diminution in the rights of the individual and of corporate entities.

[Mr Davis]

I am afraid that my old and dear right hon. and learned Friend and I are going to have a difference of opinion. We will put in the Library a letter on this specific issue, as we have already said. [Hon. Members: “When?”] Today. But the simple truth is that these rights, as he should know as well as anybody, have a whole series of origins. Some are from British common law, some are from EU law that we will bring in ourselves, and some are from the European convention on human rights—which, he will note, we are continuing with. All these things will provide those undertakings. Why on earth we need an extra layer of declaratory law I do not know. It was brought in under the Blair Government—perhaps that explains it.