Ukraine

Debate between Dave Doogan and Edward Leigh

Monday 20th May 2024 Commons Chamber

[Sir Edward Leigh]

This is a very realistic speech. The trouble with this war, as with Russia’s previous wars, is that early incompetence has now been replaced by a ruthless authoritarian determination to win at any cost by mobilising the entire economy and being utterly impervious to the loss of human life. I put to the hon. Gentleman the same question that I have put to the House: although we may breathe fire and brimstone about how we are determined to win, what is actually happening is stalemate, and we have to work out how the west will navigate itself around a possible peace negotiation with Russia. I am not saying that I want that—it is thoroughly unpalatable and not a very popular thing to say—but we have to be realistic.

[Dave Doogan]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his contribution, but I do not share the logic that he applies to the potential outcome in Ukraine. I began in a position of consensus, and I do not think that the Deputy Foreign Secretary would join the right hon. Gentleman in his summation—and nor would I. Whatever the size of the bite that Russia takes out of Ukraine, if Ukraine does not get it back, that is a Russian victory whatever way we cut it and whatever wrapper we put on it, and where Russia prevails, aggression and the tearing up of the rules-based international system also prevail. We cannot allow that to happen.

The strides that Russia has made in regenerating its heavy armour should serve as a wake-up call to UK and western partners. To counter that, Ukraine must have serious supplies of anti-armour weapons. I note that Russia’s missile capabilities are being regenerated at significant cost to Ukraine, and that raises serious questions about the efficacy of sanctions, which I will come to shortly. We must ensure the most accurate calibration in the reconciliation of that which Ukraine needs and in how the UK and NATO allies can satisfy that unmet demand.

Ukraine’s key foreign military aid requirements are air defences, long-range missiles and artillery ammunition. Its shortages in air defence over the past weeks have allowed Russia to conduct a destructive missile campaign against national infrastructure, civilian populations and military targets, including the largest thermal power plant in the Kyiv region. Long-range missiles are required to strike Russian supply depots, command-and-control centres and military infrastructure, and artillery ammunition is essential for offensive and defensive action on the frontline, but they remain in short supply.

The United States Agency for International Development package passed only on 23 April, as we all watched months of delay take their toll on the war effort. The battle to pass that Bill has sparked fresh fears that a Republican election victory—a matter, of course, for the US electorate—could significantly reduce essential US aid to Ukraine, so it is important that the UK, along with the rest of Europe, has contingency plans in place for a potential reduction in the US footprint in aid to Ukraine. That also highlights the need for long-term planning in the military aid pipeline, as opposed to pulsing batches.

Are sanctions working, and who is suffering? Russian oil products are getting through to the UK despite the UK officially banning the import of Russian oil from 5 December 2022. A loophole in the legislation allows Russian oil to continue to flow into the UK provided that it has been refined into fuel in a third country, after which it is no longer considered to have originated in Russia. That is deeply disingenuous to domestic and commercial energy bill payers across the UK, who are facing huge increases in their energy bills because of the rise in gas prices caused by the conflict, while aviation fuel and other distillates from Russian oil continue to pour into the UK’s economy unabated. What do the Government say to UK taxpayers, who are funding billions in military aid to Ukraine so that it can defend itself from a Russian aggression that is, if we follow the money, part-funded by UK purchases of fuel refined from Russian oil? It is desperate stuff, Madam Deputy Speaker, and you do not need to be a forensic accountant to figure it out.

UK purchases of fuels from China, India and Turkey—much of which originates from Russian oil—have increased considerably since the sanctions regime began. From 2021 to 2023, purchases from India went up from £402 million to £1.5 billion, those from China rose from £30 million to £663 million, and those from Turkey from £1.8 million to £60 million. How do the Government explain that loophole? Will they close it off and, in so doing, close off the revenue to Putin and his war machine?

Not unrelatedly, UK businesses continue to see record growth in exports to Russia’s former Soviet state neighbours. That manifold spike coincides precisely with the introduction of sanctions on goods to Russia. Are the Government even interested—let alone concerned—by that patent economic blip and reality? They should be, given the possibility that such exports could contain important components for military purposes. That matters, because although Russian missile production has increased since the war began, Russia faces a serious vulnerability: its most complex weapons, such as missiles, are heavily dependent on western-sourced components. Against the backdrop of a 1860% increase in the export of UK-manufactured vehicles to Azerbaijan, is anybody in the Government really under any illusions about what is happening there?

Russia has maintained a steady supply of the necessary components to make high-end missiles because of the incoherent approach to sanctions adopted by western states. A less laissez-faire approach to countering the Russian defence industry will help to disrupt Russian military supply chains and, in turn, Russian supply lines. That must be a strategic priority for all of us who care about the integrity and future of Ukraine.