Ajax Noise and Vibration Review

Dave Doogan Excerpts

Wednesday 15th December 2021 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call the SNP spokesperson.

[Dave Doogan (Angus) (SNP)]

I thank the Minister for advance sight of his statement. This is a sorry tale, but more importantly, it is a strategically very important equipment failure that leaves a very serious capability gap. I, for one, am clear that the Minister’s statement does not satisfactorily address the issues.

The health, safety and environmental protection review gets to the heart of the failures. It provides helpful definition and sources for the catastrophic failures—numerous as they are—in the management control issues, which have come to define the literally incredible £5.5 billion defence procurement fiasco. I am sure that others will detail the chronic operational consequences of those failures for the ability of UK forces to fight and defend, so I will concentrate on technical details.

I said in this Chamber some months ago that the problem was

“not…MTU V8 diesels or the Renk transmissions”—[Official Report, 9 September 2021; Vol. 700, c. 494],

which were tried and tested assets in other platforms. So it has come to pass.

The review highlights the failure of the

“Track, suspension and running gear, in particular the tension and sprocket design/track interface”,

which are unique to Ajax. The engine, good as it is, is a proven engine poorly mounted in a badly designed vehicle. We also learned today that, as the review sets out, there were

“Quality issues associated with…inconsistent routing of cabling, lack of…weld quality…insecure components”.

That does not sound to me like a £6 million vehicle. The shoddy design and appalling quality management represent engineering management from a truly different era.

There is no shortage of concerns about the programme, but one of them is about the tone of the report: “This was all very difficult, and we’ve taken a look back to see where things went wrong.” Two elements are missing from that rather lightweight mea culpa routine: who is carrying the can, and what is the future of the programme? Can the Minister identify who will take responsibility for this almost limitless failure?

Currently, GD UK management are clearly letting down the workers at Merthyr and Oakdale. What discussions has the Minister had with GD US about their future? When will he make a final decision on the future of the programme?

[Jeremy Quin]

I am impressed with the hon. Gentleman’s attention to detail, but technical issues are not really within the scope of the health and safety report. Mr King would not claim to be the person who can put the House’s mind at rest on technical issues, but there is a huge amount of ongoing work on the matter. The Millbrook trials have concluded, as I say, and we are waiting for the conclusions to arrive before Christmas, and they will be analysed. That will get to the heart of the issues with root cause analysis of noise and vibration, which I know the hon. Gentleman will look forward to with eager anticipation. I will update the House on what the answers turn out to be; I would rather not prejudge that technical analysis.

The hon. Gentleman refers to General Dynamics. One of the positives in the programme since the issues came to light is that we have had a complete transformation in the relationship with General Dynamics, which has been taken up at a very senior level: I speak to the global chief executive, and she has been in direct communication with the head of DE&S. That has helped to drive real performance through General Dynamics, all the way through the system. We are seeing a complete transformation in how it views the programme, in its determination to succeed and in its willingness to embrace the problems, which are clear. It has its own theories about them and is developing design mitigations and design resolutions. We have yet to see whether or not they can absolutely succeed; clearly we will wish to test that independently.