Budget Responsibility Bill

Debate between Darren Jones and Andrew Griffith

Committee of the whole House
Wednesday 4th September 2024 Commons Chamber

[Andrew Griffith]

Will the Minister give way?

[Darren Jones]

Briefly.

[Andrew Griffith]

The Minister can answer this briefly as well. Could he confirm that he has no plans to change the fiscal rules?

[Darren Jones]

The hon. Gentleman is enjoying himself, but he knows the answer: wait for the Budget.

The amendments from the official Opposition are therefore not necessary. To answer the question from the shadow Financial Secretary, the hon. Member for Droitwich and Evesham (Nigel Huddleston), as I have been invited to do so, the Chancellor has already confirmed that the Government will set out the precise details of our fiscal rules at the Budget on 30 October, alongside an updated OBR forecast.

amendments 6 and 7, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), focus on the definition of “fiscally significant” measures to which the fiscal lock will apply. They would extend the definition to include measures that have a cumulative effect on public sector net debt or contingent liabilities. I welcome my hon. Friend highlighting this issue, on which I know she has worked for many years. The draft charter text states that measures will trigger the lock when the combined costing is at least 1% of GDP in any year, and specifically:

“The costing of a measure is the direct impact of a policy decision on the public finances”.

It is difficult to set and interpret a threshold consistently for contingent liabilities as they can often be large in maximum exposure, but low in expected or reasonable worst-case losses. Effective management of contingent liabilities is important, and transparency is key to good fiscal management. The Government plan to announce new significant contingent liabilities at fiscal events to make sure there is transparency with Parliament. We will of course continue to notify Parliament of new contingent liabilities, as set out in “Managing Public Money”.

The amendments would also place a condition on policies with a cumulative impact on public sector net debt, and my hon. Friend noted public-private partnerships as an example. She was referring to PFI and PF2 models, which the previous Government had no longer proceeded with, and there has been no change to this policy. As the Chancellor said in her Mais lecture earlier this year, we will also report on wider measures of public sector assets and liabilities at fiscal events to ensure transparency across the whole balance sheet, which includes non-debt liabilities. Reporting transparently on the Government’s stock of contingent liabilities is key to ensuring we do not take excessive risk. I can therefore confirm today that the Government will publish a report on our contingent liabilities. I expect the contingent liability central capability to do this in early 2025. Having said all that, I recognise the issues my hon. Friend raises, and I will arrange to meet her to discuss them further.

Moving on to the Liberal Democrat amendments, amendment 2 was tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney). As she said, it would enable the OBR to notify the independent adviser on Ministers’ interests if the fiscal lock was triggered. I remind hon. Members that the purpose of this Bill is to ensure that never again do we find ourselves in a situation, like at the 2022 Liz Truss mini-Budget, in which fiscally significant measures are announced without accompanying OBR analysis. If a future Government were to act in this way, the Bill provides a clear remedy. The OBR is empowered to independently notify the Treasury Committee and to produce its own report. This would be available for full scrutiny by stakeholders and Parliament, which would be able to hold Ministers to account in the normal way. We therefore do not consider the amendment necessary.

Amendment 1, also tabled by the Liberal Democrats, would broaden the definition of fiscally significant measures to cover anything that is likely to have an impact on the cost of Government borrowing, interest rates or economic growth. The Bill is focused on preventing irresponsible large-scale fiscal announcements that could undermine macroeconomic stability, such as at the mini-Budget. To support that, we need clear and robust legal frameworks that ensure the provisions are triggered only when appropriate. This requires precise definitions that everyone, including the OBR in particular, can understand clearly and work with practically. It would therefore not be helpful, in the Government’s view, to have a broader, vaguer definition that might repeatedly trigger the fiscal lock under many different circumstances.

Amendments 3 and 4 would require the Treasury to consult the OBR and the Treasury Committee before the charter can be updated for the purposes of the fiscal lock, and to publish a report on the outcome of any such consultations. It is of course important that the views of the OBR and of Parliament are taken into account when making changes to the charter. However, I hope the hon. Member will accept that it will not be necessary to set out this specific process in primary legislation, because the Bill already includes an important safeguard on the fiscal lock, which is the requirement that any changes to the charter for budget responsibility are published in draft at least 28 days before they are laid in the Commons. That will ensure that the OBR, the Treasury Committee, this Parliament and all stakeholders will have a clear opportunity to make representations to the Treasury and to publish their views, as they see fit.

Amendment 5, tabled by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire (Ellie Chowns), would require the OBR to take net zero targets into account when preparing a report on fiscally significant announcements. Strong legal frameworks are already in place in the Climate Change Act 2008 to support the transition to net zero in 2050. The Act legislates for interim five-year carbon budgets, and requires the Government to report on those periodically. Parliament and its Select Committees already scrutinise that in great detail. The Green Book, the Treasury’s guidance on how to appraise policies, projects and programmes, requires Departments to assess the climate and environmental impacts of policy proposals, with major bids and proposals at fiscal events being assessed accordingly in that way. We therefore do not consider the amendment to be necessary.