Daniel Zeichner
Main Page: Daniel Zeichner (Labour - Cambridge)(2 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Penny Hawkins: Indeed. I think some very useful lessons can be learnt from the way in which genetically altered laboratory animals are regulated, but I emphasise that, within a laboratory setting, genetically altered laboratory animals include those in which genes have been inserted from other species. We are very clear that within this Bill we are talking just about gene editing and not about deliberate transgenesis, although there have been some discussions about potential accidental additions of exogenous material.
When genetically altered animals are created under the ASPA, a licence is required for their creation, because, obviously, regulated scientific procedures are required in order to generate these animals—procedures that relate to, for example, administering substances to animals so that they produce large numbers of eggs, or super-ovulation, removing those eggs from animals, preparing other animals to receive the gene edited pregnancies, and so on. All those require licensing, and then, when the line of genetically altered animals has been created, they have to be, as I mentioned, phenotyped. That is a battery of behavioural and biochemical tests to look at what the eventual genetic alteration was and to look at the whole animal that this creates—the phenotype.
There is a system of licensing under which the impact on the animal is categorised as mild, moderate or severe. If a researcher or research team can demonstrate that the gene edit they have done is stable for at least two generations, and if they have phenotyping data and animal welfare assessment data to demonstrate that the animal is not going to suffer as a result of being gene edited—the impact would have to be what is referred to as below threshold; not even mild suffering—then, in those circumstances, they can apply for the breeding of that particular line to be released from the controls of ASPA. That would mean that those animals would still be bred in a laboratory under all the codes of practice that normally apply to laboratory animals, but a licence would not be required in order to breed the animals, because there is no risk to their welfare because of the gene edit.
Those are the safeguards in place for laboratory animals. The issue with farmed animals is that, obviously, if they are released from ASPA and their breeding is then controlled or regulated by this PB legislation, they will not be held in a laboratory setting, with all the controls that that entails; they will join the national herd or flock. That is a very different environment, and it can be far from clear how the genes will express themselves once they are in that environment.
Also, this Bill presumably applies to other animals: companion animals, wild animals and sporting animals. At the moment, for example, projects are under way to look at gene editing grey squirrels to result in fewer females being born or male infertility. Presumably, their breeding will also be covered by the Bill. And when they are released, they really will be released into the wild. Again, that is an extremely different environment. So the safeguards that laboratory animals have will be severely reduced or absent for other types of animal.
Q
Penny Hawkins: Well, I was listening to the representations this morning and I can only echo what everybody was saying about the welfare advisory body. At present it is there to report to the Secretary of State on whether the notifier has had regard to the risks to the health and welfare of the animal and their progeny. There does appear to be some provision in clause 15 on the suspension and revocation of marketing authorisation. That provides for the Secretary of State to receive information on the health and welfare of the progeny of those animals, but that is dependent on clause 14 on reporting obligations, which states only that:
“Regulations may make provision for requiring the notifier…to provide the Secretary of State with…information”
about their progeny
“during periods…prescribed by the regulations”.
All those elements that relate to long-term surveillance really need to be tightened up, and they need to be “musts” instead of “mays”. Many of those are subject to the affirmative procedure, which I know is normal for statutory instruments, but that again does not reassure people who are concerned about the long-term welfare effects that an adequate mechanism is in place for picking these up.
Similarly, it is not at all clear what qualifications the inspectors who are going to be active under the Bill need to have, so it would be good to see some reassurance as to how they are going to be qualified and to see it explicitly said that they will have the right to access and inspect animals.
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“There is no history of safe and reliable use”.
What else could that cover? What are your concerns? Can you expand on that, please?
Penny Hawkins: Just to clarify, when we talk about safety we are talking about the safety of animals. There are two kinds of concerns about gene editing: one from the consumer point of view and one from an animal welfare point of view, and we are talking about the animal welfare point of view. I listened particularly to Professor Henderson when he spoke to you, and I noted that he said there will have to be a two to three-year process of gathering and analysing scientific evidence around both on-farm and off-farm welfare
“before the secondary legislation can be enacted.”––[Official Report, Genetic Technology (Precision Breeding) Public Bill Committee, 28 June 2022; c. 17-18, Q24.]
He said that the process for that was laid out in the Bill, but I have looked at the Bill really carefully and I cannot see any such process either in the Bill or the explanatory notes.
This morning Professor Henderson said that more thinking needed to be done regarding animal welfare advisory bodies and advice on the Bill. Coming from the DEFRA chief scientific adviser, I do not think that that is very reassuring. All of the concerns that I expressed previously about the longitudinal reporting and monitoring of health and welfare also apply here. I am particularly thinking about clause 9, which explains what happens from the bureaucratic aspect if an animal is no longer deemed to be precision bred. Presumably if an animal is no longer deemed to be precision bred, it will either be because they have not been characterised or phenotyped properly or because the genome is no longer stable.
As you heard from the Royal Society of Biology, genes can have effects in multiple tissues, so in these cases there must be a much clearer mechanism for identifying and tracing these animals, and that is also lacking in the Bill. From an animal safety and welfare perspective, there really are some issues that need to be addressed.
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Lawrence Woodward: No, the Bill is vague on definitions. Other regulatory authorities have been presented as basing their approach on end-product analysis and ignoring process, but that is not true. It is only Canada that only looks at the end process; all the other regulatory authorities look at the end product and the process. The scope of this Bill captures not just narrow gene editing, as presented by the famous word processing approach—“We alter a letter here and there and everything is okay”. The scope of the Bill is very wide, and it appears to encompass the possibilities of all new developments in biotechnology, such as RNA information sprays. This encompasses a range of things that are on the cards in the future, yet the clarity of that definition and scope are lacking, as are the assessment and consultation processes to deal with those new technologies coming forward. We have the possibility here of enlarging the scope into the future, ill-defined and without the regulatory framework to deal with that expansion.
Q
Pat Thomas: In essence, the Bill does not provide any reassurance about environmental impacts, because the Bill has decided that there are no environmental impacts. You have heard statements from scientists, and I will underscore my colleague’s point that it was a shame that dissenting scientists were not invited to present evidence to the Committee. The Bill itself has made a prejudgment that these technologies present no environmental risk, but it has not, as the Regulatory Policy Committee concluded, presented any evidence to prove that.
Particularly where we are talking about plants, which are the dominant lifeform on this planet, and a very wide scope of which are exempted in this Bill, we need to be very clear about what the environmental impact will be, not just in agricultural nature, but in wider nature. That requires much more comprehensive assessment than is currently being looked at. At the moment, the assessment is really whether it is good for business. That is fine—we all want to see business progress—but these kinds of disruptive technologies that cut across multiple areas of concern need to be assessed on a much broader basis.
One thing that would immeasurably improve the Bill would be to ensure that the assessment board is looking not just at something that is scientifically feasible, but at the impacts across environment and the social scale, from a practical, an ethical and even a vocational level. There are examples of that in the world: the Norwegians have an agricultural biotechnology board, for instance, which assesses genome edited products on all those bases. Science does not outweigh, for instance, ecological or social concerns.
A very interesting example of that was in 2017 when that board rejected a double-stacked maize that was engineered to produce its own insecticide and be resistant to herbicides. While it accepted that the maize was probably safe to eat or to grow, the deciding factor was that there was no social utility. There was no benefit for consumers or for the environment, and those concerns, given equal weight to science, were the concerns on which it was rejected. That is what we need here. We need a much broader consideration of the impacts of these technologies.
Q
Pat Thomas: They certainly do raise wider issues. Within the scope of this Bill, as my colleague pointed out, there does not appear to be any type of genetic engineering that is truly exempted. If a plant or animal breeder can make a case—that case is not checked, it is simply made; it is a notification, not an assessment—that their plant is herbicide tolerant and that there somewhere exists a plant that is also herbicide tolerant, that plant becomes exempted under these provisions.
Lawrence Woodward: If I may just add to that, I had rather lazily gone along to some extent with the claim that gene editing technology will reduce the amount of herbicides and pesticides being used. I was therefore somewhat upset and surprised to see that Cibus, one of the major gene editing developers, put out its annual report the other day with a press release praising efforts around the world and in the UK to deregulate genome editing, because it saw the possibility of increasing herbicide-tolerant traits for sale, thereby increasing the use of herbicides in agriculture. It saw a way in which genome editing technology could increase the effectiveness of putting in herbicide-tolerant traits. That is an example of the complex nature of this area. The question of utility, sustainability, reduction of herbicides and so on, which people talk about, is really not a given.
Pat Thomas: I just want to add a brief point: within the scope of the Bill, the concept of risk is being used interchangeably with sustainability. Risk assessment and sustainability assessment are two entirely different things. A sustainability assessment will look more across the board at the sorts of effects that we are talking about here. We should not take for granted that risk or safety can be used as a proxy for sustainability.
Q
Pat Thomas: I think we can learn the value of citizen views. I have been a little disturbed, in the first session and this one, by the vague disdain for citizens—“Citizens must not understand the science, therefore they must not have a view.” Citizens are major stakeholders in the food system.
What that board does is to have a high percentage of civil society groups in particular, who are used as a proxy for citizens, but it also seeks out citizen views. What we have learned from citizen engagement in our work and in sharing the work of others is that citizens tend to ask a much wider range of questions of the food system. When they are not asking those questions, it is because some aspect of the food system has been hidden from them. For example, until we understood about battery hens, people did not ask questions about that, but they ask them now. When people began to worry about pesticides in their food, they began to ask questions about organic food.
A concern for me about the Bill and citizen engagement is that the term “precision bred” is not well known. It is in fact a way of sneaking genetically engineered foods into the food system. I can envisage a case in which—even if there was a turnaround on labelling—to label something “precision bred”, for example, is not useful information to people who do not understand what that term means.
To circle back to your question, the importance of including citizens in these kinds of assessments is that we get a much more well-rounded assessment, and something that takes into account questions such as, “Why are we doing this?”, “Is there an alternative?” and, “If there is an alternative, why are we doing this?” Those questions are very important.
Lawrence Woodward: May I add to that? The Norwegian law is one thing. People always think, “Okay, it’s in Scandinavia, they don’t do much GM anyway,” but I remind you that in 2015 the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee—of which I believe you were a member, Chair—recommended in its inquiry into agricultural technology the establishment of a permanent citizens panel to work alongside ACRE in assessing all these other aspects of gene technology, such as its application, its commercial roll-out and so on. That is embedded in the House of Commons proceedings. It did not get very far, obviously. The other point about that is that although that provision did not go into detail as to what would constitute a permanent citizens’ panel, the Norwegian one does, in terms of balance of citizen representation and stakeholder representation.
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Professor Hartley: Indeed. That can happen as early as the funding agencies that fund the research all the way through the development and design process.
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Professor Hartley: One of the challenges the Bill faces is that it does not address the results from the consultation that DEFRA held. Some important issues came up through that consultation—around transparency, traceability, labelling and engagement—that do not appear to be addressed at the moment. I also think the focus of the Bill on the consultation has been around agriculture, and yet applications in conservation and environmental management are also possible in the Bill. There are a range of stakeholders in those areas who have not been sufficiently engaged, I believe, in the development of the Bill.
Q
Professor Hartley: We have known for 20 years some of the issues that the public care about in the space of emerging biotechnology, and that includes labelling, which we know is key. We also know that the public have much more support for technologies that deliver public benefit and are not for profit. Over time, these issues are quite consistent across a lot of emerging technologies, but particularly in biotech.
We could argue that part of the failure of the GM crops was that they did not deliver the public benefit that they promised to start with. They promised to feed the world and contribute to global food security, but in fact the products that were developed ended up serving the farming industry and delivering higher economic profits. We also note it is not reflected in the Bill that animals are much more of a concern to the public than crops. Again, the sensitivities to those issues of concern do not appear to have been addressed in the Bill at this point.
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Dr Edenborough: Well, I am confident that it would not be straightforward.
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Dr Edenborough: The simple point is that clause 1, as drafted, is quite imprecise. For example, if I may refer to the detail, there is the way in which subsection (2)(c) says,
“every feature of its genome could have resulted from…traditional processes…or…natural transformation.”
First, “could have resulted from” is staggeringly imprecise. Is that “likely”? Is that “very possible”? What level of probability is it? Then “traditional processes” is actually defined further in subsection (7), but it is still incredibly wide. However, “natural transformation” is not defined, so that clearly gives scope for further debate.
Even more fundamentally, “modern biotechnology” is, in subsection (3), defined by reference to the Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Release) Regulations 2002. That is wide. However, subsection (8) says that if those GMO regulations are modified, the knock-on effect, with respect to this Bill, is that the regulations may be modified
“to make corresponding changes (with or without variation)”.
Again, that is incredibly wide.
I hesitate to raise it, but there is also, in essence, a Henry VIII clause tucked away in clause 42, which is incredibly widely drafted. Those clauses always give rise to concern because, basically, you can do what you like, when you like, with very little scrutiny. Does that sufficiently address my concerns?
Q
Dr Edenborough: No, it would not be easy, for the simple reason that, because of the breadth of the way in which things have been defined—in a cascading way—you have uncertainty built on uncertainty. If a particular set of facts were presented to me and I was asked the simple question, “Is this within or without this particular Bill?” the answer would be simply, “Maybe.” It will depend on a raft of expert evidence that addresses each and every one of those points of cascade.
As soon as you get to a crunch point, whereby you need expert evidence to say whether it is within or without one of the particular points, you introduce uncertainty. If you have several of those, you introduce more uncertainty. Therefore, it would be dependent on a mass of expert evidence to determine each and every one of those points.
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Dr Edenborough: At the moment, there are no bars within the intellectual property regime to doing this sort of work. So the hesitation comes not from the IP regime but from commercial factors: in essence, whether or not you are going to make money at the end of it. The Bill, though, could introduce greater uncertainty into the commercial field, which would arise because of the unclear way in which “precision bred” is defined. That could lead to people, in some senses, exploiting that uncertainty. Now, there are a number of ways in which that could happen, but one is that you could have a big entity with a lot of muscle, and therefore a lot of money, which might want to push all the boundaries and cause confusion in the marketplace. That could have a dampening effect on other, smaller people who do not have the financial muscle to challenge the legal parameters.
Q
Dr Edenborough: My views will be limited to the legal aspects. The simple consequence is that something may, for example, occur in England that may not be permissible in Scotland. But there is uncertainty with respect to whether, if you grow something in England, you could sell the product in Scotland. That is unclear. I think that is probably as far as I can go legally.
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Dr Edenborough: Yes.
Q
Ed Barker: To take those one by one, certainly the opportunities are there, and the uptake opportunities would certainly come in. A question we often get asked is: “How soon can the benefits be realised?” That is very difficult, particularly in combinable crops, which obviously have a much longer cycle of research and turnaround to be able to realise the benefits. From our point of view, however, the Bill’s benefit is that it provides long-term flexibility—five, 15 or 20 years—for growers, farmers and agri-supply businesses around the UK. We know the world is moving on quite quickly. We have heard about Canada and Japan, and even the EU is not static on this issue. There is a huge amount of interest. If nothing else, we are preparing ourselves for the inevitable demands on innovation in the future.
For take-up from a farming point of view, one area that we really want to focus on, particularly in the trade, is what we call the fungibility of goods. If you take cereals, for example, a real benefit to growers at the moment is that there are multiple markets available to them. For feed wheat, there are markets in the animal feed sector. It can also be exported or go to biofuel sectors. Having that flexibility is a real benefit to a lot of growers, and it provides a lot of resilience in businesses.
A short-term challenge that we could see is that if a product were considered to be gene edited, of course, at the moment in the EU that would be considered GM. As a result, we would have to go through quite an extensive approvals process to export that product to the European Union. That is a big part of the fungibility and flexibility of the product, so in the short term, we are only really likely to see benefits if it goes into the UK or England as a market.
However, a potential opportunity would be to have within the Bill a parallel process in place whereby authorisations were made for approval in the European Union when a product is approved for release by the Secretary of State. That would make a big difference, because inevitably, no farmer or grower is going to grow a crop that has a very limited market available to it. The next witness will probably be able to talk about that in a lot more detail. That is a real difficulty, and in the trade, if you are trying to buy and sell these products and you have a very limited outlet market in place, you might actually find that the product has less of a market the more of it you have, and there may be a deficit. To take the example of assurance in the supply chain at the moment, if you have unassured wheat, it usually trades at a discount because the market available to it is less. I do not want that to stop the Bill from progressing, but it is a short-term to medium-term challenge that we have to recognise, given the EU’s importance. In the past year, for example, we have exported about 1 million tonnes of cereal grains to the European Union, including the Republic of Ireland, so that flexibility is important.
Labelling has been mentioned. I think overall, labelling would be extremely difficult for the trade, because you need to label something right the way from start to finish. Let us take milling wheat as an example. You have to be able to define whatever the label is—gene edited or non-gene edited, GM or organic—and demonstrate that across the whole supply chain, and the compliance is quite strong. To do that, you have to segregate, and segregating throughout the supply chain is extremely challenging, very expensive and very difficult to do. The reason why it happens, for example, in the organic sector is that there is a market for it; the organic control bodies ensure that, but there is a market for it to ensure the additional costs of segregation are put in place.
With precision breeding—which, according to the Bill documents, can be bred by conventional means; it is just that it is quicker—the market would not see any great benefit from that. There has to be a pull factor for labelling, which would usually come as a result of added value, a health claim or a fortification, and the FSA and other bodies would already be asking for that evidence. If you are providing a claim on allergens or fortification with vitamins, the burden of compliance and providing that information will probably be much higher than anything that you do on precision breeding or gene editing labelling. The traders in the agri-supply business and throughout the supply chain would see no benefits whatsoever from labelling. In the trade, it would probably kill off a lot of the provisions in the Bill completely, because it just would not be economically viable to do.
Q
Ed Barker: It would depend on the approval processes set out by the FSA, in this case. Breeders, companies, developers and the market would look at the process to go through for receiving authorisation as laid out in the Bill, whatever it might be for—an environmental benefit, lower inputs at the crop end, or a fortification or a food benefit at the other end—and if they feel that it is too laborious and too challenging, and too much evidence or time is required to do it, it is very unlikely that those technologies will move ahead, so the implementation of this is really important.
We see it, for example, in the UK for certain minor use crops such as linseed, where a number of businesses have had to seek authorisation for individual farm protection products because they are essential for that particular crop. The problem is that it is often unviable to make that authorisation because the crop in the UK is such a small size. That does not necessarily mean it will always be unviable—far from it. It depends entirely on the role of the FSA and the approval processes that are set in place.
It could well be that UK markets are available for precision bred goods, whatever they might be. We have mentioned animal feed, but other food items and even non-food and feed products could have a genuine market uptake. For example, a retailer may well want to seek to remove or lessen the amount of soy in monogastric diets, and may look to work with a plant breeder to develop a crop that has a high protein source. That could be carried right the way through to the retailer’s end products. In those situations, I can see it as viable in the short term, but it depends on the type of products we are looking at and the type of markets we have in the UK.
Q
Ed Barker: In looking at the Bill, the experience of Canadian authorities has been very intuitive to the process in place, because they take an outcomes-based approach. Another area that we are very interested in is the time taken to reach approval. It would be really positive if we were to have a set time-specific limit on authorisations within that. A big problem that we have at the moment with a number of approvals for plant protection products or GM feed imports from South America is that we have a very indeterminate approval process in terms of time. That has caused a lot of problems in the past eight or nine months, when the market has not known whether or not we should be making purchases of GM goods from South America. That uncertainty over time and time lags is a real challenge for the industry, and I think that would be the case. Some certainty over time or statutory requirements on approvals, even a requirement or expectation of turnaround, would be very helpful. At the moment, that is making a lot of difficulty for the trade on existing GM approvals.
Q
Ed Barker: It is a concern of ours that we have a difference in approach across the constituent parts of the UK, or certainly within England, Wales and Scotland. That does not necessarily mean that we should stop within the context of this Bill. What we need to know as a trade is exactly what can and cannot happen within, say, Scotland or Wales. There is uncertainty on what a grower can do. I am sure growers or even livestock owners in Wales or Scotland would be interested to know where they stand on purchasing seed, if we presume there is precision bred seed in England.
My understanding of the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020, having read through the House of Commons Library interpretation and the accompanying notes in the Bill, suggests that, if a precision bred product is placed on the market in England, it can then be sold in Scotland or Wales—obviously not in Northern Ireland, of course—but if I was a grower, or even a maltster or a miller in the supply chain, in Scotland or Wales, my first question would be, “Where does that stand with regard to regulatory compliance?” There are clearly areas within this Bill and within scope of the 2020 Act that, to my reading, potentially come into conflict.
What seed can you use if you are in Scotland? Can you use precision bred seed bought from England, for example? Can you feed your animals on precision bred animal feed purchased in England? Similarly, we have very integrated pig and poultry sectors for genetics, breeding nucleus herds that move around the UK quite significantly.
For clarity, either way, understanding what obligations or requirements are on businesses and farmers in each of those territories is absolutely key, because any ambiguity would create the risk that the industry and supplied businesses would take a risk-averse approach and not undertake to put in place any of the precision bred products that we may have opportunities to use.
No, that was perfect. It was an interesting contrast between the field—literally—and to how this can help on a global basis, rather than from a more academic standpoint. It is an interesting juxtaposition to what we heard earlier. Thank you very much.
Q
Paul Temple: Obviously, I am not an expert in these particular areas, but I do not think we have anything to hide, so public registers—registers of seed varieties and what we are growing—are really important. What you put in the public domain, to my mind, has to be measured by what benefit or what risk there actually is. I suppose my frustration with the field scale evaluation trials was that, by making everything public, it just highlighted those who wanted to protest, rather than actually look at the science. So I think is it really important that whatever element goes into this Bill is done from a science perspective and a risk-based perspective. I do not have any problem with being open as to what is happening on my farm. I think it is really important, but there just has to be some kind of sensible balance, so that it does not drag things down to where you cannot do anything.
Q
Paul Temple: Labelling is really important, but what I would pass back to you for a start is that 30 million tonnes of GM material comes into Europe, and there has never been a requirement for labelling through to the feed process, and that is on modification. This is not modified, and I think that is really important; it is not modified. This could be achieved through conventional breeding, and as such I do not think it needs specific labels. Again, to my mind, you do it from a risk-based perspective. If there is not a risk, there is no need to actually label it as such.
Going back to the global aspect, we are in a global marketplace and what we do not want to do is put ourselves out of kilter with the rest of the world and create double standards or unnecessary work. It needs to be measured and there needs to be awareness, but I do not think it should be stoked by those who seek to feed on the fear factor.
Q
Paul Temple: I very much share the view that if you are out of kilter, as a net importer, you risk causing yourself problems. Again, it is about following the science. I have been to America a number of times and I have sat with the USDA in Washington. Those guys have huge quantities of experience of managing a rapidly moving area of science. To my mind, they are the people with the most experience in this field. You should speak to them and ask them how they manage something that is actually being put out into fields now. You should go to the people with experience of managing it.
Q
Paul Temple: I have always been concerned about the approach that Europe has taken. However, there seems to be a more conciliatory approach on the necessity of enabling the technology. We will see, but there does seem to be some element of progress. What I find really interesting is the gene edited wheat that has been put out in Argentina. It is in fields in New Zealand and Australia, and the US pretty much accepts it. That facilitates trade. When countries like Argentina, which are massive net exporters, are willing to adopt this technology and look at its safety, there is a huge amount we can learn from that.
Q
Ross Houston: Obviously, there are measures to try to stop escapees, but they happen from salmon farms. I think that CRISPR precision breeding technologies are a very promising route, and indeed the subject of much R&D, to ensure that the production animals are sterilised so there would not be any genetic introgression with wild strains. The way we are thinking about it, at least, is that we would be looking to farm sterile Atlantic salmon in the future. That is a desirable thing to do anyway, but in particular if we were to introduce gene editing in the future.
The other part to it would be, I suppose, the impact of issues such as sea lice, which I mentioned before, which could also impact on wild salmon. But, there again, that is within our toolbox, and the R&D is heading in this direction. That is what we would want to use the technology for: to try to tackle these problems in a sustainable, environmentally friendly and animal welfare-friendly way. So I see that these technologies have significant promise for reducing any potential impacts on wild Atlantic salmon.
Q
Ross Houston: Could you repeat the question, please?
Basically, I can absolutely see the benefits, but I can also see risks, and it is the risk side that I am worried about. What I am asking you is whether you can see anything in the Bill—I cannot—that provides a structure for monitoring and mitigating those risks.
Ross Houston: I see the risks as very small, but I do not think that I am in aposition to comment on the detail.
Q
Ross Houston: Yes, but my practical point would be—this is the way we think about it—that we are aiming to ensure that there would be sterility of the farmed strains, and at least awareness of that potential risk of genetic introgression with wild strains, and essentially to eliminate that.
Q
Ross Houston: As I said, it is welcome that we are having this discussion, but of course most of the aquaculture in the UK is salmon farming, and most salmon farming occurs in Scotland. So from our point of view it is disappointing that we are not having similar science-based and open debates about the risks and benefits of these approaches in Scotland. The Scottish Government are also, via the Sustainable Aquaculture Innovation Centre, funding research that is looking to use CRISPR precision breeding technologies to tackle some of the sustainability concerns of the industry, such as resistance to sea lice and viral disease. Therefore, I think it would be welcome if we could have a similar discussion in Scotland.
Q
First, you will all recall the public confidence issues from 20 or 30 years ago, and that is one of the challenges now. I would like to hear whether you think the Bill has enough in it to reassure the public around some of those issues. Secondly, and in some ways related to that, most of you are plant focused, but this Bill obviously introduces animals, which is a very different set of issues and is, in some ways, perhaps more challenging. Do you think they should have been separated out? Thirdly, what do you think the public register will be used for and what benefit does it bring?
Finally, specifically for Cathie and Wendy, I had a constituent contact me, who has an issue around vitamin D being added to tomatoes. How will that constituent know whether these tomatoes have been modified in that way in future? It touches on Professor Harwood’s final point, and goes back to my initial point, on the question of labelling and reassurance. Where should that balance be struck?
Professor Harwood: Shall I take the last question first? We have talked a lot about labelling. If there was something like a high vitamin D tomato, there would be a nutritional difference, which I imagine would be picked up on labelling. That would make sense.
Professor Martin: You would probably want to advertise it.
Professor Harwood: You probably would, yes. Where there is something that might be appropriate for certain members of public and not others, clearly you would want some sort of labelling.
Q
Professor Harwood: It is not, but I think that would probably fall under part 3, which looks at food safety. I imagine that it would be—not being an expert—covered there.
Professor Martin: I want to expand a little bit on what Wendy said. What the Bill does is allow you to move forward with presenting examples. I have a real problem with trying to do a risk assessment on a technology and I know that lots of other people have said it should be on the trait, not the technology. It is a bit like 3D printing. Do we stop doing 3D printing or allowing people to do it because somebody could make a gun out of it? Or do we say, “We can make joints”? Okay, you can make joints by traditional methods, but you can do it much faster and better by 3D printing. Why do we not allow the technology and regulate the trait?
I absolutely agree about the pro-vitamin D enriched tomato that has never been considered before. There we have the regulatory system already in place from the FSA to consider it as a novel food. For environmental concerns, you take the specific edit that has happened and ACRE will assess. That is also why we want to do field trials. No person that is trying to produce improved varieties wants to produce something that is defective—it is just not in our DNA.
Not in yours, but possibly in others who are less public spirited.
Nigel Moore: I think the critical answer to the question is that public confidence and reassurance is at the heart of the Bill, in the definition of a precision bred organism as something that could occur in nature or by traditional breeding. There are many genome editing methods that can create additional changes. Absolutely the key step to generating public confidence and reassurance is the recognition that the techniques that can create those sorts of changes do not create additional risk. The ACRE guidance on qualifying higher plants that accompanies the Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Release) (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2002 gave an extremely good evidence-based approach to which types of techniques create changes that could occur in nature.
The question is about an imprecise definition. We need the additional information to say, “These are the techniques that we confirm as PBOs—they are fine.” Public reassurance is at the heart of this and we must make sure that we only put into this regulatory regime things that have the same risk profile as traditional breeding. What is clear from listening to the discussion today is how little information is known about what sorts of genetic changes happen in conventional breeding, or about the scale of those genetic changes.
I brought with me the AHDB recommended list. I will not go into it, but if we were to look at it, we would see that there are 38 varieties of wheat on the recommended list for the UK. They have many different characteristics, including resistances, yields, qualities for processing and vastly different protein contents—there is a range of about 30% of different protein contents. You can see null-lox barleys that have a different framing characteristic in beer making. You can see non-GN barleys that do not create carcinogens in whisky distilling. There are many food-safety single issues all in this vast range of genetic resources that have been created by traditional breeding. There is a wide range.
People should have confidence that all the food and all the breeding has delivered not risk, but improvement, safety and better environmental outcomes compared with old varieties. There is a big misunderstanding about the position of precision breeding. The public confidence question is about information, education and transparency. For me, that is at the heart of what we are doing here.
Public confidence should also be triggered by a recent study on the socioeconomic impact of plant breeding, run by HFFA Research, and which studied all of Europe. It showed that over the last 20 years in the UK alone, breeding development has saved 1.8 million hectares from agriculture and delivered about 16 million tonnes fewer CO2 emissions than the same production at the same level 20 years ago. That is with no more fertiliser, no more crop protection and no more land use, so there is a huge benefit to the public. Can we keep pace with climate change, and with pathogen development on stripe rusts in wheat and so on, without going faster? We must go faster. Without new technology and innovation, I do not feel very safe. The world gets warmer, we get hungrier and we need innovation—and we need to do it fast.
Professor Caccamo: I will be very brief. Labelling the technology would be a mistake. It would undermine the principle of the Bill, because these technologies should be indistinguishable from traditional breeding or something that would happen in nature. But it is also important to stress that these technologies are actually more precise, as the Bill says. Therefore, we are in a position whereby we can advance genetic benefits much faster. Trying to identify the technology through a labelling system would probably achieve the opposite with the public, because it would probably raise concerns about why we need to do that. I will leave it there.
Q
Nigel Moore: I think we have developed it here, but the concept of things that could occur in nature or traditional breeding is exactly the same concept that is being discussed with the Commission. Health Canada has also come up with a similar concept. Does it have the same three-letter acronym? No, but that concept is the common concept.
Professor Caccamo: I believe we are dealing with an anomaly, because what we are doing here is removing genome edited crops from the definition of genetically modified organisms. Countries that have adopted the technology have done a proactive measurement from scratch, whereby they considered genome editing to be a new technology that could bring new crops. The European ruling brought us into a position whereby we need to make an exception. That is the result we see in the Bill, which I consider, as I said, an anomaly.